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The tragic element in life is therefore always due to avoidable human 
mistakes: perfect beings would not know it; there can be no incongruity, and 
therefore neither comedy nor tragedy, in a world of saints and angels. 
Isaiah Berlin 
 
We, on both sides, wrongly imagine that empathy with the “other” side 
brings an end to clearheaded analysis when, in truth, it’s on the other side 
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BETWEEN MARXPLAINING AND SOLIDARITY: 
THE MORAL LOGICS OF VENEZUELA’S POPULIST DIVIDE 





This thesis examines the ‘moral logic’ implicit in populist ‘divides’—radical social polarisation— by 
looking at the case of crisis-ridden Venezuela. I examine Venezuela’s divide from the ‘ground-up’: 
through the eyes of two confronted groups residing abroad: non-Venezuelan supporters of the Maduro 
government (‘solidarity activists’), who blame the US for Venezuela’s crisis; and Venezuelan migrants, 
who have left Venezuela at different points in the last 20 years, and blame the government.	 
 
The divide coerces understandings of democracy, race relations, ‘the people,’ sovereignty, human rights, 
even colonialism and imperialism. Both discourses hold these to be values to be protected, or conversely 
‘wrongs’ to be shunned; conflict arises from respective discursive	constructions	that set differing 
hierarchies or priorities to those values.	Both groups can forgo some of their less prioritised values, in 
the belief that having their side prevail is ultimately what is ‘good’ for Venezuela in the long-term: either 
keeping or dismantling Chavismo.	 
 
Central to the Venezuelan divide, then, are different knowledges and epistemologies of oppression, 
inflicted suffering, well-being and flourishing.	Yet, I will argue that these opposed political positions are 
strikingly consonant in their logic:	overwhelmingly	both	groups resort to moral arguments to express 
what they feel about Venezuela’s dire situation, their understanding of the opposing political faction, 
and the legitimacy of President Maduro’s governance. They express moral emotions responding to their 
judgements of 'the	other'	and blame attribution: anger, contempt, disgust (not incidentally, markers of 
populist discourse). Their positions, although based on a ‘political’ issue, were, as they describe, of deep 
moral concern—that is, about ‘doing the right thing.’ This meant that one of the most socially 
problematic consequences of these logics is that approximation with the other side,	rapprochement	or 
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The desire for an enemy, the desire for apartheid, for separation and enclosure, the 
phantasy of extermination, today all haunt the space of this enchanted zone. (Aquille 
Mbembe 2016, 23). 
What builds these enmities, these ‘enchanted zones’ that Cameroonian philosopher Mbembe 
is referring to? What makes them unreconcilable? In the words of Jeffrey Nealon (1998, 2). 
“Why is it so difficult to ‘situate’ and respond to a set of specific others — ethically, politically, 
or theoretically” to the point of being unable to tolerate their presence? These are the central 






Interest in divides, or issues of polarisation—and its correlate populism—has grown 
dramatically in recent years, especially in what relates to the pull of the far-right in the Global 
North. Efforts to make sense of the Trump and Brexit phenomena have invaded library shelves 
in the intervening years of writing this thesis, asking questions such as: does the return of the 
‘strongman’ represent a break with our understanding of democracy? Or, is it all just a mid-life 
crisis, taking David Runciman’s (2018) analogy? Do divides thrive in societies that are torn 
between “anywheres,” those that can easily adapt to changing environments, and 
“somewheres” those that have stronger geographical ties (Goodhart 2017)? Or are they 
ontological, i.e. simply that which constitute the social world, or for Schmitt (2007 [1937]) and 
Laclau (2007) the political itself? And is populism then—quintessentially a divisive politics—
really a fight for that ends up being against democracy?  
Current-day Venezuela reflects a particularly extreme divide of global concern that sheds light 
on some of these questions. It is a country at the verge of civil-political and military strife—if 
not outright war—that has set forth the largest displacement of people in the history of the 
continent. It has a de facto president, Nicolás Maduro (successor to ex-president Hugo Chávez 
and part of his political movement), supported by the army, and a leader of the opposition who 
has declared himself president, alleging Maduro’s illegitimacy, supported by 50 other 
countries in the West.  
I examine Venezuela’s irreconcilable divide from the ‘ground-up’ through the eyes of two 
polarised and international positions on the Venezuelan conflict (to my knowledge never 
studied): non-Venezuelan supporters of Chavsimo1 (henceforth ‘solidarity activists’) who 
blame the US for Venezuela’s crisis; and Venezuelan migrants that have left Venezuela at 
different points in the last 20 years, who blame the government (and Chavismo). In the 
analysis, I pay particular attention to the knowledges being produced/reproduced, life 
experiences narrated, emotional language expressed, discourse, values and beliefs addressed; 
in other words, I take an inductive relational approach that gives “a comparative sociology” of 
each political position’s boundaries (Lamont 2000, 5).  
 





As a researcher, I was not necessarily interested in understanding why people make the 
political choices that lead to divides and radical polarisation. Rather I was curious to 
understand how certain political choices, or what I refer to as political ‘positions’ feel, not 
simply more appealing, but more valid (i.e., just, true, justifiable and legitimate). We arrive at 
these positions instinctually more often than not, but we cannot justify them to others in this 
way.  
I argue that at the heart of the divide are two conflicting understandings of what counts as 
‘legitimate’ governance. Overwhelmingly, interviewees resorted to moral arguments to express 
what they felt about Venezuela’s current situation, and their understanding of the opposing 
political faction. They made moral judgements of others and attributed blame: anger, 
contempt, disgust were rampant. As a result, interviewees’ positions, although based on a 
‘political’ issue, were, as they describe, of deep moral concern—that is, about ‘doing the right 
thing,’ or standing ‘in solidarity,’ or being on the ‘right’ side.  
Taking from Schwartz (1992, 3), what is at stake are the ways these two groups “organise their 
understanding of the world.” As I hope to show, the divide coerces understandings of 
democracy, race relations, ‘the people,’ sovereignty, human rights, even colonialism and 
imperialism. Both discourses hold these to be values to be protected, or conversely ‘wrongs’ to 
be shunned; conflicts arise from their respective discursive constructions—constructions that 
set differing hierarchies or priorities to those values. Solidarity activists for example, are more 
willing to accept authoritarianism, if it leads to what they believe will be broader social justice; 
Venezuelan migrants are, for example, more willing to accept interventionism, if it leads to 
what they believe will be an expansion of political and civil rights. Both groups can forgo some 
of their less prioritised moral values in the belief that having their side prevail is ultimately 
what is ‘good’ for Venezuela in the long-term: either keeping or dismantling Chavismo.  
Central to the Venezuelan divide, then, are idiosyncratic knowledges and understandings of 
oppression, inflicted suffering, well-being and flourishing. I will argue that even when there is 
substantial ideological variation within these, the two positions are strikingly consonant in two 
aspects: 1) their use of moral logic to build a boundary against the other; and 2) in their sense 
of ‘powerlessness’ against those they feel are in control of their lives: Chavistas, for Venezuelan 





also similar in the way they see their side as representing the ‘true will of the people’ of 
Venezuela. 
Stemming from this last point, I characterise Venezuela’s political divide as ‘populist.’ In so 
doing, I follow the academic literature on Chavismo and a historic tradition of labelling Latin 
American politics as ‘populist’—a tradition that has largely overlooked the conceptual hurdles 
that surround the term. I argue that Cas Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2018) well-received 
understanding of populism as a moral appraisal of politics—one that opposes the ‘honest’ 
many to the ‘corrupt’ few—overlooks how moral appraisals operate, more specifically why 
they are particularly appealing from a sociological perspective, but furthermore, how they are 
different from moral politics altogether. These are questions that are not addressed in the 
literature on populism which is, with few exceptions either state-centric, institutions-oriented, 
or top-down, i.e., focused entirely on the leader’s discourse (and by virtue of this, also centred 
on domestic politics).  
In this sense, part of the theoretical task at hand was to contribute to the emerging sociology 
of emotions and morality, as well as to enrich the existing literature on populism and political 
legitimacy through empirical interview research—research that touches on the appeal of 
morality in conflictive or antagonised, but also transnational, contexts. Significantly then, the 
thesis argues that populism can exist transnationally given it is a political logic, or type of 
reasoning. This logic can polarise the political environment or ‘public sphere’ around a debate 
that can exist anywhere, on or offline, so long as 1) the political subject in contention is an idea 
of ‘the people’ whom each side claims to represent; and 2) its moral logic is used to engender 
an extremely intolerant view of ‘the other.’ 
In this first chapter, I present the research questions and describe how I tackle these from a 
methodological and epistemological standpoint. I then discuss ‘positionality’ as my ‘unit’ of 
analysis and address how it compares to other similar concepts in the literature, ending the 
section with a reflexive account on my own positionality as a researcher (with respect to the 
Venezuelan conflict and crisis). I then explain the rationale behind the research design and 
how the fieldwork unfolded in practical terms. The chapter goes on to present a review on the 
scholarly literature published on Chavismo thus far to help differentiate the two-side approach 
taken here, before discussing some of the research’s own limitations. I end the chapter by 






Through the course of the interviews, I have come to understand Venezuela’s political divide 
as the site of two contested interpretations of ‘legitimate’ or ‘just’ enactment of political power, 
or in poststructuralist terms, antagonised discursive constructions on ‘legitimate’ governance. 
I was not asking what legitimacy is from a political theory standpoint, rather I was interested 
in looking at and describing the nature of opposed political ‘positions’—what I take to mean 
in this context simply a situated relation to an issue that is ‘political’: in this case, the perceived 
legitimacy of Chavismo’s governance.  
More specifically, I purposively asked, from a sociological perspective, what knowledge, 
emotions, lived experiences, and discourses understood in the postmodern sense of the word, 
are contested in these opposed positions and what inherent contradictions result from not 
questioning them sufficiently.  
It is from these aims that central research questions were derived: 
1. What epistemologies—here what seems to count as ‘valid’ knowledge—contend 
each position’s interpretation of ‘legitimacy’ or ‘just’ governance?  
2. What discourses, values, emotions and what kind of lived experiences—
specifically what ‘wrongs’ incurred—become tied to this understanding? 
3. How do both positions account for ‘the other’? What beliefs do they hold about 
‘the other’ and how are the other’s views described conversely as invalid, 
illegitimate or misguided? 
4. Do the groups feel the need to justify their feelings of antipathy towards ‘the 
other’?  
5. More significantly, what does this tell us about radicalised politics and the appeal of 






Qualitative methods and ethnography, specifically semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
seemed to be most appropriate for gaining insight into participants’ sense-making. In 
particular, they allow for a deep exploration of lived experience, underlying values, attitudes 
and feelings (Byrne 2018), and for these hypothesis-gathering questions.  
Rationale for choice of the two groups interviewed 
For practical reasons (relating to the inability to conduct fieldwork in Venezuela itself) I 
decided to look at two groups residing abroad. I approached two particular social groups 
within the two sides of the divide, as explained in the introduction:  
1. pro-Chavismo activists who directly post pro-Chavismo content online and are 
not Venezuelan (‘solidarity activists’); 
2. Venezuelans who have emigrated since the advent of Chavismo in 1998 and are 
against Chavismo (‘Venezuelan migrants’). 
To my knowledge, there is only one unpublished dissertation written on elite Venezuelan 
migrants to Canada in 2016, and no studies conducted on non-Venezuelans who identify as 
pro-Chavistas or of Venezuela solidarity groups more broadly—although there are a couple of 
media articles that refer to those groups in the UK as ‘Maduro apologists’ (Bloodworth 2019; 
Bickerton 2019).  
Despite their obvious differences, the groups share important characteristics that become 
important to the analysis: 
1. Both are dislocated, or de-territorialised from the conflict. Venezuelan migrants 
and solidarity activists inhabit Venezuela from a distance: through past 





2. They are only indirectly affected by the policies of the Chávez and Maduro 
governments, given they both enjoy what we can think of as “official legal status 
in another state” (Koinova 2012, 100).  
3. The groups are less materially affected by the day-to-day crisis (although I note 
that some of the Venezuelan migrants did continue to struggle economically), 
which meant that they can and want to spend more of their free time creating, 
consuming and sharing information on Venezuela. They can engage in a politics 
unapologetically of the ‘information age.’  
4. They are two groups with rivalling claims on Venezuela’s international narrative.  
5. They hold highly negative views of ‘the (imagined) other.’  
6. Their interactions do not generally happen in person. With the exception of pro-
Chavismo events that are boycotted by Venezuelan migrants, most of the 
confrontation that does occur, lives online.  
7. Both groups represent distinct ways of belonging to a nation under increased 
globalisation. For Venezuelan migrants, ‘belonging’ represents more traditional 
ideas of birth-citizenship and homeland. In the case of solidarity activists, 
‘belonging’ is ideological affinity and concern for the global working-class. The 
groups show how traditional ways of ‘doing’ politics are being reconfigured in 
globalised contexts and defy rational and economic choice theories. More 
specifically, they represent diaspora politics in the case of Venezuelan migrants, 
and broader transnational activism in the case of solidarity activists.  
8. Although I will refer to non-Venezuelan pro-Chavismo groups as ‘solidarity 
activists’, both groups engage in ‘solidarity’ understood as “a feeling of sympathy 
within and between groups, impelling supportive action” (L. Wilde 2013, 1). Both 
groups are 1) highly invested in sharing their own ‘truth’ about Venezuela’s 
conflicts; 2) particularly engaged with the media narratives that circulate on the 
country; 3) some participate in demonstrations abroad regarding Venezuela; and 
4) some—usually those living in the Global North—become involved in 





As mentioned previously, the groups display diverse political opinions within the two broader 
political positions: anti or pro Chavismo. The two groups in this research have been 
consolidated for the purposes of choosing the interviewees and analysing their antagonism, as 
I discuss in the next section. I explain how the groups maintain and negotiate multiple 
ideologies and conflicting opinions throughout the thesis.  
Superimposed unity on two ideologically 
disaggregate groups 
Being for or against Chavismo, as I note, reflects immense ideological variation. The 
aggregation of positions this thesis presents on the Chavista/non-Chavista axis, shows how 
most information on Venezuela is framed and communicated, in other words, it is the principal 
way in which the two groups, and as I discuss in chapter 2, even academics, think and produce 
knowledge on Venezuela. Interviewees were positioned in relation to Chavismo, but I note 
they also face similar challenges: Venezuelan migrants deal with migration; and solidarity 
activists confront online bullying or trolling. Importantly, all the participants in the study live 
in different countries and are unrelated to one another, they have very unique ‘worldviews.’ 
The separation on the Chavista/non-Chavista axis helped me organise the research and its 
findings. My aggregation of these groups should not be understood as reifying or ontological, 
rather as a methodological and analytical device that helped me uncover and appreciate the 
internal variation that arises from each interviewee’s ‘positionality,’ as I discuss in the next 
section, i.e. how each of the interviewees attempts to justify and reason their position in a way 
unique to their idiosyncrasies and experience, which made congregating their experiences 
into subgroups not quite feasible. 
There are, I note, very dissonant ideas about President Maduro in the Chavista faction; much 
like there are dissonant ideas about President Chávez in the group of Venezuelan migrants—
although to a lesser extent. In effect, there were many solidarity activists who were highly 
critical of President Maduro’s administration, yet preferred him to anyone in the opposition 
given their anti-imperial/anti-American stance. Similarly, Venezuelan migrants who had once 
supported President Chávez and were disenchanted with the Chavismo movement, were, for 





world. An important part of the analysis was tasked with uncovering this heteroglossia in 
Bakhtinian terms, or double voices within the larger axis. The research uncovers the (many 
times contradictory) ways in which these two groups held their chosen political positions—for 
some, against all odds.  
I also add that Venezuelan migrants do not ‘act’ as a transnational group in the traditional 
sense (see chapter 3 for conceptualisations of this); they are highly dispersed. Some did 
collectively protest to raise awareness about Venezuela’s crisis, and others collected funds to 
send to the country, but these Venezuelans are in the minority and live in the Global North. 
Their events were also highly sporadic. Most participants did not see themselves as activists: 
they were just trying to make ends meet in their new homes.  
Solidarity activists are also quite dispersed. Although activists share some connections—
especially in the anglophone solidarity world—and there is a clearer sense of a unified cause 
for action—each of the country-specific campaigns act separately. Each campaign organises 
events independently; there has not yet been a global protest, say for example, against the 
international media’s narrative. 
Importantly, there are also other (arguably rarer) groups that I could have considered but I did 
not, due to time limitations: Venezuelan migrants who are pro-Chávez, and non-Venezuelans 
who raise funds for the Venezuelan refugee crisis (many Colombians especially) and consider 
themselves to be against the Maduro government.  
Again, I felt it was particularly challenging to 1) stay attuned to the heterogeneity of the actors 
and the ‘multi-sitedness’ of the research, which often presupposes a focus on the differences 
and similarities between sites rather than discourses; and 2) simultaneously try to gauge shared 
meaning and contradictions within each group, and even more broadly between the two groups. 
To overcome this, the analysis tries to look beyond locations to “identify the primary areas of 
consensus as well as contention” (Held and McGrew 2002, 3), without reducing the actors to 





Positionality as ‘unit’ of analysis 
The entry on ‘Positionality’ in the Encyclopaedia of Geography, defines it as: 
the notion that personal values, views, and location in time and space influence how one 
understands the world […]. Positions act on the knowledge a person has about things, both 
material and abstract. Consequently, knowledge is the product of a specific position that 
reflects particular places and spaces” (Sánchez 2010, 2258). 
The term has often been used to refer to the ways in which a position conditions a researcher’s 
approach and choice of questions (Qin 2016). Hammond and Wellington (2013, 118) define it as 
steps researchers engage in to explain how a study “might be affected by their own particular 
background, beliefs, and values.” 
The idea that social and spatial positions not only influence how one understands the world, 
but act on our knowledge production is of particular importance in this study. Both sides 
claimed ‘knowing’ more about Venezuela, and saw their positions as grounded in knowledge — 
in other words, that it was in some sense “objective” (rather than grounded in lived experience, 
values or beliefs, for instance). Central to the groups’ antagonism were two conflicted 
epistemologies: Venezuelan migrants claimed what we can roughly describe as a posteriori 
knowledge, empirical or experience-based knowledge; non-Venezuelans claimed a kind of a 
priori knowledge, or knowledge independent from experience, arrived at through reasoning 
about Venezuela’s geo-political and historical circumstances.  
Venezuelan migrants felt strongly that their experience of living under the Maduro 
government provided justification enough for their political position and their involvement in 
the conflict. It also meant that they felt theirs was the only valid position in terms of what they 
believed to know. Solidarity activists, on the other hand, felt their arguments had to work on 
two levels: they had to justify their position based on what they felt was more ‘unbiased’ 
knowledge than the one presented in the media, but more subtly, they had to justify a relation 
to Venezuela in the first place, as they are not part of the nation in the traditional sense, and 





In a different respect, positions also “allow individuals to manage, in quite subtle and complex 
ways, their moral location within social interaction” (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2011, 102). 
This ‘moral location’ from where participants voiced their criticisms of ‘the other,’ became 
central as I progressed in the analysis, as already described. The term ‘positionality,’ then, also 
seems to account for the spatial and relational aspect of their moral judgement. 
I use the term ‘positionality’ to describe the relationship that arises from situatedness and 
knowledge production—not only that of this research, but that of my participants as well. I use 
the term in an understanding that, much in the same way I am, the participants involved are 
consuming, analysing, producing and contesting knowledge on Venezuela—although, I would hope, 
with less methodological rigour and time on their hands(!). This is not incidentally why I chose 
to use the term positionality vis-à-vis political subjectivity (see below). It also seems fitting to 
extend the idea of positionality as its etymology readily describes the ‘situaded-ness’ of our 
varyingly placed understandings: our different epistemologies, social, intellectual and spatial 
locations, lived experience, values, beliefs, and how these affect our subsequent analysis of the 
Venezuelan crisis. The term is also fitting in relation to the importance of ‘space’ in the 
research itself: the multiple sites of the interviews, our shared distance from Venezuela, and 
the distance that both groups have sought from each other, and I from them.  
Positionality and Bourdieu’s habitus 
‘Positionality’ in the sense I have tried to argue here is related to Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ to the 
extent that it explains “action,” not as a response to “triggering stimulus”, but as having “at its 
principle” a “system of dispositions […] product of all biographical experience” (Bourdieu 1995, 
46) that generate perceptions, appreciations and practices (Bourdieu 1990). Habitus is, as 
Maton (2008) affirms, a fiercely debated concept in a wide range of disciplines. It implies a 
more pre-determined and durable location that accounts for what Bourdieu (1977, 214) defines 
as ‘dispositions’, a “way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and in particular a 
predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination.” and “expresses the result of an organising action.”  
For Maton (2008, 52) habitus “focuses on our ways of acting, feeling, thinking and being.” It 
suggests perception depends on what is ‘visible to us,’ in relation to our field. This in turn, sets 
particular paths that shape future understandings of ourselves and of the world (Maton 2008). 





in Durkheim’s terms, how ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ selves shape each other (Maton 2008, 50), also the 
structural/hermeneutic debate, or how we come to ‘interpret’ the world. More simply, it is a 
“socialised subjectivity” or “the social embodied” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127, emphasis 
added): it accounts for—sometimes invisibilised—social regularities and the subjective 
meaning-making of social agents.  
Bourdieu’s habitus, however, has been criticised for being a theoretical “black box”—overuse 
and lack of prescription has meant the term has been applied to solve many conceptual, 
theoretical problems almost indiscriminately. Thus it has (in many cases) lost its capacity for 
analysis (Boudon 1998, 175). More specifically for this thesis, it has been criticised for ignoring 
the “moral dimensions of social judgements” (Ignatow 2009, 98). Lamont (1992, 181) in 
particular argues that Bourdieu “allows no autonomy to moral discourse, which he implicitly 
conceives as necessarily subordinated to other principles of hierarchalisation [sic]”—I discuss 
this more fully in chapter 4. For these reasons, although I find the concept useful to describe 
what is ‘visible’ to each position—how ‘positionality,’ a location, shapes the way we experience 
and understand ‘wrongs,’ and how we come to prioritise certain moral values above others—I 
refer throughout this work to interviewees ‘positionality’ in relation to the Venezuelan conflict, 
rather than to their habitus. 
Positionality and Ideology 
The definition of ideology in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy states it is: “any wide-
ranging system of beliefs, ways of thought, and categories that provide the foundation of 
programmes of political and social action: an ideology is a conceptual scheme with a practical 
application” (emphasis added). 
It is this reference to ‘practical applications,’ and ‘programmes of political and social actions’ 
that make holding an ideology somewhat different from holding a ‘political position’ on the 
legitimacy of the Venezuelan government—although these can be related. Chavismo’s very 
particular grouping, and in some way amalgamation of distinct ideologies, including but not 
limited to: Socialism of the XXI century, feminism, populism, internationalism, ‘Bolivarianism’ 
(a nationalistic endeavour), anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, Marxism and Christianity, 
can be considered an ideology in its own right. Solidarity activists are in fact varyingly located 





broadly left, others Internationalists (I discuss this further in chapter 3). I note that quite a few 
were in fact critical of President Maduro’s policies.  
For Venezuelan migrants, being against the current government is principally a rejection of 
President Maduro’s claim to the presidency, but most times (though not always) also a 
rejection of Chávez’s political movement more broadly. Importantly, anti-Chavismo does not 
stand for any party, or any specific leader, nor does it stand for any set of practical policies. 
Even support for US intervention is contested amongst the opposition, though I note it is 
relatively popular with Venezuelan migrants.2 
Most approaches to ideology that look at content—policy output, ideas about power relations 
in society, economic preferences, etc—are considered ‘spatial,’ or one-dimensional 
approaches, as they are usually mapped along a left-right spectrum. The problem with this 
divide has long been criticised, principally because ideological content per se is not able to 
account for the permeability of said ideology. Although Venezuelan migrants are accused of 
being ‘right-wing’ by solidarity activists (as I discuss further in chapter 3), Venezuelans are pro-
Welfare state, and even see it as constitutive of democracy for historical reasons (see Hellinger 
2011). This supports the argument that the universal application of the left-right ideological 
spectrum, ideated in the West, is problematic in non-Western contexts. The one-dimensional 
spectrum is simplistic and “reifies political positions rooted principally in American politics,” 
(I would add, Western politics) whilst encouraging its use in political contexts where Liberal-
Conservative divides do not necessarily reflect “political fault lines” (Homer-Dixon et al. 2013, 
340). I understand ‘a political position’ to be a more appropriate term to describe support or 
rejection of Chavismo, on the grounds of legitimacy. In this thesis, I will use the word ‘ideology’ 
to refer only to what interviewees themselves make of others’ beliefs, and what they make of 
Chavismo, taking from Žižek’s (1989) understanding (I discuss this view further in chapter 4). I 
do make references to the broad Left when discussing the ideals that non-Venezuelan 
solidarity activists—all mostly from the West—share.  
 





Positionality and Political Identity 
The concept of political identity has not often been defined in the literature. Even the 
definition from SAGE’s Encyclopaedia of Identity is broad: simply a concept that “frames 
understanding of political affiliation within a spectrum of ideological categories or 
movements.” It is also often (mistakenly) conflated with identity politics. Ruminski (2010), who 
wrote the entry, suggests it describes an evolving understanding of political agency and 
participation. Gentry instead feels it “can be best understood as an inner narrative of one’s 
political self” (Gentry 2018, 19) but his conceptualisation is problematic in that it does not 
explicitly acknowledge the role of social groups and structural elements in the formation of 
“the inner narrative,” or Erik Erikson's (1968) social-relational character of identity (see Syed 
and Fish 2018).  
Although for Venezuelans standing for or against Chavismo is, arguably, part of a narrative of 
self and a political agency, applying the concept of ‘political identity’ to solidarity activists, who 
are not Venezuelan and who have broader transnational inclinations, seems less fitting—even 
if many of them call themselves ‘Chavistas.’  
Political identity is also understood as more determining of behaviour, in broad terms. Because 
I take that what a group understands as legitimate governance might—but might not—lead to 
specific political choices and behaviour, I suggest positionality to be the more appropriate 
concept to use in this instance.  
Positionality and Political Behaviour  
Venezuelan migrants are highly invested in the media narratives on the country—what many 
understand as ‘diaspora politics’—but have, in a sense, abandoned attempts at engaging with 
politics at a local level, and confronting the government directly. We could argue that, for 
Venezuelan migrants, the ‘political act’ is to leave, i.e. to end the government’s authority over 
them—but their position regarding the government is not entirely responsible for their 
migration: economic factors and ontological security are principally at play. As I have 
explained above, a specific relation to legitimacy of the government, cannot purport to count 
as sufficient rationale for political behaviour, although it could account for some aspects of it. 





Positionality and Worldview 
I make a distinction between positionality and the broad idea of ‘worldview’, or 
‘Weltanschauung,’ defined as “a particular philosophy or view of life” by the Oxford 
dictionary, or as “the way an individual or group think about and interprets the world around 
them” according to the Open Education Sociology Dictionary. Hawkins (2010, ix) in his 
influential study of Chavismo and populism, uses ‘worldview’ to differentiate populist logic 
and discourse from ideology, so it seems pertinent to address the term here. Taking from 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993), he suggests it is a “set of fundamental assumptions about how 
the political world works” that includes, in his view, “not only moral norms, but also a sense of 
how the universe operates.” These are, as he puts it, fundamental beliefs “subconsciously 
expressed and shaped by language” (Hawkins 2010, ix). Hawkins is interested in the role of 
ideas in politics and political behaviour and is particularly invested in unpacking Chávez’s 
discourse: his assumptions and underlying beliefs about the world. Hawkins’ worldview 
concept lacks reference to the experiential, cultural and felt elements that come to shape our 
‘particular view of life,’ although he does take a postmodernist understanding of the 
determining role of discourse. In this sense ‘worldview’ is describing an interpretation of the 
world itself, rather than the process, position and elements from which our interpretation 
comes to be constituted. The experiential, cultural and felt elements are better accounted for 
in the definition of both positionality and political subjectivity.  
Positionality and political subjectivity  
The term subjectivity, is fraught in competing theories on the formation of the subject—how 
we come to experience ‘reality’ as individuals—both in the social sciences and in philosophy  
(see Foucault 1985; Butler 2005). Subjectivity loses explanatory power if it is conceived of as 
functioning independently of both context and sociality, hence why its use is contested, and is 
especially contested, in sociology.  
To counter this, Rahimi (2015, 1), in a highly original study on schizophrenia and political 
subjectivity, describes it instead as the “[…] relationship between subjective human experience 
and the political paradigm in which the individual is embedded.” It is constructed of “cultural 





the process of history,” where the subject comes “to ‘be’ through acts of interpretation and 
being interpreted” (Rahimi 2015, 8).  
Krause and Schramm’s (2011, 130–31) definition of political subjectivity is useful in 
understanding the concept’s theoretical remit, but their description wants to account for more 
than the concept plausibly can: 
a helpful notion to describe how people relate to governance and authorities. It denotes 
how a single person, or a group of actors is brought into a position to stake claims, to have 
a voice, and to be recognisable by authorities. At the same time the term points to the 
political and power-ridden dimension within politics of identity and belonging, by 
encompassing the imaginary and emotional, as well as the judicial-political dimension of 
claims to belonging and citizenship, including moments of exclusion. 
Samet (2019, 167), in his study on crime journalism and populism in Venezuela, also refers to 
political subjectivity to account for what he sees as populist radical polarisation in Venezuela. 
For him, “lived experience of wounds, of injury, of injustice” are “the very grounds on which 
political subjectivity is constructed.” Although Samet avoids defining the term precisely, one 
could argue his concept is similar to the understanding of positionality here described, insofar 
as he relates lived experiences of injustice—that I note circulate very frequently in the 
interviews—to a political position on the Venezuelan conflict. 
All three authors highlight several aspects of what they understand conforms political 
subjectivity. These are all significant aspects of the analysis in this research: lived experiences 
of injury, emotions, culture and structure. Here I take political subjectivity as that which 
shapes the way social actors interpret power, or in line with Bourdieu’s thinking, that which is 
visible to us about political power. More specifically, political subjectivity can be seen as that 
which engenders understandings of authority, governance, injustice, inequality, and 
oppression, among others, and that which helps shape specific political ‘positions’ towards 
movements, parties, or leaders. I note these positions can be, but do not necessarily need be, 
defining of who we each believe we are.  
The important difference I highlight between positionality and political subjectivity, is that the 
former addresses knowledge production as a result of situaded-ness. In this sense, subjectivity 





understanding and frame it to others. My choice of positionality as a concept to help theorise 
the interviews, highlights participants’ activism or diaspora politics, not simply the subjectivity 
from which they derive their opinions. 
Reflexive account and positionality as a researcher 
Given my emphasis on positionality, it appears imperative to acknowledge the basis of my own 
position, knowing I cannot extricate myself entirely from the subject matter being discussed.  
I remember the first time I heard Hugo Chávez speak in 1998 on the radio, as I waited in the 
car for it to be 8:00 am—the appointed time for school. Even at the age of 12, I felt something 
overwhelming about Chávez’s speech: his rhetoric was engaging, and from what I could tell at 
that age anyway, he spoke powerfully. I remember mentioning this to my mother as I heard 
him. I was rebuked immediately: “He doesn’t speak well. He’s a golpista” (a coup-monger). And 
for the rest of the time I lived in Venezuela, that was that.  
My mother and grandmother—the two closest members of my Venezuelan family—and the 
rest of my extended Venezuelan family, were opposed to Chávez’s mandate. They saw him as 
militaristic and authoritarian, and from the very beginning they expressed fears of his ties to 
Cuban-style governance, and the notion that he wanted children to belong to the state. (The 
other side of my family is from India. I ‘feel’ Venezuelan as I grew up there and was rarely able 
to afford visiting India in my childhood.) 
It is from these family surroundings that, as I teenager, I ‘picked up’ a negative view of the so-
called Bolivarian Government (the government of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro), and a 
particular understanding of its role in the deep crisis that Venezuela finds itself in.  
As I delved into the research, I understood the impact of my family’s political beliefs. We are 
not usually forced to reason these out for ourselves, at least not with the level of scrutiny of 
compelling doctoral research. My understanding of the situation as a product of 
mismanagement and corruption, led to a fascination with the love and loyalty many fervently 
continued to display towards Chávez, even amidst the gruelling crisis. I was especially 





shortages, and mass migration. It was clear that my understanding of the crisis differed from 
theirs, and I was deeply curious to understand how Chávez and Maduro followers rationalised 
their support. I initially believed that a strong emotional attachment to the project of the 
Bolivarian revolution, and Chávez himself, were a fundamental explanation of this.  
As I was growing up, political polarisation was becoming increasingly pronounced, and crime 
and inflation were rising exponentially, to the point I did not know anyone who had not been 
robbed—usually at gun point. Most of those around me blamed the government for this, and 
I had only seen my living standards, and those of my friends and family, deteriorate rapidly. 
When I left on a music scholarship to the US in 2005, migrating felt, in the vernacular, like “a 
no-brainer,” but in retrospect, the situation was nowhere near as critical as it is now.  
By the time I left Venezuela (back in late 2005 on a music scholarship from Oberlin College) 
walking down the streets of Caracas was a dangerous affair: the odds of getting mugged were, 
and still are, staggering. From a young age I was excluded by my peers from playing because 
of my dark skin tone, so it hadn't originally felt like a blessing, but it associated me with the 
poorest sectors of Venezuela. I was, in fact, an unattractive ‘muggee’: dark skin bestowed me 
with relative safety in one of the most violent cities in the world. I lived in a lower middle-class 
area in the west of Caracas, Montalbán, surrounded by the barrio of La Vega.3 My grades 
allowed me to attend school in the east side of the city, in one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods 
in the country: it made it impossible for me to fit in, yet made me deeply conscious of 
Venezuela's rampant social divides.  
It is perhaps from these personal experiences with racism and classism in the country that I 
was able to approximate myself to those that see Venezuela’s current difficulties as embedded 
in the structural inequalities produced by race and class in Venezuela. It is from agreement in 
this issue of particular importance to me personally that I felt I was able to empathise with the 
political position of solidarity activists. I came to understand that what the Chávez government 
gave to a majority of the brown, poor and working class of Venezuela, was not material. They, 
and those non-Venezuelans whom I’ve interviewed, place the symbolic empowerment, what 
 





they see as the legitimacy of Chávez and Maduro—members of the afro-indigenous and 
working-class groups, respectively—over any potential material gain.  
For those whose living standards have been reduced, and who have felt forced to leave the 
country, international support for Chavismo is particularly difficult to understand, or even 
believe. I refer to the Venezuelan middle-class who have not enjoyed the immaterial gains of 
Chavismo, and have, to a point, been vilified in the government’s discourse. The question then 
remains: is a preoccupation and prioritisation of the poor in discourse enough to elicit support 
for the government, despite the fact that those who have suffered most from this crisis, 
according to most of the data we have, continue to be the poor and working class of Venezuela?  
It depends on who you ask. Although it is difficult to entirely abandon my previous position, 
as I approached those who fervently support the government, I came to disagree with the 
opposition’s ‘Manichean’ understanding of the Bolivarian Revolution, as well as disagree with 
the idea that US military intervention is the solution to the country’s crisis. In this sense, I 
found myself increasing alienated from both sides, but especially from Venezuelans. It is 
perhaps a result of my own privilege: my pluralist identities, together with the fact that I live 
abroad, allow distance from the sufferings at hand.  
Methods 
In this section of the chapter, I describe in detail the methods and procedures that went into 
collating the data for this research. I describe the process of recruiting participants for the 
study; how, when and where the interviews took place; and how I approached some parts of 
the ethnography and online ethnography conducted. I also briefly discuss the difficulties 
involved in examining social actors that share a particular political position, but do not, in a 
true sense, share an ideology, belong to a social group, or even share geographical location.  
Recruiting participants 
A combination of ‘opportunity/purposive’ sampling and ‘snowballing’ was used to find 






I cold contacted both Venezuelan solidarity groups and campaigns, and individual members 
who post public social media content in support of the Maduro government (via Facebook 
messenger, Twitter messages, and email). A broader web search of “solidarity with Venezuela” 
(in Italian, French and Portuguese) led to additional email addresses from solidarity groups 
using these languages primarily. 
After each interview, I asked activists to refer me to others also involved in the campaigns. This 
was especially useful given entry into this group of activists was remarkably challenging (see 
Research Limitations section below), as was finding non-Venezuelan pro-Chavismo women.  
I contacted 80 ‘solidarity activists’ in total and conducted 32 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews: 8 of these were face to face in London, and 24 were via zoom with activists in 
Canada, the US, Australia, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and France. There were 5 women (1 of them 
American BAME) and 1 transgender. The rest of the participants were men. Of these, 4 were 
British BAME, and 2 were Latin American ‘white’ (see Appendix B for a complete table of 
interviewees cited in the text). 
I began contacting solidarity activists in June 2018 and held interviews from July 2018 through 
to March 2019.  
Venezuelan migrants 
I started recruiting participants for interviews with Venezuelan migrants through social 
contacts in Venezuela. Each contact referred me to at least one other Venezuelan they knew 
living abroad.  I generally did not need to ask Venezuelan migrants I spoke with to refer me to 
others; Venezuelans generally offered this themselves. According to a survey conducted by the 
firm Consultores 21 in 2019, 49 percent of people intending on migrating have at least one family 
member who has migrated; four out of every ten Venezuelans plan to migrate (A. Pérez 2019). 
This large network dramatically increased the speed at which I could conduct these interviews 
(from February 2019 to May 2019).  
I spoke to 32 Venezuelan migrants in total: 6 face to face in London and Cambridge, 26 via zoom 
in Chile, Panamá, Costa Rica, Perú, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Japan, US, Canada, and 





afro-Venezuelan and the other 14 were ‘white.’ I was able to recruit an equal number of women 
and men for this group given the ease with which Venezuelans could be contacted. Scheduling 
was also much easier, in great part, given that culturally Venezuelans allow for more 
spontaneity; they are willing, and in fact more comfortable, scheduling conversations within 
very short notice.  
Interviews 
Interviews were semi-structured with open questions and took between one to three hours 
each. This allowed for greater flexibility and for the interviews to flow as “conversations with 
a purpose” (Holloway 1997, 94). The conversational nature of these interviews meant I could 
attend to reciprocity—a reciprocity that allowed for more spontaneous exchanges. The semi-
structure of the interview guide also allowed for questions to be tailored to specific participants 
(depending on whether, for example, they had met Chávez or not, or travelled to Venezuela or 
not). It also allowed me to answer any questions interviewees had. Although I began all 
interviews explaining the research and asking if there was anything interviewees wanted to 
clarify, they were sometimes still curious about my own personal political positions; others 
about my life as a doctoral student living in Europe. In-depth one-to-one interviews were also 
useful for going through social media accounts with participants and asking them to discuss 
how certain confrontations with ‘the other’ arose online. I made sure I invited participants to 
contact me after the interviews, in case they wanted to change or add anything to what they 
had said. All interviewees were given pseudonyms to protect their identity. Posts shared in the 
analysis have also been stripped of identifying information. 
From a feminist perspective, semi-structured interviews “convey a deeper feeling for, or more 
emotional closeness to, the persons studied” (Jayaratne 1983, 145). This was particularly 
important as I was invested in learning about the beliefs and experiences of two very diverse 
groups, from which my own experiences are removed. I felt that it was important for me to 
practice climbing Hochschild’s ‘empathy walls’ in my own personal fight against 
radicalisation—a deep listening that research inclined to wider population trends, cannot 
readily provide. 
The interview guides were designed to avoid asking participants overtly why they supported 





would force participants to contrive justifications on the spot, and on basis of what they 
thought would be convincing to me—the answers would therefore not truly reflective of what 
was truly meaningful to them, and their meaning-making. Second, it could also backfire: in a 
radical political environment such a direct question could be interpreted, especially by 
solidarity activists, as a challenge or an affront to their position, and it would block their 
receptivity towards me, or their willingness to engage with me openly.  
The principal difficulties that I felt these two groups faced were the obvious ones of 
migration—leaving family and the homeland, in the case of Venezuelan migrants; and in the 
case of solidarity activists, having to deal with backlash, sometimes insults and online bullying, 
for sharing their views on Venezuela. I felt honest conversation could emerge from 
empathising with these pain points.  
For solidarity activists, I was particularly interested in understanding what was rewarding and 
inspiring about their work supporting the Venezuelan government, as this would give me clues 
as to what they aspire in the world, and conversely what they felt is dysfunctional about it. 
With Venezuelan migrants on the other hand, I was curious to know how they felt about their 
migration—what pulled them towards that decision. I also wanted to know how they felt about 
non-Venezuelans who are pro-Chávez and Maduro activists.  
I note here that Venezuelan migrants especially described the interview process as “cathartic” 
(others as a “therapeutic”) which was rewarding to me as a researcher, but also suggests 
interviewees had been ‘holding’ in some of these thoughts, or hadn’t really given themselves 
the time or space to reflect upon some of the questions I was asking about their migration. I 
tried to emphasise my role—and my own economic difficulties—as a student interested in 
their life, to downplay any power differential that could arise from my being in the Global 
North, or studying to complete a doctorate.  
Solidarity activists mentioned they were happy to finally be able to share their political views 
with someone who has a deep understanding of Venezuela and its history—something they 
say they did not get to do very often. I did feel they were trying to teach me things about 






In-person interviews were recorded using both my phone and my computer. Zoom interviews 
were recorded on the platform itself, but I used my phone to record the audio of the interviews 
as back up. I manually transcribed all 64 interviews verbatim, in both languages: I included 
significant pauses, self-corrections, emphasis, filler words, and emotional expressions such as 
sighs, laughter, or scoffs, also participants ‘self-censoring’ of bad words (when they were about 
to say a bad word and stopped themselves or made a beeping noise). The level of immersion 
that is achieved with such a laborious process, results in higher level of familiarity with data 
from an earlier stage (Minichiello et al. 1995). It also makes remembering where ‘memorable’ 
quotes, or particularly interesting stories came from, easier. I only translated the specific 
quotes presented in the empirical chapters from Spanish to English. 
Approaching the interviews and rapport 
I was highly cautious of the way I approached solidarity activists. I was keen to stress to them 
that I felt the work they were doing was important, and that I was interested in the difficulties 
involved in conducting ‘Venezuela solidarity work,’ given how the media reports on the crisis, 
and the subsequent backlash their support of the government engenders, especially online.  
This helped convey the idea that the interview was not meant to challenge their political 
position on the country—something I felt I needed to underline, given that as I said, these 
activists all too often get hostility and aggression. I emphasised I was interested in 
understanding what inspired them to get involved, and more importantly what was rewarding 
about their involvement in solidarity work. The use of these two positive words was also key 
in expressing my sympathy towards their work. In my recruitment messages, I detailed all the 
questions I was going to ask and highlighted the importance of maintaining their anonymity. 
19 of the 32 interviews were the result of cold calling. Snowballing was indeed useful for the 
remaining interviews in that interviewees were able to ‘give in a good word’ for me: in this case, 
confirm to other activists that I was not out there to attack them for their views. 
Approaching Venezuelans on the other hand was genuinely easier. The familiarity that came 
from speaking to members of the culture I was raised in—in Spanish—was instantly apparent. 
I reflect on the speed and the facility with which I was able to contact, organise, and schedule 
interviews with Venezuelan migrants: it took less than half the time that interviews with 
solidarity activists took. Participants, both male and female, ‘identified’ with me on the account 





culturally more spontaneous with their time, which meant interviewees needed little 
scheduling time— some were even willing to talk to me the same day they were contacted. It 
is important to highlight that they also very easily assumed I shared their political position, 
simply because I am university educated and living in the Global North (and despite the fact I 
am brown).  
Ethnographic approximation 
Solidarity Campaign events 
I attended several public meetings organised by the Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC) 
starting in June 2018, up until April 2020, as a member of the public. All of these were hosted 
at trade union offices in central London. It was at these meetings that I approached one of the 
leaders of the campaign, its secretary, to see if he would be willing to speak to me one-on-one. 
Given he is Latin-American, I approached him in Spanish and told him I would love to speak 
to him about his important work with VSC. This person, very bluntly, responded: “I know who 
you are. I’m not interested in speaking to you and could care less about what you do.” He then 
turned his back on me. It is still unclear what he meant when he said he knew who I was. I can 
only speculate that he assumed—from hearing my Venezuelan accent, and from knowing that 
I live outside Venezuela—that I was opposed to the government. As it stands, it is impossible 
to know. A faculty member at Cambridge (close to the campaign) emailed this person several 
times as well, to see if the organisation would consent to speak to me, without success. The 
story shows the existing degree of resistance towards talking with someone suspected of being 
on the opposite side—or even someone trying to hold middle ground. 
Attending these public meetings was an important opportunity to hear members of VSC 
discuss issues important to them, albeit in their own terms. I took field notes of these events 
and recorded the public talks. After attending a couple of meetings, I offered to volunteer for 
one of their larger events held in December 2018 (organised in conjunction with other 
solidarity networks, including the Cuba solidarity and Nicaragua solidarity campaigns) selling 
tickets and food. Although my request for interview emails had been ignored, VSC were keen 
to have me as a volunteer, when I wrote to offer help in October 2018. At the event, I felt I would 
be able to interact further with those committed enough to volunteering, given I had only been 





relegated to issues around coordinating and running the event, distributing food, handling 
cash, etc. 
The Hands-Off Venezuela Campaign (HOV) was less active in terms of organising public 
events—it was more active, for example, producing online blog content. I did attend one event 
in Cambridge in early 2019, co-organised with Cambridge University’s Marxist society, an 
event aimed at discussing opposition leader Juan Guaidó’s self-proclamation (see chapter 2). 
After the meeting, I was able to approach the student leaders, and secure an interview with 
one of them. 
Venezuelan community events 
The Venezuelan community in Cambridge is also quite vibrant, and I attended many of the 
meetings and events organised by them throughout 2017, 2018 and 2019. I was able to attend 
both organisational meetings (through the help of the leader of the group, one of the 
interviewees) as well as public events. These became a chance to see Venezuelan migrants 
discuss projects that were important to them: documentary and film screenings on the 
Venezuelan crisis, their annual Christmas party, Zumba classes and other events aimed at 
raising funds for medicines to be sent to Venezuela. 
I also attended the small protest they organised to raise awareness about the crisis outside 
Market Square in Cambridge. Although they were not boycotted, pro-Maduro activists 
approached them and told them their claims and slogans “parroted the fabrications of the 
media,” as one participant later explained to me. Participating was important to get a sense of 
the extent of the Venezuelan community’s political activity (at least in Cambridge)—their 
‘diaspora politics’—and how they responded to encountering resistance in person (which is 
albeit rare, as mentioned).  
Social Media, Blogs and the Press 
Social media was an important part of the way both groups engaged with information on 
Venezuela, so I supplement the interviews with posts from participant’s public social media 
content (discussed with them in the interviews). I also collected data from both pro- and anti- 
Chavismo media, and the two principal solidarity blogs, to exemplify and expand on 





Epistemology and Analysis 
The analysis of the interview data was not driven by any pre-determined theoretical 
perspective: it was an inductive approach, although it was initially informed by theories on 
emotions, populism and race.  
The project very loosely follows a feminist epistemology in that it “value[s] reflexivity and 
emotion as a source of insight as well as an essential part of research,” it also “provides a 
challenge to the norm of ‘objectivity’ that assumes knowledge can be collected in a pure, 
uncontaminated way” (Letherby 2003, 73). However, the question is not feminist, in the purest 
sense, and for extraneous reasons I was not able to interview an equal number of female and 
male solidarity activists (see Research Limitations below) which restricts what the research can 
say about gender. I do, however, discuss how female Venezuelan migrants, when compared to 
their male counterparts, were less willing to directly attack solidarity activists and emphasised 
a need to be tolerant—even when they ultimately weren’t—in chapter 8 (see page 218). 
I used open codes on the interviews that I later developed into broader categories, and finally 
themes for each group following Rivas (2018). From there, I constructed mind-maps that 
connected themes and categories prevalent in each group, which helped me broadly ‘visualise’ 
the data. I then proceeded to identify the key arguments in approval or rejection of Chavismo.  
In my analysis, I was curious to understand how subjects ultimately evolve their 
interpretations and ideas about the political world, not just the one they inhabit, but the one 
they aspire to inhabit. I noted that participants often referred to specific events in their lives 
that they felt had been responsible for kindling their political positions; for example, having 
been to war, the death of a loved one. In this sense, the analysis prioritises what Samet (2019, 
167) terms “the subject of wrongs”: how participants articulate individual grievances and 
imagine collective ones—a process that shapes their understanding of moral political power, 
and what each felt was legitimate or illegitimate about the Venezuelan government. Notions of 
what comes to be understood as ‘just’ are shaped by these experiences—especially what is felt 
to be, conversely, ‘unjust.’ Part of the analysis is therefore ‘interpretative phenomenological’ 
in that it takes lived experience to be an important departure point from which participants 
formulate meaning—meanings that are “unique [and] both personal and situated” (Griffin and 





counter the prevailing assumptions each group makes of ‘the other’—especially that ‘the other’ 
was somehow uncaring, and willing to enact harm (a common theme in the interviews, as I 
discuss in chapter 8).  
I was also especially attentive to any references made to emotions—especially anger, hope and 
disillusionment or frustration: these emotions seemed particularly revealing of what 
interviewees believe the world, and their life, ought to be like, and are therefore reflective of 
their moral compass.  
Although I define the participants’ positions as ‘political,’ for them the Venezuelan issue was 
decidedly more. It seemed that simply holding a ‘political’ position on Venezuela was not 
meaningful enough, in terms of the effects either this position—or Chavismo itself— had had 
on their lives. Both solidarity activists and Venezuelan migrants seemed to be making moral 
judgements with regards to the legitimacy of the government, and on the fairness of the 
government’s use of political power. In other words, they seemed to understand ‘legitimate’ 
governance as equivalent to ‘moral’ governance, and this seemed to make their resulting 
political position feel more ‘valid.’ As I continued the analysis, I began to problematise this 
logic in detail as it speaks to the appeal of populist and moral politics in general: that moral 
claims cannot be as easily relativised as political ones. 
I was also attentive to the language that participants used to describe why a position, for or 
against Chavismo, felt more valid than the other. Sperber and Mercier’s (2017, 14) 
“interactionist” paradigm, taking an evolutionary biology perspective, suggests convincingly 
that ‘reason’—a complex biological adaptation—is “a cognitive mechanism aimed at justifying 
oneself and convincing others,” as evolved social creatures. They explain how ‘reason,’ unlike 
what we expect it to be, is deeply flawed, biased and lazy: we instinctively engage with it to 
convince others and ourselves, not to arrive at a ‘real’ understanding of phenomena (at least 
not generally, in their view). Justification necessitates a particular language that can be 
understood by others—it is pointless otherwise. I note that Michael Billig’s (1991) work on the 
argumentative and persuasive nature of talk as it informs reasoning, a work that takes from 
Foucault’s ideas of ‘technologies’ as particular ‘truth games’ (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 
2011) is a precursor to Sperber and Mercier’s (2017) idea. Both helped me reason through the 





In my view, the justifications implied by Sperber and Mercier’s (2017) model are ultimately 
what postmodernists understand as discursive constructions. It was only once I began looking 
for association and variation amongst the groups, rather than within the participants of each 
group, that I began to notice how both invoke the same broad social concepts, i.e. 
‘discourses’—around democracy, race, ‘the people’, human rights—to justify their political 
positions, but expressed entirely conflicting ‘discursive constructions.’ For instance, the state of 
human rights in Venezuela was an issue for both groups, but each group highlighted or 
prioritised a specific group of rights to justify their position (see chapter 9). The empirical 
chapters build an analysis on how these very opposed discursive constructions are framed and 
justified around the same wider ideas, that are considered moral, and therefore universal, and 
how in a bid to justify one side of the issue, i.e. in being parochial, they end up being 
contradictory.  
Computational Analysis 
Lastly, I add that I also conducted computational textual analysis (digital methods) on all the 
texts published on Hands off Venezuela’s website (see Appendix C) as of June 2019. I used two 
programming languages: Python, to scrape the data off the websites, and R for the actual 
computational analysis. I used two machine learning algorithms: RAKE for keyword 
extraction from the R package ‘udpipe’; and LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) for arriving at 
topics from the R package ‘topicmodels’. I also conducted ‘sentiment analysis,’ using an 
algorithm in the ‘tidytext’ R package, that relates words used in the texts with 8 specific 
emotions (joy, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise, trust, and anticipation), the NRC Lexicon. 
In applying this specific algorithm, I discovered that it was biased against the left (see Appendix 
C). 
Chavismo in the literature  
Hugo Chávez’s ongoing popularity, a popularity that has arguably driven the historical process 
Venezuela has undergone since the early 1990’s, is perhaps one of the most fascinating social 
and political phenomena of Latin America’s recent history. The ‘pink-tide,’ or turn to the left 





electoral successes of Luis Lula da Silva, Néstor Kirchner, Tabaré Vásquez, Evo Morales, and 
Rafael Correa in the 2000s.  
‘Explaining’ Chavismo has no doubt been an obsession of recent scholarship on Venezuela.  
‘State-centric’ analyses, that dominate the literature, see Chávez’s success as the “breakdown 
of democracy” or the demise of the traditional political parties in their inability to articulate 
“interests, representation and governance” (Molina and Perez Babot 2004, 103). Theories of 
class fissures emphasise ‘economic voting’ under previous policy failure (Canache 2004; 
Kulisheck and Canache 1998; Kornblith 1998; McCoy and Myers 2004). Political economy 
approaches put Venezuela’s unstable petro-state, ‘the Dutch disease,’ Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI), and Venezuela’s 1980’s debt crisis at the forefront of the structural issues 
that propelled the movement (e.g. Roberts 2003). Others suggest that Venezuelans were drawn 
towards Chávez’s new ‘participatory’ democracy and constitution as their deepened democratic 
values—forged after 40 years of, albeit corrupt, political stability—had made the existing 
clientelism untenable (e.g., Smilde 2011).  
Scholars with a sustained interest in the enduring popularity of Chávez, focus on how Chávez 
built his relationship to the ‘masses’: Weyland (2003, 844) discusses Chávez’s ‘messianic’ 
charisma, moulded from Venezuelans’ “psychological need to believe in salvation”; Ellner 
(2008, 92–93) highlights the “sense of empowerment” Chávez awarded those traditionally 
marginalised through his popular social programmes; Emerson (2011, 106), instead, shows how 
Bolivarian identity “codified […] frustrations, ideas, symbols, beliefs and demands.” I note that 
comparatively few scholars point to Chávez’s afro and indigenous background as appealing — 
in fact only a handful of scholars focus on the issue of race and Chavismo more broadly 
(Herrera 2005; Ishibashi 2007; Gottberg 2011). I have found only one doctoral dissertation (M. 
Wilde 2013) that argues for Chavismo’s moral appeal at an ethnographic level. 
Some analyses of Chávez’s government  try to fit it into the democracy-authoritarianism frame, 
or the ‘hybrid regime’ spectrum (Corrales and Penfold 2011), but most political science 
accounts take Chavismo to be quintessentially ‘populist,’ (notably Levine 2002; Hawkins 2016, 
2010; Block 2016; Arenas 2005; Laclau 2005, 2007; Paramio 2006; Roberts 2012, 2003; de la Torre 
2010, 2015, among others). 
Most of these studies have been disengaged from the experiences of groups supportive of 





contribution to the legitimacy and popularity of the government” (Buxton 2011, xi; Velasco 
2011). These accounts tend to be reductive in the way they assume ‘masses’ to be ‘easily 
manipulated’, or politically barren, or “charisma-hungry” (Weyland 2003, 843); this, in 
Fernandes’ (2010, 7) words, simply so they “fit the ideological parameters of the position being 
argued.” Fernandes (2010, 6). argues, similarly that the working class has often been 
“mythologized or demonised” in the literature. Valencia (2015) in fact shows that historically 
scholars have understood little of the political sensibilities and agency of the poor in 
Venezuela—i.e. as a political constituency in its own right, alongside workers and students, 
who are often perceived as better organised.4  
Instead, ethnographic accounts looking at barrio and communal activism in Venezuela, have 
sought to get at the ‘meaning-making’ of Chavista activists in the urban landscapes of Caracas, 
and have been more successful at understanding support for Chávez (notably Fernandes 2010; 
Ciccariello-Maher 2013; Valencia 2015; Strønen 2017; M. Wilde 2013; Samet 2019; Blackmore, 
Jarman, and Plaza 2019). These authors underline the importance of recognising popular 
movements “as legitimate political participants in state formation” (Valencia 2015, 36).   
These authors counter-argue the myth that “the urban poor never successfully organised 
politically” (McCoy 2004, 270; Roberts 2003), and the idea that support for Chavismo is a 
relationship of dependency on the state (Fernandes 2010). As these ethnographic accounts 
note, many colectivos (neighbourhood activist groups) had been actively organising against 
drug trafficking and other issues for at least 25 years; they precede the revolutionary 
governments, reclaim their autonomy from them, and were often in tension with Chávez 
himself (Ciccariello-Maher 2013).  
Fernandes (2010, 5) notes that although left-wing and progressive supporters of the Chávez 
government abroad have provided a useful counterpoint to state-centric perspectives,” these 
 
 4 I see a difficulty in defining ‘who’ the poor are. Defining who ‘the people’ are presents a similar problem. 
In political discourse, ‘empty signifiers’, as Laclau (2005) calls them, thrive in their indistinctness, so studies 
congregating ‘the poor’ can fail to account for the distinct interests of different marginalised groups (single 





groups (which 1o years later include interviewees in this study) are not so attentive to the 
obstacles barrio-based actors face in their interactions with the government, and seem 
interested exclusively in groups formed under Chavismo.  
Problematising studies on Chávez and Chavismo 
The problem with a lot of the literature on the popularity of Chavismo—aside from the fact it 
has almost exclusively focused on Chávez’s discourse—is that Chávez is no more, and 
Venezuela has seen a dramatic poverty increase as the deep socio-economic crisis has 
devolved—a crisis decidedly more pronounced than the one that saw Chávez emerge in the 
first place. Although levels of frustration with the current administration run high, this has not 
translated necessarily into disapproval of Chávez, whose movement Maduro represents: 
Chávez enjoyed 50 percent of popular support at least as of February 2017, when the question 
was last asked (E. Martínez 2018)—although this can have changed today. More apposite to 
this research, Chávez and Maduro also enjoy the support and backing of the international 
extreme-left groups interviewed here—a support that to my knowledge has never been 
engaged with or studied.  
Questions on Chavismo ‘after Chávez’ remain, but academic interest on Venezuela has 
dwindled considerably since Chávez’s death in 2013. The academic community is also divided 
on their assessment of the Bolivarian Revolution—a divide that, much like for interviewees, 
reflects ‘positionality’ (not always disclosed), political values, and disciplinary and 
epistemological commitments.  
To note an example of this polarisation in the literature, some accounts even ‘choose’ facts 
with precision: for example, by showing governmental figures of their own approval ratings 
(rather than that of national pollsters); or reaching conclusions about the government’s 
intentions based on statistical models that explain less than 6 percent of the variance. I note 
my account does not pretend to stem from any purported objectivity: rather, lived experience 
has led me to a profound dislike for the radicalised nature of Venezuela’s political divide. 
The academic polarisation mirrors a second contention that arises in the assessment of 
Chavismo: top-down or bottom-up? Accounts more favourable to the political movement, 





contest Chavismo’s legitimacy (e.g. Ciccariello-Maher 2013). Accounts more critical towards 
the movement, highlight its autocratic tendencies, its concentration of power in the executive, 
the politicised distribution of funds, an uneven electoral field, loyalists in the courts, and a top-
down approach to policy-making and identity formation in the image of Chávez. Chavismo, as 
one can imagine, is more than just horizontal or vertical. As Fernandes (2010, 5) argues, this 
dichotomy denies the interdependencies that “both constrain and make possible each other’s 
field of action.”  
A third problem that arises in the study of Chavismo is that opposition groups have not 
garnered scholarly ethnographic attention, to my knowledge, perhaps due to their rather 
diffuse and less attractive political activism: simply a rejection of Chavismo without a 
concerted front.  This has led to the pervasive stereotype, or caricaturised understanding of the 
opposition as white-middle and upper class. Very different sectors of the population 
participate in the opposition (and in Chavismo) as discussed previously. Consequently, there 
has been: 1) an invisibilisation of marginalised sectors of the population (notably indigenous 
groups) that are disenfranchised from the government by opposing it; and 2) a simplification 
of the dissatisfaction of the opposition as a loss of class privilege. Levels of insecurity, loss of 
aspirations and concerns regarding political, civil and human rights—today even food 
security—have never really been considered.  
This study cannot purport to shed light on the groups on the ground in Venezuela, but it does 
nonetheless tend to an unexplored facet of the Venezuelan divide from this ‘demand’, or 
‘horizontal’ side: a set of transnational actors that subscribe to Chavismo, and Venezuelan 
migrants that have felt alienated from it. Its central concern is not Chavismo or the opposition 
in themselves, rather how the contested positions relate to one and other, how they are 
experienced, justified, and perpetuated.  
Chavismo and Populism 
Chávez has been characterised very prominently as a populist leader by academics and 
journalists alike. He is often understood as a ‘return’ to the strongman, or earlier ‘classical’ 
Latin American populists, such as Perón in Argentina. Chávez was also often characterised as 





exuberantly anti-establishment and nationalistic—although, as I discuss in chapter 4, this is 
not, at least exclusively, how I understand populism here.  
I turn now to the most prominent authors that have written on populism in the Venezuelan 
context: Hawkins (2010); Laclau (2005, 2007); Cannon (2008); Block (2016) and Samet (2019). 
Perhaps the most cited work on Chavismo and populism is Hawkins’ (2010) comparative study. 
It uses a form of qualitative textual analysis to rate several political leaders on a ‘populist scale’, 
from 0-2, by identifying several elements of their discourse—most significantly a Manichean 
(i.e. moralising) outlook that sees a “cosmic struggle between Good and Evil.” Chávez’s score 
on this scale is 1.9/2 — higher than any of the 25 leaders examined, which makes Chávez a 
consummate example of populism, according to Hawkins’ calculations.5  
For  Samet (2019), Hawkin’s (2010) (and also Weyland's 2001) emphasis on leadership, obscures 
the social discontent that underlies populism. Analyses that look at the catalysts of populism 
in Latin America began in the 1960s and 70s (see chapter 4) with Gino Germani and most 
notably Ernesto Laclau. For Laclau (2005, 60)—who stresses the open ‘potential’ of populism 
as a basis for democracy, Chávez is the maximum exponent of what he calls ‘populist rupture:’ 
a displacement of the political elite to enact what (at the time) Laclau believed was true social 
change. 
Cannon (2008), taking from Laclau, suggests race plays a role in the ‘conspiring elite’ versus 
‘pueblo’ antagonism that underwrites Chavez’s discourse, one that also makes him a legitimate 
representative of that people. This as I note subsequently, is a particularly appealing aspect of 
Chavismo that solidarity activists interviewed in this research refer to often, as I discuss in 
chapter 6.  
 
5 An important point to note on these results is that another classic Latin American populist Juan Perón, for 
example, only scored 1.5. Although Hawkins (2010) does not draw attention to this, Chavez’s score could be 
biased due to the fact that Hawkins’ definition was conceived around Chávez’s discourse. Purposefully or not, 





Block (2016) instead explains Chávez’s ‘messianic’ identity and his singular connection to his 
followers by approaching Chávez’s unique ‘populist’ communicative style. Taking from 
Adorno, she places Chávez’s discourse under what she terms the logic of mimetisation by 
framing it around his populist use of cultural symbols (2016, 243). For Block (2016, 7) the 
paradox of how Venezuela’s “grim socioeconomic landscape” has been unable to fully tarnish 
Chávez’s popularity:  
suggests that issues of a subjective, symbolic or irrational nature often associated with 
cultural symbols and human emotions might have played a crucial role in Chávez’s 
hegemonic success. 
This seems like a reasonable assumption and was indeed my own initial thesis: Chávez’s 
discursive references to cultural symbols, particularly those associated with Venezuela’s 
indigenous and afro populations, were genuinely novel in Venezuelan politics, as I argue in 
this chapter. Yet, in thinking about solidarity activists that support Chávez and Maduro, two 
things struck. First, even if we assume that the interviewees arrive at support for Chávez largely 
through subconscious means (which I would argue is different from assuming these processes 
are ‘irrational’), interviewees always felt the need to justify, i.e. give reasons for, their political 
position. These justifications were expressed through moral emotions of admiration and 
contempt for the injustices against, and historic disenfranchisement of, the brown poor; they 
were not ‘irrational.’ Second, both supporters and detractors had strong criticisms of those that 
vow to ‘represent’ them—both leaders of Chavismo and leaders of the opposition—something 
that, again, suggests support was reasoned. 
Samet (2019, 17) also criticises this understanding of the urgency of populism as ‘irrational,’ 
stressing instead its origins in the grievances (real and imagined) of social groups and actors. 
Samet’s (2019) book—an ethnographic account on crime journalism in Caracas that 
reconstructs the ways in which Venezuelan investigative journalists articulate the “collective 
fiction” of ‘the people’—is concerned with the populist logics of the media. He contests the 
notion that only Chávez’s discourse and Chavismo are ‘populist’ given that for him populism 
underlies the logic that frames all popular collective grievances.  
Lacking in this literature, is therefore, a more sociological exploration of the link between 
believing in and rejecting the legitimacy of Maduro’s government—the feelings, knowledge, 







Because I was limited to cold-contacting activists, I found increasingly that female activists 
were rare and difficult to get hold of (as were activists in the LGBTQI+ community): there were 
less of them to be found. The idea of activism and masculinity has been addressed by some 
scholars (see Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases 2014). More specifically, Haapamaki 
(2005) looks at the links between masculinity and the British left in the narratives surrounding 
the Spanish Civil War. He suggests that the impending violence of the revolutions of the 
radical left might more often appeal to notions of masculinity. Of course, more research in this 
area is warranted, but the interviews do point at this relationship, at least in terms of numbers. 
There were several instances (8 in total) where solidarity activists had agreed to an interview, 
and expressed interest in participating in the research, but for extraneous circumstances 
stopped responding to my messages. The reasons for this are unclear to me—it is possible that 
it was simply an issue of time for them. This was especially unfortunate as 3 of those were 
female activists. 
As I mentioned earlier, I did manage to get an equal number of Venezuelan migrant women 
and men and do discuss some of the important differences I see in their responses and attitudes 
towards ‘the other’ in chapter 8. 
Language 
Another limitation of my search for activists was language: I was limited to searching for pro-
Maduro content in English, Spanish, and was able to do some limited searches in Portuguese, 
French and Italian (although arguably most of the published interest in Venezuela is found in 
these five languages). This in fact speaks to the idea of where ‘solidarity activism’ takes place: 
generally, where people are afforded the luxury of participating and debating cosmopolitan 





Fieldwork and crisis 
Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC) is by far one of the largest Venezuela solidarity groups: 
not being able to speak to its secretary represented quite a setback. However, as I have 
mentioned, I was able to interview members that did not belong to the group’s organising 
team. The setback pushed me to explore more ‘transnational’ aspects of solidarity, as I 
progressively got involved with groups outside of the UK. 
The rapid development of events in Venezuela—given the economic and social crisis and the 
timescale of the interviews—made keeping up to date with events on the ground (and 
subsequently writing about them) quite challenging. The semi-structured nature of the 
interviews was ideal, though, as it allowed for a discussion around events that were being 
broadcasted in the news. This was especially true for the first four months of 2019: Juan Guaidó 
had just declared himself president and called for humanitarian aid to be allowed in through 
the Colombian border (Richard Branson then organised a large all-day concert in Cúcuta on 
the 22 of February). The events provoked a strong resurgence in solidarity activity—activity 
that had been largely dormant since the violent protests of 2017. The activists I spoke to in these 
four months were clearly more engaged with the cause than the few I spoke to in the months 
before.  
Thesis Outline 
The next three chapters of the thesis (Part I) contextualise the academic and historical milieu 
for this research.  
In the next chapter, I trace some of the events that led to the creation of Venezuela’s so-called 
‘petro-state’ while marking the significance of this model for Venezuelans, their broader 
political culture, and how it led to the rise of Hugo Chávez’s political movement. I then 
reference data available on the current crisis to help navigate the extreme positions of the 
divide, for and against Chavismo, focusing on the topics most mentioned by interviewees: the 
role of race in the political conflict (discussed in chapter 6), the exorbitant levels of crime and 
violence (discussed in chapter 8) Chávez’s social missions (discussed in chapter 9), and lastly 





Chapter 3 looks at broader ‘transnational solidarity,’ and attempts to give context to the group 
of non-Venezuelan interviewees who consider themselves activists for the Bolivarian 
Revolution. I delve into an account of the movements that have historically predated 
‘Venezuela solidarity’ activism, importantly those in support of Chile’s Allende, Cuba’s Castro 
and Nicaragua’s Ortega. I then briefly describe how the different Venezuela solidarity groups 
themselves define their political activities and goals, before examining the moral and political 
concept of solidarity itself, in theoretical terms.  
In chapter 4, I attempt to trace a theoretical nexus between my proposed understanding of 
populism and populist logic (taking from several authors), and existing theories of political 
legitimacy, morality and moral logic in groups, and theories on moral emotions. Here I 
highlight the relevance of some of the findings to populism theory, transnational populism, and 
to the sociology of morality and emotions more broadly. 
Through the empirical chapters 5-9 (Part II) I attempt to describe the ‘deontology’ of populist 
logic: that is, how taking a political position on Venezuela is a moral imperative to defend what 
is ‘right’ and ‘good.’ Chapter 5 looks at contested understandings of democracy, seen by both 
as the most legitimate and moral way to exercise political power. Chapter 6 looks at the framing 
of the Venezuelan conflict in racial terms, by solidarity activists, as a way to justify the 
legitimacy and morality of Chávez’s and Maduro’s government, using what I have termed 
historical-racial moral logic. Chapter 7 looks at the two distinct practices of signification in 
conceptualising ‘the people,’ where both sides claim to be ‘the majority.’ Chapter 8 looks at the 
circulating moral emotions on both sides, both negative (mostly in regards to feelings of 
perceived injustices); and positive, in regards to their admiration and hope for the eventual 
triumph of ‘good’ in their eyes. Chapter 9 explores the more specific moral justifications and 
arguments, including those surrounding human rights, put forth by both sides.  
I conclude by summarising some of the main ideas and arguments presented in the thesis, 
discussing its broader theoretical contributions, and fleshing out a short discussion on the 
challenges these populist moral divides ultimately place on democracy. I lastly present ideas 







Chapter 2. Venezuela’s petro-state and 
democracy 
 
The government of Nicolás Maduro has held on despite severe food and medicine shortages, 
power outages, some of the highest homicide rates in the world, the highest hyper-inflation in 
the world, an astounding economic contraction of over 70 percent since 2013, and a leader of 
the opposition, Juan Guaidó, recognised as president by over 50 countries in the West. 
The crisis has become a serious liability for Venezuela’s neighbours in Latin America. 
Venezuelans are the second-largest displacement in the world, after Syria. And yet, it is not 
overtly at war—although some of the participants in this study very much argue it is. The 
United Nations predicted that by the end of 2019, 5.3 million Venezuelans would have migrated 
to other countries (16-18 per cent of its population). This chaotic descent—in a country with the 
largest oil reserves on the planet—will no doubt fall into history books as one of the great 
conundrums, and tragedies, of the twenty-first century.  
In the first sections of the chapter, I trace the historical backdrop of Venezuela’s current crisis, 
tightly knit to Venezuela’s unhappy marriage to oil production. To situate the figurative ‘birth’ 
of the divide, I provide a short history of Venezuela’s contemporary past and look at some of 
the structural conditions that helped Hugo Chávez ascend to power in 1998. The historic 
context, centred on the influence of oil in state formation, helps grasp Venezuela’s political 
culture: more explicitly, how the Venezuelans I interviewed see development, democracy and 
the state, even their own unquestioned racial ‘mestizo’ identity—all themes I examine in Part 
II. In proving this context, I emphasise how Venezuelan politics cannot readily be placed on 
the left-right spectrum: a detail solidarity activists from the Global North miss. I also note ho 
w most of the accounts interested in Chavismo neglect the influence mid-twentieth century 
political discourse on oil-wealth redistribution had on Venezuelans’ understanding of 
democracy, an understanding not readily associated with the left more specifically. I make a 
point of underlining that this mid-century discourse is, not surprisingly, an understanding 
from which Chávez’s own ideas emerge (see Coronil 1997, 2008).  
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The section also tries to engage with pro and anti-Chávez discourse as it emanates from the 
media and the country’s political actors and parties, so as to help place the opinions of 
interviewees. The private media especially, in its determination to oust the standing 
governments, has acted as a political party during the Chávez and Maduro eras, and was more 
favourable and trustworthy to the Venezuelan migrants I interviewed than opposition leaders 
themselves, even if, as I show, a good part of their discourse is shared. 
I note that the social and political issues that surround the conflict amount to dissertations 
unto themselves, so I focus the second section of the chapter on exploring the data available 
on the issues those most mentioned by interviewees: the economic crisis and political conflict 
in 2017, the role of race in the conflict, Chávez’s missions, the levels of state corruption, and 
lastly the levels of crime and violence in the Chávez era.  
Lastly, I felt it was important to review the existing scholarly literature on Chavismo to help 
place this research in a broader academic context. This helps identify how the research 
addresses knowledge gaps and how my approach—looking at both sides of the divide—
purports to be different. 
Caudillismo and the pre-eminence of the military 
Simón Bolívar, liberator of several South American nations, seemed disheartened when he 
writes in his Manifiesto de Cartagena that Venezuelans were, at the time, incapable of exercising 
their liberties. In his own words, they “lack the political virtues that characterise the true 
republican” (Pérez Vila 1983). Bolívar’s 19th century ‘positivist’ credence—that in broad terms 
saw ‘mestizo’ (mixed race) and rural populations as the root cause of Latin America’s low 
industrial development (Lacruz 2006)— lives on in the way Venezuelan migrants’ imagine el 
pueblo and their country’s progress (see chapter 7).   
The 19th century, teemed with political strife, saw little opportunity to develop political 
institutions, agriculture, or industry. The military, symbol of independence, became the focal 
point of political and social power, displacing the landed aristocracy. The patterns that framed 
the power structures of Venezuela in the 19th and 20th centuries—those connecting the army, 
regional bosses and caudillos—are still at work today (Karl 1997; Yarrington 2003), most 
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evidently in the critical role the military plays in bolstering and sustaining Maduro’s 
presidency.  
For most of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, positivism justified the ‘need’ for 
strong authoritarian leadership in Venezuela—today often associated with right-wing 
populism; then, the personalistic rule of force known as ‘caudillismo.’ In an analogous way, 
Venezuelan migrants, unable to fathom a democratic exit to the crisis, believe force from the 
US or the Venezuelan military, is the only way forward (see chapter 9). 
Juan Vicente Gómez, military general and de facto ruler of Venezuela from 1908 until 1935, 
oversaw a bloody dictatorship and the genesis of Venezuela’s dysfunctional ‘petro-state,’ after 
the discovery of oil in 1914. The subsequent precipitous displacement of agriculture as a main 
source of revenue had enduring negative effects on Venezuela’s political institutions. Given 
Venezuela lacked the capacity to develop an oil industry, Gómez allowed foreign companies 
to take over production—the only nation in Latin America to do so. It is argued, ironically, that 
foreign oil companies were pivotal in edifying the Venezuelan state: they preferred to deal with 
one central authority (Coronil 1997; Karl 1997; Tinker Salas 2009). Gómez, in turn, garnered 
greater control as the executive and amassed significant wealth in his dealings with foreign 
companies. 
When Gómez dies in December 1935, social unrest and mass looting ensued. Spear-headed by 
a group of students, protestors made demands for a new democratic state that would distribute 
the oil rents held by a small faction attached to the figure of Gómez. Understanding the pitfalls 
of a repressive regime, and as a response to public discontent, Gomez’s successor, Eleazar 
López Contreras ushered democratising reforms in all areas of public policy, including an 
incipient welfare state (Caballero 1998; Márquez 1997). Participation in the debate on the 
nation’s oil wealth and its redistribution, has since been the only legitimate way to exercise and 




The Oil of Venezuelans 
In 1936, Rómulo Betancourt—founder of Acción Democrática (AD) the party that would 
dominate Venezuelan politics up until the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Perez in 1993—
decried that for “Venezuela to be for Venezuelans” the subsoil needed to be retaken from 
foreign hands (Betancourt 1983, 300). AD and Betancourt, who built their most important 
constituencies from grass-root efforts in rural areas, vowed that only democracy, as executor 
of Venezuela’s wealth, could ensure these populations would benefit from the ‘modernising 
effects’ of the oil industry. It was not, however, until a new oil law passed in 1943 that foreign 
companies began sharing half their profit with the state. By 1945 and once in power, Betancourt 
(an ex-communist militant exiled during the Gómez dictatorship) oversaw new state-owned 
enterprises flourish—which became an important way to show that “the nation’s wealth would 
be used for the benefit of all” (Coronil 1997, 100). Betancourt’s call to reclaim Venezuela’s 
‘subsoil’ from the elite and US imperialism would forever mark Venezuelan political 
discourse—his presidency having been described as Venezuela’s first experience with 
populism.  
The notion that the state should finance itself, at least in part, by citizen’s taxes was never 
considered, as Karl (1997) notes. The institutionalisation of the rentier taxation dismantled 
Venezuela’s income tax base, and de-incentivised domestic productive capacity—a problem 
Venezuela has yet to overcome. Although most scholars looking at Chavismo overlook this 
short-lived democracy (1945-1948), Hugo Chávez appealed to a strikingly similar discourse that 
took moral force from the ideas of redistribution, democratic inclusion, and anti-imperialism 
of this period.  
General Pérez Jiménez’s coup on Betancourt’s nascent democracy installed a new military 
dictatorship in 1948. Pérez Jiménez, well remembered for prioritising public infrastructure, 
reversed some of the social advances gained. Although Venezuela’s per capita in 1950 was the 
4th highest in the world, the agricultural sector continued in decline, producing a significant 
increase in urban migration. With cities unable to accommodate the influx, a displaced 
population settled in the outskirts—visibly in the mountains of the capital, today the barrios 




Once Pérez Jiménez was overthrown in 1958, the leading political parties COPEI (the Christian 
democrats), URD (centre-left Unión Republicana Democrática), and AD, agreed to preserve 
democracy by signing what is known as the Pacto de Punto Fijo. Its legitimacy stood on a 
guarantee of economic stability and societal development sustained by the country’s oil wealth 
(Smilde 2011, 3).  
The parties did considerable grass-roots work to organise the lower classes and provide 
favours for votes (Ray 1969; Hellinger 2011); the state itself became “entrepreneur, employer 
and provider of social welfare” (Daguerre 2011, 835) as petroleum rents were able to turn 
organised interests into “subsidised clientele” (Karl 1997, 101). Venezuela also adopted a 
Keynesian/social investment model aimed at a pattern of inward growth, in the understanding 
that Venezuela would eventually de-couple from western economies. Venezuela’s increasing 
stream of petrodollars in the economy, however, was and continues to be a result of rent rather 
than real productive activity (Lacruz and González 2007).  
The strength of an insurgent and armed left in the 1960s, further compelled the state to prove 
that it could enact profound social transformations, whilst effectively redistributing 
Venezuela’s oil wealth, sans calls to expropriation (Márquez 1992, 112). Popular support for the 
radical-left faded in these years, but the Communist Party of Venezuela, notably excluded 
from the Punto Fijo pact—and more importantly its affiliated guerrillas—had a lasting 
influence on community organising in the popular sectors (Velasco 2011; Valencia 2015), and 
on the radical left’s understanding of the pact as ‘class dictatorship’ (Smilde 2011).  
I note that Venezuela’s relative economic and political success at this time—its large oil 
reserves, two-party system exchange of the presidency, high miscegenation (despite persistent 
racism), and the absence of extreme nationalism—all buttressed the misleading but 
widespread idea that Venezuela was an ‘exceptional democracy’ (Ellner and Tinker Salas 
2006). 
Carlos Andrés Pérez and La Venezuela Saudí 
Although Carlos Andrés Pérez, first elected to office in 1974, never called himself a socialist (a 
term that would have surely hindered his relationship with Venezuela’s biggest oil buyer, the 
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US), his government spent more than all other Venezuelan governments combined, and was 
devoted to, according to his inaugural speech, “improving the working and living conditions 
of the working-class” (C. A. Pérez 1974, 125; Tarver 2004). Pérez oversaw the dramatic oil boom 
of the 1970s. He nationalised the oil and petroleum industry, and heavily invested Venezuela’s 
(elevenfold) revenue increase in state-owned industrial projects, including in the production 
of aluminium and hydroelectricity. In fact, during ‘la Venezuela Saudí’ as this decade is known, 
workers enjoyed the highest wages in Latin America and received subsidies in food, health, 
education, and transport (McCaughan 2010). Pérez, with an anti-imperialist bent prescient of 
Chávez’s, re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba, played a role in the transfer of the 
Panama Canal to the Panamanians, and founded SELA (the Latin American Economic 
System—a precursor to Chávez’s ALBA) to offset the influence of Organisation of American 
States (OAS), which he felt was US-controlled.  
The 1980s drop in oil prices triggered—what was until now—Venezuela’s worst economic 
crisis. It had been in the making as production breakdowns, public enterprise inefficiency, 
marked corruption, capital flight and overvalued currencies plagued most oil producing 
nations during the boom. Poverty jumped from 46 to 62 percent in 1989 alone, once the state 
abandoned several of its welfare provisions (McCaughan 2010).  
Venezuelans re-elected Pérez in the hope he would somehow restore the progress and 
splendour of the 1970s, but they were soon to be disappointed.1 A mere two weeks after his 
inauguration in 1989, Pérez privatised state-owned companies and introduced a series of deep 
macroeconomic adjustments aimed at increasing savings and attracting foreign investment, in 
the hope of diversifying the economy from oil. Although Pérez had rallied against the IMF 
during his campaign, calling it “the bomb that only kills people” (McCaughan 2010), his plan 
had been negotiated with the organisation to receive critically needed loans  (Mujica 2002; Karl 
1997). These new policies were in line with a neoliberal critique of the dirigiste state that was 
 
1  People had referred to him as ‘Locoven’, the combination loco (crazy) and ‘ven’ the suffix used to designate 
state-owned companies. CAP then became ‘Venloco’, translated as “come, crazy one” when he ran again in 1988 
(Coronil 1997: 372). 
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revolutionising development economics in the 1990s (Mohan et al. 2000); but, in the words of 
Coronil (1997, 378) they meant turning from:  
the parochial oil-protected national market toward the competitive global market [and] 
dismantling the complex network of protections—state employment, loans, subsidies, 
tariffs, price controls, and wage regulation that had constituted the populist model of 
development for more than half a century. 
Although Coronil’s understanding of populism differs from the one I explore in this thesis, 
turning away from this development model, as he describes, aggravated inequalities to 
untenable levels—levels that led to the undeniable appeal of Hugo Chávez’s discourse. 
El Caracazo and the rise of Hugo Chávez 
A couple of weeks after the measures were announced, the price of petrol—heavily 
subsidised—was increased (McCaughan 2010). Riots broke out in Caracas the next day, on the 
27th of February, and by nightfall the protests had escalated to collective looting of 
supermarkets and grocers en masse. Spurred by a decade of discontent with the economic 
decline of the country and the corruption-laden main parties (AD and COPEI), the protests 
were the largest and most repressed in Latin America at the time, and the first against 
neoliberal austerity in the world (Coronil and Skurski 1991; Walton 1989; López Maya 2003; 
Samet 2019). The army, tasked with restoring order, shot hundreds of civilians, most of them 
in working class districts. Unofficial figures estimate between 1000 to 3000 casualties—mass 
graves having later been found in one of Caracas’ public cemeteries, secretly buried by the 
authorities (Coronil and Skurski 1991). The riots, known as ‘El Caracazo’ (Caracas-smash), 
evinced the profound social exclusion “perpetuated by white-elite ruling classes” and began 
the progressive de-legitimisation of the Punto Fijo state (Valencia 2015, 44).  
Sublieutenant Hugo Chávez had, in 1983, created a secret cell within the army named ‘The 
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200’ (MBR-200)—one of many dissident clandestine 
military organisations active at the time (Hawkins 2010). Deeply influenced by his brother (who 
had been involved with the guerrilla Left in the 1960s) the MBR-200 hoped to dismantle 
inequality and overturn the corrupt elite that had been hoarding Venezuela’s wealth. The 
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“moral and political chaos,” underpinning the Caracazo, in Chávez’s own words (Aló Presidente 
No. 269 2007), galvanised Chávez’s conspiratorial activities. The riots spiked the 
disillusionment of many among the ranks who understood the government had acted brutally 
against the interest of the poorest sectors. Indeed, they made many officers amicable to 
Chávez’s ideas. I note, solidarity activists often recalled the riots were the ideological genesis 
of Chávez’s project. 
On February 4th 1992, Chávez attempted to overthrow the man that handed him his sword of 
command in 1975: Pérez himself. His movement marched inside the presidential palace but 
was forced to surrender 10 hours later, once it was clear the plan had failed to spark a general 
uprising (Hawkins 2010; El Nacional 4 February 2018). The coup largely determined what many 
Venezuelan migrants, and a few solidarity activists, initially thought of Chávez: that he was a 
man of the military, prone to violence, with a strong authoritarian bent.  
Chávez accepted blame for the failure but confidently told the nation that change would come: 
they had failed ‘for now’ (por ahora). It was a short allocution that catapulted him onto the 
national consciousness. After he and his co-conspirators were pardoned and released from 
prison, Chávez began to work on a grass-root civilian movement that called for a constituent 
assembly (Zago 1992). The movement built the political party that allowed him to run for the 
presidency in 1998, as interest in his ‘democratic revolution’ flourished.  
At that point, Venezuelans—highly sceptical of the two traditional parties and eager to rid 
themselves of what they felt was a plague of corrupt, inept and clientelistic politicians—felt 
only a true outsider could enact profound change (Aguiar 2009; Hawkins 2010). The political 
elite in Venezuela had traditionally been white, so Chávez’s afro-indigenous appearance was, 
no doubt, an indelible mark of an appealing political ‘outsiderness.’ Chávez, I note, did not 
initially command the polls, but once his opponents accepted the endorsement of the 
discredited older parties (AD and COPEI), they failed to prove they were not aligned with those 
parties’ history of corruption and ‘old politics.’  
It is ironic that what was lauded as the ‘exceptional’ or ‘model democracy’ in Latin America 
subsided to an infatuation with the leader of a military coup. Part of this paradox is explained 
by engaging in a more nuanced analysis of the genuine appeal of Chávez’s movement, from a 
racial, cultural and moral perspective—an appeal that crossed borders, as we see from the 
fervour the solidarity activists interviewed here express.  
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Chavismo in power 
Although President Chávez dismissed the Punto Fijo era as a series of ‘oligarchic regimes,’ and 
promised to ‘fry the heads’ of its leaders, it was actually Venezuela’s “first extended experience 
with electoral democracy and constitutional alternation in government” (Hellinger 2011, 28)—
and what appeared to be a subordinate military. In 1950, Venezuela was half illiterate and 
rural—by 1990, it was 90 percent literate and urban. Venezuela was able to maintain 
unparalleled political stability at a time when Chile, Brazil and Argentina succumbed to 
dictatorships. It is no doubt the reason that Venezuelan migrants born in the fifties and sixties, 
reminisce so often about this era. Its achievements had a lasting impact on the political culture 
of Venezuela and Venezuelans’ conceptions of democracy, that include most importantly, (at 
least according to a study conducted by Hellinger 2011, 42–43), that “the state guarantee 
education and health for everyone,” and that “all the sectors [be] included and enjoy the same 
rights.” Venezuelans see the welfare state as achievements of democracy rather than as 
achievements of the left—one of the main reasons the Western left-right political spectrum is 
inadequate. There was, in fact, very little degree of differentiation between the parties of the 
Punto Fijo democracy in ideological terms as Smilde (2011) and Ellner (2003) argue. 
Chávez also promised to “place human welfare at the heart of [his] Bolivarian Revolution” 
(Daguerre 2011, 386). But Chávez’s project was predominantly characterised by an opposition 
to the corruption and bureaucracy of Punto Fijismo: it in fact lacked clear propositions (Lacruz 
2006; Wilpert 2003) save the drafting of a new constitution aimed at moving beyond “mere 
representative democratic mechanisms” (Kutiyski and Krouwel 2014, 71). Critics argue that 
these ideas on participatory democracy were symptomatic of a Marxist distrust of 
representative democracy. Yet it is also true they stem from a uniquely ‘Bolivarian’/Romantic 
understanding of legitimacy that many solidarity activists interviewed here share: that the will 
of the collective stands above the individual—a process that eventually overcomes the need 
for representation (Hawkins 2010; Smilde 2011). 
The new constitution, approved by public referendum, institutionalised participatory 
practices—such as those of community councils already in place—and gave them a role in the 
local decision-making process. It enshrined the rights of indigenous peoples, although 
controversially not of afro-descendants or mestizos more broadly, unlike what well-known 
solidarity activists such as John Pilger believe (see chapter 6). The new constitution was highly 
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novel in its conception of popular sovereignty and allowed for referenda and direct recall of 
public officials. In its push to deepen new democratic institutions, it enjoyed broad national 
consensus. Scholars are, nonetheless, divided on their assessment of its benefits: it was 
criticised for its failure to protect decentralisation, for eliminating the Senate, and for 
concentrating power in the executive (Hawkins 2010).  
The constitution also took precedence over socio-economic concerns, and no truly innovative 
social policies were put in place in these early years (Buxton 2003; Chacín 2003). In fact, most 
solidarity activists were not aware of what was going on in Venezuela at this point. This 
emphasis on constitutionality cost Chávez his popularity: beginning 2001, approval ratings 
declined from over 80 percent at the start of his presidency to under 38 by early 2002. 
Unemployment stood at levels unseen since the ‘Caracazo,’ and poverty rose from 31 percent 
in 2001 to 41 percent in 2002—all facts solidarity activists seem unaware of. Former co-
conspirators and close political advisers defected from his movement,2 business allies 
withdrew their support, and the press (a press that had largely supported Chávez when he was 
elected) began to call out what they felt were the failures of ‘yet another’ corrupt project that 
was increasingly accumulating powers in the executive.3  
It is clear Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution amassed large popular appeal, but it also created a 
powerful backlash from those displaced from political power, one hard to quell when oil 
prices—and relatedly Chávez’s popularity—were low in 2001-2004 (Farnsworth 2021). As 
Samet (2019, 5) puts it: “jobs were won and lost, friendships made and broken, institutions 
funded and dismantled, based on where a person was judged to stand vis-à-vis the divide 
between ‘Chavistas’ and ‘the opposition.’” It left an almost impenetrable schism in Venezuelan 
society that lives on. 
 
2 This includes Francisco Arias Cardenas, one of his principal partners in the 1992, and communist Luis 
Miquilena, his principal political adviser.  
3  The new National Assembly granted Chávez an enabling law that allowed him to pass 49 controversial 





Protests and strikes during these early years— including a coup that deposed the president for 
over 36 hours, a two-month national oil lockdown, and a hard-fought recall referendum on 
Chávez’s presidency in 2004—pushed Chávez to radicalise and re-baptise his political project 
as ‘Socialism of the XXI Century’ in 2006.  
After the coup, Chávez’s rhetoric flared pronouncedly against purported ‘enemies of the 
nation,’ including journalists more broadly, the old traditional political class, the 40 years of 
Punto Fijo democracy, NGO’s working on human rights, and the US. After the lockdown, 
Chávez fired half of the state oil company and replaced it with loyalists (Bulmer-Thomas 2013; 
Smilde 2011). Doing so allowed him to pursue his poverty reduction ‘missions,’ targeted social 
policies that I discuss in a later section. It is in this period, and through his anti-American 
rhetoric, that he gains notoriety with the international left. This is, no doubt, when solidarity 
activists interviewed for this research become interested in his mandate (see chapter 3). 
Importantly, their understanding of the Punto Fijo era of Venezuelan history just described 
stems from Chávez’s discourse around it at the time: ‘racist’, ‘corrupt’, ‘US-backed’, 
‘treasonous’, ‘anti-Venezuelan’, as I discuss in chapter 6.  
Chávez understood he would need to produce his own mediatic narrative if he was to control 
public opinion on his revolution. Thus, one of the administration’s objectives became 
“communicational hegemony”: the state media apparatus grew exponentially at this time, 
acquiring six national television stations, three national radio networks, an international news 
television station (TeleSUR) and three Caracas-based newspapers (Samet 2019, 27). The 
apparatus had successful international projection: solidarity activists very openly explained 
how they were principally waging a war against the international media, and they often quoted 
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information they had read in pro-Chávez outlets, most notably venezuelanalysis.com and 
TeleSUR (for whom some of the interviewees worked for).4  
For Smilde (2011, 10), writing in 2011, the acrimony that characterised this period of his 
presidency can be further understood by looking at the political actors involved. For him, the 
opposition coalition consists of those that “have (or at least had) a solid place in formal society.” 
Smilde is referring to the powerful sectors that have always opposed Chavismo and continue 
to do so: commerce, industry, the Catholic Church. The reality is part of the opposition also 
included the reformed left, some of the revolutionary left, students, academia, and organised 
white-collar labour (López Maya and Lander 2005). Smilde’s failure to mention these sectors 
proves symptomatic of a pro-Chávez stereotyped view of the opposition, a view that lives on in 
the interviews with solidarity activists (Hetland 2017).  
The private press that initially helped elect Chávez by denouncing the corrupt practices of the 
Punto Fijo era, also turned against him in 2001, and in many ways, became the opposition. Samet 
(2019) argues that the country’s major newspapers and television channels (El Nacional, El 
Universal, RCTV, Globovisión) functioned as a political party in the way their programming 
drove public opinion and denounced the government’s failures. Venezuelan migrants had 
little positive to say about opposition leaders or parties, as I discuss in chapter 8. This is partly 
explained by the long-standing disenchantment with the political class that both Chavistas 
and anti-Chavistas in Venezuela share,5 but also by the fact that the opposition had (and has) 
its strongest base in the press. I discuss some of the similarities and differences between their 
discourse and those of the political parties in a later section of this chapter. 
 
4  Venezuelanalysis.com is registered as an NGO in the State of New York, whose objective is “to provide 
counter the corporate	media propaganda of the Bolivarian Revolution by giving a voice to	leftist and grassroots 
movements in Venezuela,” according to its website. 
5  In fact, less than 35% of the population agreed that “without political parties than can be no democracy” 
according to Latinobarómetro (1995-2013). I note however, that support for political parties did grow 
considerably throughout the 2000s and fell back to around 60% in 2012. 
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As for Chávez’s initial constituency: it was made up primarily of those “living at the margins of 
formal citizenship,” who, according to Smilde (2011, 9) and Roberts (2003), had never been 
strongly ideological. Their support was based on a perception of the government’s 
performance and the extent to which, at least discursively, it prioritised their demands and 
concerns. Chávez’s coalition also included a new emerging political elite, now the 
boliburgueses.6 There were also loyal state employees, and members of the growing social 
movements supported by the government, including communal councils (barrio assemblies) 
and the colectivos who had helped form them—some, historically aligned with the radical-left 
and the guerrilla insurrections of the 1960s (Valencia 2015).  
Many of these colectivos are community or neighbourhood organisations that help implement 
some of the government’s social programmes in poorer neighbourhoods. Colectivos are often 
mentioned by solidarity activists as being part of the successful grassroot work of the 
Bolivarian Revolution they greatly admire, in line with what the pro-Chavista press writes, and 
in line with some of the work they have seen on the ground in Venezuela. Some colectivos, 
though, are armed and there is evidence to suggest they have committed extrajudicial killings 
and attacked anti-government protestors (Amnesty International 2019). According to some 
colectivos themselves, their ranks have been infiltrated by state intelligence agents 
masquerading as colectivos to attack and intimidate opposition protests (Fuentes 2020). 
Although the entire livelihood of many of the members of these groups is tied to the viability 
of the Bolivarian project (Smilde 2011), the communal and colectivo support for, and work with, 
Chavismo is not straightforward. Part of the Maduro state apparatus “is hostile to communal 
power”—this is especially true of local elected officials who are weary of grassroots activists 
that they feel might “threaten their legitimacy” (Ciccariello-Maher 2016, n.p.). Certain popular 
sectors do identify as being a part of the state but maintain “strategic ambiguity,” that is, a sense 
of autonomy “to be able to put pressure on the state when necessary” (Fernandes 2010, 28). 
This detail is often missed by solidarity activists who assume that the government stands 
wholly alongside colectivos, in other words, that their interests are aligned. The government’s 
legitimacy is based on this alignment and the extent to which it represents groups such as the 
 
6  Today Chavistas accuse these elites of being highly corrupt, see chapter 7. 
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colectivos, who are part of the ‘true people’, as I discuss in chapter 7. Fernandes’ closer look at 
this relationship, shows this is not necessarily the case.  
Venezuela’s political crisis starting 2017 
The continued existence of Chavismo without Chávez is testimony to Chávez’s legacy on the 
political institutions of Venezuela, and to the cultural, racial and ideological appeal of his 
movement. By appointing Nicolás Maduro himself, Chávez avoided possible frictions from 
within the different sectors of Chavismo, but his popularity was not easily replaceable. Once 
he died in 2013, support for Chavismo decreased dramatically. As of February 2020, polls 
showed 78.1 percent would vote for Guaidó, and 21.9 percent would vote for Maduro, according 
to Datanálisis pollster (Yapur and Vasquez 2020).7 As of 2021, the same pollster found that only 
11.4% would vote for Guaidó, 12% would vote for Maduro, and 45.6% would vote for an 
independent candidate (Datanálisis 2021). 
The supposed election is not likely to happen anytime soon, as the last elections were held in 
May 2018. Moreover, the opposition to President Nicolas Maduro argues that the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) and the electoral processes in Venezuela are rigged. The opposition 
alleges four of the CNE’s five members are stooges of the government—Luis Emilio Rondón is 
in fact the only member who has been critical of the government (BBC News May 21 2018). The 
EU, OAS, the Carter Centre, widely recognised as one of the most important electoral monitors 
in the world, the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), among many other international 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have denounced the 
government of President Maduro both in terms of Human Rights violations against opposition 
to the government and electoral tampering in the past two elections (2017 and 2018). The High 
 
7  Problematically, Chavistas are weary of the main polling agencies in the country: Datanálisis and 
Consultores 21, as they believe the firms stand with the opposition. The agencies have never backed from 
showing positive numbers for the Maduro and Chávez presidencies. Most academics looking at Venezuela rely 
on (or have requested) polls from these two agencies. Supporters cite instead the electoral results of the 2018 
election, where Maduro won to attest to his legitimacy, as I discuss in chapter 5. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN at the time, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, stated that 
“Venezuela was not able to guarantee the minimum conditions required for a free and credible 
election” in 2018 (Buitrago 2018). Even the company that made the electronic voting machines 
that are used in Venezuela, Smartmatic, the same company that has been conducting elections 
from 2004 to 2015, denounced that “without any doubt” there had been major manipulation of 
their system in 2017 (BBC World, August 2 2017; The Guardian, August 3 2017).  
The last time the main factions of the opposition openly participated in an electoral contest 
was in 2015 for the National Assembly elections. The opposition won a landslide majority—
proof to many that the electoral system, even despite the CNE, was functional then. As a 
countermeasure, Maduro called for the election of a new ‘National Constituent Assembly’ in 
2017, originally tasked with the drafting of a new constitution—although this was against the 
old constitution’s demand for a referendum before any rewriting could take place. The 
Constituent Assembly effectively dismantled the powers of the old opposition-led Assembly 
by taking over its ability to pass laws, remove functionaries and manage budgets, allegedly 
because the original assembly had sworn in legislators whose elections were not valid. The 
National Constituent Assembly election in 2017 was boycotted by the opposition and sparked 
some of the deadliest protests the country has ever witnessed. Several people associated with 
Chavismo were burned and lynched, among them afro-Venezuelan Orlando Figuera whose 
story I discuss in chapter 6. The election and especially the government’s repression of the 
protests, where 165 people died, were highly criticised by the EU, the OAS, and many other 
international organisations—although it is true there were violent faction from within the 
opposition as well. The institution of the Constituent Assembly was seen as an auto-coup and 
unfaltering evidence of the breakdown of democracy in Venezuela (UNCHR 2019) by the 
international community and Venezuelan migrant interviewees.8 
The opposition has not participated in elections since 2015, but certain opposition politicians 
have subverted the unofficial mandate and participated anyway—Henri Falcon in the last 
 
8 Although for at least one of the interviewees, a Venezuelan living in London who had been a strong 
supporter of Chávez when he was alive, the Constituent Assembly resulted in end of the guarimbas, part of the 
violent opposition demonstrations in Caracas. 
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presidential election of 2018 stands out as a case in point. The ‘when’ and ‘when not’ to 
participate has been haphazard and divisive; the resulting ambivalence has cost the opposition 
its credibility. Falcon’s participation revealed a bitterly divided faction incapable of 
coordinating efforts against President Maduro. Moreover, it granted a sense of legitimacy to 
the presidential election, even if Falcon later refused to accept the results.  
In January 2019, alleging that the 2018 elections were fraudulent, Juan Guaidó who had just 
been elected President of the defunct National Assembly, declared himself interim President 
of Venezuela, spiralling an unprecedented constitutional crisis. He was quickly recognised by 
the United States, the United Kingdom, members of the EU, and more than 50 other countries, 
who hoped he could garner enough political clout to dismantle the Maduro Presidency and 
call for new elections. Those who support Maduro’s government, including solidarity activists 
in this study, see the move as a blatant coup instigated by the United States, who has not 
accepted the will of the Venezuelan people. To worsen matters, on the 28th of March 2019, the 
Comptroller General announced that he had found inconsistencies with Guaidó’s spending, 
and that he would be banned from participating in elections for 15 years. The government had 
already banned several other prominent opposition leaders, among them former presidential 
candidate Henrique Capriles in 2017 and Leopoldo López in 2014.  
The opposition has not been without scandal: nine members of the old assembly were found 
to be involved in a corruption scheme that aided the government (see chapter 8). There have 
also been several violent attempts to remove Maduro, most embarrassingly in early May 2020 
when a couple of paid “mercenaries” (two of them ex US war veterans) arrived by sea set to 
topple the president (BBC News May 7 2020). The whole affair was nicknamed ‘the bay of 
piglets,’ for The Guardian a “farcical failure” that has seriously discredited genuine opposition 
to an unpopular government. 
The role of political parties inside and outside 
Venezuela 
Opposition to Chavismo has largely failed to coalesce successfully. Much like Venezuelan 
migrants, opposition parties all agree that the country does not enjoy democracy. Yet the 
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extent to which the leaders wish to eradicate Chavismo and participate in elections are two, 
among many, contentious issues they grapple with. Interviewees are similarly divided on the 
degree of forgiveness they are willing to grant Chavismo—arguably this is the crux of the 
opposition’s inability to consolidate effectively. The issues relate to an important point I try to 
make in this research: to what extent are factions able to accept and tolerate ‘the other’ in these 
populist antagonistic settings?  
Many of the most well-known opposition parties, those that won seats in 2015, were also 
banned from participating in elections by the new Constituent Assembly. This includes the 
old-timer AD, but arguably two of the most well-known opposition centrist parties, Primero 
Justicia and Voluntad Popular, as well as a host of other parties in the left: Bandera Roja, Causa R, 
Alianza Bravo Pueblo among others. Bandera Roja’s story is particularly noteworthy as it was a 
communist party involved in the guerrilla insurgencies of the 1960s, one that was opposed to 
Hugo Chávez’s candidature from the outset, given Chávez’s original revisionist/reformist 
character (a critique some of the solidarity activists interviewed here also carry). What is clear 
is that opposition parties have little in common except the desire to oust Maduro. 
As of recent, the opposition’s goals have been what they call the “restitution of democracy” and 
“overcoming the mafia,” as stated by an alliance of political movements Soy Venezuela, founded 
by three prominent (more radical) opposition leaders: Maria Corinna Machado, Antonio 
Ledezma and Diego Arria. These three politicians have also led the discourse on military 
intervention—an intervention that was appealing to many Venezuelan migrants in 2019. María 
Corina Machado very openly called for international military action, citing the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Pact. The pact allows states to 
intervene militarily if another state is deemed a threat to another OAS state or the region, yet 
Machado had a hard time convincing international jurists that its application in Venezuela’s 
case was viable, let alone justified. I note most interviewees spoke of US intervention instead, 
taking perhaps from Donald Trump who, according to reports in 2018, “repeatedly raised the 
possibility of invading Venezuela” (The Guardian, July 5 2018).  
Other parts of the opposition are more willing to negotiate politically with the regime and are 
hopeful, but less confident in the military’s will to defect, given its ties to Maduro. Harvard-
educated Leopoldo López, perhaps the most famous opposition leader, imprisoned after being 
accused of spurring a wave of deadly protests 2014, insists Maduro’s deposition must be 
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peaceful—although according to him he “cannot discard [domestic] military intervention” 
(EFE May 3 2019). Henry Falcón, Henrique Capriles (also former presidential candidate of 
Primero Justicia in 2013) and Claudio Fermín (a politician from the Punto Fijo era) and more 
recently, Juan Guaidó, the man who contests the presidency with Maduro (a virtual unknown 
till 2019) are also in this league. In an interview with TIME magazine, Guaidó stated:  
The mafia structure they have built in Venezuela is crumbling. We’re seeing the collapse of 
the dominant class. Now is the time to offer the military and other government officials the 
guarantee of amnesty […] Today in Venezuela you can’t walk down the street, because it’s 
not safe. […] You can’t buy food because you can’t afford it or there isn’t enough in the shops. 
But we have to find a way to restore normality. That means we have to find one way or 
another to forgive (Nugent 2019, n.p.) 
Guaidó hints at two important themes that appear in the interviews with Venezuelan migrants. 
First, he associates the word ‘mafia’ with the government—this association is widespread 
within the opposition, as I just mentioned, and I explore this further on in this chapter as well 
as in chapter 9 in discussing the moral distance Venezuelans seek from the government. 
Second, Guaidó calls for ‘restoring normality.’ I turn to this important theme in chapter 8: 
interviewees feel ‘forced’ to emigrate because, they allege, Venezuela ‘was not normal.’  
The Chavista block is similarly far from monolithic. It comprises competing agendas, diverse 
ideologies and even incompatible economic preferences. Importantly, much like there are 
with solidarity activists, strong ideological differences exist in terms of support for workers’ 
control, confronting versus accommodating capital, extending and restraining popular power, 
maintaining unity,  and dealing with corruption within the state. In fact, some academics argue 
that the PSUV encompasses sectors in the centre-right, within the generals and other members 
of the military (see Hetland 2017). Yet it has enjoyed the towering almost religious figure of 
Chávez to unite it—unlike the opposition. 
Hetland (2017) notes Chávez consciously set-up his initial MVR-200—the organisation that 
won him the elections in 1998—as a political movement, not party. Chávez’s antipathy towards 
political parties however, slowly quelled once he realised the need to organise his political 
base, especially those in the popular sectors who defended him spontaneously and helped him 
return to power after the coup. The MVR was tied to elections thus had weak links to civil 
society. It also largely failed to confront corruption (Ellner 2008: 127). Moreover, Chávez’s idea 
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of forming the PSUV in 2007 stemmed from a need to clarify and unify his ideological position, 
having just declared himself a socialist of the XXI century.9 I note some of the parties that 
supported Chávez in the past (Patria Para Todos, the Communist Party and Por la Democracia 
Social) declined to join, thereby claiming independence from PSUV’s purported ideological 
hegemony. Regardless, the PSUV became Venezuela’s largest political party, and it has 
enjoyed broad electoral dominance since. 
Perhaps the most vocal Chavista politician, at an international level, given his level of English 
and his degree from Cambridge, is current foreign minister Jorge Arreaza. Arreaza is in fact 
often invited to speak at Venezuela Solidarity Campaign events. In a tweet published in July 
2021, he writes in response to Dominic Raab’s call for elections in Venezuela:  
Mr @DominicRaab, you continue supporting violent and terrorist plans. Isn't the negative 
impact generated on the Venezuelan health system as a consequence of the robbery by your 
government of 2 billion dollars in #Venezuelan gold in the middle of the pandemic, enough 
for you? 
Associating the opposition to terrorism and violence is a standard play in the Chavista 
handbook—as is calling the government a ‘mafia state’ in the handbook of the opposition. I 
note that solidarity activists rarely mentioned Venezuelan politicians—save of course for 
Chávez and Maduro.10 The principal difference between the discourse of solidarity activists 
and the PSUV in Venezuela, is that, unlike the PSUV and its politicians, solidarity activists are 
free to openly criticise Maduro’s policies, and many of them do. The question stands, can you 
be an anti-Maduro Chavista in Venezuela? 
The Alternativa Popular Revolucionaria (APR) is a Chavista-leaning political coalition founded 
in 2020 as a response to the “anti-worker policies” of the government of Nicolás Maduro, 
 
9  I discuss the concept of socialism of the XXI century in the next chapter. 
10  One of the interviewees though, Ignacio, spent considerable time working with the PSUV in Venezuela. s 
His knowledge of politicians and diverse factions within the party was exceptional. 
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according to their Facebook page. Chavismo has been, until now, very successful at 
maintaining unity in Venezuela by focussing its rhetoric on an external enemy: more recently 
the US and its economic sanctions; it is therefore difficult to gauge how much political clout 
this competing organisation will have. The organisation does, nevertheless, echo the concern 
of many of the Trotskyist-leaning solidarity activists interviewed here, as I discuss in the next 
chapter. It states in its founding communiqué that it is opposed to the “criminal imperialist 
aggression against Venezuela at the hands of US imperialism and its European allies” but it 
also denounces the government, stating Maduro seeks to arrive at a pact with the elites and 
capitalists to “restore neoliberalism” (In Defense of Marxism, April 20 2021). I note that some 
solidarity activists interviewed here were present (virtually) at the APR’s inaugural congress, 
alongside Alan Woods and other members of the International Marxist Tendency.11  
The contested gains of the Revolution 
The two groups of interviewees contest existent data on Venezuela; when they do not, they 
contest who they believe is responsible. The Chavista government can claim substantial 
poverty reduction—from 54 percent in 2003, to 29.4 percent in 2013, right after Chávez’s death, 
according to World Bank data. Some scholars claim that this reduction reflects only an 
increase in income attributable to Venezuela’s higher oil revenue in that period, i.e. that it was 
not really a reduction given other structural elements of poverty and work productivity are not 
considered in those metrics (Ponce and González 2015; Freije 2008).  
One of the most touted successes of the government was the reduction of the GINI coefficient 
down from 0.48 in 1998, to 0.38 in 2010 (up slightly at 0.40 in 2012, although low in relation to 
other Latin American countries). However, the distribution of income for those who are in the 
lowest 20 percent of the population improved, from 4.1 percent in 1998 to 5.7 percent in 2010, 
 
11  This group broke with the Workers’ International Committee in 1992. It was founded by Ted Grant, 




according to the government. Venezuela’s Human Development Index score (measuring life 
expectancy at birth, expected school years, mean school years and GNI per capita in 2011 PPP 
dollars) increased dramatically during the Chávez era, too: from 0.672 in 2000, to 0.763 in 2016. 
Most Latin American countries experienced similar increases in their human development 
scores, and decreases in their inequality scores, as the region underwent sustained economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Galván, Amarante, and Mancero 2016). It is fair to say, 
nevertheless, that the Chavista governments, up until 2014, were spending around 40 to 50 
percent of total public spending on social (education, health, culture, pensions) spending 
(Observatorio Social CEPAL).  
Certain policies in the Chávez era promoted women’s working rights, particularly the Banco de 
la Mujer, which provided financial and technical services to aid women in the poorest sectors 
(Lacruz and González 2007; Block 2016). Venezuela’s Bolivarian constitution of 2001 recognises 
work at home as an economic activity, and even incorporated all the masculine and the 
feminine versions of all political actors mentioned, making an explicit invitation for women to 
participate equally in politics (Wilpert 2003).12 The Gender wage ratio is also 93.8, above the 
continent’s average, 87.2 (ECLAC 2020). Unfortunately, the proportion of women to hold seats 
in the new 2017 National Constituent Assembly is only 22.2, below the continent average of 31.6 
(ECLAC 2020)—a fact that points at the difference between legal frameworks, governmental 
discourse and Venezuela’s structural realities.  
Problematically, the government has not provided any data to the World Bank since 2015, and 
only certain data to the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC/CEPAL). Venezuela’s statistical capacity score in 2019 was 57.7, down from 90 in 2008. 
Moreover, the agency tasked with collecting social indicators for the Ministry of planning, 
SISOV, with which I had collected data for my MPhil research in 2014, was closed as of 2016. 
 
12 An interesting note on the constitution: it prohibits state financing of political parties—a move that is seen 
as proliferating the influence of money in politics. Historically, COPEI and AD enjoyed generous state funding, 
but their lack of accountability and widespread corruption led to this article. 
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What the little data available seems to show is that the economic crisis has reversed all the 
gains and made the situation significantly worse. Poverty has increased to a staggering 96 
percent as of 2020, with extreme poverty lying at 79.3 percent, according to a report by the 
Catholic University of Venezuela (F. Singer 2020; España et al. 2020)—levels unseen in 
Venezuela, now the poorest country in Latin America. The GINI coefficient has gone up to 51—
meaning Venezuela is now the most unequal country in the region after Brazil. The Human 
Development Index has gone down to 0.726 in 2018, in part due to Venezuela’s fall in GNI per 
capita. Life expectancy has decreased steadily: 73.13 in 2010 to 72 in 2018 (the second lowest in 
South America). One of the clearest health indicators, infant mortality rate, also increased 
from 18.9 per 1000 births in 2014 to 30.9. in 2019 (CEPAL 2020). I note that Chavismo’s health 
expenditure has always been incomprehensibly low compared to other social spending, 3.2 of 
GDP in 2015 (CEPAL 2020). Cuba, in contrast, spent almost 13 percent in 2012, and 10.9 percent 
in 2015, the highest in the continent (the average being 6.9).  
Distressingly, BBC reported that in 2017, 64.3 per cent of people had lost weight that year, 11.4 
kg on average, with those in the poorest sectors losing most. 8 out of 10 said they were eating 
less because they did not have enough food at home (BBC News February 4, 2019). CEPAL’s 
2020 report confirms that 21.2 per cent of the population lives below minimum level of dietary 
energy consumption—the highest in the region (the average for Latin America and the 
Caribbean is 6.3 percent).  
In terms of the distribution of food aid itself, the report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Venezuela (UNHRC 2019), based on a study of 558 
interviews with victims and witnesses of human rights violations, states that:  
1. “There are reasonable grounds to believe that grave violations of economic and social 
rights, including the rights to food and health, have been committed in Venezuela 
[…] As the economic crisis deepened, the authorities began using social programmes 
in a discriminatory manner based on political grounds, and as an instrument of social 
control, disproportionately affecting women” (2019, 14). 
2. “The authorities have particularly targeted certain individuals and groups, including 
members of the political opposition and those perceived as threats to the 
Government due to their capacity to articulate critical positions and to mobilise 
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others […]”. The report quotes that at least 15,045 people have been detained for 
political motives between January 2014 and 2019 (2019, 8). 
3. “Venezuelan indigenous peoples face serious violations to their individual and 
collective rights. [We] are particularly concerned about reports of threats and 
violence against indigenous authorities and leaders, targeted repression of Pemons 
(an indigenous community) who oppose the government” (2019, 14). 
The report was slammed as being one sided by the government, as well as by solidarity activists 
aware of it, who feel the UN is US backed, and therefore unjust to the Venezuelan government. 
The report certainly overlooks the impact of sanctions on the country and omits referencing 
violence committed by opposition supporters in 2017. However, the UNHRC claims suggest 
there are serious reasons to believe that Venezuelans’ democratic, economic and social rights 
have been completely overturned during Maduro’s presidency. I add that in September 2020, 
a new independent international fact-finding mission of the UNCHR (2020) sent to investigate 
the situation in Venezuela, concluded more definitively that the FAES and Maduro’s 
government had committed crimes against humanity. 
I also note that according to Bolton’s book (2020) between 2018 and 2019, the US has imposed 
four major sanctions on Venezuela. It blocked its ability to trade gold; froze PDVSA’s assets 
(the national oil company) including its US subsidiary Citgo; sanctioned its central bank 
(freezing it out of the world’s financial systems); and imposed an economic embargo. These 
sanctions are clearly not to be taken lightly, and have had a major role in further impoverishing 
an ill-maintained economic system. 
Race and skin colour in Venezuela 
Given many of the solidarity activists I interviewed made a point of racialising Venezuela’s 
conflict (see chapter 6) it seems important to nuance some of the ways racialisation operates in 
Venezuela, especially given Venezuelan migrants themselves rarely, if ever, mentioned race in 
their understanding of the conflict. 
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Considered one of the more ‘mixed’ colonies of Spanish America, Venezuela had a small 
indigenous population that meant the colonisers imported considerable amounts of labour 
through slavery to work in the coffee and cocoa plantations. It is estimated that over the course 
of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some 100,000 Africans entered the 
country (Herrera 2005) and that by the end of the colonial era (1522-1821) 60 percent of 
Venezuelans had African origin. Of the 25 per cent classified as white, 90 per cent had some 
African ancestry (Soriano 2018). In this regard, Venezuela is similar to Brazil and Cuba, in that 
it shares a majority dark-skinned population: 67 percent (Brazil), 61 percent (Venezuela) and 54 
percent (Cuba) (Gott 2007).  
Mestizaje (miscegenation), became the forging discursive element of the nascent Latin 
American nations who strived for a sense of nationality—rejecting Spain and 
contemporaneously rejecting indigenous and afro-descendent groups—groups that helped 
win the independence wars in the first place. Mestizaje’s modern subject, the mestizo, was 
culturally mixed, of indigenous, black and European descent—a mixture that allegedly 
dismantled and transcended the old colonial racial order.  
During the late nineteenth century, positivist thinkers in Venezuela continued to argue that 
Anglo-Saxon (white) societies were ‘successful’ because they ‘worked harder,’ implying people 
of colour were poorer because they were ‘naturally lazy’ and ‘unintelligent.’ Not incidentally, 
these are stereotypes of Chavistas and the popular classes that still circulate amongst 
Venezuelans, including some of the interviewees, as I discuss in chapter 7. 
The 1930s oil boom in Venezuela saw mestizaje and its inherent egalitarianism “repackaged as 
a national cultural value” (Bolívar et al. 2009). The rise in fiscal revenue loosened social 
mobility and feeding the sense that progress and modernisation was not limited exclusively to 
whites. The idea of the mestizo citizen, symbol of racial equality, was tied to democracy itself 
and readily embraced by politicians of the mid-twentieth century.  
‘Poet-politician Andrés Eloy Blanco, who in 1944 coined the notion of ‘patria café con leche’ 
(coffee with milk nation) to illustrate Venezuela’s particular racial project, “attacked any 
expression of racial discrimination as un-Venezuelan,” (Wright 1990, 2) effectively wedding the 
idea to the nation. In practice, it has always been understood that “more milk is better than 
more coffee” (Nichols 2013). As late as 1945, political elites among them Arturo Uslar Pietri, 
stressed the need to contract European labourers, advocating and promoting continued 
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whitening (Wright 1990). The calls led to a ban on non-white immigration to Venezuela, and 
the influx of around 1 million Spanish, Portuguese and Italian immigrants in these decades.  
For Hazel Marsh (2017, n.p.), in an article written for The Conversation, Venezuela “was best 
known for its beauty queens and its oil” – these are, not incidentally, the two national icons 
that best “represent the racial and cultural politics that are driving today’s unrest.” Marsh 
attributes Venezuelans’ belief in the superiority of Europeans to the impact that the foreign-
owned oil sector had on the Venezuelan middle classes in the mid twentieth century, taking 
from Venezuelan scholar Miguel Tinker Salas. In Tinker Salas’ (2009, 172) own words “over 
time, intellectuals, academics and artists actively participated in formulating a national, social 
and cultural project that identified the economic interests of the foreign oil companies with 
the welfare of the nation.” I discuss how this ‘euro-philia’ continues to be part of the national 
consciousness in chapters 6 and 8. 
I add that the historical and cultural contributions of afro-descendants in particular have been 
“ignored, undervalued or construed” (Ishibashi 2007, 26; Pineda 2017b). The remarkable slave 
rebellion of Coro in 1795, for example, was historically silenced and “completely excluded from 
Venezuela’s nascent narratives of nationhood” (Ruette-Orihuela and Soriano 2016, 337). School 
textbooks disproportionately represent whites and mestizos (77.5 and 13.6 per cent 
respectively), whereas afro-descendants and indigenous people account for 4.7 and 4.2 per cent 
respectively (Ramírez 2002). Gulbas (2013) has also found that white-European physical 
characteristics are still considered more beautiful—ideas persevered by the media, as 
Ishibashi’s (2003) study on black bodies in Venezuelan television confirms. 
In sum, mestizaje/patria café con leche, is a “hegemonic political ideology” (Moreno Figueroa 
2010, 388) that 1) aims for a desirable, yet unattainable, social equality; 2) values the idea of 
whiteness that has served to maintain white supremacy; 3) conveniently disguises the 
inequalities that lead to racism by attempting to neutralise the historical facts of indentured 
labour that have forged them in the first place (Bolívar et al. 2009); and 4) has been internalised 
by the population in such a way that Venezuelans are not able to acknowledge their own racist 
postures (Ishibashi 2003; Charier 2000). This is especially clear in the way one of the 
interviewees, César, an Afro-Venezuelan, dismisses the idea of racism in the country, even 
when he is the principal victim of it (see chapter 6). 
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Chávez and our ‘Brown America’ 
It is in this context of deep invisibilisation of race that Hugo Chávez enters the political 
landscape in 1998. He was the first dark-skinned president of Venezuela, and he identified 
himself as afro-descendent and indigenous:  
Racism is very characteristic of imperialism. Racism is very characteristic of capitalism […] 
Hate against me has a lot to do with racism. Because of my big mouth, because of my curly 
hair. And I’m so proud to have this mouth and this hair, because it is African. [Hugo 
Chávez, September 21, 2005]. 
Because senior political and military leaders (and winners of the ‘Miss Venezuela’ beauty 
pageant) traditionally come from the ‘white-settler class,’ many solidarity activists agree that 
for the opposition, “the physical presence of Chávez in the presidential palace was an 
uncomfortable reminder of the existence of an immense, impoverished and non-white 
underclass in their country […] a reality that most of them have long chosen to ignore” (Gott 
2007, 271). Ciacariello-Maher, in an interview with Cecily Hilleary (2014), explains that “part of 
what angered the elites so much when Chávez came to power was that he was a person who 
didn’t 'look like he was ‘fit’ to govern.”  
Chávez successfully used his physical appearance to his political advantage, given he 
understood that a majority of the country was non-white. By openly acknowledging the racial 
burdens that accompany his colour of skin and physical features, by embodying the racial 
roots that are traditionally marginalised, Chávez sought to build national unity in a brown 
‘pueblo,’ a concept of ‘Venezuelan people’ that implies the need to expel the old (‘white’) social 
order. He effectively managed to fathom this ‘people’ along racial (skin-colour) and class lines 
and brought racial issues to the fore of the debate—a debate never before addressed despite 
Venezuela’s profound racial inequalities. Chávez made himself part of what he and solidarity 
activists agree was the more ‘legitimate’ pueblo, and the protagonist of its political saga.  
I note that this discourse, however, has served to simplify and radicalise the political divide in 
racial terms, as I discuss fully in chapter 6. Given that at least 60 per cent (INE 2014) self-identify 
as moreno in the last census (dark-skinned) the reality is that there are also millions of dark-
skinned Venezuelans that are against Chavismo. 
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Skin-tone and discrimination in Venezuela  
Many different phenotypic cues contribute to how Venezuelans and other Latin Americans 
differentiate, categorise and rank one another, but the extensive mixture of indigenous 
peoples, Africans and Europeans has meant skin colour in particular plays a determinant role 
in ‘othering’ (Banton 2012). Telles (2014) shows that where perceived identification by others is 
pertinent, self-identification with an ethno-racial group is less adept at revealing structural 
inequalities and phenomena of discrimination when compared to skin colour. In fact, ethno-
racial categories, such as indigenous or black, hide skin colour variation and distinct racialised 
experiences in Latin America.  
The 2011 national census report explains that afro-descendent groups in Venezuela solicited 
the inclusion of a question they called ‘ethnic self-recognition.’ These groups have also asked 
for constitutional recognition since 1999, but this has not been granted to date (INE 2014; see also 
Rivas Brito and Ruette-Orihuela 2019). The term moreno, that very broadly describes ‘brown 
skin’ in Venezuela, was used in the question alongside ‘white,’ ‘afro descendant,’ ‘black,’ and 
‘other,’ the indigenous population was counted separately. Moreno relates only to skin colour, 
unlike the other terms which represent ethno-racial categories. It encompasses a wide gamut 
of brown skin tone as well as different phenotypic features, in Venezuela and other parts of 
Latin America (Guimarães 2012; Gravlee 2005; Telles 2014) and covers the majority, 51.6 percent 
of the population. Although we can presume authorities chose to avoid the use of the word 
‘racial’ versus ‘ethnic,’ the reasons behind the choice of moreno as a category for self-
recognition remain unknown. The fact that moreno was included nonetheless points to the 
determining character of skin colour versus race as a consequence of extensive admixture in 
Venezuela. 
Camardiel et al. (2005) suggest that Venezuelans today refuse to bring race to the forefront 
because merely asking about race and racism is an acknowledgement of their existence, which 
contradicts this internalised belief that skin colour in Venezuela does not matter. This is on 
display in the interviews with Venezuelan migrant: issues of race were very rarely mentioned. 
Racism is practiced in Venezuela, however, as a phenomenon of exclusion, carried out at an 
individual level, based on physical characteristics.  
For Esther Pineda, an afro-Venezuelan scholar:  
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it has traditionally been practiced through symbolic annihilation, that is, through 
language, jokes, nicknames […] omission, invisibilisation, among other naturalised 
practices that allow for discrimination to be enacted with complete impunity” (Pineda 
2017a, n.p.).  
The agglomeration of certain phenotypes and specific skin tones in the lower income groups 
of the population is also evidence of the structural racism long denied by the national 
discourse. A study that looked at mitochondrial DNA and Y-chromosome markers to estimate 
what the author’s call ‘components of admixture’, was conducted in Venezuela to compare 
‘components’ vis-a-vis socio-economic level (H. Martínez et al. 2007). The researchers took 
blood samples from two groups: one from a private hospital as a proxy for higher income, and 
one from a public hospital located in a poorer district of Caracas, as a proxy for lower income. 
The higher socioeconomic group showed a high European component (78 percent), and the 
lower socioeconomic group showed a high indigenous and African component (40 percent and 
30 percent respectively). The study points to the fact that ideas of racial democracy did not help 
overcome the burdens of indentured labour, or colonial social stratification: they simply 
perpetuated white hegemonic discourse, and helped cover whites’ ‘settler colonialist’ status in 
Latin America and Venezuela.  
Chávez’s missions 
For many scholars, the ‘Misiones,’ Chávez’s flagship poverty alleviation programmes of which 
many of the colectivos are part of, were a response to the heightened political competition of 
2003 (D’elia and Cabezas 2008; Corrales and Penfold 2007; Hawkins 2010; Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008). The popular social programmes are constantly mentioned by solidarity 
activists (especially those with less on-the-ground knowledge) as some of the most exemplary 
achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution, so it is important to clarify what they are, and 
exactly what they achieved. 
Financed by the state oil company’s revenue (PDVSA), and created by presidential decree, they 
stood (and currently stand) under direct presidential purview—this allows them to bypass 
regular legislative budgetary oversight (Vera 2009). The policies were sui generis: they covered 
a wide array of objectives, tackling deficient access to health, education, state-issued 
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identification—and were arguably veritable efforts to combat exclusion, especially for those in 
the informal sector (Lopez Maya and Lander 2011). They were also aimed at reversing public 
opinion, achieving “popular adhesion” to the figure of the president, and increasing the 
electoral registry (Aguiar 2009, 318).  
I note that despite their conceptual similarity to neoliberal compensatory policies (including 
ones that accompanied Pérez’s infamous structural adjustment measures in the 1990s) they are 
perceived of as achieving social inclusion because recipients, at least at the time, felt they were 
part of social development projects and nation-building, not simply recipients of aid (Daguerre 
2011; López-Maya and Lander 2011; Strønen 2017). This was, as Strønen (2017, 5) calls it, taking 
from Gledhill’s (2000) work on Chiapas in Mexico, “a new model of dignity”, of collective 
identity and political agency that countered the social stigma of marginalisation, and the 
shame associated with receiving aid.  
The best-known missions, Barrio Adentro and Mercal, (also those most familiar to interviewees) 
were created in December 2003 to attend to the urgent health and nutritional needs of the 
residents of the barrios in Caracas. New health-care centres located inside the barrios were 
built, and Cuban doctors who provided on-site care were brought in exchange for subsidised 
oil to the Cuban government. By 2008, there were at least 30 different missions attending to 
housing, single-motherhood, identification, and social security, besides health and food 
distribution.  
For the opposition, and for Venezuelan migrants I spoke to, the missions reproduced three 
principal flaws of social policy in Venezuela: institutional improvisation, lack of long-term 
planning, and clientelistic redistribution of oil revenues; for Chavistas the policies were 
flexible and desperately needed (Daguerre 2011). For Venezuelan migrants the missions were 
also associated with the ‘lazy’ and ‘corrupt’ nature of the Venezuelan ‘people’ more broadly, 
themes I discuss in chapter 7. For solidarity activists, they were inspirational (see chapter 3 and 
9), to the extent that many thought these policies could and should be replicated elsewhere.  
By 2014 and the oil crash, the missions faced severe funding problems and attended to less than 
10 percent of the Venezuelan population (España 2015). Barrio Adentro went from serving 2.6 
million people in 2015, to less than 200,000 people in 2017. By 2018 and come the sanctions, only 
one mission was fully functional: the food box distribution mission, known as CLAP (Comité 
Local de Abastecimiento y Producción). Today it attends 92 percent of families, although 
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unfortunately 46 percent on an irregular basis (España et al. 2020)—again facts that are not 
mentioned by solidarity activists. 
Venezuela’s mafia state? 
For Venezuelan migrants, and for opposition leaders, the Maduro government is not merely 
corrupt, it is criminal. Accusations regarding Maduro’s involvement with narco-trafficking 
were consistently underlined, as were references to the government’s exorbitant corruption. 
Its known relationship with Hezbollah was often mentioned in the interviews—even though 
Foreign Policy wrote in 2019, that there was little reason to suspect that regime change would 
stifle the Lebanese terrorists’ presence there (see Clarke 2019). 
Drug-trafficking claims are described at length in a report InSight Crime Foundation —an NGO 
working on crime in the Americas—published in 2018. In it, the foundation presented their 
arguments for believing that the Venezuelan state is a ‘Mafia State’: namely that high-ranking 
members from within the government have been indicted or convicted of drug trafficking.  
Already in 2008, The Guardian had published an article entitled “Revealed: Chávez’s role in 
Cocaine Trail to Europe,” based on the testimony of deserters of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), openly supported by Chávez—clearly the allegations are not 
new.13 InSight names 40 high-ranking members of the government, mentioning it has 
information on 123.14 Except for those that have in fact been indicted and charged (including 
 
13  The group of government officials involved in the drug trade are dubbed the “Cartel of the Suns,” taking 
from the stars the generals of the Venezuelan National Guard wear on their epaulets, a term first used in 1993—
before the Chávez era—when two anti-drug chiefs were first investigated for ties to the cartels they purported 
to dismantle. 
14  I note that the report simply states that its investigation is the product of three years of field research in 
Venezuela, but no methodological details are given. 
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President Maduro himself in May 2020), the list does not explain how evidence has been 
collected.  
More compelling are the allegations made by Hugo Carvajal, former high level Chavista and 
head of Venezuela’s intelligence service, who has also been indicted and faces extradition for 
drug trafficking; Leamsy Salazar, Chávez’s former bodyguard, who defected in 2014; and Eladio 
Aponte, former Venezuelan supreme Court Justice who fled in 2012. They have all been source 
witnesses for the US Department of Justice in these allegations. In 2020, Maduro himself, and 
another 14 members of his cabinet were charged by then US attorney General William Barr 
for their intimate connections to the drug trade. 
For supporters of the government and solidarity activists interviewed here, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the ‘war on drugs’ is an excuse: it aids espionage and 
intelligence in the countries it operates in (see Lefebvre (2014). The Chávez and Morales 
governments expelled the DEA from their countries in 2005 and 2008 respectively alleging 
espionage. This has created the sense amongst these supporters that none of the news 
regarding drug-trafficking is accurate. 
For journalists Koerner and Vaz (2019): 
The goal is never to prove anything or present substantive debate, but to further poison 
the well of US public opinion against Venezuela, legitimating regime change as US state 
policy. Rather than victims of murderous US sanctions, Venezuelans are depicted as the 
purveyors of an anti-American drug war. In fact, the most egregious dealers of death and 
deceit in the hemisphere are, as always, US policymakers and their stenographers in the 
corporate media. 
Koerner and Vaz (2019), in their article criticising a report by the Wall Street Journal, feel all 
defectors have a “clear incentive to fabricate information in order to secure their status in the 
United States and protect themselves against possible prosecution.” According to their 
subheading, the media and the US treasury is “relying on traitors’ testimony”—their use of the 
word ‘traitor’ assumes that defecting from the government is treasonous, which speaks to their 
bias. The authors do not mention those that have been imprisoned for drug charges: for 
example, the nephews of Cilia Flores, the First Lady, apprehended as they attempted to seal a 
deal that would smuggle 800 kilograms of cocaine into the US, and sentenced to 18 years in 
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prison. They also fail to mention the Air France flight that departed from Caracas with 1.3 tons 
of cocaine on board, under the purview of the Venezuelan Bolivarian National Guard. For 
Koerner and Vaz “independently verifiable evidence” is missing. How this could be garnered, 
however, is unclear.  
What does seem clear is that the Plan Colombia, successfully enacted in cooperation with the 
US, forced drug routes via Venezuela (see Smilde 2017). Drugs can only traffic through 
Venezuela with the consent of the Armed Forces. Whether top officials in the Maduro and 
Chávez governments are directly benefitting from the trade, or simply turning a blind eye to it 
is hard to determine. It is possible that allegations incriminating them have been done so 
hastily, but in either case, the converging testimonies described, at very different time points, 
can hardly be dismissed.  
There is no definitive way to prove whether the government is in fact a ‘mafia’. What is 
important to stress here is how the discourse—in referencing criminality—makes use of 
morality to build an impenetrable divide, an argument I make often in this research. Guaidó 
can exhort for forgiveness, but if the other side is accused of being a ‘mafia’, this is exceedingly 
uphill to achieve. 
The paradox of Violence 
All Venezuelan migrants interviewed had been victims of criminal activity of some sort—some 
had been kidnapped, others lost a member of their family robbed at gunpoint. Most talked of 
wanting a ‘normal,’ ‘peaceful’ life, in reference to their living in fear and their decision to 
migrate, as I discuss in chapter 8. Caracas became the most violent city in the world in 2016, in 
terms of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. It has remained in the top-three since 2011.  
From 2006 to 2013, the most significant problem for Venezuelans became ‘insecurity’—above 
unemployment, corruption, the economy, and political instability. The inordinate levels of 
criminality significantly coloured their understanding of the ‘immoral’ qualities of their fellow 
citizens and their disillusionment with the country more broadly. Crime and impunity are, 
with reason, at the heart of their discontent with the Chávez and Maduro presidencies. It is in 
 
91 
part how Venezuelans understand being ‘wronged’ as I also discuss in chapter 8.15 Of 
significance is that fact that criminality is not an issue that solidarity activists bring up in the 
interviews. 
The exponential rise in homicides and petty delinquency (tripled in the years between 1998 
and 2008) is particularly unnerving given that—at least in the Chávez years—poverty was 
reduced on many accounts (as discussed above). The paradox is still under-examined. 
Structural accounts point to the fact that more than 56 percent of Venezuelans were under 30-
years of age in 2009, and 16 percent of young males were unemployed. Most state-centric 
accounts believe part of problem revolved around a well-intentioned but inefficient approach 
to crime, where police forces and judicial institutions were neglected, in the hope that 
decreasing poverty and inequality would solve the structural issues around criminal activity 
(Briceño-León 2012; Zubillaga 2013; Smilde 2017). A dramatic decrease of detentions, following 
President Chávez’s preference for no suppression, led to high disorder in judicial processes 
and impunity. In 1998, for every 100 homicides, there were 118 arrests. By 2010 there were barely 
9 arrests for every 100 homicides, i.e. 91 percent of homicides had no arrests, ruling or sentence. 
Police forces became increasingly involved in crime, and those disproportionately affected by 
were the urban poor—Chávez’s political base (Zubillaga 2013). For Samet (2019, 35) policing 
was “just the tip of the iceberg”: courts were ineffective, prisons were ‘incubators’ of organised 
crime, firearms were ubiquitous. 
Answers to the question of violence in Venezuela lie beyond the scope of this research. Maps 
of the most violent areas of Venezuela show that border regions, and areas along the drug 
routes, are the most violent—i.e., part of the problem points to this increased competition for 
dominance in the illicit market.  
For Smilde (2017; see also Crespo and Birkbeck 2009; Crespo 2017) however, it is the de-
legitimisation of institutions—understood as the breakdown of their moral authority to exert 
power—that holds the important part of the puzzle. For Smilde (2017) more specifically, the 
influx of extraordinary oil rents undermined the government’s “institutional capacity for 
 
15 See also Samet 2019, Deadline. 
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exerting social control.” Smilde (2017) does not explain exactly how this occurs, yet one could 
suspect that the sudden influx of resources makes them more susceptible to corruption. The 
government prioritised relieving certain short-term social issues by creating para-institutional 
organisations—such as the missions I discuss in the next section—which meant reducing the 
funding available for traditional institutions (police, schools, large public hospitals, etc).  
Ethnographic accounts have highlighted the diminished mechanisms of socialisation that 
foment empathy—in other words “the means through which individual actors adopt 
particular norms, rules, and practices associated with membership of a given group” (Rodgers 
2017, 648). Merton’s cultural strain theory, which suggests people will find alternative means 
to achieve culturally valued goals, i.e. not simply the education and means of subsistence that 
Chávez had thought were sufficient. Violence became a major source of self-worth, and 
appearance and material wealth became increasingly valued during the Chávez era (Crespo 
2010; Moreno et al. 2009; Smilde 2017). Crespo (2010), distinguishing between cases of criminal 
actors before and after the 2000s, understands the absence of these empathy mechanisms as 
Durkheimian ‘anomie’: before 2000s criminal actors still saw their actions as illicit; newcomers 
to crime in the years of Chávez and Maduro did not. Crespo (2010) also points at specific 
psychosocial authoritarian and narcissistic personalities product of de-socialisation in 
Venezuela. Others emphasise how violence becomes moralised in its prevalence: to survive, 
and defend your own, violence is required. 
Clearly, the undertaken research in this area has diagnosed some of the issues, but it leaves 
much unanswered. I note in reference to the paradox, taking from Smilde (2017) and Ponce and 
González (2015), that the poverty reduction achieved by the Chávez government was 
‘superficial’ to the extent that quality of employment, education, and neighbourhoods 
remained largely unchanged. Increased income was, in effect, transferred to those spaces still 
affected by structural violence “creating new inequalities, resentments and conflicts typical of 
processes of change” (Smilde 2017, 308). 
I also note that Chávez although against any repressive model of policing, adopted a mix of 
‘progressive’ (humanist) and ‘heavy-handed’ (mano dura) militaristic policies. Maduro, in 
contrast, would very openly embrace the use of deadly operatives against the residents of the 
barrios, and began a practice of systemic extra-legal executions (Hanson and Zubillaga 2018; 
UNCHR 2019; 2020). In fact, in 2017, the General Prosecutor of Venezuela confirmed that 21 
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percent of the violent deaths that had occurred that year, had been in the hands of the state. 
The overwhelming levels of criminality, and perhaps more importantly the state’s 
devolvement in it, were never mentioned by supporters of the government interviewed here.16  
I return to these theoretical ideas in chapter 4, before turning to the empirical work with these 
issues in mind. I will first look at transnational solidarity networks and how they have evolved 
historically, as a means to contextualise the work of Venezuela solidarity.  
  
 
16  Taking from Wacquant (2001) and Mbembé (2003), we can understand this ‘hardened hand’ as a 
compensatory mechanism to account for state policing’s lack of legitimacy, a form of ‘necropolitics’: the post-







Chapter 3. Transnational solidarity  
 
The central question regarding transnational solidarity networks, such as the ones interviewed 
for this research, perplexes any rational choice account of political behaviour: how does an 
‘other’ become a political subject that needs to be defended, or to whom responsibilities are 
owed? (Stites Mor 2013).  
In this chapter, I look at how transnational solidarity movements have evolved historically 
within the left, and take a brief look at other solidarity movements in the continent, most 
notably those for Nicaragua, Cuba, the Zapatistas, and Chile—all strongly related to 
Venezuela solidarity. I also examine the concept of XXI Century socialism, coined by Heinz 
Dietrich Steffan that made Chávez’s revolution so attractive to many outside Venezuela, 
importantly solidarity activists. I then describe how the different Venezuela solidarity 
campaigns interviewed here, see themselves and their goals within the broader 
‘internationalist left,’ taking from their websites and pamphlets. Lastly, I examine the origins 
of ‘solidarity’ as a philosophical, but specifically moral concept, or deontology: intricately tied, 
as thinkers in the 19th and 20th centuries argue, to our understanding of our relationship to 
others, and what our social duties ought to look like. The concept can help situate, at least 
theoretically, some of the feelings, values and aspirations that participants of this study share, 
especially those that see themselves as being ‘in solidarity’ with Chávez’s revolution. 
Origins of international solidarity 
Solidarity Song  
Peoples of the world, together  
Join to serve the common cause!  
So it feeds us all forever  
See to it that it’s now yours.  
Forward, without forgetting  
Where our strength can be seen now to be!  
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When starving or when eating  
Forward, not forgetting  
Our solidarity!  
Black or white or brown or yellow  
Leave your old disputes behind.  
Once start talking with your fellow  
Men, you’ll soon be of one mind.  
 
In the solidarity song, written at the end of the 1920s, Bertold Brecht (its lyricist) extols the 
potential different peoples—of different colours—must be “of one mind.” Here lives “a wish to 
share and act commonly in order to overcome the atomising pressures of a voracious 
imperialist capitalism,” interpret Hatzky and Stites Mor (2014, 127).  
The aims of the international workers’ movement, echoed in this song, called for a global 
working-class solidarity able to transcend national and racial confines—historically, a goal 
central to the socialist tradition. 
Scholarly accounts on international solidarity movements share no singular historic thread, 
though Hatzky and Stites Mor (2014, 132) trace the origins of solidarity to the anti-slavery 
movement that began in the 1790s, as well as more general struggles of class solidarity in 19th 
century Europe. I note they mean of solidarity campaigns and not the political-moral concept I 
discuss at the end of this chapter. The Anti-Slavery Societies in Europe and North America 
were precursors to modern-day transnational movements. Their success in 1807 was “the first 
collective and public expression of global solidarity and protection of human rights,” and 
benefitted from the transnational activities of former slaves like Frederick Douglass (Hatzky 
and Stites Mor 2014, 132). As one of the first examples of transnational solidarity with Latin 
America, Jones (2014) acknowledges the men that left Britain in the 1800s to fight in Simón 
Bolívar’s independence wars.  
Most other historical accounts of solidarity movements begin with Charles Fourier and the 
utopian writers of mid 19th century France, who called for ideas of fraternal justice and new 
models of ‘association’ and ‘harmony.’ The utopian socialists and later Marxists opposed the 
“liberal attitude in capitalist England,” (ter Meulen 2017, 36) which resulted in the appalling 
living conditions of the working classes. In this period, working class movements began 
arguing for a working-class solidarity centred on shared class oppression—a solidarity that 
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could rebuild social unity post industrialisation. In fact, Marx, living in exile in the UK, was 
especially impressed by Britain’s working-class movements and their ties to the North in the 
American Civil War (Featherstone 2012). 
Internationalism and anti-imperialism 
In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels speak of ‘proletariat internationalism’: an 
overcoming of nationalist preoccupations to allow for an international united workers’ struggle 
that could signal the road to a communist and classless society (Zoll 2000).  
In an analysis of Karl Marx’s later writings, Foster (2000), distinguishes the key elements of 
socialist Marxist internationalism: 1) the critique of international exploitation, and 2) the 
national and international working-class movement—although a once-promised book on the 
‘world market’ would never come to fruition (Marshall 2014).  
The ideas inspired the founding of the First International (1864-1876) in London, and the 
Second International (1889-1916) in Paris. They would mark the origins of a form of “global 
consciousness,” central to today’s solidarity activism (Hope 2011, 12). Trotsky, most notably, 
understood that the Russian Revolution’s long-term survival depended entirely on its global 
success. This need for ‘internationalism’ and a global-workers’ alliance would become 
cemented in the voice of Lenin, and one of his key texts Imperialism: The highest stage of 
capitalism, that saw global revolution as the only way to overcome capitalism’s crisis and 
‘revisionism’ in general (Lenin 1996 [1916]).  
The espoused cosmopolitanism that guided the founding of the Second International fell 
before the decision of most socialist parties to support their governments in the First World 
War (Keck and Sikkink 1998). It was a betrayal for Lenin, who saw the war as imperialistic: “an 
annexationist, predatory and plunderous war,” in his words (Lenin 1996 [1916]), one that 
exploited the proletariat to advance a bourgeois state. Lenin’s imperialism can be understood 
more broadly as a “structural domination of peripheral countries and regions by core powers” 
through financial capital, exploitation of resources, monopolistic capitalist associations, and 
the territorial division of the world among a few capitalist powers (Lenin 1996 [1916]; 
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Domínguez López and Yaffe 2017, 2518). Venezuela solidarity activism shares Lenin’s 
perspective on anti-imperialism, as I discuss in chapter 9. 
The Third international, also known as Communist International (or Comintern) was 
conceived as a highly centralised proletarian party with local Communist Parties, called on by 
Lenin himself in Moscow in 1919. The Comintern included anti-colonial movements and 
resolved, among other things, to overthrow the ‘international bourgeoisie.’ Revolution would 
have serious and tragic outcomes in the 20th century, but the Comintern—albeit in a 
paternalistic way—was the first to form a movement of workers struggling under capitalism 
and ‘distant others’ struggling under imperial rule (Fisher 1955; Hatzky and Stites Mor 2014).  
From these ideas, and taking an ideological stance similar to that of solidarity activists, Foster 
(2000) suggests no genuine internationalism can exist “that does not have anti-imperialism at 
its heart.” Harris (2009, 28), again from the perspective of the more radical left, and looking 
specifically at internationalism, distinguishes between two forms of cooperation between 
people of all nations for the common good: liberal (which he understands as bourgeois) and 
socialist (proletarian) exemplified by the Cuban regime. Harris (2009) notes that Fidel Castro 
and Ernesto Guevara theorised a concept of ‘internationalist solidarity’ that was inspired by 
Marx’s and Lenin’s anti-imperialism, and by the anti-imperialism of Jose Martí, Antonio 
Maceo, and Simón Bolívar. For El Ché, the Cuban Revolution was “in solidarity with all the 
oppressed peoples of the world” (Guevara 1997 [1961], 229): Cuban internationalism, and true 
solidarity more purposefully, seeks to collaborate in the independence and revolutionary 
struggles of other countries (this included Venezuela in 1962).  
For Harris (2009, 28)—and solidarity activists—‘liberal’ internationalism, based on European 
cosmopolitanism, does not oppose:  
the exploitative relations of production, the unequal international division of labour, the 
global stratification of power and privileges, the unjust distribution of income and wealth, 
and the hegemonic domination that are inherent in the existing international order. 
Castro’s and Guevara’s internationalism, on the other hand, does. I problematise the way in 
which solidarity activists fail to question if the Bolivarian Revolution has dealt with the 
injustices Harris (2009) mentions effectively—however from his perspective, the point of 
internationalism is not necessarily to correct these failures and injustices, but rather to oppose 
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and make them visible. I note, however, that the anti-US sentiment of Venezuela solidarity 
activists is based on moral outrage against US foreign policy and interventionism—and not, 
say, anti-corporatism.  
The Americas and the anti-imperial struggle 
The idea “that workers on one side of the world could alleviate the struggle of workers living 
under a dictatorship on the other” (Jones 2014, 1), continued at the core of the international 
labour movement throughout the 20th century. It fostered the World Congress against 
Imperialism and Colonial Oppression in Brussels in 1927 which allowed participants from 
Latin America, Africa and Asia to network, discuss and develop their own ideas of 
revolutionary socialism—ideas sometimes counter to the ‘orthodox Left’ (Hatzky and Stites 
Mor 2014). The network would eventually lead to one of the first cases of South-South 
solidarity movements in Latin America: the “Hands off Nicaragua” committee, founded in 
Mexico in 1928, that aimed to support the guerrilla war of César Augusto Sandino against US 
intervention—a movement that would be resurrected in the 1980s against Reagan era foreign 
policy, as I discuss in the next section.  
Diverse US social movement also played a role in international solidarity. For Striffler (2019) 
throughout the 1800s, and early 1900s the US public associated empire with Europe. While 
some felt that US military intervention was a betrayal to US democratic values, others simply 
did not want to “incorporate ‘tropical peoples’ into the nation-state”; for Striffler (2019, 21) this 
was simply a racist, paternalistic and “oddly imperial form of anti-imperialism” that is not 
‘internationalist’ in the sense I have been describing. It had no qualms about intervention and 
extended US presence in Latin America— it simply disliked ‘colonies.’   
Striffler (2019) distinguishes two independent streams of US anti-imperialism: black 
internationalism, that related racial oppression within America’s borders with the US’ push 
for expansion; and the (whiter) radical-socialist movement that made a similar connection. 
Black internationalism was particularly active in the Spanish Civil War, as part of what 
Featherstone (2012, emphasis added) calls “an ongoing engagement with the shifting maps of 
 
100 
grievance through which fascism was contested.”17 The Mexican Revolution and the US 
military’s occupation of the Caribbean intensified more radical feelings of anti-imperialism in 
the first two decades of 20th century. However, once the US emerges from the Second World 
War a superpower, there was little domestic opposition to an empire, and under McCarthyism 
the labour movement itself purged the Left out of its ranks.  
Human rights and solidarity movements in the 
mid-to-late 20th century 
For Striffler (2019, 11), it was the undermining of progressive left politics and the dismantling of 
the left in America at the onset of the Cold War, that “essentially destroyed the broad current 
of anti-imperialism” narrated here. Alternative internationalisms emerged and Human Rights 
advocacy came to play a central role in emerging transnational movements, with a distinctive 
form of ‘solidarity’ divorced from political projects, one that used professional organisations 
and NGOs to respond to more urgent crises (Striffler 2019). For Striffler (2019, 15), however, and 
from the perspective of the radical left in the US, even when these groups opposed 
neoliberalism, they shared in its logic by “embracing a politics that moved away from the state 
as a key site of struggle.” 
Throughout the 20th century, the Latin American left, more specifically, understood 
transnational solidarity, of the kind I discuss in this section, represented “a powerful political 
resource for accessing public opinion in distant regions of the world” (Hatzky and Stites Mor 
2014, 130). In other words, they awarded coveted “external validation” (Stites Mor 2013, 4). 
These campaigns today are aimed at granting international legitimacy, or what theorists call 
‘political cosmopolitanism,’ a concept I discuss in the next chapter.  
 
17 I return to the idea of grievance and populism in chapter 4.  
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I note that a famous derogatory expression for one who provides this ‘external validation’ is 
‘useful idiot.’ The expression is attributed to both Stalin and Lenin, although the facts behind 
this are contested. For Stalin, validators included most prominently the Moscow 
correspondent for the New York Times, and Pulitzer Prize winner, Walter Duranty, who highly 
praised his regime in the paper. The idea relates to how Venezuelan migrants see solidarity 
activists: i.e., as ‘naïve outsiders’, ideologues who blindly aid a regime’s propaganda efforts 
internationally. I argue that for solidarity activists, helping the Maduro and Chávez 
governments gain legitimacy abroad represents a deontology or moral duty.18 They believe the 
most important way they can contribute to the Bolivarian project is by helping Maduro 
improve his international standing and avoid intervention in Venezuela.  
Chile Solidarity Campaigns in the US and UK 
Importantly, for some of the themes in this thesis, human rights violations in Latin America 
during the 20th century were generally targeted at the left (Striffler 2019). In fact, a history of 
transnational human rights activism can be traced to the estimated 200,000 Chilean exiles who 
formed diaspora communities and alliances with leftist groups in their host countries (Kelly 
2013). Kelly (2013, 167) also names these groups ‘solidarity activists’: “an ad-hoc group of exiles 
and leftists who worked ‘in solidarity’ against the abuse of military dictatorship.” For Kelly, 
solidarity activists shared “higher devotion to a political cause” (2013, 167, emphasis added), that 
he contrasts with Amnesty International’s shunning of any mention of politics in its bid to 
transcend political squabbles.  
Solidarity activists interviewed here (some exiles, others part of Chile solidarity campaigns) 
draw parallels between Allende’s story then, and Venezuela’s crisis today. For them and leftists 
world-wide, Salvador Allende’s democratic triumph stood as the beginning of a pacifist 
socialism, one that was brutally eviscerated by Augusto Pinochet’s US-backed coup in 1973.19 
 
18  See chapter 9 for a complete discussion of this theme in the interviews. 
19  This idea is not however factually correct: the communist party in the Indian state of Kerala had already 
been elected to rule democratically and pacifically in the state as early as 1957. 
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The US’ hand in the matter is no secret. The CIA spent millions helping the campaign against 
Allende, even paying the head of the secret police. Records released in the early 2000s also 
confirmed the CIA received direct instruction from Nixon to attempt to foment the coup (CBS 
September 19, 2000). The Venezuelan case looks no different to solidarity activists from the 
outside. 
Leftist groups in the US at the time established the Non-Intervention in Chile group and 
focused on disseminating alternative media products that countered the anti-Allende rhetoric 
in the mainstream press (Goff 2007). This solidarity group was part of the North American 
Congress on Latin America, NACLA, whose goals are still deeply related to those of solidarity 
activists today. According to their 1966 flier, they aimed to: “build a community of informed 
and committed individuals who combine research and action” and who would “work to 
broaden the base in North America for a reorientation of US policy toward Latin America.” 
For them a growing number of Americans at the time were troubled by the “widening gulf 
between [their] lives and interests and the lives, needs and aspirations of more than 200 million 
people of Central and South America” (as quoted in Goff 2007, 96). These concerns live on in 
the minds of many American solidarity activists interviewed here. 
The UK Chile Solidarity Campaign was also formed in the immediate aftermath of the coup 
in opposition to the new regime. This campaign attempted to build on “the empathy felt 
[towards] Allende’s socialist experiment” (Wilkinson 1992, 57) and focussed its lobbying efforts 
on the trade union movement and the Labour party. The campaign was more successful vis-à-
vis influence on UK policy: indeed, the then Labour government withdrew their ambassador 
to Chile as a result of the campaign’s pressure and even refused to renegotiate Chile’s debt.  
The 3000 Chilean refugees that had entered the UK helped maintain the campaign alive, even 
when the administration changed to the Tory Party in 1979. Although these international 
efforts lost momentum as the prospects of toppling Pinochet’s brutal regime became less 
certain, the campaign successfully managed to persuade MPs to take up human rights issues 
surrounding Pinochet’s government. I note that although many activists campaigned for 
human rights issues alongside Amnesty International at the time, today paradoxically, they 
accuse the organisation of being pro-US and recriminate its strong stance against Venezuela’s 
government (see chapter 9). 
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The Solidarity with Nicaragua campaign 
Social movements of the 1960s and the New Left, advocated for major social reforms and 
liberation from colonial domination and imperial hegemony, particularly in Central America 
(Heztky and Stites Mor 2014). The presence of revolutionary movements in El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua inspired the dimmed internationalist current that had been 
invested in a socialist revolution. For many of the internationalists seeking economic justice, 
what was happening in Central America became “the central pillar of hope and faith for those 
who still put their faith in social revolution” (Hobsbawm 1995, 436). Venezuela today is no 
different for many solidarity activists, as I describe in chapter 8. Nicaragua in particular stands 
out for the sheer number of times it has been under US occupation. As such, the country 
haunts the minds of many interviewees who associate the Sandinista fate to the Bolivarian one.  
The transnational campaign supporting Sandinistas in Nicaragua argued that it was not only 
supporting those struggling for liberation, but that the campaign was in fact weakening US 
imperialism—imperialism traced, again, directly to the CIA. The CIA trained, armed and 
directed the contra-revolucionarios, or Contras (a group of former National Guardsmen of the 
deposed Somoza government) after the popularly supported Sandinista Front for National 
Liberation came to power in 1979. Whilst operating out of Costa Rica and Honduras, as well as 
in parts of Nicaragua, the Contras attacked villages, killed and kidnapped thousands of 
civilians—those they deemed ‘Sandinistas.’ The Reagan administration also imposed an 
economic embargo on Nicaragua, blocked its international loans and even ignored a World 
Court ruling that deemed its actions against Nicaragua illegal. To sustain its policies, Reagan 
built (not surprisingly) a discourse around the criminality of the Sandinista government—a 
discourse that solidarity activists equate to the one surrounding opposition to the Chávez and 
Maduro governments today. I note that unlike what has happened in Venezuela, the CIA 
conducted military actions of its own in Nicaragua: aerial raids, attacks on oil tanks, and the 
mining of Nicaraguan harbours in 1984—all actions solidarity activists believed could befall 
Venezuela during the Trump Presidency.  
There were major activist networks pulling forces to halt the US-backed guerrilla war against 
the Sandinistas. The anti-Contra-war campaign involved over a thousand peace and justice 
organisations in 1983 and grew to over 7000 in 1986. The networks organised several successful 
activities aimed at engendering public but more importantly congressional opposition to the 
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war (Peace 2008, 63). A couple of the Americans interviewed here also visited Nicaragua and 
organised work brigades to help with the cotton and coffee plantations as part of these efforts 
in the 80s. The activists then returned to help build this very vibrant grass-roots campaign that 
lasted more than 7 years—i.e., until the Sandinistas were defeated at the ballot box in 1990.  
The campaign was highly successful and managed to raise the political cost of a direct US 
attack on Nicaragua and constrained US activity there (Peace 2008; Perla 2009). Indeed, Oliver 
North, part of Reagan’s security council at the time, wrote that the principal hindrance to 
intervention in Nicaragua was, in fact, US public opposition (Peace 2008).  
The UK Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign continues to exist and was always present at the 
Venezuela Solidarity events I attended. I note all the events I attended enjoyed the presence of 
both the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan ambassadors to the UK, who spoke on behalf of their 
respective governments and against, what they decry, is US terrorism and an international 
press conspiracy against their states. Thus, the campaigns serve as external communicational 
platforms for the governments they seek to defend. 
Both the Chilean and Nicaraguan campaigns are fundamental to Venezuela solidarity for 
several reasons, including the fact that many activists interviewed have participated in both. 
More importantly the events in those countries: 1) heightened the anti-American sentiment of 
the continent, and that of Americans who felt their policies were two-faced, excessive and 
outright immoral; and 2) they advanced the sense that the US treated Latin America as its 
backyard, i.e. it refused to let it’s people choose their own fate unless its governments subject 
to American liberalism. The two campaigns promoted the sense that activism of this kind 
could be (relatively) successful. 
Cuba Solidarity 
Perhaps even more foundational to the solidarity work around Venezuela has been the work 
in favour of Cuba’s revolutionary government. Cuba’s political leaders have been seeking 
ideological allies to stand with them against isolationism ever since they got into power. 
Although the revolution was unable to continue its direct sponsorship of insurrections around 
the world, it designed promotional materials and global campaigns that sought to disseminate 
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the key premise of left solidarity: the disenfranchised around the world can unite (Bustamante 
and Sweig 2008).  
US aggression towards Cuba and its civilians (known as the Cuban Project or Operation 
Mongoose) was a leading focus of the Kennedy administration. The project included repeated 
attempts to overthrow the regime, amongst them the infamous ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion launched 
in 1961—a conflict that set the stage for the US-Soviet confrontation commonly known as the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The US’ apparently ineffective and highly unpopular subsequent 
policies towards Cuba have in fact helped the regime draw the victim card and gain much 
sympathy around the globe. Cuba has done so more successfully than once oil-rich Venezuela, 
and the Eastern Block, despite its unwillingness to grant civil liberties and other basic political 
rights to its citizens. It is no surprise then that Cubans have spent considerable energy 
organising brigades that give foreigners the opportunity to view their model first-hand, under 
the aegis of the Cuban Institute for Friendship and Peoples. Cuba’s symbolic role as an 
‘underdog’ rebel has indeed become mythologised through the years in great part due to the 
revolution’s long-standing achievements in health and education, ones that are even more 
impressive given the economic blockade.  
The large UK branch of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign has been active for around 57 years, 
according to its ‘About us’ page. It campaigns for an end to the blockade and the US’ 
occupation of Guantánamo—a blockade which, according to the campaign, is aimed at 
“toppling the revolutionary government,” a phrase solidarity activists repeat often when 
mentioning Venezuela.  It also lobbies MPs in the UK, organises brigades and specialist tours, 
sells Cuban merchandise, and works with some unions and NGOs in Cuba. More recently, the 
organisation signed a letter of appeal to President Biden published as an advertisement in the 
New York Times on July 23rd 2021.  
A successful strategy often employed by both solidarity campaigns involves hailing any anti-
revolutionary as violence-prone. It is not surprising then that the Cuba Solidarity Campaign 
recently retweeted the aggressive comments made by Miami Mayor, Francis Suárez, who 
called for military action against the current Cuban government (July 16 2021) to emphasise 
this precisely. Among other comments the organisation retweeted is the related idea of: “Latin 
Americans are always silenced if they don’t agree with the US” (July 18 2021). Both retweets 
attempt to argue: 1) that the blockade seeks to topple a popular government, and 2) that the US 
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attacks anyone in Latin America who does not agree with them. These are, again, central tenets 
of solidarity discourse that are extrapolated to the Venezuelan case. 
Although the Cuba Solidarity campaign has had what is arguably ‘superficial’ impact, 
opposition to the embargo has grown in the UN and even in the seats of the US Congress. 
Obama very prominently changed the tune towards Cuba in his presidency, although 
believing that the campaign was responsible for this, is very much a stretch.  
Zapatista Solidarity and the Anti-globalisation movement 
Post-Marxist thinking of the late 20th century argued that for NGO’s to be successful in 
achieving transformation, they had to link their interventions to “an overarching radical 
analysis of the causes of underdevelopment,” focused on the empowerment of marginalised 
groups (Hope 2011, 5, emphasis added). One of the interviewees of this study specifically 
mentions Gunther Frank’s development thinking and dependency theory: in the interviewee’s 
words “that underdevelopment was not a condition of backwardness, but something that is 
done to people. And it’s done by the imperialist countries” [interview with Andy 2019]. This 
thinking was central to the Anglo-Saxon baby-boomer solidarity activists I interviewed that 
saw in afro-indigenous Chávez and his participatory politics the opposition to imperialism 
they had envisioned.  
The momentum of the left’s campaigns after the fall of the communist world in Eastern 
Europe—and Fukuyama's (1992) alleged ‘end of history’—focused, therefore, on shedding light 
on the resulting poverty and social exclusion brought about by the neoliberal economic 
policies of the new ideological hegemony; the original, more ambitious left internationalism 
became harder to sustain as trade union solidarity faced increased resistance (Bieler 2014). 
Transnational solidarity campaigns began to represent a new role for the left, raising 
awareness towards political subjects in other places, and groups that shared in this ‘common 
cause’—opposing NAFTA, or supporting the Zapatistas in Mexico, for example.  
The uprising of the Zapatistas—a group of mostly rural indigenous people—in the southern 
Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994, is considered the first post-communist rebellion in Latin 
America. Since then, the Zapatistas have sought to build an alternate and autonomous system 
of governance, that includes healthcare, education and food production. Though they align 
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themselves ideologically with the anti-neoliberal and anti-globalisation movement more 
broadly, they uniquely synthesise ideas from libertarian socialism, Marxism and Mayan 
tradition. The Zapatistas also oppose the plundering of natural resources, and practice what 
they call a ‘participatory’, radical or bottom-up politics that seeks to fight the state’s 
disconnection to el pueblo’s needs—a politics highly attractive to groups in the radical left, one 
related to Chávez’s own understanding of participatory democracy.  
The Zapatistas in particular, “caught the imagination of people both in Mexico and abroad,” 
and have inspired an impressive amount of scholarly work in the last two decades (Olesen 
2004b, 89; Cleaver 1998; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Khasnabish 2013). There are several 
support committees around the world that seek to raise awareness and spread the Zapatista 
message, the UK Zapatista Network, and the Chiapas Support Committee in the US being the 
largest and most influential. The Zapatistas have also arguably been a catalyst for broader 
online causes, hence its being named “a movement of movements” (Khasnabish 2013, 68).  
Zapatista solidarity is, in relative terms, much more appealing than Venezuela solidarity today. 
The Zapatistas have had a highly successful communication strategy, and attracted high-
profile figures such as Oliver Stone, Naomi Klein, Gabriel García Márquez, Eduardo Galeano 
among others to their cause—the kind of support Chávez managed to garner from celebrities 
early-on. I note that original support for Chávez waned once President Maduro’s human rights 
abuses became vox-populi; only the support of very minor groups in the radical left remain. 
Support for Zapatismo is, clearly, not nearly as controversial. 
Lastly, I add that the anti-war and anti-globalisation movements of the early 2000s (whose 
expansive growth and development is attributed to the growth of the internet) were also 
important strategic allegiances for the Zapatista movement, and some of the solidarity work 
described here. As an example, Mack, one of the activists interviewed here, began his 
‘solidarity journey’ fighting in the war in Iraq, and later joined others against it through the Act 
Now to Stop the War coalition (ANSWER) that was part of this broader movement. 
Bustamante and Sweig (2008, 228) in fact call the movements “a new framework through which 
to sell [Cuba’s] ideas to a broader public,” although is important to bear in mind that these 
movements have been substantially more widespread than those focused on supporting the 
left in Latin America. 
 
108 
The movements are said to have risen from opposition to free-trade agreements originally, 
though have no singular leader, or name. Their consensus is instead based on an opposition to 
neo-liberalism, corporatism, and an urge to preserve the natural environment; hence why 
many scholars, including Noam Chomsky, point out that ‘anti-globalisation’ is in fact a 
misnomer:  
“No sane person is opposed to globalization, that is, international integration. Surely not the 
left and the workers movements, which were founded on the principle of international 
solidarity—that is, globalization in a form that attends to the rights of people, not private 
power systems” (Croatian Feral Tribune May 2 2002). 
Chomsky’s quote points at some of the core themes discussed thus far around solidarity: how 
it is in favour of the rights of the people, and hence very much against private enterprise. The 
interviews with solidarity activists, and their involvement with these movements more 
specifically, show that activists’ view of past US involvement indeed colours their discourse, 
understandings, and fears, around the Venezuelan conflict. What is important to note about 
all these movements and who they defend, as McPherson (2003) argues, is that the US history 
of involvement in Latin America in particular, grants political clout to any resistance to the US 
(domestic or international).  
Political Parties and Solidarity Work 
We could assume that solidarity activists follow what politicians in their own countries have 
to say about Venezuela. Yet this was only the case for those in the UK intricately tied to former 
Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn and the political movement Momentum (which seeks to reform 
the Labour party from within), and those with ties to Unidas Podemos in Spain.  
In 2013, the then Labour backbencher praised Chávez and his revolution as an “inspiration to 
all of us fighting back against austerity and neoliberal economics.” His shadow Home 
Secretary, Diane Abbott, said back in 2012 “I think the importance of Venezuela is it shows 
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another way is possible”—a theme of ‘hope’ repeated consistently across the interviews.20  
Corbyn, and his entourage would later refrain from commenting on Venezuela once Corbyn 
was elected leader of the party: their association with Chavismo was being used by the press to 
argue that he aimed to turn the UK into another Venezuela, no doubt a blunt over-statement. 
Corbyn mostly refrained from commenting on Maduro’s government publicly; he only spoke 
about “opposing outside interference in Venezuela” (The Guardian, February 3 2019). Once he 
stepped down, he renewed his involvement with both the Cuba and the Venezuela solidarity 
campaigns: throughout the lockdown in 2020, he actively conference-called in and attended 
several of the campaign’s events online. 
A couple of UK-based interviewees, specifically those associated to the International Marxist 
Tendency (IMT), consider Corbyn to be a reformist, and so were critical of his tenure. The 
Tendency is an orthodox Trotskyist organisation founded by Ted Grant, long-time leader of 
the original Militant Tendency. It conformed the Committee for a Workers’ international in 
1974, at the time the largest Trotskyist organisation in Europe. Grant separated from the 
committee in 1992, after disputes regarding whether to work together with the Labour party in 
the UK (which Grant originally favoured) and founded the IMT. Grant’s new IMT, today led 
by his friend Alan Woods, believes strongly in ending privatisation and market economics, and 
instead believes in introducing a state monopoly of foreign trade. Solidarity activists that 
belong to the tendency dislike Corbyn’s reformism; they are also very much against the 
policies of Maduro’s government for the same reasons, and were not surprisingly therefore 
involved with the new anti-Maduro Chavista party, the Alternativa Popular Revolucionaria.  
In Spain, solidarity activists were members of Izquierda Unida and Podemos—now Unidas 
Podemos, a party that has been presented in the Spanish press as being “under the shadow of 
its connection to Chavismo” (El Mundo, December 14 2018). Some of the members of the party 
have even been advisers to the Venezuelan government, most notably Juan Carlos Monedero, 
who circulated part of the discourse on Socialism of the XXI Century (see the next section). 
The press’ attack on Chavista-leaning politicians has had decidedly more muscle in Spain than 
 
20  I discuss this theme of ‘hope in the alternative to neoliberalism’ in chapter 9, page 240.  
 
110 
in the UK, given historic ties between Spain and Venezuela, and the number of Venezuelan 
migrants there. Venezuela’s crisis is also a consistent topic in the Spanish press: most 
Spaniards know of President Maduro but cannot name the President of Portugal. It is no 
surprise then that Unidas Podemos have also distanced themselves from the Bolivarian 
movement, again, seeing how the press has feasted on Spanish politicians’ relationship to 
Chavismo.  
The government of Pedro Sánchez, from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ party (conformed in 
coalition with Unidas Podemos) has been ambivalent towards Chavismo, perhaps for these 
reasons. Although Sánchez has officially recognised Guaidó as interim president, like most EU 
countries, and given asylum to opposition leader Leopoldo López, Sánchez refused (unlike 
Macron or Johnson) to receive Guiadó personally. Much like Corbyn, Pablo Iglesias, leader of 
Unidas Podemos and ex Vice President, stopped praising Chavismo, but has continued to speak 
against intervention (see chapter 9). During the course of the interviews, I also spoke briefly to 
another ex-leader of Podemos and ex-fan of the Bolivarian Revolution, Iñigo Errejón. It was 
equally difficult to tell his current stance on Venezuela: Errejón openly stated the Bolivarian 
movement had fundamentally gone astray, but it was clear he would never side with the 
opposition, or advocate for intervention there.  
Solidarity activists point to this attack on their politicians when explaining why they distrust 
what is published in the media on Venezuela: even if the ills that afflict the country are true, 
the only reason they appear in the press is to make Iglesias, Corbyn and socialism look bad.21 
Solidarity activists did not question their chosen politicians’ distance from their cause: they 
simply highlighted the role the press has had in ‘silencing’ them and socialism’s successes 
more broadly.  
 
21  I discuss this resistance to the media in chapter 5.  
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Socialism of the XXI Century 
In his book, Der Sozialismus des 21 Jahrhunderts, German sociologist Heinz Dietrich Steffan 
(1996) argues that the leading 20th Century ideologies, free-market capitalism and Marxism-
Leninism, had failed to solve humanity’s problems: hunger, exploitation, economic 
oppression, sexism, racism or the destruction of natural resources. Dietrich argued that the 
process by which to achieve a transformation of society should be ‘revolutionary,’ yet not 
violent or immediate, rather gradual and peaceful—a discourse that would be extremely 
appealing to Chávez’s early idealism. Dietrich (and later Chilean scholar Martha Harnecker et 
al., 2012) would underline this new socialism’s commitment to a participative democracy, one 
that expressly distances itself from the mistakes of its Soviet incarnation. As I noted in the 
introduction, this commitment to democracy as a fundamental normative value—above, say, 
future equality or the empowerment of the popular classes—is debated amongst solidarity 
activists. I turn to this topic in chapter 5. 
Chávez, heavily influenced by Dietrich at the time, told participants of the 2005 World Social 
Forum (WSF) that it was their task to re-invent socialism: “a new type of socialism, a humanist 
one which puts humans and not machines or the state ahead of everything.” He added that this 
is “possible to do under democracy, but not under the type of democracy being imposed from 
Washington” (venezuelanalysis.com, January 31 2005). Importantly, Chávez reasoned that the 
answers would emerge as new systems develop, so long as these systems were “built on 
cooperation, not competition.”  
Juan Carlos Monedero, a Spanish academic from the Complutense University of Madrid, 
(initially a founding member of Podemos in Spain, and an adviser to Hugo Chávez) would also 
take a stab at building a theoretical definition that could underlie the so-called Socialism of the 
XXI century. Monedero would tie the concept to what he calls the “radicalization of the golden 
rule,” or in other words, the idea “that socialism is love” (Monedero 2008, n.p.). With empathy 
as a society’s pre-eminent normative value, socialism is: 
a system of social, normative, political and economic and cultural organisation that 
searches for liberty and justice, able to harmonize society’s material, institutional and 
intellectual resources, with the goal of achieving the equality of personal capacities, the 
liberties of individuals and collectives, the solidarity amongst members of the 
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community, the defence of differences, the respect of the environment, peace between 
nations and equal conditions for all the peoples of the world (Monedero 2008, n.p.) 
I note that the concept of love was tied to several of Chávez electoral campaigns—that of 2006, 
for example, with the slogan “Chávez por amor.” I discuss the importance of the concept of 
solidarity Monedero mentions at the end of this chapter, and how solidarity activists in fact 
express ‘love’ for the Venezuelan people and Chávez more fully in chapter 7. Here I note that 
Monedero’s understanding of this new socialism is, inadvertently or not, influenced by 
liberalism: in its defence of the liberties (of both individuals and collectives), and especially its 
defence of ‘difference’—ideas that do not tie in neatly with the more Manichean 
understanding of politics that are pushed in populist spheres.  
This updated, more liberal understanding of socialism is not reflected in the interviews, as I 
discuss in Part II. Solidarity activists did not refer to themselves as being 21st Century Socialists 
specifically: perhaps because, and this is especially true for those that had lived through the 
Cold War, the fight for socialism and solidarity was more than anything a fight against US 
imperialism. The concept is important in so far as it reflects activists desire to incorporate a 
peaceful and democratic transition to socialism and the emotional investment activists placed 
in the success of the Bolivarian revolution. 
Situating online transnational activism 
I note that most of today’s Venezuela solidarity activity has been enacted in the online world. 
As Gillan and Pickerill argue (back in 2008) in their account of transnational anti-war activism, 
the internet most certainly has facilitated transnational activism by offering “a relatively 
inexpensive and highly efficient means of transcending geographical boundaries” (2008, 60). 
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the internet has become the only way transnational activism 
can operate—Venezuela solidarity is no exception. Little has been written in regards to the 
influence online networks have had on left-solidarity campaigns more specifically, although 
of course, much can be translated from literature on digital activism and the digital public 
sphere more broadly, including the more recent #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter 
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movements.22 Bennett, Givens, and Breunig (2008) show how the internet, already in 2008, had 
become central to protesters’ daily activities and how reliant activists are on digital 
communications for their consumption of information. Devin (2011) does note how 
transnational solidarities remain fragmented and virtual, and insists that though they interfere 
in interstate relations, they are no substitute for them: they remain less effective at enacting 
policy change. Social networks have been, nevertheless, the principal way in which ‘discourse’ 
understood in a postmodern sense, ‘travels.’ They are also what I argue is the ‘antagonised 
sphere’ in which participants in this study interact with their respective causes and positions. 
Here I refrain on making an analysis of if and how digital spaces transform activism and 
political action more broadly, as these questions are already being tackled in studies looking 
at movements with more transnational clout than Venezuela solidarity campaigns. Rather, I 
explore how solidarity activists inhabit online spaces, and cope with their small scale of 
influence, in a world that is increasingly hostile to their ideas and beliefs. 
Venezuela Solidarity as a transnational network 
and campaign 
Basically, I often —as someone who helps to organise protests and movement activity— I 
often get asked to by my friends, who were not that political, even sometimes people in the 
movement: ‘you know, what? What impact can you have with a demonstration? Like, what 
does it really do?’ And one of the examples I often quote is the demonstration in Venezuela 
during the coup in 2002. And the massive impact of that had been, you know, really putting 
a stop to that and bringing Chavez back in. So I think yeah, I think that's incredibly 
inspiring, and something we can learn from [Sahas, interview 2019]. 
 
22  See Caiani and Pavan (2017) for an interesting account of what they call the “inconvenient solidarities” of 
extreme-right online networks in Europe; see Stephan (2013) for an account of the Arab Women’s Solidarity 
Association that used online networks as a ‘safe space’ to promote women’s rights in the Arab world. 
 
114 
The people of the barrios, the low-paid workers, the tenant farmers, the Afro-Venezuelans, 
the indigenous, the women, the LGBTQ+ coordinated with the military in order to defeat 
the coup and to defend their revolution. This says something important about the nature 
of the ongoing political struggle in Venezuela. It shows that the radical governments of the 
last two decades have achieved something very significant that goes beyond the economic 
benefits accrued to ordinary people, beyond the millions of homes built, beyond the 
provision of healthcare and education services. What has been created in Venezuela isn’t 
just a benevolent state; it’s a democratic revolutionary process that has given the working 
masses a voice, a stake in society. This process has politicised the millions, mobilised them, 
empowered them, drawn them for the first time into the running of their own society. It 
has taken up their interests and developed structures that allow them to take up their own 
interests. That’s why millions of Venezuelans defend their state even as it faces a level of 
systematic sabotage and destabilisation that’s creating widespread suffering [C, 
interviewee, part of an article written in his blog]. 
Here I explore the aims of several of the Venezuela solidarity campaigns and organisations—
what their ‘solidarity’ entails—as described by the groups themselves. It is outside the scope 
of this work to arrive at a history of international solidarity towards the Bolivarian revolution 
over the past 20 years of Chavismo—a history complicated by “ideological differentiation, lack 
of institutional continuity, and inconsistent presence” (Striffler 2019, 5)—to my knowledge, 
such history has yet to be written. However, I will trace the short history of the organisations 
involved, taking from the organisations themselves and some of the interviewees.23 
Here I note that although the campaigns themselves refer to solidarity ‘with Venezuela,’ they 
mean more specifically with Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and Chavismo. What the 
following exploration of the diverse groups hopes to show is that there are several competing 
sub-groups amongst solidarity groups—with competing agendas and priorities and 
associations that as I mention, are not always in tandem with one another. Importantly, 
although I have suggested Venezuela solidarity is ‘solidarity’ from the perspective of 
 
23 Steve Striffler’s (2019) book Solidarity: Latin America and the US Left makes an attempt at providing a history 
of broader US to Latin America solidarity, but overlooks Venezuela solidarity entirely—perhaps because it has 
become so controversial.  
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interviewees, it can also be understood theoretically as ‘political altruism’ given the relation of 
difference between activists in the Global North, and Venezuelans in the Global South. I 
explore these theoretical differences more specifically in the last section of this chapter.  
In their seminal work on advocacy networks in international politics, Keck and Sikkink (1998, 
x) suggest political science has “tended to ignore such nongovernmental actors because they 
are not ‘powerful’ in the classic sense of the term”: they depend simply on the production and 
exchange of information—what other scholars might deem ‘negative’ power. Although the 
course of shaping public opinion is by no means established, activists (including those I 
interviewed) at least hope to foment what Habermas (1990) calls ‘moral outrage’—in the case 
of Venezuela solidarity activism, outrage surrounding US imperialism and the opposition’s 
racist behaviour—by use of traditional media, social media, petition signing, small-scale 
rallies, and door-to-door mobilisation (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of email asking subscribers of the Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC) to sign a petition 
asking the Government of Boris Johnson to give to President Maduro Venezuela’s gold assets in the Bank of 
England 
It seems pertinent to note that Venezuela Solidarity activism cannot be considered a 
transnational movement, given its scale and scope. Venezuela solidarity is better described as a 
transnational network of activists, under Sikkink, Riker, and Khagram (2002) paradigm, and as 
a specific transnational campaign that has different names in different places. Although there 
are Venezuela solidarity campaigns in many different countries, they do not interact with each 
other as such (organise protests on the same day, for example). Some simultaneous, cross-
campaign interactions do occur online.  
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As discussed previously, the campaign takes ideological weight from the campaigns that exist 
to defend Cuba from the blockade, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Chilean Left during 
Pinochet’s regime, and to some extent those which aimed to prevent the Iraq war in 2003—
although Venezuela solidarity, as I discuss, is significantly more controversial.  
Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1-2, emphasis added) define ‘transnational advocacy networks’ as 
“networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in 
motivating their formation”—and here I note the deontology implicit in their understanding, 
which is crucial to my principal argument on the appeal of morality. Transnational networks 
of activists can leverage supra-national political resources to influence local outcomes (Stites 
Mor 2013), i.e., they help “transform the practice of national sovereignty” by clouding the 
distinction between a state’s relation to its own citizens and its relation to an international 
system (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). This is especially true of human rights activism and the push 
to adhere to international law.  
Importantly, Keck and Sikkink (1998, 2) admit that the fact that these networks are “motivated 
by values rather than by material concerns,” makes them fall outside traditional political 
categories of actors. The networks are, according to the authors, also prevalent in issues that 
share “high value content” and “informational uncertainty”—given that at the heart of these 
campaigns lies “information exchange” (1998, 2). I suggest that we instead think about these 
campaigns as invested in ‘knowledge production’ (rather than mere ‘information exchange’), 
and hence the use of ‘positionality’, vis-à-vis subjectivity in speaking of campaigns and 
activisms. The positionality embedded in what is being shared suggests information is not 
simply exchanged, as Keck and Sikkink (1998, 2) also admit to: it is “framed” to target specific 
audiences, encourage action, in other words, selectively communicated and contextualised so 
as to spur Habermas’ (1990) ‘moral outrage’.  
Taking from the interviews and from Striffler’s (2019) account of US solidarity in Latin 
America, I identify five fundamental aspects of Venezuela solidarity (although these points 
could equally apply to international solidarity movements associated with left 
internationalism more broadly): 
1. it is rooted in an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle that emphasises the 
right to self-determination and/or national sovereignty; 
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2. it is racially rooted within African, Asian and Latin American experiences of 
exploitation; 
3. it is conceived of as a shared experience of oppression, that looks past 
geographical location (and race), towards a common socio-economic location; 
4. it stems from a sense of responsibility (or guilt) at the suffering inflicted by the US 
government, and other imperial powers, irremediably tied to the privileges 
experienced in the Global North (see chapter 9); 
5. it shares a political commitment to radical and revolutionary transformation of 
the economic order, which has a long history in the left, and to some extent 
Socialism of the XXI century. 
I note the idea of a common socio-economic location is especially important in understanding 
how solidarity activists come to view themselves as part of ‘a grieved people’ in the populist 
sphere and debate, regardless of their citizenship, or current location. 
Hands off Venezuela (HOV) 
‘Solidarity with Venezuela’ begins right after the presidential coup of April 11 2002, briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Some of the activists I interviewed mentioned Chávez 
failed to gain the attention of the international left initially given the fact he was a man of the 
military, rather than, say, a man of the unions. 
Many solidarity activists come to hear about Chávez through the documentary film “The 
Revolution will not be Televised.” The film by Irish directors Donnacha O’Briain and Kim 
Bartley (2002) is shot inside the presidential palace, and follows the coup—before, during and 
after—and is, in the words of Roger Ebert (2003), Pulitzer Prize winner and supporter of 
Chávez, “unique in film history.” According to Ebert’s blog, it is also “clearly biased in favor of 
Chávez— most clearly so in depicting his opponents” (Ebert 2003). In other words, the film’s 
knowledge production is clearly positioned in favour of Chávez, although solidarity activists 
rarely understand it in this way.  
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The film shows how the coup failed when hundreds of supporters surrounded the palace and 
loyal members of the presidential guard managed to arrest the culprits and bring President 
Chávez back to power after 36 hours. The film does not show that there had been a large 
opposition march two days earlier, of an estimated 400-500 thousand people. (Polls at the time, 
as I have discussed, showed Chávez’s popularity had declined significantly that year.) A 
portion of those in the march (Human Rights Watch estimated 5000 people) headed to the 
presidential palace, where Chávez supporters were gathered. Confrontations ensued on both 
sides, but the private media, vehemently against Chávez, showed only the opposition being 
attacked. The true story of the violence that took place that day is marred by conflicting 
accounts and agendas. Ultimately Chávez, an elected president, was deposed by sectors of the 
military, and most countries in Latin America condemned the coup.  
M, is a member of the International Marxist Tendency (IMT) previously discussed, and was 
involved in the founding of ‘Hands Off Venezuela’ (HOV) one of the solidarity campaigns I 
looked at for this study.24 He has been traveling to Venezuela every year (sometimes twice a 
year) as part of the campaign’s efforts. For him there was:  
a military coup against a democratically elected government, the interference of foreign 
governments like the United States in particular, but also European governments. We 
decided to organise a solidarity campaign in the tradition of other solidarity campaigns 
that have been held in the past, for Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile. There was a very 
strong campaign for Chile here in the 70s, so there were people that had participated in 
some of these campaigns. 
The initial aim of the campaign was, therefore, to defend democracy in Venezuela— i.e., 
democratically elected president Chávez from a coup that put businessman, and US ally, Pedro 
Carmona into power. M also mentions the campaign’s historical counterparts—discussed in 
the previous section. HOV’s website, more succinctly, frames their story thus:  
 
24 I refrain from giving him a pseudonym in this section, to protect his identity in the empirical chapters.  
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Alan Woods, editor of ‘In defence of Marxism’, made an appeal to defend the Bolivarian 
revolution, to oppose US intervention in Venezuela and to ensure that truthful 
information about what was really happening in Venezuela would reach the trade union 
and labour movement outside. 
Knowledge production, as I discuss in the empirical chapters, is a central aspect of Venezuela 
solidarity. In fact, HOV grew from a desire to share ‘truthful information’ with the trade 
unions— historically invested in solidarity work—given the international news on Venezuela 
was becoming increasingly polarised and would eventually come to favour opposition to 
Chavismo almost entirely.  
HOV now works in more than 30 countries, mostly as an effort to counter the international 
media narrative on Venezuela. According to their page, its goal is to raise awareness within the 
trade union movement in different countries. The unions that support HOV, as far as I have 
been able to verify, are ASLEF (Locomotive Engineers and Firemen Union), and RMT 
(National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport workers). HOV also works with the Student 
Marxist Federation in the UK.  
In regards to the principles it adheres to, the HOV page states (as of September 20, 2020) that 
these are:  
1. solidarity with the Bolivarian Revolution,  
2. opposition to imperialist intervention in Venezuela,  
3. building direct links with the revolutionary and trade union movement in 
Venezuela. 
HOV organises public meetings, video screenings, supports moving motions in parliaments, 
and sends solidarity delegations to Venezuela, and as mentioned, most recently supported the 
Alternativa Popular Revolucionaria, who are Chavistas against Maduro. According to its 
Wikipedia page, the campaign also “issues press releases to counter unfavourable western 
media reports on the Chávez government.” The campaign was thanked by President Chávez 




Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC)  
The other UK based organisation is the Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC). Its ‘About’ 
section on their Facebook page (as of September 20, 2020) shows it shares very similar goals to 
HOV—but was founded later, in 2005: 
The progressive developments underway in Venezuela today are some of the most 
inspiring in the world. The Venezuela Solidarity Campaign is a broad-based campaign in 
solidarity with this social progress and for the right of the Venezuelan people to determine 
their own future free from external intervention. 
The reason for the existence of two broadly similar solidarity campaigns in the UK is unclear 
from what I was able to gather—this was not central to my research—but it might be HOV’s 
explicit Trotskyist bent, and Ken Livingston’s (former Mayor of London) subsequent 
endorsement of VSC (a larger broad-based left coalition).  
VSC have organised 19 events in 2019, which speaks to the volume of their activity in London, 
far greater than that of HOV. Their Facebook page lists more than 11,000 followers—which is 
an impressive number. As of May 2020, only 6 unions of 19 listed on their Wikipedia page 
mention an affiliation to VSC on their website: UNITE, UCU, National Education Union, 
NAPO, National Union of Mineworkers, and Communications Union (CWU).25  
 
25 The TSSA (Transport Salaried Staff Association) was affiliated to an older organisation founded by one 
of the participants for this research, the Venezuela Information Centre, according to their website. I take this 





Figure 2. Protest outside of the Bank of England (organised by HOV in June 2020) asking Venezuela's gold to be 




Figure 3. Facebook profile picture for Venezuela Solidarity Campaign (VSC), showing a (brown) Venezuelan 
woman at a Maduro rally in Venezuela. 
 
Figure 4. VSC email invitation to online meeting to discuss UK-US-Venezuela relations. 
Photos of Trump and Guaidó and Dominic Raab and Guaidó removed 
for copyright reasons.  
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UNITE, one of the six unions that continues its support for VSC, is the second largest trade 
union in the United Kingdom. With more than 1.2 million members, it is committed to 
“protecting workers rights and equality and diversity in the workplace,” as stated on their 
webpage (as of September 20, 2020). One of the aspects of their work includes what they define 
as ‘Solidarity’: i.e. being “engaged in action to support workers and communities across 
borders and continents.” UNITE explains that Venezuela has had: 
One of the most democratic and progressive governments in the world, has extended free 
healthcare, education and workers’ rights, showing there are real alternatives to cuts and 
privatisation. Record levels of investment in public services have seen four million 
Venezuelans lifted out of poverty and the minimum wage become the highest in Latin 
America. However hostile elements in the US and in the old Venezuelan elite do not 
intend to allow the Venezuelan people to determine their own future with numerous 
attempts to overthrow the elected government.  
The statement ends by explaining why international ‘solidarity’ is vital: the campaign is 
needed to defend ‘the Venezuelan people.’ ‘The people’ are churned out consistently 
throughout the interviews, by both groups, yet the narrative implicit in this quote summarises 
quite succinctly what solidarity activists, also defenders of the Bolivarian Revolution, are trying 
to communicate: 1) that Venezuela is a an admirable democratic and progressive government; 
2) that it invests highly in public services and lifted Venezuelans out of poverty; and 3) that the 
US and the white Venezuelan elite are trying to force regime change.  
Australia Venezuela Solidarity Network (AVSN) 
The Australia Venezuela Solidarity Network (AVSN), on their Facebook page (as of September 
20, 2020) states it is:  
dedicated to building solidarity with the people of Venezuela in their struggle against US 
led imperialism and to build Socialism of the 21st Century. It has groups in every major 






Figure 5. Australia Venezuela Solidarity Network (AVSN) Facebook page cover photo. 
The Maritime Union of Australia, that supports and is a member of the AVSN, passed a motion 
on July 8th, 2017 that summarises the aims of most solidarity groups studied here:  
1. To pledge our resolute solidarity with the people of Venezuela and their 
Bolivarian Revolution. 
2. To reject the intervention of the US and other capitalist powers in Venezuela. 
3. To oppose the attacks by violent, fascist gangs of the right-wing opposition in that 
country. 
4. To call on the Australian labour movement to express solidarity with the 
Venezuelan people, and against right-wing attacks on Venezuelan democracy. 
5. To call on the government and parliament of Australia to dissociate itself from 
US intervention in Venezuela's internal affairs, and to express full support for a 




Through associations with organisations such as the Maritime Union of Australia, AVSN 
raised $10,000 for community groups in Venezuela in 2019 alone (Slee 2020). In early 2020, it 
was also able to send a delegation to Venezuela to “promote people-to-people solidarity,” one 
of the only solidarity campaigns that has sent an entire delegation recently (Fuentes 2020). Part 
of the funds raised were handed over to an audio-visual project supporting communes and a 
social-political agro-ecological school. I note that solidarity work has not historically entailed 
direct transfer of funds to the groups (see chapter 5, 140-141), but Venezuela’s dire 
circumstances have pushed the campaign to move towards this more ‘financial’ interpretation 
of the word solidarity.  
Other Venezuela solidarity groups around the globe 
The two organisations that I interviewed specifically dedicated to countering the international 
media narrative on Venezuela were Spain-based ‘Voces en lucha’, and UK based ‘Alborada’.  
Voces en lucha, headed by a Spanish couple who travelled by foot through South America for 
two years, describes itself as:  
A space for communication, that began on our two-year journey, starting in Chile and 
ending in Cuba, along the many territories of the Abya Yala. 
Its fabric is painted by some of the popular movements and resistances (native peoples, 
peasants, urban dwellers, women, Afro-descendants...), as well as by the national and 
territorial processes of change in the struggle for emancipation that inhabit this vast and 
battered region. Learning to look from the periphery, we need to decolonize thought and 
show diversity without homogenising it. The objective is to recover and disseminate tools 
that contribute to the democratisation of spaces of knowledge, and allow for the 
construction of dreams of equality in diversity (as published on their website as of 
September 20 2020).  
Alborada on the other hand, is anglophone and UK based. Similarly, the organisation screens 
documentaries and arranges talks around Latin American politics. It considers itself to be: 
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an independent voice on Latin American politics, media and culture. We provide a 
progressive take on the region, offering perspectives rarely found in the mainstream.  
There are two other very active organisations that I did not have opportunity to interview: the 
‘Venezuela we are with you Coalition’ and the ‘Hugo Chávez People’s Defence Front,’ in 
Canada. There is also an Asia-Pacific Venezuela Solidarity Network that includes the 
Philippines-Venezuela Solidarity Network; the Nepal-Venezuela Solidarity Network; the 
Socialist Party of Malaysia, and the Working Peoples Party in Indonesia.  
I note that all these activist organisations emphasise the Bolivarian Revolution as a process of 
‘the people’ and the ‘working masses.’ Their interest—and discourse—is centred on a 
preoccupation with “peasants, urban dwellers, women, Afro-descendants”—and 
(purportedly) not ideology. I discuss how this plays out in chapter 7.  
The deontology of Solidarity 
We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward 
the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over 
frontiers and legal documents [Former U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar; 
quoted in Rieff (1999, 1)]. 
In 1840s France, Solidarité emerged as an alternative to the discourse of individualism and the 
problematic ‘atomisation’ that resulted from increased industrialisation (ter Meulen 2017). 
Both Saint-Simon and Comte argued for a new social and political order that stressed the 
interdependence of individuals. Even liberal thinkers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, spoke of 
enlightened self-interest”: minimal self-sacrifice for the common ‘good’ that ultimately serves the 
self (Siedentop 1994). Durkheim would later distinguish between ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ 
solidarities: where one refers to the relations among members of the similarly-characterised 
communities of traditional societies; and the other to the links formed by the individuals of 
modern society through cooperation and division of labour (L. Wilde 2013). 
In 1896, León Bourgeois argued further that without solidarity, “individuals cease to exist”: they 
cannot maintain security and prosperity without it (ter Meulen 2017, 45). For him, association 
and solidarity—not economic competition, or a Darwinist survival instinct—are the defining 
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features of social life. Like Gide and Durkheim, his framework bases solidarity on the 
instinctual connectedness of individuals, instead of on the theology or metaphysics of 
existence.26 
Richard Rorty (1996) is arguably the first to bring back the concept of solidarity to the late 20th 
century. Interestingly for Rorty, this idea of our ‘intrinsic’ humanity and commonality, is in 
fact also “remnants of an outdated, metaphysical way of thinking” (L. Wilde 2013, 69). Instead, 
solidarity needed to be built, or sustained, in the “imaginative ability to see strange people as 
fellow sufferers” (Rorty 1996, xvi, emphasis added). Rory’s ‘ideal type’ figure, the ‘liberal 
ironist,’ recognises that what unites her with the rest of humanity is a susceptibility to pain—
most especially the pain caused by other humans, i.e. humiliation. For him, our common 
susceptibility to humiliation is the only thing required to widen human solidarity. (Rorty 
misses the extent to which this ‘bond’ is neurologically limited to those that are ‘like us,’ see 
chapter 4).  
It is Kurt Bayertz who first admits that the concept of solidarity has rarely been the object of 
theory. “Positive obligations to act,” as he explains, are rather difficult to place in both ethical 
and political thought (Bayertz 1999, 4).  Bayertz gets at the etymology of the word in Roman law 
of obligations, obligato in solidum—the pay of common debt—to describe the origins of the 
principle of mutual responsibility between the individual and society, now applied more 
extensively. ‘International solidarity’ falls into Bayertz third category of ‘solidarities’: namely a 
commitment towards common interests or against particular opponents, in reference to justice 
and rights. For Bayertz, this kind of solidarity also denotes “the emotional cohesion between 
the members of these social movements and the mutual support they give each other in their 
battle for common goals” (1999, 16). In the empirical chapters, I describe how interviewees in 
defence of Chavismo share this particular understanding of ‘solidarity’: the ‘emotional 
cohesion’ towards others who are ‘fighting their battle’ was frequently mentioned in the 
interviews. However, their solidarity is not necessarily ‘mutual’, or reciprocal, as Devin (2011) 
notes. At least in the context of the interviews, ‘solidarity’ is understood as unconditional 
 
26 Bourgeois’ solidarism became the principal ideology of collective action in early 20th century France, and 
guided the establishment of its welfare state. 
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defence of an ‘unknown’ group of others. Bayertz does avert to the ethical dilemma inherent 
in solidarity that has, he believes, been responsible for the difficulties in situating it 
conceptually: its lack of claim to universality. One is ‘solidary’ towards specific groups and 
actors. I add that, consequently, one is opposed to others—an opposition that can be especially 
problematic in highly radicalised spheres and contexts. 
Chandra Mohanty (2003, 49 emphasis added) account is relevant as she focuses on this 
antagonistic aspect of solidarity. She finds in a “common context of struggles against specific 
exploitative structures and systems” the motivation that determines the “potential political 
alliances” of solidarity movements. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas (1990), treats solidarity as the 
obverse aspect of justice, and would argue in the late 20th century, that ‘cosmopolitan’ 
solidarity forges itself out of shared moral outrage or indignation. This is a central premise of 
this research in that two very different groups contest the legitimacy of the Maduro 
government but in fact share feelings of deep moral indignation—only against different actors. 
In this sense, we can say both groups act ‘in solidarity’ with Venezuela while responding to a 
populist ‘moralising’ logic and political environment that pities them against each other.  
For Habermas (1990) ‘cosmopolitan’ solidarity takes place in response to significant human 
rights violations or mass violence, and is, he argues, fleeting and less meaningful in terms of 
organising political life, inasmuch as it is contingent on specific temporal events. This is similar 
to what Peter Rippe (1998, 357) understands as ‘project-related’ solidarity.’ Rippe in fact cites 
“solidarity with the leftists in Chile [and] with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua” among other 
examples of this type of solidarity—two campaigns that share activists with Venezuela 
solidarity work as discussed.27 Dean (1996) refers to these as ‘conventional’ solidarities: those 
that are constructed in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and offer a restricted range of available identity 
concepts. For Striffler, this kind of focused activism is a result of neoliberalism and the decline 
of traditional large-scale oppositional movements—although I would argue that he means the 
decline of international workers’ movements, more specifically: the feminist movement, and 
anti-racism movements, for example, have expanded exponentially.  
 
27 Scholz (2008) differentiates this from her concept of political solidarity. 
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Scholz (2008)—who attempts a broad theory of political solidarity—distinguishes quite 
successfully between social, political and civic solidarity. Her political solidarity as a “moral 
relation that marks a social movement wherein individuals have committed to positive duties 
in response to a perceived injustice” (Scholz 2008, 6) is particularly apt in her use of the word 
‘perceived,’ as I discuss subsequently in the next sections. 
Charity, Altruism and Condescension  
Featherstone (2012, 5) understands the political concept of solidarity as “a central practice of 
the political left,” and he examines specific instances of solidarity formed with the US ‘North’ 
during the Cotton Famine. His historical work asserts the existence and importance of 
subaltern groups in solidarities ‘from below.’ He is presumably contrasting this with the more 
‘expected’ solidarity towards ‘those who have less,’ which Pierre Leroux (1840) in De l’Humanité 
sees instead as ‘charity’.  
Here I rescue Leroux’s understanding of charity in that it suggests an unequal relation—what 
others authors call ‘political altruism’ (Passy and Giugni 2001). Political altruism describes a 
specific activism in the North that tends to issues in the South—that they have no stake in—
out of a sense of moral responsibility (Passy and Giugni 2001, 5). I argue that this moral 
responsibility is particularly meaningful for activists, although it is not entirely unproblematic.  
Jones (2014, 167), in discussing the work of Mavis Robertson, one of the most important Chile 
solidarity activists in Sydney, Australia writes “[Robertson] attributed the founding of her 
desire to support the underdog to her mother, who always ‘had her eye on all the little 
countries.’” There is a slight condescension or paternalism in Robertson’s and her mother’s 
understanding of ‘the other,’ that is qualitatively different from solidarities that emerge from a 
common struggle. Here, Robertson seems to be engaging in ‘political altruism,’ or ‘charity,’ that 
stems from a position of power. With regards to solidarity activists in this thesis, they perceive 
a common struggle with the Venezuelan ‘people,’ even if others perceive that they are in a 
position of power and not struggling (see chapter 8). This makes for an important tension 
between 1) how solidarity activists view themselves and their own experiences of 
marginalisation (that affects the way they understand their solidarity); 2) how as scholars we 
might categorise them; and 3) conversely how Venezuelan migrants stereotype them as ‘agents 
of privilege’ because they come mostly from the Global North (see chapter 8).  
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Empathy and Solidarity 
For Heyd (2007) solidarity is mediated through commitment to a cause. For him, “it is not a raw 
feeling but involves cognitive and reflective elements, as well as the commitment of individuals 
to remain loyal to the collective cause even when it means ignoring their self-interest and 
potential personal gain” (2007, 118). Heyd (2007) also suggests solidarity’s normative 
dimensions demand loyalty from members of the group. This explains in part why solidarity 
activists viscerally dislike leftists who do not support Chavismo, as I discuss in chapter 5. 
Similarly, Gould (2007, 149) takes from feminist theorists who have re-conceptualised the role 
of empathy to define solidarity as a “moral reflection in international affairs” that shares an 
“imaginative” understating of the “perspective, situation, and needs of others as a basis for 
moral action in response to them.” Gould’s work stands out as one of the first who sought to 
conceptualise a new form of solidarity “more suitable for the new forms of transnational 
relationships” (2007, 148) of the kind explored here. In so doing, she makes three important 
points about transnational solidarity work:  
1. it’s “feeling-with,” i.e. emotional pull that impels supportive action (also stressed 
by Wilde 2013).  
2. its “disposition to act towards others who are recognised as different from oneself” 
(2007, 157) but that we come to identify with—which Heyd (2007, 118) suggests 
“does not come naturally to us but takes a conscious effort aimed at the 
achievement of an impersonal goal.”  
3. its “shared values” and a “commitment to justice” (2007, 156) as constitutive of 
relationships—I turn to these moral values in the next chapter. 
In what regards (2), I note that solidarity activists I interviewed accept they come from a 
different racial and cultural location; this does not, however, hinder their understanding that 
they are also somehow part of ‘the (Chavista) people,’ as I have mentioned. They either 
understand themselves to be part of (and in defence of) an international working class; or they 
align their ideological identity to the Chavista or revolutionary-left movement more broadly. 
I discuss at large in chapter 7. 
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In the context of gender and the feminist movement, Butler (1990, 21), similarly rejects the idea 
of “unity” on the basis of an “agreed-upon” identity as prerequisite for solidarity. She questions 
what she calls the “exclusionary norm of solidarity” amongst ‘women’, that is, a norm of 
solidarity towards those purported similar to oneself (in contrast to Gould’s second point). The 
qualitative difference between Gould and Butler suggests that thinking of ‘charity’ or ‘altruism’ 
as a relation of difference, and ‘solidarity’ as a shared struggle (although not necessarily a 
shared identity) is conceptually valuable. Solidarity activists feel a shared struggle with the 
‘good’ Venezuelan ‘people’, against the ‘bad’ US and elite interests, even when a crucial part of 
their identity is not shared. 
Lastly, I note Gould (2007, 156) explicitly rejects “solidarity in support of inhumane, dominating 
or pernicious projects.” Interestingly, in the Venezuelan case, many would argue that the 
Bolivarian revolution, is an ‘inhumane, dominating and pernicious project,’ given its egregious 
violations of human rights. The fact that this does not stop solidarity activists from believing 
that they stand in ‘solidarity’ shows the Venezuelan case is particularly challenging to theorise. 
Arguably in this case, I will not be examining ontological aspects of solidarity, i.e., whether 
activists are in ‘solidarity’ or not. I find it more compelling to understand how participants 
make sense of what they see as their solidarity towards (and against) a particular group of 
‘others.’  
Solidarity and Foucault’s ‘ethics of self-formation’ 
Taking from various authors, solidarity as a political norm or ideal describes a shared 
commitment to economic and social justice, on the basis of a common struggle, felt as a moral 
duty. This commitment exists in several actors and groups but is also part of an ideal of what 
human and transnational relations ought to look like.  Summarising, solidarity is distinctively 
deontological—bolstered by pressing moral emotional concerns—but importantly also 
antagonising. It is both for and against a specific group of others, and therefore susceptible I 
argue, to populist logic. I discuss these theoretical observations, specifically those regarding 







Chapter 4. Legitimacy, Moral 
Judgement and Populism 
In understanding the appeal of populism in domestic and transnational contexts, as well as its 
de-legitimisation of pluralism, the literature on populism—largely state centric—needs to 
further address several theoretical points that I tend to in this chapter. I start by looking at 
philosophical normative and descriptive sociological understandings of legitimacy that help 
situate some of the moral arguments interviewees make when defending their position on 
President Maduro. I then look more specifically at moral judgements, and what I term moral 
logic (a specifically parochial form of morality) that sees morality as a form of group ‘boundary 
work’—a boundary work of us good/them bad, that relates strongly to populism. I use these 
two broad understandings of legitimacy and morality to knit together a broader sociological 
understanding of populism as a political logic that vouches for a particularly moral (and 
therefore, seemingly meaningful) project, one which can help explain more fundamentally 
how political spheres become polarised and deaf to exhortations of dialogue.  
Legitimacy 
It is only when the exercise of political power has been contested—in acts of disobedience, 
resistance, or massive exodus, all seen in the Venezuelan case—that we have a serious 
reflection on whether an authority’s claim to power is “legitimate.” Legitimacy concerns those 
reflecting on it, or affected by it, are “getting something in return for their subordination, 
sufficient for them to acquiesce most of the time” or leave or revolt (Tilly 1991, 594). As I 
understand it, interviewees support for, or aversion towards, the Maduro government, stems 
from an acceptance or rejection of Maduro’s claim to political power in Venezuela—his 
legitimacy.   
The word legitimacy stems from the Latin root ‘lex’—law—the adjective, legitimus originally 
meaning ‘lawful.’ The Oxford Dictionary states legitimacy is “conforming to the law or to 
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rules,” but also “able to be defended with logic or justification; valid.” The concept of political 
legitimacy implies more broadly that a de facto monopoly over violence, is insufficient to justify 
a claim to political power. Arriving at an analysis of the principles that constitute political 
legitimacy—in other words, what constitutes the ‘rightful’ exercise of power in a normative 
sense—has been a central task of political philosophy since Ancient Greece (Beetham 2011). As 
a subject of inquiry, it is more often associated with thinkers of the Enlightenment. Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hume have all famously offered accounts of political legitimacy 
and authority, each with their own understanding or critique of the idea of the ‘social contract’: 
how individuals, in Locke’s case from the ‘state of nature,’ come to accept constitutional rule 
and the establishment of political institutions.  
Political scientists and sociologists in the 19th and 20th centuries, became more interested in 
descriptive theorisations of socio-political orders and were curious about the complex historical 
processes of normative structures and inner-societal cohesion implicit in the apparent 
legitimacy of regimes. For Chris Thornhill (2011, 1), sociology in its very origins evolved in 
opposition to the (Enlightenment) idea that legitimacy derived from ‘external acts of reason’ 
or from constitutions, or “rationally generalised principles of legal validity.”  
One of the most influential of these sociological accounts was developed by Max Weber. For 
Weber, power holders can only count on subordinates following their mandate—without use 
of coercion—if and only if they enjoy legitimacy. Weber’s typology traces a historical 
transformation where people hold legitimitätsglaube, a belief in legitimacy, either because the 
social order is accepted as tradition; there is faith in the rulers (what Weber terms ‘charisma’); 
or there is trust in the legality of the system (Weber 1964).  
Because these beliefs vary widely, social-scientific accounts recognise that legitimacy is 
multidimensional. Empirical approaches such as this one, try to understand legitimacy’s 
‘social subjective’ aspects: in other words, the logics that frame the justification for exercising 
and accepting political power and authority. Importantly for this research, within and outside 
a nation-state’s borders. The central questions for understanding legitimacy here are 
therefore: what knowledge, values, beliefs are being reproduced that allow for acceptance or 
rejection of the use of power? How are ideas about legitimacy and illegitimacy sustained, 




In philosophical accounts—understood as normative—there exists a tendency to discuss 
legitimacy as an externality, given its theoretical concerns. What social scientists, and 
specifically sociologists are trying to argue is that legitimacy is fundamentally a perception that 
is constructed. Legitimacy is also fundamentally not a binary, rather a dialectic process. I 
contend it is highly influenced by the media and socially circulating ideas—and felt on a 
collective and subjective basis. Such a descriptive account does not assume that power is 
legitimate (or illegitimate) simply because certain, or enough people come to believe that it is, 
i.e., that there are no incorrect or correct ways to exercise power as long as it is willingly 
accepted—an objection philosophers tend to make of what they see as reductionist 
understandings of legitimacy. Rather, my task here is descriptive: to elucidate those beliefs that 
underpin approval and rejection of Chavismo as holders of power. For my descriptive empirical 
analysis of the beliefs regarding the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency, I will, in fact, need to 
contrast each groups’ normative understandings of ‘rightful’ exercise of power, as I do in Part 
II.  
Legitimacy and morality  
For social psychologists, one of the most basic tenants of the concept of legitimacy, or more 
specifically, legitimate hierarchies, is that they are associated with cooperation; illegitimate 
ones “are associated with domination” (Lammers et al. 2008). In their reasoning, “the 
consequences of power seem to be determined by how power is conceived and conceptualised, 
and how it is acquired and wielded, not just by the amount of resources possessed” (Lammers et 
al. 2008, 563 emphasis added).  
In what regards the Venezuelan divide, solidarity activists highlight the aspects of the 
Revolution that show how it has positively transformed the lives of disenfranchised 
Venezuelans; Venezuelan migrants highlight the corrupt aspects of the regime that show how 
it is merely self-interested. For both groups then, as Beetham (2011) points out, the 
government’s legitimacy is justified in terms of how ‘morally’ power is exercised. 
Beetham (2011) explains how—especially in contexts where political performance matters—
political authorities depend on the cooperation of those they serve: their capacity and 
effectiveness depend on their “moral authority,” which impinges on their ability to convince 
people that the political system is both fair, and enacted fairly (2011, 1416). For Beetham (2011), 
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a “power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it 
can be justified in terms of their beliefs”; where morality is of utmost importance (Beetham 1991, 
11). Beetham effectively suggests that loss of moral authority, akin to the one Maduro faces 
today, stems from a perceived ‘immoral’ exercise of political power. Put differently, because 
those who exercise political power enjoy status, privilege and access to the means of violence, 
they must show that they “merit [their power] and use it to serve a more general interest than 
merely their own advantage”—i.e., they must be perceived as having moral virtue (Beetham 
2011, 1419). Whether this is the case or not, is (and should be) up for debate in the public sphere. 
Legitimacy and political power 
In conceptualising political power, more specifically Chavismo’s ‘reach,’ interviewees think 
broadly of its policymaking, agenda-setting, decision-making, and most importantly whether 
this power has yielded positive or negative effects over the lives of Venezuelans (or their own 
lives, in the case of Venezuelan migrants). This ‘lay’ understanding of power reflects an 
intuitive feel for what political power does —I note the example of an interviewee, Hector, who 
underlines how he feels Chavismo has criminalised his aspirations of earning a higher wage 
(see chapter 8). Political power in his conception is not merely a ‘juridic-discursive’ exercise of 
“supremacy in the making, application and enforcement of law” (Buchanan 2003, 146). Such a 
definition misses the degree to which governance affects diverse aspects of our lives outside 
the law, including governments’ ability to manipulate aspects of public opinion. The juridic 
conception suggests thinking about politics solely in terms of ‘meta-political’ established 
frameworks, or ‘constitutionalities’ (Hamilton 2003, 3). It reinforces judicial sovereignty and 
fails to account for other sites of political power: conflicted group interests, elections as an 
evaluation of government performance, among many, many others.  
In contesting Chavismo’s power, interviewees think not only of its ability to enact laws, but 
rather in its ability to impose discourses that orient specific values, lived relations, how to think 
about the political, and even who the ‘enemies’ of the nation are. The extent of this power is 
especially evident in Global South contexts where political actors sometimes practice what 
Mbembé (2003), taking from Foucault, terms ‘sovereignty’: the ability to decide over life and 
death in their use of force—Maduro’s use of military operatives in the barrios described in 
chapter 2 are a prime example of this reach. 
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Foucault’s idea of governmentality is a broader (but perhaps more material) way to 
conceptualise political power: although slippery, it is a complex form of power “which has the 
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault 2009, 107–8). I will use the term often 
in the next chapters to include influence over the media apparatus as a form of knowledge and 
influence over the judicial system as a major technical instrument, but principally to describe 
political power that is, again, not simply juridic, but rather all-encompassing. 
Because political power, as Buchanan (2003, 151) explains, “involves some persons imposing 
rules on others,” it is antithetical to equality—and freedom. Wielders of power effectively 
impose their will, as I have suggested: governmentality deeply affects how we live, which is 
why these scholars argue it is evaluated morally. As Lukes (2005, 37) explains in his famous 
Power: A radical view, any talk of interests invites judgements of a moral character, “so it is not 
surprising that different conceptions of what interests are, are associated with different moral 
and political positions.” Both Beetham (2011) and Lukes (2005) suggest that power can be seen 
as ‘moral,’ when it advances common interests; or immoral, when it goes against common 
interests or is self-serving. Foucault, similarly although without recourse to normativity, 
suggests that his concept of biopower, for example, can “exert a positive influence on life” 
(Foucault 1990, 137). Taking from the interviews, I argue, as these scholars do, that power does 
not necessarily always seem or feel immoral: for solidarity activists especially, Chavismo in 
power is for historical and racial reasons, moral, as I discuss further in this chapter. 
For many other scholars, holding political power itself is perceived as immoral—a view that 
stems from Machiavelli’s principal argument on the corruptive qualities that power engenders. 
Specifically, for C. W. Mills (2000 [1956]; also Urbinati 2019), it is the possibility of what power 
can do, more than what it actually does, that makes it seem ‘immoral.’ Power feels immoral—
US power, for solidarity activists, Chavismo for Venezuelan migrants—when it is deemed self-
interested and therefore imposed—or we can take it further, non-consensual. This is the 
denunciation populism makes of existing power structures, as I discuss in the last section. If 
political power does not advance the interests of those it is imposed upon, it is perceived of as 
domination, or imposition, and imposition feels ‘immoral,’ among other reasons, because it 
requires forms of overt or covert coercion.  
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For interviewees, the exercise of this governmentality is judged on a moral basis—largely (but 
not exclusively) taking from an understanding of whose interests or what Hamilton (2003) calls 
‘needs’ are being served and to what extent it is being ‘imposed.’  
Consent and Political Legitimacy  
Our intuitive response is that governments are legitimate—and hence ‘moral’— when they are 
democratic. Indeed, all interviewees point to the democratic achievements or failings of the 
Maduro government to show why they considered his government to be legitimate or not. But 
democracy does not imply ex ante equality of power. Even in a democracy there are power 
asymmetries: certain actors wield power over others (judges, police officers, legislators, the 
executive). So why do participants, and all political ideologies that value democracy (including 
Socialism of the XXI Century), sense that democracy addresses political power’s fundamental 
moral challenge to the equality of persons? 
An answer is the notion of ‘consent,’ prominent within normative accounts of legitimacy. It 
was perhaps first described by Étienne La Boétie in his 1577 essay Servitude Volontaire that—
much like Gramsci centuries later—pondered on the acceptance of domination. Consent 
theory came to replace ‘divine authority’ theories and is more explicitly associated with the 
work of Hobbes in the 17th century. How this ‘consent’ materialises remains unclear. Some, 
including Locke, argue for a ‘tacit’ form of consent, i.e., as long as a community is not rebelling, 
or leaving residence, there is ‘consent.’ Yet this ‘consent’ cannot purport to suggest ‘legitimacy’: 
as Rousseau famously argued, a collective process is ultimately required to determine the 
scope of the use of power that is being consented to, and who is being consented to use it. Hume 
also famously countered that the state is almost always the result of violence—not consent.   
‘Consent theory’ as it is often referred to, is deeply related to two fundamental ideas about 
legitimacy: the importance of democratic participation, that take from Rousseau; and ideas 
about public reason, that take from Kant. In the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt, a consent 
theorist, proposed that the legitimacy of power derives “from the initial getting together” of 
people (1972, 151). For Arendt, power—a collective engagement and human construction—
must be based on consent and persuasion. Having looked extensively at totalitarianism, she 
suggests only legitimate power is power, which she distinguishes from strength, force, and 
violence (these being what she terms ‘natural phenomena’). John Rawls (2007, 124) would later 
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also underline the ‘joining consent’ of legitimacy, that is, how legitimacy is an ongoing 
evaluation of a political regime.  
When Venezuelan migrants speak of Venezuela as not being ‘normal’ (see chapter 8), they are 
essentially justifying the illegitimacy of Maduro’s government on the grounds of its disfunction 
or disservice to the Venezuelan people. This understanding relates to other contemporary 
accounts that argue for a more intuitive ‘principle of utility’ as a source of political legitimacy. 
Hampton (1998) in particular suggests political authority is “the invention of a group of people” 
seeking to find collective solutions to collective issues, that benefit from particular leadership, 
or authority.  Raz (1986, 56) argues for a ‘service conception’ of authority that sees illegitimate—
but effective—authority, as that which does not serve those it governs. We can tie this 
‘utilitarian’ concern to the approach to morality I briefly describe in the next sections, where 
what is ‘moral’ is understood as that which promotes ‘well-being' (see Lakoff 1996).  
Taking from Kant, Rawls endorses a strictly “political” or procedural view of democratic 
legitimacy, independent of doctrines of religion or morality: only power “exercised in 
accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten)” that has been endorsed by all citizens 
“in light of their common human reason” is legitimate (Rawls 2001, 41). For Rawls, this 
understanding arrives at the counter-intuitive idea that a political decision that is legitimate, 
can also be ‘unjust.’ Rawls’ understanding is consonant with the etymology of the word, but 
his definition falls into some of the juridical tropes described above (as noted by Mouffe 2002) 
and sits uncomfortably with the ‘lay’ understandings of legitimacy explored in the interviews: 
i.e., that it relates more explicitly to the moral use of political power. Arguably, certain regimes 
can also accommodate legality to suit them.  
Legitimacy and Democracy 
Buchanan (2003) advances a modern moral conception of political legitimacy—for him a 
‘liberal’ understanding —that resembles the one shared by the states that have pronounced 
themselves against Maduro and is touted forth by Venezuelan opposition leaders. He argues 
that “an entity that exercises political power is morally justified in doing so if, and only if, it 
meets a minimal standard of justice, understood as the protection of basic human rights” 
(Buchanan 2003, 146). Buchanan (2003, 158) raises the point that legitimacy is based on “the 
most fundamental moral principle of all, the principle of equal concern and respect for 
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persons”—a principle that requires the promotion of the basic interests all persons have.  What 
all persons’ basic interests are, and what they ought to be, is evidently contested.  
Buchanan (2003) refutes the view that ‘consent’ secures the legitimacy of the state system, as 
for him it is a state’s “credible commitment” to the protection of human rights that grants 
legitimacy—not mere consent of those governed. He differentiates consent from what he calls 
‘democratic authorisation’: that an agent can only be justified in wielding political power if 
they have been chosen to do so through democratic processes. The emphasis this idea places 
on democracy as the principal source of legitimacy is importantly why solidarity activists argue 
so fervently for the democratic credentials of the Maduro government, and why Venezuelan 
migrants highlight instead its authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies (see chapter 5).  
There are, nevertheless, accounts that contest the idea that only democratic processes make 
for legitimate use of political power. Specifically, ‘democratic instrumentalists,’ such as 
Richard Arneson (2003) and Steven Wall (2007), argue that sacrificing ‘political’ equality for 
‘overall’ equality, does not undermine legitimacy. As I have noted in the last chapter, many 
solidarity activists strongly defend this notion, i.e., that there is an ideal collective outcome (an 
end) that is independent of democratic processes (the means)—processes that they feel only 
benefit the individual. Arguably, this view more strongly adheres to traditional Marxist-
Leninist socialism that some of the interviewees share, as I discuss in the next chapter.  
The case of Venezuela (among others) shows how this instrumentalism is weak 
argumentatively. The limiting of Venezuelans’ political liberties, for example, has meant social 
benefits are distributed discriminately on political grounds: governments will lack incentive to 
enact policies in the interests of ‘the powerless’ when accountability can be manipulated. 
Governments can avoid revolt by using need, and access to basics, to coerce ‘consent’ or 
acceptance, thus why international human rights theorists insist that all rights (political, 
economic and social) should be prioritised equally. In other words, human rights are indivisible, 
as affirmed in the UN Vienna Declaration of 1993: a hierarchical understanding of some rights 
over others, is theoretically unsound, even if this fact does not live so plainly in the political 
world, as I discuss further in chapter 9. 
Intuitively, interviewees believe democracy to be prima facie moral even when it does not solve 
the problem of equality. Part of the reason lies in the fact that today the only equality that can 
be advanced for all simultaneously is civic: the equal opportunity to choose the wielder of 
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power, who then determines how it will be wielded—and whose interests are advanced. The 
difficulties inherent in defining the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the collective, was described 
by Kant in Theory and Practice (Part 2) (see also Mouffe 1992): that is, that the right of any person 
implies some restriction or loss of privilege for others. This is most obvious in the tensions that 
continue to exist between political and civil rights, and economic, social and cultural human 
rights. Political and civil human rights have been hard fought and won in what concerns race, 
sexuality and gender, i.e. we should be able to claim these rights ‘equally’ and 
simultaneously—at least in most democracies today. Economic, social and cultural human 
rights on the other hand, call for negotiation amongst interest groups. Choosing who will wield 
power fairly amongst equals, and having that choice be respected, is the only way to accept the 
outcomes of what Habermas’ (1996) understands as the deliberative processes of democracy 
that seeks to negotiate these tensions. Democracy wields leadership decision to the collective, 
in the assumption that actors understand what their true interests are (regardless of whether 
this is the case or not). The idea underlines a collective agency that feels intuitively legitimate. 
The ‘democratic hypothesis’ supposes that in advancing the interests of ‘the people’ as 
majority—popular sovereignty—the interest of the whole polity is served. To guarantee 
fairness, it also supposes there are conditions in place to allow for these majorities and their 
interests to change, as opinions circulate freely. Taking from Bobbio (1987), Urbinati (2019) 
argues that this second aspect is constituent of democracy—not simply a liberal adornment: 
popular sovereignty is insufficient without constitutional will to protect civil and political 
rights that allow opinions, and therefore, majorities to change. To function efficiently, and 
fairly, democracy must protect these rights. Not coincidentally, the theoretical tensions that 
exist between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘popular sovereignty’ are replicated in the interviews 
between anti and pro-Chavistas; they are part of the uneasy relationship that exists between 
populism and democracy, something I turn to at the end of this chapter. 
Legitimacy within Venezuela and beyond 
Venezuelan migrants today contend that Chavismo is both illegitimate and immoral given 
most Venezuelans—‘the people’—are suffering economic and social hardships at its hands. 
Venezuelan migrants claim Chavistas have only advanced their corrupt personal interests (and 
the interests of drug-trafficking) in dealing with Venezuela’s oil wealth, and more directly, have 
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wrongfully banned opposition leaders, and used state force against ‘the people’ who oppose 
them (see chapter 5 and 9).  
Solidarity activists claim that in its exercise of power, Chavismo has advanced the interests of 
the Venezuelan ‘people,’ against the elite, and against the US’ sphere of influence. In bringing 
those who have not historically wielded power before to do so, and in fighting US domination, 
Chavismo is enacting a form of justice, and is thus both legitimate and moral in its exercise of 
power (see chapter 5 and 6). This moral principle seeks to right wrongs and is willing to 
castigate those who it feels have committed them historically. I discuss this further in the next 
sections.  
Ideas of ‘the people’ are thus at the centre of the contended understandings of legitimacy, 
democracy, and the moral exercise of political power, as I discuss in chapter 5, 6 and 7—hence 
why, among other things, I contextualise the divide as ‘populist.’ I note, however, the groups 
interviewed are reflecting on Chavismo’s legitimate use of political power from outside 
Venezuela’s territory; though Venezuelan migrants have been subject to it, at least in the past. 
Legitimacy, however, in more practical terms, is not only awarded by those subjected to a 
government. Fellow nation-states, and all kinds of transnational organisations legitimise and 
delegitimise governments—Amnesty International is a good example. President Maduro’s 
government does enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of Russia and China, and in many other 
countries in the Global South. This international aspect of legitimacy, or put differently, “that 
national communities are not the exclusive source of political legitimacy in the global realm” 
(Peter 2017), is what theorists call ‘political cosmopolitanism.’ It has a real impact on 
governance, especially in the Global South. It is from losing legitimate face in the eyes of the 
West, that heavy sanctions are being waged against Venezuela. That political 
cosmopolitanisms matter is evidenced in the importance governments assign their ‘external 
validators,’ as discussed in chapter 3. 
In chapter 8, I describe how Venezuelan migrants resent the fact that solidarity activists give 
their opinion on Venezuela’s affairs, in part, because they ‘can come and leave as they please’ 
[interview with César, 2019] and (most) are subjects of powerful rich nations. This appears, at 
first, to be a political philosophy argument based on a type of political ‘nationalism’: because 
solidarity activists are not subject to Chavismo’s policy choices, Venezuelans argue their 
opinions are invalid—and immoral. Only those that, in Locke’s terms, consent to making the 
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body politic under a government, and are obliged to submit to its governmentality, ought to 
speak about its legitimacy and whether continued consent is warranted. And yet the fact that 
fifty countries do not consider Maduro to be legitimate—on their understanding of a 
breakdown of the democratic process—is surfaced by many Venezuelan migrants to support 
their claims of Maduro’s illegitimacy. What elicits Venezuelans’ resentment, and sometimes 
rage, is therefore not the post-hoc political ‘nationalist’ rationalisation of legitimacy, just 
described, but rather whether these international actors fundamentally agree with them or 
not. I discuss this significant contradiction further in chapter 8.  
Today, Maduro continues to be a legitimate president for a small but highly important group 
of Venezuelan society, the military, who have benefitted monetarily from his government. 
Maduro’s continued de facto presidency—very much despite sanctions against his 
illegitimacy—strengthens the widely accepted thesis that what matters for sustaining regimes 
is loss of legitimacy within the ruling elite. However, to secure his monopoly, Maduro has been 
forced to employ what Beetham (2011) describes as ‘costly’ coercion—a coercion many see 
evident in the numerous extrajudicial killings and repression of protests that his government 
has undertaken.  Coercion can collapse rapidly, though, if actors lose the will to use it, or those 
who enforce it give themselves to the highest bidder (Beetham 2011); but we are yet to see if and 
how this plays out. 
Moral judgement 
Hume argued in his Treatise of Human Nature back in 1739, that our moral rationalisations have 
a strong emotional foundation. Darwin and Westermarck would follow in the 19th century, 
locating the origin of our morality to our instinctive feelings and our sociality (Pipatti 2019).  
In The origin and development of moral ideas, Westermarck (1976 [1906]) in fact argued that moral 
feelings arise from two notions: our interpretation of an agent’s intention, and conversely how 
we believe we would have acted, put in that same situation. For him, there are two basic moral 
feelings: those of approval and disapproval. Here Westermarck points at the distancing or 
boundary work done by moral emotions and their concomitant judgements: implicit in them 
is the idea that ‘I’ or ‘we’ would have acted similarly (or differently). Importantly Westermarck 
argues, taking from Hume, that we are naturally prone to evaluate acts as expressions of a 
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persons’ ‘nature’ (what I have called ‘essentialising’): i.e., that the object of moral judgement is 
not an action, but the intention behind it, “construed as an expression of the person’s 
character” (Pipatti 2019, 29). I find this concept helps explain some of the dynamics and 
contradictions witnessed in the interviews, especially attributing an ‘evil’ nature to ‘the other’ 
based on a list of their actions.  
Since the late-twentieth century there has been an increased focus in trying to understand how 
the association between emotions and morality operates. There is growing consensus on the 
idea that moral emotions are biologically wired: moral emotions elicit responses from 
neurotransmitters, neuroactive peptides, hormones and the autonomic nervous and 
musculoskeletal systems, as do other emotions (Stets and Turner 2006). More controversial for 
sociologists—Stents and Turner (2006) argue—is that emotional moral responses also seem 
biologically evolved. The fascinating work of Francs de Waal (1996, 1982) conducted on 
primates, shows they share rich moral emotive capacities: attachment, empathy, sensitivity to 
social rules, giving, avoidance of conflict, and also a desire for revenge when reciprocity is 
violated. For Stets and Turner (2006, 546) the difficulty for sociology lies in accepting that 
culture “expanded the range of situations activating moral emotions” but that the capacity and 
propensity for our moral emotions stems from “hominid and neuroanatomic evolved 
mechanisms.” Crucially for this research, neuroscientists have found that our moral 
judgements are shaped by our “valuation of other people’s social behaviour” and our affective 
links to them—in other words, that they are largely parochial, group-based and useful for 
boundary work (T. Singer et al. 2006, 466).  
Psychologists have shown that acts understood as having harmful consequences, are 
universally considered to be ‘wrong’: judgements of dishonesties or illegal behaviours, for 
example, are negative—only a small amount of variance is explained by country and culture 
(Vauclair and Fischer 2011). This is how what is ‘right’ is argued and justified as ‘universal’, and 
why morality seems to give interviewees a sense of superiority. This reasoning develops at a 
young age: when harm is intrinsic to a specific act, children understand that the act is 
universally wrong, “even in another town or country and even if adults were to say the act was 
permissible” (Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993, 614). On the other hand, moral values such as 
obedience to family, authority, and sexual behaviour—where harm is not imminent—vary 




Certainty, experience and positionality 
From the interviews it seems that moral values, built on emotional association, provided a 
sense of stability or certainty; moral values assert meaning (Giner-Sorolla 2012). For Giner-
Sorolla (2012, 35), it is only through affective associations that we can act upon our values; they 
form “the end-point concepts that anchor our beliefs about what is good and bad.” Considering 
different positions with no emotional way to choose between them is incredibly taxing, and 
brings in uncertainty—for psychologists, an existentially threatening condition (Giner-Sorolla 
2012). This was evident in the interviews: very few interviewees had recently changed their 
minds about the benefits or shortcomings of Chavismo.  
Fundamental ideological change is rare, and ‘often disruptive’ (Homer-Dixon et al. 2013, 345). 
Advances in neuroscience, in fact, have shown that the brain responds to intellectual threats 
in the same way it responds to physical threats (Damasio 2001; Kaplan, Gimbel, and Harris 
2016; Lamm and Singer 2010). Questioning our biases is useful, but most “prefer the certainty 
that derives from following our emotionally based attitudes” (Giner-Sorolla 2012, 36)—and 
these, in fact, hold benefits including resistance to colds (Fazio and Powell 1997) and being 
more decisive (Kraus 1995). Given Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck's (2016) findings 
on the relationship between vulnerability and support for populism, the idea of certainty 
becomes especially insightful in understanding how populism might become appealing to 
these groups, as I discuss in the last section. 
Because moral emotions share cognitive, cultural and somatic elements, the habitus is also 
useful in describing deeply entrenched dispositions reiterated through practice. The habitus 
tends to “protect itself from crises and challenges” and so rejects “information capable of 
calling into question accumulated information” (Bourdieu 1992, 62). Both Ignatow (2009) and 
Sayer (2005) develop the idea of  a ‘normative orientation’—or ‘ethical disposition’ —of the 
habitus, a dimension that Bourdieu, as explained in the Methods chapter, famously 
overlooked. Ignatow (2009, 100) finds the concept of habitus particularly attractive because it 
can be seen, if adapted, as “a jumble of intertwined bodily-cognitive, bodily-social, and social-
cognitive phenomena” so deeply engrained they are experienced as ‘second nature.’ 
Bourdieu’s model also explains variation in moral dispositions according to social context 
(Sayer 2005).  
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I note that participants were keen to stress events from their lives that—they believed—had 
shaped their idiosyncratic moral and political positionality: Mack describes his experience in 
the Iraq war as guiding his anti-war sentiment; Liesel talks about how austerity was hurting 
fellow LGBT+ classmates. Bourdieu’s habitus helps situate the weight of these experiences, 
although Bourdieu weighs early experiences more heavily than those of adolescence or later 
life that interviewees sometimes spoke of. This is not to say that actors do not sometimes 
modify their position, rather that presenting contradicting evidence produces significant 
cognitive dissonance and emotional distress.  
I found there was clearly some reflexivity involved in privileging certain experiences over 
others in these ‘internal conversations,’ or explanations participants were giving themselves 
for their unique moral positions. In this sense, the analysis in Part II highlights an 
‘interpretative phenomenological’ idea of morality and values, where they are shaped, justified 
or perceived of as stemming from certain lived experiences. This does not mean that they 
necessarily do stem from experience (many are indeed shared with the broader discourse on 
Chavismo and anti-Chavismo) rather, interviewees reflect and narrate them in this way. Their 
experience of injustice or inequality are sought out to strengthen and rationalise what I have 
defined as each of their positionality. As Bourdieu and Hauser (2006) argue, these 
positions/dispositions might already be there, but they appear nonetheless self-conformed. 
Idiosyncratic experiences are also partially explicative of the fact that many interviewees had 
parents and brothers or sisters with whom they profoundly disagreed with on the Venezuelan 
issue: certain life choices had led them to experience injustices in unique ways.  
Moral logic and the moral qua political 
Moral conflicts, such as the one evident in Venezuela’s divide, are “an intrinsic, irremovable 
element in human life,” writes Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1997, 167). Similarly, from a philosophy 
critical of an individualistic and disembodied understanding of ‘the moral,’ Seyla Benhabib 
1992, 125), writes: 
Moral judgment is what we ‘always already’ exercise in virtue of being immersed in a network of 
human relationships that constitute our life together.  
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Both Berlin and Benhabib speak to the gravitas of social life’s moral dimension—a centrality 
largely overlooked in sociology, where there has been a tendency to view moral action as an 
external (reactionary) system of regulation (Sayer 2005, 9), or as subjective—a view at odds 
with structural explanations (Abbott 2020). The study of morality itself, as that which concerns 
invisibilised notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ was historically at the heart of sociological 
inquiry—prominently in the works of Durkheim and Weber. The past two decades have seen 
re-flourished interest, especially in what concerns its emotional bearings, however, 
sociologists interested in morality today, unlike psychologists and philosophers, have “few 
places to congregate that are explicitly defined by that interest” as the sociology of morality 
lacks an institutionalised subfield (Hitlin and Vaisey 2010; Harkness and Hitlin 2014; Sayer 
2005).  
The importance of morality in shaping concepts of ourselves and our groups, means sociology 
needs to address the moral practices of everyday effectively, if it is to understand how ‘folk’ 
sociologies and boundaries are built and sustained. I find that a particular problem with the 
results of those who do study morality (from both an individual and group perspective) is that 
the moral systems they ‘find’ depend on the moral questions they ask their research 
participants. Methodologically, sociological accounts do not seek to probe or prime specific 
answers to moral questions under specific circumstances, rather they seek to understand the 
ways in which morality becomes compelling in meaning-making, and an all-pervasive aspect 
of sociality. The few sociologists interested in morality have documented the diversity of moral 
systems as shared by co-nationals, working class cultures (Sayer 2005), gendered forms, and 
religion. They have shown that it is, indeed, central to understanding group formation 
(Lamont 2010, vi), though there is still a wide gap in the field. 
By morality I mean very broadly a system of beliefs based on embodied principles of ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ that bear on the welfare of others. The ‘lay moralities’ I tend to here, concern how 
interviewees—non-moral philosophers—believe “the world ought to be” (Prinz 2007, 1) and 
their normative rationales. In this sense my task, much like with legitimacy, is entirely 
descriptive—not prescriptive. I take moral beliefs to be values, to the extent that serve to guide, 
justify or rationalise our choices and positions, and characterise what we find to be ‘right’ and 
therefore meaningful. For Schwartz (1992, 1) who built an influential scheme for classifying 
values, these are ranked hierarchically both by individuals and culture. They are the ‘criteria’ 
against which we evaluate others but also ourselves. I take a ‘Humean’ perspective that sees 
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moral values as intimately tied to affect, emotion and feeling, taking from a number of 
sociologists and moral psychologists that see corresponding moral judgement as interrelated to 
intuitive cognitive and embodied processes (Prinz 2007; Lukes 2008; Sayer 2005; Ignatow 2009; 
Cohen 2014; Giner-Sorolla 2012). It is with an emphasis on value priorities that I refer to ‘lay 
morality’ as a ‘system’ 0f values. 
For the purposes of the analysis in the chapters that follow, I make an all-important distinction 
between what I understand for ‘morality’ and ‘moral logic,’ taking from Giner-Sorolla (2012) 
and Elster (2005). Beliefs based on ‘true’ morality (or what Elster calls moral ‘norms’) must be 
equally upheld for all, i.e., they are “not conditional” (Elster 2005, 204)—the Universal 
Declaration of 1948 is a prime example. Morality reflects an ‘everyday Kantianism’ in “doing 
what would be best if everyone did the same” (Lukes 2008, 57). Crucially, Giner-Sorolla (2012) 
argues true morality is highly exacting to meet, and almost no person can put it into practice 
perfectly.  
On the other hand, moral logic, or Elster’s ‘quasi-moral’ norms, invoke the absolute nature and 
universal substance of morality for parochial aims (Giner-Sorolla 2012). To explain this 
difference, Giner-Sorolla (2012) uses the example of Nazi propaganda and its manipulative use 
of moral feelings to decry Germans as having been injured unjustly, and to justify their 
subsequent actions. Moral logic uses morality to stress the “‘we’ are good/ ‘they’ are evil” 
antagonism—populism’s key trait. In Elster’s (2005) conception, quasi-moral norms emphasise 
reciprocity: eye-for-eye reasoning, or conditional cooperation—not incidentally, one of the 
strongest displays of morality in primates (De Waal 1996). This distinction, and moral logic’s 
‘use’ of the premise of morality as universal, makes it easier in my view, to understand how 
populism’s moral antagonising operates so successfully. (I describe this more fully below.) 
This logic is most evident in the contradictions that stem from each groups’ political position. 
Solidarity activists attack the opposition for being ‘coup-mongers’ and anti-democratic but 
celebrate Hugo Chávez’s coup in 1992; Venezuelan migrants reject solidarity activists’ opinions 
because they have not lived in Venezuela but are happy for other international actors who 
share their view to intervene in the country. Effectively, they are merely justifying their 
contempt for ‘the other,’ not demonstrating that they abhor coups, or intervention. Thus, there 
is an abuse of moral feelings at work (I note, specifically contempt and anger) when making an 
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appeal to specific injury and ‘transcendence’—a bid that seeks to strengthen and elevate the 
in-group.  
Nietzsche and ‘boundary work’ 
I found it highly significant that solidarity activists have sacrificed important career 
opportunities because of their political position on Venezuela. To assume they are merely 
ideologically ‘brainwashed’ is simplistic: the transcendent dimension of what is ‘good’ above 
the material benefits of advancing their careers, solidifies a specific sense of self for them. It 
would appear morality matters a great deal to solidarity activists. Representing what is ‘true’ 
becomes a ‘technology of the self’ in Foucault’s conception, if we take activists as acting on a 
particular moral order from which they evidently derive worth. There is also something highly 
compelling about maintaining a political position in the face of opposition, as one interviewee, 
Damien, describes: “the more of my opponents I anger, the more I feel like I'm doing the right 
thing” (see chapter 9). 
I mentioned earlier that moral judgements of ‘the other’ are essentialising: we imagine people 
to be ‘made’ of ‘substances’ that are determinate (Lakoff 1996). In other words, participants 
imply that it is not just actions that are ‘wrong’; actors themselves are. This is part of 
interviewees ‘folk sociology’ of the out-group, or ‘the other.’ For them, being ‘wrong,’ ‘evil’, 
‘immoral’, conversely ‘right,’ ‘virtuous,’ ‘moral’ constitutes ‘character,’ i.e. it is predictive of how 
others will act subsequently (Westermarck 1976 [1890]).  
The determinate aspect of this judgement might have been useful from an evolutionary 
standpoint, but it is, nevertheless, highly problematic. These specific assessments of ‘the other’ 
are reminiscent of Nietzsche’s famous and controversial critique of morality as removed from 
any true measure of right or wrong, and rather a “free-floating expression of vengeful 
resentment against some (real or imagined) perpetrator” (Anderson 2017, n.p.). Nietzsche’s 
‘cynical’ or highly sceptical analysis of morality suggests that powerlessness engenders hatred 
against oppressors—a feeling he characterised as ressentiment, and key to understanding 
enmity and the evaluation of others (and things) as ‘good/evil.’ Although extreme, Nietzsche’s 
ideas are useful to the extent they emphasise feelings of ‘powerlessness’ that are related to 
interviewees’ moral logic. In the empirical chapters, I highlight how both groups feel powerless 
against those they emphatically appoint blame to—Chavistas and US/opposition, for 
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Venezuelan migrants and solidarity activists respectively. Nietzsche highlights the emotion of 
disgust as characteristic of this morality, useful to understand the extent to which groups felt 
viscerally ‘repelled’ by ‘the other’ (see chapter 8).  
In understanding how certain grievances come to be experienced and felt by interviewees as 
‘wrongs’ done to them, their vulnerability or ‘powerlessness’—the feeling of being ‘forced’ out 
of Venezuela for Venezuelan migrants, and feeling their ideology is consistently marginalised 
for solidarity activists—Self-Determination Theory (STD) is particularly insightful. STC 
proposes three basic human psychological needs, applicable cross-culturally: autonomy (“self-
endorsement of one’s behaviour”), competence (“experiencing opportunities to exercise, 
expand and express one’s capacities”) and relatedness (“feeling socially connected”) as 
indispensable aspects of psychological wellness of individuals that concerns the realisation of 
their potentials (Ryan and Sapp 2009, 76). In my analysis, I note how both groups seem to 
experience lack of competence: for Venezuelans the reduced ability to make material choices; 
for solidarity activists, the reduced ability to voice their political position, without experiencing 
career backlash. These feelings seem related to ‘Nietzschean’ powerlessness and 
concomitantly a moral judgement of ‘the other’ seen as responsible for that feeling. I find it 
important, however, to stress that suffering, harm or injustice, or the diminishment of well-
being is not subjective. Our judgements might be ‘fallible’ and ‘biased,’ but damage can indeed 
be inflicted, even if we do not recognise it (Sayer 2005). 
In-group/Out-group moral judgement 
In understanding the appeal of boundaries, Brewer's (1999) work on reciprocal feelings of ‘in-
group love’ and ‘out-group hate’ is also useful. Brewer (1999, 433) takes an evolutionary biology 
perspective that sees morality as arising from individuals’ dependence on others’ willingness 
to “expend resources to another’s benefit.” She takes group membership to be “a form of 
contingent altruism”; moral judgements stem from the paramount necessity to determine 
loyalty, trustworthiness, and to distinguish selfishness, psychopathy, and apathy—all 
detrimental to the group. Emotions are also fundamental to determine trustworthiness, vis-a-
vis language: they are much harder to ‘fake’ (Giner-Sorolla 2012).   
For Brewer (1999, 435), once groups become larger and depersonalised, cultural customs and 
institutions take on the character of “moral authorities”—although how institutions that 
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maintain in-group loyalty and cooperation ‘take the character’ of moral authorities—in other 
words, how these authorities derive legitimacy, is unclear in her work. When out-groups are 
seen to subscribe to different moral rules, “indifference is replaced by denigration and 
contempt,” feelings that are expressed time and time again against ‘the other’ in the interviews. 
Taking from the Realistic Conflict Theory of intergroup relations (LeVine and Campbell 1972; 
Sherif and Sherif 1953), Brewer suggests out-group hostility is especially strong when groups 
are competing for resources or political power (as is the case in Venezuela). Importantly, given 
morality is purported as absolute and universal, resulting moral superiority is “incompatible 
with tolerance for difference” (Brewer 1999, 435); I return to the importance of this point in the 
next section on populism. Brewer hints at a study by Sidanius (1993), which she uses to 
conclude that “moral superiority provides justification or legitimisation for domination or 
active subjugation of out-groups” (1999, 435). Here I extend commentary on the significance of 
this, by suggesting that moral superiority is appealing to the extent that it elevates conceptions 
of the self and of the group, as well as instils psychological certainty. I note that Brewer’s work 
is supported by what neuroscientists have found with regards to empathy: that it is “sensitive 
to deeply-rooted parochialism and in-group bias” (Chiao and Mathur 2010), the building 
blocks of deep divides.  
Marx and historical-racial morality 
Solidarity activists do not feel that diminishing the political and civil rights of the opposition—
or outright repression of their opinions—is problematic, a feeling we can relate to the 
denigration and contempt that Brewer identifies against those deemed morally inferior. The 
feeling is especially contradictory given many of them were involved in the human rights 
campaigns against Pinochet’s Chile in the 1970s, alongside Amnesty International, that is, these 
activists had been invested in defending political and civil rights previously.28 Here, and in the 
subsequent chapters, I discuss two reasons for this disjunctive: 1) they question the veracity, 
methods and interests of human rights organisations today, including Amnesty and the UN 
 
28  I discuss this ideological contradiction more fully at the end of chapter 9. 
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(see chapter 9); and 2) their particular understanding of Venezuela’s conflict as a racial-class 
struggle, sees the diminishing of the opposition’s rights, as an enactment of justice, a 
retribution (see chapter 7). Put differently, they see in Chávez’s and Maduro’s governments an 
opportunity for “wrongs to be righted”: for the power to be ‘given back’ to its ‘legitimate’ 
owners—specifically the brown and black poor of Venezuela.  
Despite these expressions of moral judgement, Engels’ and Marx’ purported the explicit ‘non-
morality’ of their dictums. For Lenin especially, ‘philosophical idealism,’ in its efforts to base 
socialism on ethics, posed significant danger to the socialist movement. These were ideas 
incompatible with a ‘scientific’ understanding of the ‘laws’ that govern capitalism and 
revolution (North and Kishore 2008)—laws that underpin historical advancement. Save 
extraneous interference, “communism [is] historically inevitable, and moral questions 
generally superfluous,” as A. Levine (2019, 44) explains. Orthodox Marxists in fact called 
themselves ‘scientific socialists’ to differentiate themselves from those they saw appealing to 
justice—the so-called ‘utopian socialists.’  
Yet it is hard to doubt the idea that Marxism holds a powerful moral message (Lukes 1990a, 27): 
especially evident in the way solidarity activists justify their political beliefs. Scholars have in 
fact contested the idea that Marxism is devoid of moral content, using more ‘modern’ 
understandings of morality. For Peffer (1990, 9) the reason for Marx’s reticence to morality was 
a “healthy reaction to the excessively metaphysical views” of his time. Marx and orthodox 
Marxists were in fact making a moral claim in their view of exploitation, class domination, 
alienation: all words which denote normatively objectionable actions—even when Marx did 
not develop a ‘moral theory.’ In other words, Marxists today are ‘utopian socialists’ “despite 
themselves” (A. Levine 2019, 47).  
Marxism is “a morality of emancipation that promises communism as universal freedom from 
the peculiar modern slavery of capitalism,” writes Lukes (1990a, 22). Marx’s radical demands 
for an egalitarian distribution of freedom, as he understood it, suggests a specific deontology, 
i.e., a call of duty or obligation, according to Peffer (1990)—one which many solidarity activists 
I interviewed subscribe to. Socialism, as Lukes (1990a, 27) understands it, portrays itself as 
being primarily concerned with issues of justice; however, what is promised is not ‘justice’ and 
‘rights’ but rather the conditions for emancipation that make them unnecessary. It is precisely 
this premise, and promise, of Marxism that solidarity activists reference when they describe 
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‘hope’ in Chavismo (see chapter 8). I note that in the Marxist tradition—unlike in Socialism of 
the XXI century—freedom can only be achieved through violent struggle, hence its consistent 
use of metaphors of war, and (like Schmitt), its “ingrained suspicion of compromise” (Lukes 
1990a, 22).   
One could argue solidarity activists defend stripping the opposition of civil rights because they 
seek not merely to change the ‘economic base,’ “but also the super-structural institutions and 
forms of consciousness that depend upon it” (A. Levine 2019, 53). The most effective way to do 
this, argue revolutionary Marxists, is via social revolution: the expropriation of proprietors and 
the ruling class. However, the prominent feelings of ‘doing what is right,’ and contempt for the 
opposition more specifically, suggest that this exclusion is not simply a reasoned acceptance of 
Marxist doctrine, but more powerfully a justification that stems from the idea of exclusion as 
a means for vindication. I term this ‘historical-racial’ moral logic: the objective suffering of poor 
brown and black Venezuelans is used to mark opposition members as racist and justify both 
their exclusion from the political system and a particular contempt towards them.  
Espejo (2015, 74), in discussing populism’s exclusionary logic, suggests that the hegemonic 
group considers itself entitled to exclude those who do not pertain to ‘the people,’ because for 
“the populist, ‘the people’ is not the actualisation of individual freedom and collective 
autonomy through the common recognition of each individual’s freedom and equality.” 
Espejo (2015), as I understand it, is implying populists do not consider individual rights to be 
collectively constitutive of ‘the people.’ I argue, more specifically below, that populists are 
concerned with the collective and individual rights of a specific ‘people.’ Their sense of 
entitlement seems to have more to do with: 1) the moral accusation made of those they want to 
exclude, one which gives them the upper moral hand; and 2) seeing exclusion as the means to 
enact justice for the ‘true’ people. 
The problematic assumption the exclusionary logic makes is not simply that the middle-
classes should endure repression of their political opinions, nor that it does not matter if the 
middle and upper classes are wronged—although these are of course highly problematic—
rather, that all political opposition, in assuming it has been at some historic point ‘privileged,’ 
should be repressed on moral grounds. This precludes the possibility that those same 
impoverished brown and black Venezuelans, and indigenous populations, could in fact at 
some point, suffer at the hands of the Chavista government, or have serious concerns to voice 
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against it (as the UNCHR report suggests they do). I note that the opposition is not exempt 
from wanting to exclude ‘the other’ from the political system, as I describe in chapter 8: Marcos 
very frankly explains why he would exterminate all ‘communists’ for the damage that he 
believes they have ‘done’ to Venezuela. This is in part why I argue that both sides respond to 
this populist logic. Here I simply note a Marxist understanding of morality and justice, that I 
feel is highly relevant to the group of solidarity activists. 
Populism as an analytical category 
It’s not about Chavistas or anti-Chavistas, no […] The patriots and the enemies of the 
nation. That’s the historic battle in Venezuela today (Hugo Chávez, speech in San Carlos, 
January 10, 2003).  
I contend, together with Samet (2019), that theories of populism are especially placed to help 
understand the nature of Venezuela’s political divide and its polarised public sphere, but more 
importantly its radical aspect: the aspect which makes consensus prohibitive from both sides. I 
have argued briefly in chapter 1 that in so far as the political subject in contention is an idea of 
‘the people’ whom each side claims to represent; and to the extent that moral logic is used to 
engender an extremely intolerant view of ‘the other’, we have a populist divide that goes 
beyond the location of the actors in question. In this section, I expand on these theoretical 
ideas. 
Populism’s appeal has generally been explained (especially in the West) in relation to 
constitutional democracy’s failings to deliver on its promises of broader equality in the context 
of globalisation and neoliberal hegemony (Urbinati 2019; Goodhart 2017). This is no doubt one 
prevailing factor at play, but the question of how populist moral appraisals are appealing from 
a subjective-collective standpoint, is never openly addressed in the political science literature 
on populism. That populism makes an antagonistic moral appraisal of politics is in fact one of 
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the very few definitional tenets that theorists today agree upon,29 so this is really an impending 
fundamental question. The answer is assumed to be simply that they are: division and 
boundary drawing is appealing—and necessary—for group self-assertion. But the question is 
how are moral boundaries especially appealing?  
Arlie Hochschild (2016) most notably, also Demertzis (2006, 2013); Spruyt, Keppens, and Van 
Droogenbroeck (2016); and Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza (2017), are some of the few scholars 
that have been interested in understanding the emotional aspects of populism. There is 
growing consensus in what regards the ‘emotionality’ of populist politics, but relatively little 
empirical work to show for it (Müller 2016). I contend that to understand the appeal of 
populism’s ‘moral’ politics, we also need to understand the appeal of morality in politics—
more specifically moral judgement—tasks traditionally handed over to philosophers, and 
more recently, moral psychologists.  
Specifically, that moral judgements and boundaries are particularly meaningful, is an 
important aspect of populism that needs to be explored, if we are to consider Spruyt, Keppens, 
and Van Droogenbroeck (2016) findings that populism is especially attractive to those feeling 
most vulnerable in society. Questions such as how moral appraisal is experienced remain 
largely out of the scope of theoretical accounts of populism—the leadership (or top-down) and 
state-centric approaches that have dominated this literature do not readily ask these questions.  
Sociology and social psychology seem better placed to analyse populist/moral variations 
between groups, uncover populist/moral frameworks and their social consequences, and 
explore its phenomenological aspects. Indeed, a partial answer, although removed from 
populism theory, can be found in the work of sociologist Michele Lamont (2000, 3), who, in 
looking at the experiences of both white and black working-class men in America and France, 
concludes that morality functions “as an alternative to economic definitions of success and 
offers them a way to maintain dignity and to make sense of their lives in a land where the 
 
29  See Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Elchardus and Spruyt 2014; Pauwels 2014; Rooduijn 2014; Stanley 2008; Rico, 
Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017; Michael Wuthrich and Ingleby 2020; Mudde 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015 
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American dream is ever more out of reach.” She then describes how morality is used to engage 
in ‘boundary work’—between imagined communities of those ‘like me.’ 
The meanings of populism 
To use the concept of populism analytically is problematic in that its meaning has been abused 
extensively. Everything from the ranks of messianic leaders of the calibre of Perón, to the auto-
reflexive intellectuals of Podemos in Spain, the indigenous movement of Morales in Bolivia, 
the socialist narodnichestvo in nineteenth century Russia, even the semi-deity figure of 
Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu, India, have all been labelled ‘populist.’ The fact that populism has 
historically been hard to map on the one-dimensional spectrum, has aided the plethora of 
definitions. Labelling such diverse movements as ‘populists’ seems to be an instinctual, rather 
than intellectual pursuit—‘excitable speech’ to quote Judith Butler (1997). 
In twentieth-century theories of Latin American populism it has been used to describe:  
1) stages of development (Tella 1965; Germani 1974);  
2) clientelistic and short-term public policy, especially one which appeals to the urban 
and rural poor (O’Donnell 1979; Cardoso and Falter 1979);  
3) a political strategy (Weyland 2001); 
4) a charismatic leader (Conniff 1982; Drake 1978; Burbano de Lara 1998).  
Furthermore, ‘lay’ definitions of populism tend to have impending pejorative connotations: 
the idea that populism ‘simplifies’ politics, or that it is ‘mere rhetoric,’ or that it is ‘of the 
masses,’ also populism’s association with weak governmental institutions, “cheap 
emotionalisms,” crises of representation, and personalistic authoritarian leaders, have all 
contributed to seeing the concept in a negative lens (Comaroff 2009, 9). Unfortunately, these 
associations also obscure the term’s utility. Specifically, the negative overtones mask the 
tightrope relationship between populism and the democratic principle of popular sovereignty 
through which it is legitimised (Worsley 1969; Samet 2013; Urbinati 2019; Espejo 2015)—in other 
words, that populism is based on aspects of democracy, even if it can and many times does, 
subvert it.  
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I approach populism here, instead, as a polarising political logic from ‘the ground-up’. In this, 
and taking from several theorists,30 I focus on trying to understand what populism does and 
how it appeals to collective thinking—importantly for this research, collective thinking that 
transcends borders and coerces increasingly polarised discourses in the public sphere or 
political environment. Populist logic articulates a series of shared grievances (real and 
perceived) to frame politics as a moral conflict—a conflict powerful enough to question the 
legitimacy of institutions. It partitions the political field between those who have been 
wronged, ‘the people,’ the central political subject it claims to represent, against those 
responsible for those wrongs (generally an elite) (Samet 2019; Laclau 2007). In so doing, it 
asserts the moral superiority of one people over the other, therefore debasing any vision of 
pluralism (De la Torre 2015). 
Populist and moral logic 
For Samet (2019) (also Martín-Barbero 1993), ‘the popular’ is the concept with “greatest 
salience” for Latin American Studies. As an adjective, ‘popular’ is said to mean that which is 
prevalent or current among the general public (Oxford Dictionary). It also refers to that which 
is relating to, deriving from, or consisting of “ordinary people or the people as a whole,” as well 
as “generated by the general public; democratic” (emphasis added), definitions that hint at the 
consensus of a majority, and a latent ambiguity between ‘the ordinary’ and ‘the whole people.’ 
‘Ordinary’ carries the stigma of being unimpressive, normalised, generic.31 In this vein, one of 
the most pertinent definitions of ‘popular’ as related to ‘populism,’ is that which is “intended 
for or suited to the understanding or taste of ordinary people as opposed to specialists in a 
field”—an antagonism or opposition most populist theorists emphasise. The Oxford 
Dictionary also presents two obsolete definitions of ‘popular’: “of low birth, plebeian”; and also 
“vulgar, coarse, ill-bred”—meanings that trace a historical association of ‘popular’ with lower 
 
30  Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015; Samet 2019; Urbinati 2019; Laclau 2007; Stanley 2008; Hawkins 2010 
31  Fernando, a solidarity activist interviewee from Australia, explicitly challenges the semantics of the word 
‘ordinary’, which he dislikes, and calls working-class Chávez supporters ‘extraordinary.’ 
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economic class and disenfranchisement from the political system, not coincidentally 
depending on the context, also a majority that shares in some form of collective grievance.  
Scholars who take a top-down or ‘supply’ approach, i.e. those who have looked exclusively at 
leader discourse, have termed this the ‘Manichean’ logic of populism, which pities ‘incorrupt’ 
people against an ‘evil’ elite (e.g. de la Torre 2015; Hawkins 2010). These terms, although 
accurate, miss the extent of genuine discontent at the heart of populism, which I argue makes 
moral appraisal imminent in seeking retribution in a larger segment of the population.  
Populist views of legitimacy and political power, as I’ve argued, coerce the ‘pool’ of ideas about 
the social world and the public sphere—including those of rights, power, democracy, ‘the 
people,’ legitimacy, and even race—into zero-sum where no middle ground is possible. In the 
populist logic of ‘us and them,’ ‘the people’ emerges from the identification of a common 
perpetrator of wrongs—a moralised enemy: they who have ‘not cared.’ For Urbinati (2019, 14; 
77-78) this is, in fact, a process of ‘ethnicisation’ as well: the substitution of the ‘whole’ of the 
demos (‘the people’ conceived constitutionally) with one of its ‘parts’, i.e., the alleged ‘good’ part, 
which leaders “purport to incarnate” by sharing in “some social or ethnographic condition.”32  
Identifying power in a particular act assumes “that it is in the exerciser’s or exercisers’ power to act 
differently (Lukes 2005, 57). It is this attribution of intentionality or neglect that signals 
populism’s moral conception of power. Populist logic as Tilly (1991, 592–93) explains, taking 
from Lukes (2005), favours a radical conception of power: when X exercises power of Y—even 
in an unconscious or indirect way—X blocks the realisation of Y’s true interests. I argue that, 
to the extent that Y’s true interests are blocked intentionally or via neglect—which is the 
accusation interviewees make of ‘the other’—power is seen as immorally exercised. It is in this 
way that populism effectively de-legitimises political opposition. Unlike the cases of 
subordination that interest Lukes (2005), i.e. where conflict is lacking, populism articulates a 
verdict: it locates power to instil conflict. It assumes X has purposefully or neglectfully blocked 
Y’s interests to foment outrage and draw a (moral) boundary. 
 
32 See Subbiah 2020, for a discussion on the use of the term ‘ethnopopulism.’ 
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Assigning intentionality therefore seems key to populist discourse. Cushman (2015, 97) 
discusses folk theories of ‘intentionality’ in moral evaluation extensively, taking from Jean 
Piaget: that is, how “we restrict condemnation to ‘intentional’ harms”33 vis-à-vis lack of control, 
which generally suggests harm was not premeditated. Cushman (2015) also differentiates 
another key aspect of our moral evaluations, what he terms negligent harm in: where harm is 
not intended but “could have been prevented with further care” (Cushman 2015, 100). As I 
mentioned earlier, both accusations of blame and especially lack of care, were prominent on 
both sides of the interviews (see chapter 9). In essentialising ‘the other’ as immoral, moral logic 
is again assuming ill-intention as a determining feature of ‘the other’s’ behaviour. It predicts 
that ‘the other’s’ future actions will by nature be immoral, and hence it evades continuous 
deliberation or reflection on its own position. This is, not incidentally, why Coronil (2008) calls 
‘divides’ the “rule of the stereotype”—a rule which dismisses any form of rapprochement: 
negotiation with ‘wrong’ is also seen as ‘wrong’.   
As I describe in chapter 8, interviewees speak of the added value of ‘doing what is right,’ a 
deontology in the face of others that do not. It brings an ‘ego-boost’ or moral superiority, that 
I tie to the appeal of populist politics. In the case of interviewees—coming from different socio-
economic backgrounds but mostly college educated—I will argue that moral logic is a 
performative aspect of ‘boundary work,’ yet here the logic serves not as an alternative to 
economic success, as it does for Lamont’s (2000) working-class interviewees, but rather as a 
claim to a particular ‘truth’ or knowledge of what is ‘good’ and what is ‘wrong’ that enhances 
the self and the in-group.  
In understanding this appeal, I take from Žižek's (1989) (Marxian) critique of ideology, which 
insists that, for it to take hold, ideology needs to be presented and accepted as not ideological: 
in other words, it needs to stand as representative of True and Right, or that which is too 
“sacred to profane by politics” (Sharpe 2020, n.p.). We make others subjects of ‘ideologies,’ not 
ourselves. Indeed, as I have noted, for interviewees, the political position on Maduro’s claim to 
legitimacy is not ‘political’ it is beyond, or much graver than politics—it is moral. We can take 
 
33  I note Westermarck had already emphasised this aspect of moral judgement in the 1890. 
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Žižek’s (1989) understanding of ideology as a type of ‘folk sociology’: an explanation we 
attribute to others’ political behaviour, not ours, given the pejorative sense we bequeath the 
term. This is indeed the idea that Venezuelan migrants have of solidarity activists and their 
socialist concerns: that ideology blinds their reasoning on what occurs in Venezuela.  
For Žižek (1989), then, ideologies (and what I think of as political positions) do not simply 
‘brainwash’: they allow people to flirt with conscious distance to their ideals. Indeed, we could 
argue part of the reason participants were critical of their respective political leaders, was 
because participants were partaking in what Žižek (1989) terms “ideological disidentification”: 
they voice criticism as an assertion of their distance or independence from full allegiance to a 
faction. In my view, more substantively, their criticism of their own faction is a reflexion of 
their position as moral, and not political: interviewees feel able criticise their leaders (who can 
be mistaken) without this meaning they need to abandon their position on the broader issue 
(which cannot be mistaken, given they are positions based on ideas of what is ‘right,’ ‘valid,’ 
‘true’). Their positions purport universalism and transcendence by definition, so allow little 
space for relativism, plurality, or tolerance.   
The emotional certainty gained from holding the superior moral position—seen as 
‘transcendent’ or ‘true’—I would argue, is particularly appealing for those feeling vulnerable 
in society, namely those who, according to Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck (2016) 
are more susceptible to engaging in populist politics. Moral logic is therefore one of the key 
difficulties in overcoming Venezuela’s radicalised divide. In thinking about how this is self-
reinforcing, Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘habitus’ and its binding dispositions is useful. The idea 
that divides become perpetuated and entrenched is in line with neuroscientific accounts that 
look at the importance of emotion in resisting change to one’s beliefs, change that produces 
significant cognitive dissonance (Kaplan, Gimbel, and Harris 2016), and highly negative 
psychological uncertainty (Giner-Sorolla 2012).  
Transnational Populisms 
One of Laclau’s (2007) most persuasive arguments, is that for the definition of populism to be 
useful as an analytical category, it must transcend specific incarnations. In other words, any 
definition that turns to a policy, strategy, or politician as defining trait, is weak or rather not 
sufficiently abstract for conceptual generalisation.  
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For Laclau (2007), populism is and must therefore be described as a ‘political logic,’ as I have 
suggested taking from this idea. Laclau omits the moral or emotional aspects of the logic, 
instead describing it as one that enables a set of heterogenous demands and needs of a 
constituency to be homogenised through an ‘equivalence,’ i.e. an amassing of those demands 
into one problem (say immigration), or person (say Obama), or group (say, the Jewish people). 
This homogenisation creates a sense of unity, and in some cases an identity against an ‘other.’ 
Laclau takes this argument to the extreme by saying all politics make an equivalence of 
demands and therefore all politics are populist—a claim many have argued defeats the 
purpose of abstracting what the concept is in the first place.  
Other scholars, known as ideational theorists, have asked instead whether populism is a full 
or thin ideology (Cass Mudde, most famously). Their debate is, in my view, centred around 
different understandings of the ‘site’ of populism, in other words, what gives rise to populism. 
For those that believe that populism is a worldview, an ideology, or a set of ideas, discourse 
emerges from the leaders’ view on his or her political and social world. Ideas stemming from 
the leader are communicated, ‘absorbed,’ and are then defended or rejected. Scholars that 
instead understand populism as a logic (Laclau, Mouffe, Samet), locate the grievances, or 
demands of a group as the catalysts for populist movements. Both understandings of populism 
are not necessarily opposed to each other: Laclau’s more abstract definition accounts for the 
circumstances of discontent that make certain discourse attractive. It is therefore more suited 
to studying the ‘demand’ side of populism this research tends to.  
I argue that populist moral logic helps explain the extent of the intolerance that takes centre-
stage in this research. That is not to say that all extreme intolerance is populist (although 
Laclau might want to argue this). Rather, that in claiming to represent the will of a certain ‘good 
people,’ populism demonises ‘the other,’ and eliminates any need or desire for consensus or 
rapprochement. What is perhaps more pertinent theoretically: this abstract and open 
conceptualisation allows us to explore the radical and antagonistic aspects of the two 
discourses in a transnational context. In centring our understanding of populism on the logic 
that sustains ideas of ‘the moral people vs the other,’ the analysis transcends any domestic 
political sphere. Put differently, it allows us to examine the reasoning behind discourses that 
emerge from transnational debates. 
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Both sides, as I discuss more vividly in chapter 7, feel that they are somehow part of that ‘good 
people,’ regardless of their current geographical location. For solidarity activists, there is an 
understanding that they are part of the grieved global working class, as I discussed briefly in 
chapter 3, and discuss more fully in chapter 7. Nevertheless, the grievances of the global 
working class are not in contention—at least not in the interviews centred around the topic of 
Venezuela. One could see how the grievances of the global working class against the 
international corporate elite, could potentially represent a transnational populist discourse, 
though not discussed here. Solidarity activists’ discourse is however never anti-corporatist, as 
we could expect it to be; it is always anti-American above anything else.  
Having said this, I note that discourses on both sides are clearly still anchored to a particular 
location, Venezuela. The understanding of a ‘people’ is never truly divorced from its place of 
origin—although as I’ve noted solidarity activists will argue that they are somehow part of a 
‘global’ working-class. Effectively then, although solidarity activists and Venezuelan migrants 
are dispersed around the globe, their discourses express ideas and feelings about a specific 
Venezuelan ‘people’ and the space those particular people inhabit.  
Populism, Legitimacy and the aversion to compromise 
What seems clear is that democracy and its mechanisms do not resolve the tension between 
social and economic inequalities (brought about by market capitalism), and the promise of 
equal citizenship and voice (Beetham 2011, 1422). These rights are, and historically have been—
as evident in the way they were contested when they were first brought forth in the Universal 
Declaration—always in contention. Populism, in seeking to resolve this tension, promises to 
remove the interests of ‘the elites’ and instate the legitimate will of ‘the people.’ In so doing, 
populism accepts only one ‘true people’ and presents only one will—irretractable and 
infallible. What I see as a particularly ‘populist’ understanding of legitimacy is not widely 
accounted for in political theory discussions on legitimacy: the degree to which the 
government or leader symbolises a particular version of that ‘true people.’  
Dichotomies of apathy-care, friend-enemy, right-wrong, embed ‘boundary work’ and sustain 
and deepen radical divides, including the one I tend to in this thesis. The friend-enemy 
dichotomy (that Chávez himself defends in the quote at the beginning of this section) was 
introduced as that which defines ‘the political’ by the controversial Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, 
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liberalism undermines politics to the extent that it seeks to substitute the inherent struggle of 
legitimacy with procedure or the law (Mouffe 1999; Strong 2007). For him, any solution to this 
struggle that rests on compromise, i.e., brought forth by ‘liberal’ democracy, can never be final 
and can never advance democracy’s claims of equality because it will be prey to perpetual 
discussion (Strong 2007, xiv). The influential political theorist of Nazi Germany, instead, 
underlines that it is only through the identification of a common enemy as a political group 
(that is, not as individuals), that ‘we’ can come to understand what ‘our’ interests are. He states: 
“Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his 
opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own 
form of existence” (Schmitt 2007 [1932], 27). Conflict is for Schmitt, Laclau and Mouffe, inherent 
to politics—an idea related to Lenin’s (1996) converse understanding of pacifism’s (also 
“democracy’s”) ability to obscure the contradictions of imperialism “and the inevitable 
revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise” (Lenin 1996, n.p.).34  
Schmitt underscores the ‘high stakes of politics’ that populism seems to be vying for, but 
contrary to interviewees, for him the political is beyond the moral: moral claims, in his view, 
deny “the finality of death in favour of an abstract universalism,” which he was vehemently 
against (Strong 2007, xvii). This was because Schmitt (of all people) recognised—much like 
Adorno (2001) and Butler (2005) —the potential that claims to universal good have for violence: 
“the adversary is no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace […] thereby designated to 
be an outlaw of humanity” (Schmitt 2007, 79). Any universal ethical claim acquires a 
“repressive and violent quality” says Adorno (2001, 17), in its failure to reformulate changing 
social and cultural conditions, adds Butler (2005). Marcos’ logic (chapter 8) again, stands out as 
a stark example of this violence: he had little qualms about wanting to exterminate all 
communists, because he saw them as a disease inimical to the entire humanity.  
I note that even when Schmitt seeks to avoid a moral vis-a-vis a political boundary, such 
distinction is limited to his own theoretical abstraction: the friend-enemy dichotomy is most 
convincingly felt against the moral character of another, rather than on ‘political,’ or 
 
34  That Lenin writes “democracy” in quotations, is suggestive of his scepticism of the idea. 
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‘ideological’ grounds. As Giner-Sorolla (2012, 2) contends, the Reich, drew on “the passions of 
the unjustly wronged and humiliated”—like all ideologies in Žižek’s (1989) view, and I contend 
all populisms. It extolled a concern with morality, which was graver, and purportedly more 
universal, than that of ideology or even identity. The claim to moral rightness appeals to what 
is believed to be the (more meaningful) ‘higher’ plane of universal justice, or truth, placing it 
at odds with tolerance and compromise. 
Populist logic takes on Carl Schmitt’s politically appealing but contentious exhortation: it 
assumes a dyadic ‘friend-enemy’ society, divided amongst those who wield power and those 
who don’t; those injured and those responsible for those injuries; a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong’ people. 
Laclau (2007) characterises this as populism’s charismatic claim to legitimacy, a legitimacy very 
often based on ethnicisation. For solidarity activists, Chávez and Maduro are understood to be 
the ‘rightful’ heirs to power, inasmuch as they represent the poor brown and black people of 
Venezuela, who are the majority; indeed, this is central to the admiration (a moral feeling) 
solidarity activists share for these leaders. Urbinati (2019, 63, emphasis added) suggests 
populism “wants the large majority alone to be represented, because (it believes) this is the only 
legitimate part.” Its legitimacy is constructed on the belief that it represents and serves the 
volonté general of that people and is thus not ‘imposed’ (like elite rule is). I argue it also 
legitimised in the way it enacts justice: it takes from those that ‘have had’ power and abused it 
to give it back to its ‘rightful’ owners.  
Although Mouffe (2000) does not address populism directly in her essay on democratic 
agonism, we can see how she might defend (alongside Schmitt, Laclau, and Lenin) that its 
discourse animates necessary conflict for social transformation, or the way Laclau defines 
populism as politics itself in its fight for legitimate use of power. Mouffe (2000, 14) who accepts 
that power relations are “constitutive of the social,” argues that the goal of (democratic) politics 
is not simply to eliminate power (and therefore conflict) through deliberation—as some of her 
contemporaries want to argue (Rawls, Habermas, Benhabib)—but rather “how to constitute 
forms of power that are compatible with democratic values,” and therefore more legitimate 
(Mouffe 2000, 15). For her (2000, 15), the key is ‘agonism’: the conflict of legitimate adversaries, 
i.e., one who we combat but not someone we need to destroy and one “whose right to defend 
those ideas we do not put into question.” This, she notes, stands in contrast to ‘antagonism’: 
the struggle between enemies. For Mouffe (2000, 16) these adversaries share “adhesion to the 
ethic-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.” The crucial difference 
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between populist logic and her political ‘agonism,’ therefore lies in the conception of the 
adversary as one who shares in the two ‘most important’ values at stake (liberty and equality), which 
makes them still a part of the larger ‘us.’ 
Where and how to draw adversarial lines without falling into moral logic is unfortunately 
unclear. I argue that in populism, the boundary built against immoral opponents precludes 
them from being respected as legitimate adversaries: it puts into question their right to defend 
their own ideas. If legitimacy is the extent to which a regime can be justified, its ‘ultimate 
justification’ will always be a moral claim, by nature categorical and grave. Furthermore, the 
more a regime becomes contested (the more power it demands), the more it appeals to these 
‘transcendental’ logics. The empirical chapters that follow lend support to the idea that once 
the conflict is laid bare in moral terms, it becomes impossibly hard to dismantle, plea for 










Chapter 5. The battle for democracy 
 
 
Cameron, a long-serving British MP, has been interested in Latin America ever since he was 
elected to office, when certain groups approached him to discuss what had been going on in 
Venezuela and the social gains of Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution. Although he’s never visited 
Venezuela—because, he admits shyly, he is terrified of flying—he says he was “impressed 
frankly with the progress that had been made there under Hugo Chavez” in terms of “poverty 
reduction, eradication of illiteracy, investment in healthcare and decent housing”: 
Obviously, Maduro is not Hugo Chávez, but nevertheless he’s won another election, it was 
an open election, and I know that some of the opposition decided to boycott it but, in the 
end, they weren't prevented from standing. And I think the reason, in my opinion, they 
didn't field candidates was that they didn't think they could win, and by boycotting it, I 
think it felt it gave them the sort of opportunity to attempt to occupy some sort of mythical 
moral high ground, by suggesting that the elections weren't a fit and proper process. But I 
know that when Jimmy Carter had actually observed elections in Venezuela, he’d actually 
described that as the safest elections anywhere in the world. 
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Cameron wants me to know, firstly, that Maduro won the last presidential election fair and 
square. Although Cameron insists that he does not view Latin America with “rose-lensed 
spectacles”, and that the Chavez administration has, in his view, taken a “number of wrong 
turns,” all in all, Chavismo had been elected by a majority into power, yet again in 2018.  
In contrast, Reynaldo Trombetta writing for the Guardian (23 May 2018)—to the chagrin of 
Cameron and many solidarity activists—states “Venezuela has fallen to a dictator.” 
Where does this profound difference of opinion reside? Ideas of democracy are, as any 
widespread understanding of a political concept, varied amongst my interviewees but largely 
similar within the two groups: non-Venezuelan solidarity activists and Venezuelan migrants. 
Even the academic literature ensnares itself debating the term, so this comes as no surprise. 
Broadly speaking, Venezuelan migrants I interviewed feel their country has been taken over 
by a dictatorial repressive regime, a story consonant with the international media’s narrative; 
solidarity activists I interviewed, on the other hand, feel that the Bolivarian Revolution is a 
grass-roots participative democracy, that is constantly threatened by the US and an 
undemocratic opposition. 
Defining Democracy 
Twenty-two-year-old Jack, a young black-British solidarity activist, supporter of Jeremy 
Corbyn, explains his understanding of Maduro’s governance:  
So yeah, I think Maduro seems like an ordinary reasonable guy. And he isn't a tyrant, 
because his authority does not come from just having control over the police. His authority 
comes from the hundreds of thousands of people who go out on the streets for him, the 
ordinary people who go out and say, we support the party, we support the revolution, that's 
where his support comes from. 
Jack is effectively describing what political legitimacy means to him: Maduro’s “authority” is 
framed in terms of popular sovereignty—often confounded with democracy—the support of 
‘ordinary people’ on the streets who vouch for him as a representative of their will. The tell-
tale sign he is not a tyrant. 
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A minimal definition of democracy, on the other hand, according to David Runciman (2018), 
“says simply that the losers of an election accept that they have lost.” The definition’s simplicity 
presupposes an electoral process deemed fair by all groups involved in the contest for state 
power—especially those that must accept they have lost. Taking this minimal definition at face 
value, democracy is unable to flourish in Venezuela: the majority of the opposition is unwilling 
to accept the results of any contest given it believes it has grounds to distrust the arbiter and 
the system in general. The central question becomes, why would Cameron and other solidarity 
activists from countries outside of Venezuela defend Maduro’s government as a democracy 
when the legitimacy of the last presidential election is so seriously questioned by the most 
important international organisations?  
The fact is most of us defend democracy as, if not the ideal, at least the “worst form of 
government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time,” to quote 
Churchill’s famous remark. So, it is not surprising both groups purport to stand behind it. 
William Crotty (2005, 5) writes: democracy “has no ideological rivals” given it is “universally 
invoked (if not always put into practice) to justify regimes or their actions.” He then adds: 
“democracy sets the standards and terms of debate as to how nations are to be viewed and 
dominates the contemporary political landscape.” The intrinsic and related notion of ‘majority 
rule,’ so appealing to populism, has come to be seen in the last century as the most ‘just’ and 
‘moral’ form of overturning ‘collective power’ to a particular elected representative. It is 
democracy’s ability to be deemed fair and representative that has led to its ‘universal’ 
invocation as the most legitimate way for a few to exercise power. Democracy has also been 
seen as “the only sustainable legitimate order compatible with the conditions of market 
capitalism,” and increased popular demands of inclusion in political processes—with the 
exception of China (Beetham 2011, 1422).  
For Cameron’s defence of Chavismo to be considered legitimate, regardless of what he admires 
of Chavismo’s ideology, he needs to defend what he understands are Chavismo’s democratic 
credentials first. As an elected representative, Cameron stands to lose moral ground if he were 
accused of supporting a dictatorship. For him, President Maduro is still popular with the 
majority of the electorate. President Maduro’s government is legitimate, in Cameron’s eye to 
the extent that a majority, the popular sectors of Venezuela, i.e. “the people,” stand with 
Maduro and the Bolivarian Revolution. Here lies the crux of the factual disagreement between 
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both groups of interviewees irrespective of their ideologies: how does the majority actually 
stand?1 As it did in the election? Or as it does in the polls? 
Although Venezuelan migrant genuinely believe that solidarity activists’ continued support of 
the Maduro government mean they are: “crazy,” “in for the money,” or “blinded by their 
ideology,” the reality is, I hope to show, exponentially more complex. Activists’ ideas about 
democracy in Venezuela reflect a belief that Chavismo represents the ‘will of the people’—not 
any ‘people’ as I discuss in the next two chapters: those who have been excluded by prior 
political regimes, i.e. the poor brown majority. Hence why Maduro’s governance is both 
legitimate and moral, as I discussed in previous chapter.  
For solidarity activists, the opposition did not participate in recent elections simply because 
they believed they would lose. For Mack, a young American journalist and war veteran from 
Iraq, who covered the deadly protests in 2017, it is this knowledge of their inability to win that 
drives them to protest violently: 
When I was there last year, they knew at that point that the election was coming up, that's 
why the protests were happening, because they knew that if they went to a presidential 
election, Maduro was just going to win again. So they never intended to be able to take 
power democratically. And they also know that they can’t take power by force because 
they tried that in 2002, they tried that in 2014; they are incapable on their own of taking 
power by force. So in my view, from the very beginning, the protestors understood that 
their strategy was to create enough of an international crisis and spectacle that there's 
foreign intervention that removes Chavismo from power. And so, they couldn’t do it 
democratically, they couldn’t do it by force, the only option to get Chavismo out of power 
is international interference. 
The opposition has lost all but two elections in the past 20 years, though only two solidarity 
activists were aware of the unusually high levels of abstention in this election and the one in 
2017. At 46 percent, the presidential election of 2018 was the most poorly attended election in 
 
1  It is interesting to note that in the computational sentiment analysis conducted on the articles published 
by HOV, the word ‘majority’ was prominent in the texts and associated with the feeling of joy, see Appendix C. 
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Venezuela’s history. To put this in context, previous presidential turnouts have averaged 79 
percent. The opposition had called for abstention, but it is hard to attribute any kind of political 
will to that number; it could equally represent growing apathy towards the system. Those two 
solidarity activists argue that 54 percent is a normal abstention rate when compared to Western 
countries, and that President Maduro cannot be delegitimised, or overturned because of it. 
Activists defend the idea that democracy exists in Venezuela because it is understood as the 
only legitimate way to govern in today’s modern politics—but democracy, in their 
understanding, is not liaised to the political freedoms of ‘liberal’ democracy: press, religion, 
assembly, speech, etc. This does not mean that solidarity activists’ concept of democracy is 
narrowed down to elections, rather that 1) when a state represents “the will of the people,” 
understood as a majority, it is legitimate and democratic—in other words, for them popular 
sovereignty (Hawkins 2010; Samet 2019) and democracy are equivalent; and 2) that as long as 
rival political parties compete—i.e. there is purported ‘agonism’ amongst adversaries—
elections are valid enough to constitute a democratic state.  
As mentioned, solidarity activists also see democracy as giving the traditionally excluded a 
political voice: 
There are huge levels of inequality still there. And so that's five-hundred years of 
oppression. And that's what Chávez is having to deal with. You can't deal with that in 
perfectly straightforward so-called democratic ways. You have to use as much democracy 
as you can, but you also have to make decisions, which not everybody is going to agree 
with. And unless we have that kind of revolutionary attitude to dealing with the problems, 
not only of deep poverty, but of the planet, we're not going to fix things. See what a mess 
our democracy is here. 
Here James—a seventy-plus white British writer-consultant—is arguing that it is seriously 
difficult to deal with inequality without some degree of authoritarianism, or “revolutionary 
attitude.” For the greater good of dealing with inequality, the end justifies the means—in this 
case a slightly less consensual way of proceeding. In political theory, this argument is known 
as democratic instrumentalism, discussed in chapter 4. James’ hint of the “mess our democracy 
is here,” represents a generalised disillusionment with representative democracy in the West 
that Runciman describes as “tired, vindictive, paranoid, self-deceiving, clumsy, frequently 
ineffectual [and] living on past glories” (2018, 148), although I note Runciman’s argument 
explores possibilities for the future of democracy, not just its demise. 
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James presents us with a central moral question: is preserving a certain ideal of democracy 
more important than fighting oppression and inequality? Phrased this way the answer seems 
straightforward (at least for some), no. But the question implies both a zero-sum game and a 
rather formalistic understanding of democracy: a procedural bureaucratic consensus. When 
we think about democracy in terms of the rights and responsibilities that it purports to grant 
the citizenry, the question that follows is why should political rights preclude equality 
overall—even if it takes slightly longer to achieve? As I discussed in the theoretical framework 
can there really be a better chance at equality, when specific political positions are targeted in 
the Venezuelan case, for example?  
In describing a democracy they feel they do not have, some Venezuelan migrants, on the other 
hand, underline the ease with which the government is able to ban and also incarcerate its 
opponents:  
So this week they banned Guaidó for 15 years. This is crazy. Because firstly, those that are 
taking the decisions of the Comptroller General, should have been chosen by the National 
Assembly, and they weren’t. They were chosen by this Constituent Assembly, which we 
all know is shi—crap. […] the national assembly would have had to strip him of his 
parliamentary immunity first […] but because they were rushed, the comptroller simply 
said he was disqualified.  
The pro-Maduro Constituent Assembly, for Wilson a ‘mamarrachada,’ loosely meaning ‘crap,’ 
appointed the comptroller who banned Guaidó from standing for 15 years because his 
“personal financial statements contained inconsistencies,” according to an article on BBC 
(March 29, 2019). Because Maduro has taken over the judicial institutions by appointing 
members that are loyal to his government, he is able to control who can run against him. 
Wilson makes a political argument in regards to democracy’s need for true agonism (where 
leaders emerge from the demands of constituents) rather than constructed agonism (where the 
opposition is hand-picked).  
The voting system 
When justifying their support for Maduro, solidarity activists were keen to stress that the 
Venezuelan voting system was infallible. Two solidarity activists were international observers 
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to the 2018 Presidential elections: not surprisingly the same two interviewees that were aware 
of the high abstention levels for those elections. They were genuinely shocked to read in the 
international press that no international observers had attended in 2018. James and Tim were 
both invited by the government to observe, but their presence was being ignored by the 
media—they complained. Both spoke with great confidence about what they felt was a fair 
election and a brilliant voting and auditing system. The media’s omission of their presence 
added much to the scepticism they already held towards the BBC and more particularly 
towards the British newspaper The Guardian, who they and other solidarity activists feel is no 
longer left-leaning enough.  
James tells me of his visit: 
The electoral system is the best I've ever seen. It's completely fraud proof, it's really, 
movingly brilliant. You know how it works. It's fabulous. And I really questioned how it 
works, and so and so forth, and the back-ups. No. It’s brilliant.  
James and Tim were ‘international’ and indeed went to ‘observe’ quite literally, but both are 
emotionally invested in a particular side of the Venezuelan conflict and defend one side of the 
narrative. Even if, James insists, he sought to speak with the opposition throughout election 
day, his position presumes that the opposition participated openly and fully in the election. 
Although they are not directly affected by the consequences of the government in power (one 
of the theoretical requisites that constitute the right to vote), it does not mean that they do not 
feel that they belong to a particular side of Venezuela’s divide—both openly label themselves 
as Chavistas. Not being Venezuelan is therefore not enough of a pre-requisite to witness 
elections fairly; solidarity activists hold an ideological tie with the government’s leaders—even 
despite any personal criticisms they may hold of them.2  
Cameron, who has never been to Venezuela, paraphrases US Democratic ex-president Jimmy 
Carter’s opinion (known for his role in observing elections) to support his view. According to 
Cameron, Carter said “Venezuela’s electoral system was the best in the world.” But the quote 
 
2 I discuss these criticisms further in chapter 7. 
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is misrepresented. Jimmy Carter’s foundation for the monitoring of elections, the Carter 
Center, states on their website: 
In 2012, I applauded Venezuela’s use of electronic voting machines as exemplary in the 
world […] That characterisation since has been misused by Nicolas Maduro to suggest a 
broad validation of Venezuela’s election system as a whole and of subsequent elections 
that The Carter Center did not observe. In fact, The Carter Center and others routinely 
have expressed concern about government interference in recent electoral processes. The 
Carter Center has not observed elections formally in Venezuela since 2004 
(cartercenter.org, posted February 4, 2019). 
The end of the Carter Centre’s statement reads: “This is a critical juncture for the Venezuelan 
people who are calling for democracy” (emphasis added). Carter’s people “calling for 
democracy,” alludes, we suppose, to the series of protests that took place in February 2019 
(when this post was published). It implies that this (undefined) Venezuelan ‘people,’ and the 
Center itself, does not feel that Venezuela guarantees the rights protected by a properly-
functioning democracy—an assumption that suggests a majority is against the government.  
As this quote shows, it is not only supporters of the government who use the “will of the 
people” to invoke legitimacy: both sides of the divide are invested in presenting themselves as 
the majority and therefore the most democratic, what I have argued is key in populist spheres. 
The Centre avoids saying explicitly that the elections are rigged; they simply express concern 
with the electoral process. 
By quoting Carter, Cameron defends the notion that democracy—through fair elections—
exists in Venezuela, a point that he uses to justify his political position on the country. For 
Cameron, Carter’s personal political position is implicated in his decision not to observe 
elections in Venezuela: Carter refuses to grant credibility to the elections run by Maduro, not 
because Carter is concerned with the electoral process, but because Carter dislikes Maduro. 
For Cameron, this means there is no reason to believe that the elections are not credible 
 
175 
anymore.3 Cameron is not ignorant of the fact that Carter has not validated, and not attended 
subsequent elections in Venezuela (as we could presume). Instead, Cameron believes ex-
president Carter has turned partial to the opposition and is unwilling to support the elections 
in the country, or even simply observe them—least he finds out they are still fair. Solidarity 
activists, it seems, miss other integral aspects of the electoral process: fair airtime, 
opportunities to run for office, the impartiality of the arbiters and electoral council, among 
others. For solidarity activists, the Carter Centre’s presumed political position on Venezuela—
that coincides with the international narrative on the country—makes its accusations, its 
‘knowledge’ of the elections invalid.4 Their discourse is similar to that of President Maduro 
himself and the influence that he believes the US and the UK hold on the company Smartmatic: 
“That stupid guy, the president of Smartmatic, pressured to the neck by the gringos and the 
Brits” (The Guardian August 3 2019) he decried. In that televised speech in August 2019, Maduro 
unabashedly proceeded to vow that he would use the new Constituent Assembly to target his 
opponents.  
For Cameron, it seems ex-President Carter has been duped into the media narrative that 
Venezuela is a dictatorial regime simply because supporting the Maduro government is seen 
as ‘inappropriate,’ and ends up being politically costly in the West. This aspect of radical 
divides, the way in which those who are emotionally invested in pertaining to one side, feel 
everyone is positioned on that divide, invites dismissal of all information as partial—be it from 
whatever international agency (the UN included). The questions remain: why did Carter 
decide to stop endorsing the electoral system? Could some aspects of the electoral process have 
changed from his initial endorsement? Solidarity activists do not seem to confront these 
questions—but when they do, activists appeal to a larger moral predicament, as I hope to argue 
further: the importance of standing against the US and representing the true ‘people.’ 
 
3  I tie the idea that my interviewees need to justify their position to others, to what Mercier and Sperger 
argue is their ‘reason’—the evolutionary-adapted mechanism to persuade and justify actions to others—
discussed in chapter 1. 
4  I discuss the differing ‘validities’ of knowledge as the basis for opinion on Venezuela in chapter 7. 
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The fact that James and Tim were subsequently invited to the inauguration of Maduro’s 
second term, and others were invited by the Venezuelan embassies in their respective 
countries, to attend functions and festivities, shows the extent to which some (though not all) 
solidarity activists enjoy certain privileges with the Venezuelan government—the sort of 
privileges that prime Venezuelan migrants to believe that solidarity activists are monetarily 
benefitting from Maduro’s government. However, none of the interviewees had anything 
material to gain from supporting the government, a fact that makes their allegiance an 
important question for this thesis. As Chase explains: 
Some groups figured that Venezuela was going to be paying for the Solidarity Movement, 
and so they wanted a piece of the pie thinking that there was some financial value to it, 
which there wasn't. Venezuela, the country, never gave us a cent. 
An interesting aspect of solidarity activists’ support is that it hinges, and to an extent breaks, 
understandings of ‘ideological’ vis-a-vis ‘national’ identities and sense of belonging. Although 
solidarity activists are unaffected materially by the decisions that are made in Venezuela—a 
criticism that is often made of their strong support—they are invested in the fate of the 
Caribbean nation to the extent that it stands for certain ideological values that they hold dear, 
and that they see as part of their identity.  
The Hybrid War  
Because Venezuela is an oil country, the scenario of US intervention felt extraordinarily real 
to both groups of interviewees. With Donald Trump in charge, they had reason to believe it 
could happen: he explicitly mentioned that he would intervene several times (Borger The 




Figure 6. Image of Trump attached to the emails requesting donations for VSC. 
Solidarity activists therefore do not subscribe to the idea of a ‘humanitarian’ and ‘human 
rights’ crisis—terms that are frequently heard in press references to Venezuela. The distrust 
in the severity of the crisis underlies a belief that the opposition, and the US, needs this 
discourse of ‘Venezuela is not a democracy,’ or that in Venezuela human rights are 
systematically violated, to give the international community an excuse to force regime change 
(see Figure 6). In other words, the idea being sold by the media (that Venezuela is not just 
dictatorship, but needs humanitarian aid) is, according to them, an excuse to justify US 
military intervention.  
For solidarity activists, it is the ‘Hybrid War’ that accounts for the economic meltdown, a 
product of US imperialism—anti-imperialism as a moral imperative, being one of the most 
important sentiments solidarity activists share (as I discuss in chapter 9).5  
 
5  Steve Ellner (2019), an American academic who has lived in Venezuela—to an extent sympathetic with 
the government—includes the instability caused by Chávez’s illness in 2013, and the “refusal of the opposition 
and the United States’ government to recognise Maduro’s triumph in the elections following his death” as 
contributors to hyper-inflation. Ellner (2019) does suggest that Maduro’s failure to take “difficult but necessary 
measures,” such as modifying the exchange-control system was highly problematic—although, we could 
argue, this failure can also be attributed to Chávez, who began the policy. 
Photo of Trump removed 
for copyright reasons.  
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To give a sense of how central this idea is to their cause, the Venezuelan Solidarity Campaign 
(VSC), who refused to grant me an interview as I explained in chapter 1, held monthly meetings 
(several that I attended) to discuss the threat of invasion by Trump, even as late as April 2020. 
Similar meetings were taking place around the world, and I did manage to speak to two leaders 
of the Australian Venezuela Solidarity Network (AVSN), Tony and Damien, about the protests 
they were organising around this issue in 2019. Tony, a white Australian activist and academic 
in his mid-fifties (who has been convicted and imprisoned twice, and who was recently 
removed from his post at university), summarised his intentions for the protests thus:  
Our slogans for tomorrow are no to US backed coup, yes to independent Venezuela, and 
yes, they elected their President, deal with it. 
For solidarity activists, Trump himself anointed Guaidó, the president of the defunct National 
Assembly, since no one had even heard about him before he declared himself president. Tim, 
the South African electoral observer, argues: 
[The US] mistook moaning about Maduro for wanting to murder Maduro and replace him 
with a US backed oligarch. They got that wrong […] It's like people in Tottenham might 
moan about a labour MP, but they're not going to go out and vote for the far-right of the 
Tory party […] So what happened when the US tried to impose Guaidó, who's just a 
Trump-anointed jackass, this guy, made in Washington. No one had ever heard of him in 
Venezuela like some poll said, 20 percent of people? […] So it backfired on the street. So 
the government demonstrations are bigger than the opposition demonstrations.  
Although Tim is right to assume that a majority of Venezuelans are not in favour of military 
intervention (at least according to a survey by David Smilde (2019) at the end of 2018, that found 
that 54 per cent are against it), Venezuelans are in favour of a negotiated pact to remove 
Maduro (64 percent, according to the same survey).  
This idea that Venezuela is genuinely under US military threat and an ‘evil’ opposition, allows 
for a forgiving stance on the authoritarian tendencies of the Maduro government. Ignacio, for 
example, is painfully aware of an issue within Chavismo that he highlights would shock any 
European: the principal government party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venenzuela (PSUV), 
does not hold primaries: 
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I know perfectly well that any European would be shocked to see the lack of a primary 
process. But it is simply that Maduro, obviously, after mediating in corridors with others, 
decides on Rod Dexar. So they propose Rod Dexar. Call votes in favour. And everyone 
raises their hand. All right. Okay sure, yes, but we were four months away from an 
imperialist invasion. 
In his “Muy bien, vale sí” (Okay sure, yes) Ignacio acknowledges how problematic he feels 
having Maduro hand-appoint leaders in the party is, but then clarifies: “we were four months 
away from an imperialist invasion.” This justificatory clause is telling of how Ignacio 
rationalises and grapples with what he himself sees as authoritarian, on the one hand; and his 
underlying belief that the Bolivarian Revolution is a popular democratic process, on the other. 
For Ignacio, the imperialist aggression against Venezuela justifies Maduro’s direct and rapid 
action, but this justification is not truly valid: Chávez and Maduro had been appointing leaders 
since the party’s inception in 2007, when Venezuela was not, at least as far as I understand, 
under threat. (It is possible that Ignacio believes Venezuela has always been under threat.) 
Ignacio’s reaction suggests that defending the principal government party against US 
aggression (what he sees as a corrupt form of power) is more important to him than criticising 
Maduro—who is in fact a geopolitical ‘underdog’—based on an ‘impure,’ if you will, 
democratic primary process. This reflects, as I have argued in the introduction, a set of value 
priorities. I add that for Ignacio, who is attacked by his own political party in Europe because of 
his allegiance with the Venezuelan government, defending the revolution in Venezuela has 
become part of his defence of self. I discuss this further in chapter 8. 
Fernando, an Australian journalist who lived in Venezuela for three years, also alludes to a 
similar war argument: 
We can then discuss about the electoral process and whatever. But to me, it's utter garbage 
to say that you stand for democracy if you believe that a free and fair election can be held 
in the current situation in Venezuela, which is essentially a borderline war, war type 
situation, and I mean, no country in the world that's been in war has ever held elections.  
The idea that the crisis in Venezuela is a “war type situation” leads to an anything goes attitude 
towards the government of President Maduro. Fernando is also saying that an electoral process 
cannot take place because Venezuela is in the midst of fighting an economic war with the US. 
This ‘state of exception’ that solidarity activists attribute to the Hybrid War, justifies the halting 
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of a real electoral process—democracy’s key act. It admits, therefore, that the elections were 
not ‘free and fair.’ 
It is this portrayal of the crisis as ‘extreme,’ that makes aspects of democracy secondary to 
solidarity activists’ idea of Venezuelan sovereignty against US power. For Alberto, none of 
Chavismo’s mistakes—and he accepts there have been many—can be corrected by military 
intervention: whatever people criticise about the government can only be discussed once the 
war threat is over. Alberto, who is a Basque Spanish national, was a particular interesting case 
because although he visits Spain often, he lives in Venezuela:6 
After twenty years of Chavismo, surely there are many things that can be improved, 
seriously many things. And obviously after 20 years, many people feel frustrated, and 
disenchanted because their expectations haven’t been met. There we can get into another 
discussion, when things are calmer, but at the moment, all that is on the side-lines because, 
if the United States enters, with the squalid ones [escuálidos, derogatory term for the 
opposition] in hand, eh? To blow up Venezuela? Any of the issues that one could have 
against Maduro, I mean others—not me, others—come to nothing. Because, what will 
there be? More quality of life? Are there going to be medicines? Will hospitals work? 
Factories? Will the standard of living go up? Will the country's infrastructure increase? 
Will the country take a step forward, technologically, industrially? Will it produce more? 
Which of the deficiencies that you can attribute to the Venezuelan regime could improve 
with military intervention? I'm still waiting for someone to explain it to me. 
The Media and Censorship 
According to Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index in 2019, Venezuela has slid back 
32 places since 2014, ranking 148 out of 180 in terms of freedom of the press. Another major 
organisation, Freedom House, considers Venezuela to be “Not Free” in terms of political rights 
 
6 I discuss Alberto’s story in more detail in the last chapter. He explains the importance of his belonging to 




and civil liberties—at 16/100, Venezuela is a point below Chad, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Venezuela’s Internet Freedom score is also categorised as “Not Free,” with a score slightly 
below Russia. The issue is politicised to the point where, as Samet (2019) notes, not seeing a 
problem with the press assumes you take a pro-government stance. Yet nuancing the situation, 
he notes how the private media “were not simply mouthpieces for the opposition; they were 
the opposition” (2019, 26) as discussed in chapter 2. 
To put this in the context of the interviews, the word ‘democracy’ was not even mentioned by 
Venezuelan migrants, a fact telling of the perception they share of the government. It was used 
once to refer to the Punto Fijo period (before Chávez) and once to suggest that the government 
wants to give a semblance of ‘democracy’ to the international community by allowing certain 
critical press and media to continue running but closing most of the others. In Wilson’s own 
words: 
My favourite show was that of César Miguel Rondón, that was taken off the air. I don’t 
know how others have done who continue fighting. There’s a girl, Ana María Trujillo, she 
has a show on RCR, that is highly critical. And she’s still going. The government tries to, 
well, pretend that there is a democracy, despite all they do. 
For Wilson, a brown vocal coach in his sixties, now living in Perú, ‘appearing’ democratic 
means to allow critical viewpoints to air, or to be printed—an idea in line with a liberal 
conception of freedom of speech. Here Wilson suggests that journalists are ‘fighting,’ that is, 
that they are defying the government by speaking against it and that they play a role in 
exercising discursive power—or the republican idea of power in the negative. This power has 
not been overlooked by the Maduro and Chávez presidencies, who have done their best to 
close as many outlets as they believe is justified to do so. President Chávez controversially 
closed RCTV (Channel 2) Venezuela’s main television channel in 2007—allowing it to air only 
via cable. In 2013, business allies of the government then bought over Globovisión, the main 
news outlet for the opposition, and subsequently dismissed all its critical journalists (or they 
resigned). A similar bought-over took place with two of the most widely read newspapers in 
the country El Universal and Últimas Noticias in 2013 and 2014 respectively, and barriers were 
placed on the procurement of materials for El Nacional, the other major country-wide 
newspaper (Samet 2019). 
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Leopoldo Castillo, a critic of the government, considered “the nemesis of the president” (The 
New Yorker August 30 2013), famously resigned in 2013 when Globovisión was bought over. 
Castillo’s case was a precursor to Rondón’s. César Miguel Rondón had been on the air for more 
than 30 years and was asked to leave his morning radio show in 2019. According to Rondón, he 
was extorted: either he left, or CONATEL (the National Telecommunications Commission) 
would close the entire station. He explained that he was not allowed to discuss the 
government’s repression of the protests, or Juan Guaidó as ‘interim president,’ and so he felt 
he had no choice. “This is not auto-censorship, this is pure and hard censorship,” Rondón 
concluded (El Nacional 28 January, 2019).  
One interviewee, Jairo felt the repression in situ. He was detained by the police simply because 
he was a reporter covering elections in his hometown, Maracaibo, in the West of Venezuela: 
J: I was held back once. They arrested me but they didn't take me to jail, they did detain 
me, the national guard, because I was covering some local elections, I don't remember 
which ones. They arrested me because I was just a journalist. Just because of that. Then 
there was a scandal on the radio and I was released. I was detained for about an hour. And 
I used that [to apply for asylum]. 
P: Just because you were a journalist?	 
J: Yes. Just because I was a journalist covering the election. He got annoyed and said come 
here. You're going to jail. 
This incident eventually served Jairo to ask for political asylum in Spain, where he lives today. 
There was no other reason for the detention, other than the fact that he was a journalist 
covering a low-attended polling station—a fact that, according to Jairo, irked the pro-
government national guard. Jairo’s story marked the way he understands who is in power in 
Venezuela, and where the national guard stands: not in favour of ‘the people’ but rather in the 
hands of the government. His story aligns with the National Media Workers Union report that, 
in 2017, found “498 instances of harassment by state authorities over news articles,” and the 
arrest and jailing of 66 journalists and editors covering the protests that year (Rapoza Forbes 
December 28 2017). CNN was kicked off the air completely in February 2017, and 49 
broadcasters ceased operation, (though this includes purely music stations). Deutsche Welle 
was also temporarily interrupted from the airways when it began screening a documentary 
titled “Venezuela—Escape from a Failed State” in August 2018. 
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According to Artz (2015, 503), an academic involved in Venezuela solidarity activism, 
Venezuela’s new constitution “required expansion of public broadcasting, so Channel 2 was 
licensed to Venezuelan Social Television.” Artz (2015) is suggesting that the closure of RCTV 
was not intended to silence criticism. In his eyes, the take is justifiable given the state needed a 
channel and RCTV (channel 2) had the largest national reach. For Gregory Wilpert, an 
American journalist publishing in venezuelanalysis.com: 
In terms of diversification and democratization, the Chávez government has arguably 
done more than any government in Venezuelan history or in the history of most countries 
of the world [by] enabling hundreds of community radio stations and of dozens of 
community television stations [to] give ordinary citizens access to the media in an 
unprecedented manner (Wilpert 2007).7  
For supporters of Chavismo abroad, it is in limiting private ownership of the media and 
facilitating working-class access to the means of communication (by funding community radio 
and television stations) that true democratisation has been achieved in Venezuela (Artz 2015)—
an idea of democratisation that stands in conflict with, for instance, Wilson’s understanding 
above. Even if the producers of these community radio and television stations admit that these 
outlets are only able to reach a limited audience (Schiller 2011), Chavismo has given working-
class neighbourhoods the ability to produce content that relates more realistically to their lives 
and difficulties. What ultimately matters to those who support Chavismo is the symbolic 
weight that these grass-roots efforts carry, as evidence of its commitment to the popular classes. 
One can see the problem with having a group of six very wealthy Venezuelan families own the 
largest commercial media outlets (that garner the largest audience share in the country) and 
fervently oppose the government. One can also see a problem in the fact that once the 
government has given you the funds to open a community radio station, you will feel obliged 
not to speak against it—a violation of your autonomy. The example of Catia TVe comes to 
mind: they broadcast segments several times a day on the advances of the Bolivarian 
 
7  Although Wilpert (2007) does not make mention of this, Martínez et al. (2010) explain how community 
media became a priority only after President Chávez realised community stations had helped him in defeating 
the 2002 coup (when the private outlets had entirely stopped reporting). 
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Revolution in exchange for the bigger chunk of their funding from the government (see 
Schiller 2011). Catia TVe did highlight the bureaucratic inefficiency of the state, and its inability 
to meet some of their basic needs, but, as Schiller (2011, 117) herself explains, “in practice, 
Chávez was never openly criticised on Catia TVe’s airways,” nor did they purport impartiality. 
My aim is not to debate whether Chavez’s community media contribute to creating new forms 
of participatory democracy, or new ways to relate to and define the state, as Fernandes (2010) 
and Schiller (2011) have done respectively, although quite some time ago. Rather, I note the 
very different—and fragmented—understandings of democracy and democratisation in 
relation to the media, that exist across the divide. Access to mediatic opportunities and 
freedom of the editorial line of the press, become different rights—not different aspects of the 
same right. Neither aspect need be mutually exclusive, but in the polarised populist sphere, 
where ‘the other’ is understood as ill-willed, the ideas appear to oppose each other, stemming 
as they do from two conflicting understandings of freedom and diverging political priorities. A 
similar phenomenon occurs with human rights, as I discuss in the last chapter. 
Distrust of the press  
Venezuelan migrants share a tremendous distrust of the Venezuelan press, for reasons already 
exposed. Solidarity activists harbour the same distrust for the international media.  
James, having met President Maduro, has strong opinions against him and his policies, but 
nonetheless calls himself a Chavista because, in his words, he “understood what [Chávez] was 
doing.” In his seventies, with wonderful good nature, he tells me the long story of his 
involvement with Latin America, where his daughter was born and raised. He tells me 
switching to Spanish: “tengo sangre latina,” [I have Latin blood] and exudes a knowledge of the 
continent unparalleled by any of the other solidarity activists I spoke with—no doubt fruit of 
the years he has spent living there. In contrast to other activists, what he learned from 
observing the elections was that the “place is chaotic, but the chaos is not entirely caused by 
the American blockade”—unlike what all my other activists want to argue. However, similarly 




One thing I did look at was, where all these lies came from. And from very few sources. 
Writers were the main source of the lies. I found the vocabulary is exactly the same. So 
you’d read in the Guardian, and the Observer, exactly the same words that appeared in the 
American press, in the New York Times and the Washington Post. And writing the same 
vocabulary. No electoral observer. Copied each other. Without any kind of journalistic 
integrity. Or attempt to discover what was going on. Not interested. Just spread lies. 
Including the Guardian. Very disappointing. Not the only thing the Guardian disappoints 
on nowadays. They disappoint an awful lot. 
At a public event I attended where James discussed his experience of the Venezuelan elections 
in 2018, James referred to the BBC as the “central lying office.” A similar rejection of the BBC is 
also expressed by Abdo (see Figure 7). Abdo, a Sudanese-British journalist in his mid-thirties, 
who spent a month in Venezuela during one of the longest blackouts (from the 7th to the 14th 
of March 2019) felt particular resistance from his friends’ back in the UK who refuse to believe 
what he was posting:  
Here in Venezuela, online, I get a lot of opposition groups attacking me, saying that I'm 
paid by Maduro's regime, etc. etc. But also from back home, because obviously a lot of my 
friends back in the UK, they're watching the same, what I call, propaganda channels as 
everyone else. So they're thinking ‘what's going on? How come?’ They kind of disbelieve 
some of the things that I'm saying, that I've been brainwashed or that I'm on that line 
because of the channel that I work with and it took a while for me to convince them, more 
evidence, pictures, more, more interviews, and slowly but surely, they're starting to 
understand that what they're being told on the mainstream press if far, far from true. Some 
resistance from people back home that just think that the press can't be lying, either the 
press are lying or I'm lying and the more likely to be, that I'm lying as an individual, than 
the institution that they trust, such as the BBC.  
 
Figure 7. Screenshot of Abdo's tweet (anonymity preserved) criticising media coverage on Venezuela. 
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Juan, a Spanish activist in his late sixties, fighting for the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara, a 
disputed region on the northwest coast of Africa, got involved with Venezuelan politics 
because Hugo Chávez became one of the few leaders of the world that recognised the Sahara 
as independent from Morocco. He claims, “100 percent of the Sahrawi people support the 
Bolivarian Revolution for this reason.” He used the memorable term ‘infoxication’ to refer to 
the role the media has played in building what he feels is the narrative of Maduro as dictator:  
The media has played an important role here, which I call infoxication. They report 
intoxicating. Infoxication is the term I use because most people in Spain have the criteria 
that Maduro is a dictator. You read this everywhere. 
Mauro, the principal organiser of an anti-fascist collective, targeted specifically against the 
modern football field in Brazil, one of two Latin American solidarity activists I spoke with had 
a similar complaint. When I asked him about the difficulties his organisation faces because of 
its open support of the Maduro government, he explains that the difficulties are the same for 
everyone:  
Our right to speak about the Bolivarian process, has been denied to us for the last 20 years. 
For the dominant monopoly, nothing positive can be said about that country. It is, 
effectively, denying the right to counter-argue, leaving a one-sided version imported from 
the north (translation from Portuguese by the author).  
Solidarity activists share the sense that Venezuela’s reality—what is good—is not presented in 
the media. Instead, the media seeks to portray Maduro as a dictator. In tandem to their feelings 
of isolation, solidarity activists feel their views cannot even be debated seriously (I discuss these 
feelings of isolation further in chapter 8). Pedro, for instance (an important film documentarist 
that has spoken several times on the BBC on the topic of Venezuela), tells me he has a problem 
with my way of addressing him as an activist, given the connotations he feels this word entails:  
I just think it’s the kind of lowly term that's used, quite [pause] I think it’s used from one 
side to the other, but never from the other side. So I would argue, if I'm an activist, the 
Guardian Venezuelan correspondent is also an activist. But I'm a journalist, and I would 
argue that my journalism is more robust than their journalism. I don't mind. I mean I'm a 
journalist, who's also a film maker, if some people view [it] as ‘activistic’ that's fine. I'd 
rather discuss it on the plane of journalistic documentary in that sense, but again, I don't 
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have a problem, I'm not deeply offended by it, but I find it curious that its seen kind of from 
one side.  
Importantly Pedro understands his role as one of presenting, if not the truth, at least a more 
robust version of the events that unfold in Venezuela—events that are being framed, if you 
will, in a certain way by The Guardian and the BBC. For him activism represents a factionalism 
he does not identify with—a factionalism that results from Venezuela’s highly polarised 
environment. Pedro continues to explain how debate is stifled: 
I think places like the Guardian should be painting a kind of informed rigorous critical 
discussion about what's going on in Venezuela. But I think it’s so off the mark, so strikingly 
correlated to what the government—someone like me goes on a programme—they almost 
polarised the debate. I think the kind of extremist media positions on Venezuela polarised 
the ability for progressive rigorous debate […] you end up just being laughed as a kind of 
‘Chavista’ kind of activist.  
Pedro paints an important image of how his ideas are ridiculed, a fact that adds to the feelings 
of isolation and being misunderstood that many other solidarity activists experienced, feelings 
that solidify their sense that power is being used ‘unduly’ against them. Despite how 
widespread it felt to interviewees, it’s worth noting that this hate-speech against the far-left has 
not really been addressed in the literature or in Lumsden and Harmer's (2019) important book 
on online othering and discrimination. 
Solidarity activists make the case, moreover, that the press is using Venezuela’s case to tarnish 
the reputation of leftist leaders worldwide, as discussed in chapter 3. By associating 
Venezuela’s crisis to leftist policies more broadly (including, for example, those of Bernie 
Sanders in the US), certain right-wing media feel they can trigger fear against them. A topic for 
an entire thesis in and of itself, here I note simply how this media rhetoric adds to the 
scepticism interviewees amassed of the press more broadly. For Sahas, a young British-Asian 
activist, in his early thirties:  
I think also, because, you know, since Jeremy Corbyn ran for leadership of the Labour 
Party since 2015, the media has nearly constantly compared him to Venezuela. To say that 
if Jeremy Corbyn comes to power, we're going to get a Venezuela kind of thing. So every 
anti-Corbyn person now is completely using Venezuela in that way, as well […] You look 
at since the current crisis began with Guaidó and all, the media has been even more 
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abysmal than they've usually been. I mean, they've been completely one-sided, 
completely, you know, devoid of facts and very much pushing the [British] government's 
line, which is obviously an anti-democratic and you know, pro-war line. And, you know, 
fostering these myths about what's happening in Venezuela […] It was just yesterday that 
the New York Times published that article finally admitting that it was opposition activists 
in Venezuela that had burned the humanitarian aid, […] Yeah, all the media was saying, 
‘Look at Venezuela, Maduro's people are burning aid’ blah, blah, blah. And any activists 
on the left who are on the ground there who are reporting and saying this isn't the case are 
just utterly vilified. Or ignored.  
For Sahas, the New York Times story is particularly emblematic of the narrative the media is 
trying to push: forceful regime-change is needed against President Maduro who is ‘burning’ 
humanitarian aid at the border. New evidence showed that it was the opposition who had in 
fact burned the aid, although not purposefully, and the New York Times had to rectify the 
information—blaming Colombian authorities for having spread misinformation. The New 
York Times, though, pushed a slightly different line from what Sahas describes here in their 
correction: for them it is US officials and the State Department (including Vice-President Mike 
Pence and John Bolton)—not the media—who are looking for regime change in Venezuela, 
and helped spread the lie.  
Liesel, a young transgender activist about to finish University, describes how they got involved 
progressively with Marxism by engaging extensively with its literature. In this memorable 
quote, they explain how they feel capitalism is failing, and that socialism cannot be 
‘reformed’—in fact, they dislike Jeremy Corbyn, unlike most other solidarity activists, because 
they see him as a reformist. Most importantly, as a Marxist, they paint a picture of their world 
that is very telling: 
I read the paper, Marxist.com. And I also read the Financial Times. Which if anything can 
convince you that capitalism is collapsing, it will be the Financial Times, because the 
ruling class are much more honest to each other in the FT which is basically their internal 
bulletin, than to us in the Guardian.  
The Financial Times is the internal bulletin of the ruling class; The Guardian on the other hand, 
is a tool for the subjugation of the working classes, where lies are spread to avoid revolt. Liesel 
does not avoid the press, they just feel the press that ideally would appeal to them, is not willing 
to defy the international media narrative on Venezuela.  
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Jacobin or not: a divided left 
Unlike other interviewees who speak little Spanish, Ignacio, from Spain, has an ambivalent 
understanding of democracy in Venezuela. He in fact agrees that, to a certain extent, 
democracy does not exist there: 
That there isn’t democracy? Well, not exactly. In Venezuela there isn’t democracy because 
you can’t have democracy without an agonism that can sustain different political options. 
We all know that. That there’s no plurality? Plurality exists, the problem is that it is not 
integrated into a political system because the opposition has not wanted to participate in 
elections for years […] The other day I got together with a Trotskyist friend, a dude that 
comes from radical militancy […] that told me, ‘we can’t defend Maduro because we 
defend agonistic democracy […] pluralism, we defend a non-Jacobin revolution […] It 
really shows the extent of insanity to which people can succumb.  
A young sociology student at a top-tier University, living in the UK, Ignacio invokes Chantal 
Mouffe’s understanding of the term ‘agonism’ to describe “the existing struggle of adversaries,” 
described in chapter 4 (Mouffe 2000, 16). Ignacio easily admits there is a non-existent 
democracy in Venezuela; he is agreeing to the fact that Venezuela lacks this ‘agonism’—
political conflict ‘integrated into the political system’. Other solidarity activists, and I note with 
less knowledge of the system, surely disagree with him, citing the presence of Henri Falcon in 
the last elections. For him, this is not necessarily problematic given that he contends 
‘pluralism’ does exist. He encounters plurality within the Chavista movement, encompassing, 
as it does, differing leftist undercurrents.8 He also sees agonism in the clout that the opposition, 
and Juan Guaidó, have managed to galvanise from the media and other nations abroad. For 
Ignacio, most importantly, the opposition is not integrated to the political system because they 
do not want to participate in the electoral processes—i.e., not because the system is inherently 
undemocratic, but because the opposition is. 
 
8 Some academics argue that the PSUV—Chávez socialist party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela—
encompasses even the centre-right, see Hetland (2017). 
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Ignacio then tells the story of a Trotskyist friend who refuses to support Maduro because his 
friend stands for “agonistic democracy and pluralism, and a non-Jacobin revolution.” For 
Ignacio the fact that a Trotskyist is unwilling to support Maduro demonstrates “the insanity to 
which people can succumb.” Why someone in the far-left, a professed Trotskyist, would decide 
not to support the government of Maduro, is beyond him—it’s ‘insanity,’ madness. As I’ve 
discussed previously, Trotskyists have always been uncomfortable with Maduro’s reformism. 
But Ignacio’s idea of ‘the other’ as ‘insane,’ ‘evil’ or ‘incomprehensible’ is emblematic of the 
radicalised populist politics I have been describing. (Venezuelan migrants display a similar 
reaction when confronted by solidarity activists’ support for the Maduro government: that 
they are also insane.)  
At a deeper level, saying others are insane—or more seriously, morally ‘wrong’—is a simple 
way to dismiss asking difficult questions about why, in the case of Ignacio, someone with 
generally similar views, disagrees with him on this particular issue. In Ignacio’s case, he 
believes those broadly on the left ought to share his interpretation of the conflict in Venezuela, 
and the need to defend it against US aggression9—but many in the left do not, starting with 
Ignacio’s own president Pedro Sánchez. This split in the left seems to suggest that how we 
interpret and locate what is felt as ‘undue’ or ‘just’ power, our positionality, is an idiosyncratic 
rather than an ideological preference based on a series of lived experiences.10 
Most solidarity activists, as Ignacio’s example showed, were very frustrated with other factions 
of the centre-left and the centre-left press that do not support Maduro. For them, these factions 
of the left (including the communist party in Venezuela who is against the government) seem 
unable to prioritise what they see as the popular sovereignty of the Venezuelan people above 
US imperialism. In Andy’s own words:  
 
9  In chapter 3, I discussed Heyd’s (2007) understanding of solidarity. He underlines the loyalty solidarity, as 
a moral imperative, makes on those considered to be members of the group (in this case, others in the far-left). 
10  The split is also mirrored in debates on Iraq and Afghanistan between anti-imperialists opposed to any 
intervention, and anti-totalitarians, who broadly accept war against any terrorism (Ryley 2013: 29). (I discuss 
this fragmented, or hierarchical understanding of human rights in the last chapter.)  
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[T]hey were worried that some of the people on the committee were going to be split with 
Chavez. I mean, there was a series of doubts being voiced on the left in Britain about 
Chavez—particularly from the far left, you know, who are not anti-imperialist, who are 
workerist, and always are trying to find fault with any leader in the third world. They call 
it ‘third worldism,’ they say, like we're chasing after white knights, they say ‘we should be 
equally critical’. This is just a trope, you know. ‘We should be really critical of people who 
are attacking the trade unions and human rights abroad as we are in our own country.’ To 
which my response is, well, first of all, you have to know what's going on and the countries 
you're attacking. And second, we live in Britain, we don't live in Venezuela. So we're not 
[pause] we're not responsible for the rest of the world's problems. They have to sort out 
their own problems. 
Andy’s position assumes that some people on the far left—‘workerist’ he calls them—are 
critical of Chávez’s government only because it was accused of violating several human rights 
(see chapter 9). For Andy, then, these rights issues are ‘domestic’ affairs that need not be 
judged. Andy emphasises that his main stance is to let Venezuelans solve their own 
problems—this is part of the anti-imperialist struggle. Yet his stance is questioned by 
Venezuelans who believe his strong opinions are denying their experience of Venezuela’s 
reality (see chapter 8). The critical position against the government assumed by certain 
‘workerists,’ is not necessarily held exclusively by the very far left of the spectrum, as Andy 
wants to suggest, but rather, I would argue, by those in the left who prioritise human rights over 
maintaining an anti-imperialist, or anti-US stance. This is, again as I have just mentioned, not 
an ideological preference, rather one of value priorities. 
Fernando, instead, derides the faction of the left that says that Maduro’s government is not 
‘truly left’:  
[imitating others] ‘We don't want our project to be associated with [Maduro] given the bad 
things that are occurring in Venezuela.’ [But] you don't get out of that by just saying oh, 
well then that's not me [laughs]. No, no one falls for that trick. You can't just turn around 
and say ‘oh but Venezuela is not socialist.’  
Fernando’s comment shows an unrealistic desire for loyalty from all sectors of the left towards 
leaders such as Maduro, who proclaim themselves leftist—an aspect of solidarity highlighted 
by Heyd (2007). Fernando is implying that the Maduro government has upheld the values of 
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socialism, more than in simple discourse—even when this is debatable—and that those values 
are more important than those of pluralism, or agonistic democracy.  
In his characterisation of activism, Tony, an Australian writer, academic and activist—
expelled from his academic post—is hesitant to use the word, much like Pedro was, but for a 
different reason. He feels today’s demonstrations of ‘the left’ are ‘co-opted’ by what he feels are 
‘powerful interests’: 
Let's say in the US, basically, who have co-opted all these words, you know, they've really 
colonised all this language of activism, and what does Hillary Clinton call herself? The 
resistance now, or something like that […] But anyway, that's the problem with activism 
these days, that activism is sort of and some of the online stuff which is pretty fake too you 
know […] People don't really understand what it is. They think that if they pay some money 
to Greenpeace […] or something like that, that they're being an activist […] It was very 
different. I mean, I was [pause] as I was quite young, I was involved in that Vietnam war 
stuff. And it was very, very different then because it was quite a radical thing to go to a 
demonstration or to hand out a pamphlet because it was illegal, you couldn't have a 
pamphlet or go to a demonstration. Of course, now it's very organised, it's very easy to do 
[…] If you want to have a serious big demo, you contact the police, the police organize it, 
and get you down on the street. So it's almost part of the bureaucracy, it's part of the 
furniture, you know? So it's doesn't have the impact […] All of activism I feel is very, is very 
controlled, very calm, co-opted and organised, basically.”  
As Tony explains, activism for him is not what it used to be, but more importantly, it has been 
co-opted. It isn’t a tool for the oppressed, or of rebellion against the system: it is used to support 
the interests of those in power already. This idea of who moves and handles powerful interests, 
re-surfaces frequently, not in reference to Hillary Clinton as it does for Tony, but in reference 
to the US’ global hegemony more broadly. It is this emphasis on the US’ place in the world, 
and the need to fight it about other things, that differentiates solidarity activists from others on 
the left.  
This want of disassociation from these other factions in the left is understandable: the media 
has used the Venezuelan case to discourage support for the left in all countries of the West, 
especially in Spain (against the incipient party Podemos) but also in the United Kingdom 
(against Jeremy Corbyn and Momentum), and more recently in the United States (against 
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Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren). Martín, describes it as a phantom that surrounds the 
Podemos project, which he had been a part of: 
The phantom that they put on you—that you want to turn Spain into the new Venezuela, 
the Bolivarian Red Chavistas who are going to nationalize everything and take away 
people's houses. Well, yes, that creates a stigma for you as a defender of a ‘bloody’ 
(sangrienta) dictatorship that has the country in ruins, you know, what the media typically 
says here. 
To defend the “‘bloody’ dictatorship” is stigmatised in Spain, especially because, according to 
the media, those who defend Maduro want to “convert Spain into Venezuela.” This association 
of the left with the government in Venezuela, specifically the idea that socialism will lead to 
the destruction of any nation, was touted by Juan Guaidó himself on Fox News (broadcast 
October 15, 2019). The defence of the Venezuelan government is, as Martín explains, 
stigmatised.  
Conclusion 
Democracy is imagined and shaped as the most legitimate way to exercise power in the 
modern polity by both groups. Both groups use the concept of democracy as the singular way 
in which political power can be enacted morally—but hold entirely different value priorities, 
or value-systems, meaning they are willing to sacrifice certain aspects of democracy for others. 
Because Venezuelan migrants feel they have lost their autonomy and feel that they have been 
forced to migrate (I describe this fully in chapter 8), they value individual liberties above other 
things. They understand democracy as that system of government which protects freedoms of 
speech, religion, press, protest. In part because solidarity activists feel that their (and poor 
Venezuelans’) opportunities have been slighted by the neoliberal hegemony, they defend 
democracy as that system of government that increases access and participation to those 
traditionally marginalised because of it. Democracy is used simultaneously as an ideal to 
describe what is allegedly inexistent in Venezuela, and as a justification to describe what is, 
also allegedly, advancing opportunities, a fact that speaks to the malleability of the term. 
At large, the discursive difference between the two groups corresponds to notions of ‘liberal’ 
democracy versus simply ‘democracy.’ I note Urbinati (2019, 11) understands this difference to 
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be antithetical to the concept of democracy because a democracy requires “that no majority is 
the last one, that no dissenting view is confined ex-ante to a position of peripheral impotence 
or subordination merely because it is held by the ‘wrong’ people.” In other words, true 
democracy requires the “convertibility of majorities into minorities and, conversely, of 
minorities into majorities” (Sartori 1987, 24). Democracy is in Claude Lefort (2007) famous 
conception, an ‘empty space’ of power and for this, the liberties associated with civil and 
political rights—protected by universal human rights—are constitutive of, and not merely 
incidental, aspects of democracy, as discussed in chapter 4. This stands in contrast to a populist 
understanding of democracy that seeks inclusion of the ‘many’ by excluding what is 
understood as the ‘few,’ or the political establishment, who have abused their power by being 
inattentive to the needs of the many. I argued in chapter 4, that this exclusion of the elites is 
felt by participants as a historically and racially ‘just’ or a ‘moral’ process in which democracy 
and human rights are expanded, not reduced.  
It is this interpretation of the political world in moral terms that determines the extent to which 
interviewees are willing to defend certain means above certain ends, and whether they see 




Chapter 6. Racial understandings of 





Figure 8. Social media post from "Struggle for Socialism" website, calling for protests on August 9th 2019, in 
New York City 
A contentious Australian journalist (admired by solidarity activist) John Pilger (2019), entitles 
an article written in February 2019 (after Guaidó’s self-proclamation) ‘The war on Venezuela 
is built on lies.’ Pilger, who met Chávez many times, aims to persuade a Western audience that 
the narrative on Venezuela (Venezuela as a dictatorship; Venezuela as a place of violation of 
human rights) is wrong, advanced by US interests, and promoted by a racist white upper class 
in Venezuela.  
Pilger starts by mentioning Chávez’s electoral gains: 8 elections in 8 years, and describes him 
as “the most popular head of state in the Western Hemisphere, probably the world.” Chávez’s 
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credentials as a popular and legitimate leader, supersedes all other arguments regarding his 
legitimacy. Immediately after, he writes: 
Every major Chavista reform was voted on, notably a new constitution of which 71 percent 
of the people approved each of the 396 articles that enshrined unheard of freedoms, such 
as Article 123, which for the first time recognised the human rights of mixed-race and black 
people, of whom Chavez was one […] Ordinary people regarded Chavez and his 
government as their first champions: as theirs. This was especially true of the indigenous, 
mestizos and Afro-Venezuelans, who had been held in historic contempt by Chavez's 
immediate predecessors and by those who today live far from the barrios, in the mansions 
and penthouses of East Caracas, who commute to Miami where their banks are and who 
regard themselves as “white”. They are the powerful core of what the media calls “the 
opposition”. 
In his article, Pilger only mentions article 123, which, according to him, recognises the mixed-
race and black people of Venezuela—importantly for him, it seems, this racial advancement is 
the new constitution’s most significant achievement. Unfortunately, the actual law does not 
make mention of either mixed-race people or black people.11 To this day only indigenous 
populations (pueblos indígenas) are explicitly recognised in the constitution, and are specifically 
mentioned in this article, despite the asks of several Afro-Venezuelan organisations (see Rivas 
Brito and Ruette-Orihuela 2019).  
I note that immediately after discussing Chávez’s democratic popularity, Pilger emphasises the 
racial dimensions of the Venezuelan divide. In so doing, he not only explains how Venezuela’s 
racial structures build the divisions that exist in the country today, he also paints a disturbing 
picture: those marginalised by the state’s oil wealth and those who have benefitted from it have 
done so because of the colour of their skin. Subsequently he writes: “They could be white 
South Africans, the petite bourgeoisie of Constantia and Sandton, pillars of the cruelties of 
apartheid.” His analysis reflects on a different racial project—that of South Africa, and one that 
 
11 Article 123 reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and promote their own economic 
practices based on reciprocity, solidarity and exchange; their traditional productive activities; their 
participation in the national economy; and to define their priorities.” 
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has very much influenced anti-racist (and solidarity) movements in the West.12 By comparing 
it to a racial project Westerners are more acquainted with, he is strengthening the case for 
Chávez—although missing the context under which Venezuela’s own racial project and 
racism operates. 
Pilger assumes that what is at work in Venezuela is a crime he already knows, apartheid. In 
explaining the conflict in these terms, he is calling against a racist white opposition waging a 
battle against a legitimate brown government. His powerful discourse highlights the cruelty 
and injustice of the white upper class in Venezuela. This is a moral demand by any extent—
even if ironically, the idea that Venezuelans need defence is interpreted by some Venezuelans 
as interventionist itself.13 
In another example, Pulitzer Prize winner Roger Ebert, writes: 
Chávez was elected primarily by the poor. He asked a simple question: Since the oil wells 
have always been nationalised and the oil belongs to the state, why do the profits flow 
directly to the richest, whitest 20 percent of the population, while being denied to the 
poorer, darker 80 percent? His plan was to distribute the profits equally among all 
Venezuelans (Ebert 2003, n.p.). 
Taking from Chávez’s own discursive reasoning, as discussed in chapter 2, Ebert discloses what 
is for him the true heart of conflict: a darker 80 percent have been unfairly denied their rightful 
share of Venezuela’s oil wealth.  
Pilger, Ebert, and solidarity activists, see the conflict in racial terms, having been involved with 
the anti-colonial and anti-racist militancy central to the international left. Referencing this 
aspect, Andy, a British-Canadian in his late sixties, tells me: 
 
12 See Hope's (2011) doctoral dissertation for an account of the Canadian solidarity movements working 
closely with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. 
13 I discuss how Venezuelan migrants view solidarity activists as having a colonialist mindset in chapter 8. 
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The whole of the history of my organisation of the British left was bound up with, on the 
one hand, the anti-racist struggle, which is huge in Britain. Because it dates from the 
earliest days from the influx of Caribbean people who came with the wind Rush and so on 
and then the subsequent influx of South Asian people. It's very fundamental. 
I discuss the importance of anti-British imperialism sentiment in chapter 9, but here I note 
what Andy feels is one of the most prominent arms of his organisation and activism: anti-
racism. His understanding of Britain’s own imperial and unjust racial projects conditions his 
support for Chávez’s own, that, to his eyes, is dismantling structural racism.  
Similarly, Jack, the young black-British activist, (member of Jeremy Corbyn’s Momentum 
movement), tweets: 
The US policy will harm working class Venezuelans and indigenous people, most of 
whom are black and brown. This is imperialism and white supremacy in action. The poor 
Venezuelans starve while the rich white Venezuelans in the wealthy neighbourhoods and 
abroad do fine. 
Jack is referring to the harsh economic sanctions on Venezuela that discriminately affect poor, 
black and brown Venezuelans, now entirely dependent on government food-boxes for their 
subsistence. Here the racial element embedded in Venezuela’s structural inequalities also 
serves to justify a moral position against the allegedly ‘white’ Venezuelan US-supported 
opposition.  
These ideas are expressed throughout the interviews with supporters of the Chávez and 
Maduro governments. On the other hand, Venezuelan migrants only referenced racism as they 
felt it was experienced against indigenous populations in other countries (with the exception 
of two interviewees in the group of 32, incidentally one afro-descendant, and another with 
indigenous features born in Colombia). In subscribing to the idea of mestizaje described in 
chapter 2—that Venezuelans are of mixed background (Indigenous, Black and European)—
Venezuelans overlook how racialisation operates in their own country and in Chavismo—a 
fact that makes the racial aspect of solidarity activists’ discourse particularly noteworthy.  
Because Chavismo stands as a government for the brown poor—a disenfranchised majority 
and thus the legitimate heirs of power—solidarity activists feel it needs to be defended from the 
right-wing, white interests (and American interests) that, as Jack implies, conspire to harm it. 
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Here, I take a closer look at how Chavismo’s governance feels ‘just’ given the historical racial 
marginalisation and oppression these groups have endured—what I term historical-racial 
moral logic. 
A racist opposition 
 
Damian, a young Russian-Australian in his mid-thirties, has met and interviewed an 
impressive group of political leaders (including Jeremy Corbyn, Rafael Correa, Cristina 
Kirchner and Evo Morales) from a decade of activist work aimed at the “final end of 
neoliberalism across the world,” as he writes on his Facebook page. Interestingly, Damian 
differentiates between the migrant wave that left Venezuelan during the Chávez years, white 
and European, and that which leaves today en masse: 
I think we need to talk about the nature of immigration from Venezuela to Europe, to other 
parts of the world, through these two different phases. Chávez era immigration and 
Maduro immigration. While right now we're seeing a lot of economic immigration from 
Venezuela, mass group of people who, yes, have to immigrate out of Venezuela in search 
of jobs, in search of a better life, in search of food, and basic supplies, which is real, it is a 
real problem. And a lot of these people are doing it purely for economic reasons. This was 
not the case during the Chávez era, which was largely I would say, ideological. Ideological 
or, the vast majority of those who immigrated from that time were from the upper classes 
and upper middle classes, who saw their privileges being threatened by a progressive 
government. And also, we see overwhelmingly white. Or European. 
For Tim, a white South African journalist in his early sixties, there is more to a mere divide 
based on class and race: there is a genuine dislike, to an extent, hatred the white classes share 
against the indigenous and black populations: 
And [the Venezuelan middle and upper classes] look down on it, and why they used to call 
Chavez a mono, a monkey. And the idea of these ‘nasty funny tinged’ people. We 
incorporate this ‘funny tinge’ thing internationally. It really describes how they look at the 
world. So these people with the funny tinge, yeah? And it’s horrifying the idea that these 
people could be in charge of them. I mean it’s—for [the middle and upper classes] it’s 
disgust, it’s disgraceful, it’s against the natural order of things.  
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In February 2019, when I conducted the interview with Tim, the UK member of parliament 
Angela Smith had just left the Labour Party to join the Independent Group, briefly known as 
Change UK. She referred to people from BAME backgrounds as being ‘funny tinged’ in a 
debate aired live on the BBC a couple of days before I spoke to Tim—a fervent supporter of 
Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the UK’s Labour Party at the time. Tim was particularly distraught, 
even angry at the defection of these seven MPs from Labour and their negative views of 
Corbyn. As Tim describes the situation in Venezuela, he is reminded of the phrase ‘funny 
tinged’ that had just made headlines, and the systemic racism it implies. Tim uses Angela’s 
racist faux pas to expose the underlying attitudes of the MPs that had just left Labour, and their 
hypocrisy, given they were accusing Corbyn of anti-Semitism. To him Angela’s expression 
exemplifies how white middle- and upper-class people in all corners of the globe see the rest: 
the term she uses, ‘funny tinged,’ is imminently pejorative. Tim sees how the fact that Angela 
says this is telling of an unconscious normalising bias she seems completely unaware of. Tim 
understands how whites, such as himself, see themselves as ‘naturally’ educated, privileged, 
and how the rise to power of a mulatto man that breaks with this order, could be ‘horrifying’ 
to Venezuelan whites. Tim is particularly well versed in racial issues, he explains, because he 
married a black woman and has a black daughter. His feeling is that for white Venezuelans 
(and here he disengages me, a brown Venezuelan, regardless of my privileged education) it is 
particularly lamentable that Chávez would be in charge, because white dominated the political 
landscape for decades.  
A radical post shared by one solidarity activist, Fernando, an Australian-Argentinean 
journalist in his late thirties who lived in Venezuela for more than three years, is also 
exemplifying of this ‘white-typification,’ or stereotype solidarity activists make of the 
opposition. Fernando re-posts a tweet that seeks to characterise the group of people that 
accompany Guiadó’s wife—he lets his followers arrive at their own conclusions. The first 




Figure 9. Facebook post shared by one of my interviewees that shows a picture of the Venezuelan diaspora in 
New York, where it is obvious to the commentators that these migrant Venezuelans are all in a majority white. 
Others suggest they are “Whities, upper class and cowards,” and the last comment, which is 
the most offensive, applauds annihilation, an execution of all Euro-settlers by Putin.14 The 
association solidarity activists make of the opposition with whiteness and privilege serves to 
justify deep contempt—and in this instance, even hatred—towards the opposition, but also to 
justify their support for Chavismo as the ‘right’ moral stance to have on the conflict. 
As a black man supporting the government of Venezuela, Abdo’s opinion on this issue is note-
worthy. The British-Sudanese journalist in his mid-thirties, spent a month in Venezuela 
during the severe ten-day power outage, and was in Venezuela when we conducted our 
interview. He cheerfully tells me he is known as ‘the Venezuelan guy’ in his office, because of 
the deep interest he has developed towards the country’s politics. He then adds: 
 
14  This desire for annihilation is a subject I return to in chapter 8. 
Photo of group of Venezuelan 




I've got quite a lot of racism, so ‘hashtag yankee go home’ (#YankeeGoHome), a lot of 
opposition. But to me that just supports the argument […] ‘cause you see from here, the 
opposition process is predominantly white […] That naked racism comes out.  
Abdo’s twitter feed is primarily a forum on news about Venezuela, where he shares 
information he feels is not being disclosed by the international media (including photos of 
fully-stocked supermarkets in the wealthier areas of Caracas, and images of the marches in 
favour of Maduro). Abdo felt the attack against his political support of the government was 
racist. He felt the opposition dislikes the fact that he is black, because for him, they are 
predominantly white. I note that the hashtag ‘Yankee go home,’ is more often used by 
Chavistas when they want to attack US commentary on the country; it is rarely used against 
Chavistas. In this case, we can presume the hashtag implies a profound dislike towards Abdo, 
a foreigner supporting Chavismo, who is ‘meddling’ in Venezuelan affairs and negatively 
impacting the image of Venezuela’s crisis—and the opposition—internationally.15  
Abdo notes in his feed (see Figure 10):  
If you want to see what it looks like when working class black & brown people feel included 
& welcomed in society. Go to #Venezuela but please make [sic] avoid #Colombia. Photos 
was taken by me in West #Caracas on 9th March 2019.  
 
15  I discuss this feeling against pro-Chávez foreign opinion, a feeling that was very prominently replicated 




Figure 10. Above, below. Two photos taken by Abdo, in Caracas (posted on his Twitter account) that highlight 
his sense of Chavismo as a predominantly black and brown political movement. 
 
 In another tweet Abdo suggests:  
In #Bolivia like #Venezuela the right-wing elite use violence against indigenous brown + 
black working-class people who they assume support @NicolasMaduro or @evoespueblo. 
The right wing in both countries are funded + supported by Washington who have no 
problem with their tactics. 
Abdo is using the problematic association of Chavismo and dark skin (but also indigeneity and 
support for Morales) in two distinct ways: 1) to suggest that Chavismo supports the previously 
excluded sectors, and is thus enacting racial moral justice; and 2) to suggest it helps right-wing 
sectors easily identify and attack their ‘opponents.’  
Authors of the limited articles that discuss race and Chavismo in Venezuela,16 are generally in 
agreement that there are racist attitudes entrenched in the opposition. Gott (2007, 271) 
 
16 See Herrera 2005; Ishibashi 2007; Cannon 2008; Gottberg 2011; MacLeod 2019; Gott 2007. 
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describes these as “race hatred—a gut hostility towards blacks and Indians.” Gottberg (2011) 
instead, explains how the white elites and the media have racialised Chávez’s crowds of 
supporters, seeing them as “dark-skin mobs.” MacLeod (2019) similarly notes how the press 
refers to them as ‘thugs,’ with the intent of sparking fear—fear partly responsible for the early 
migration wave in the 2000s that Damien has alluded to. Herrera quotes terms used against 
those from the popular classes more broadly ‘Indian,’ ‘vermin,’ and ‘rabble.’ Ishibashi confirms 
that the opposition referred to Chávez as ‘monkey.’ He also interestingly suggests that had 
Chávez been willing to negotiate returning some of the economic and political power they 
enjoyed in the Punto Fijo era, they would have eagerly, if hypocritically, adopted him as one of 
their own. 
The alleged hatred is supported by the behaviour of some of the opposition politicians 
themselves (although it cannot be generalised to the entire opposition, as solidarity activists 
seem to want to suggest). Carlos Ocariz, candidate to the governorship of Miranda, and long-
time mayor of the eastern municipality of Sucre in Caracas, was caught sending messages 
regarding a campaign visit to an afro-descendent community that read: “those sweaty negros, 
their smell is awful! How exasperating!” (Noticias-Ahora October 8 2017). Although the 
messages were taken up and repudiated by opposition journalist Patricia Poleo on her 
YouTube channel (she is currently exiled in Miami), they did not spark the debate that needed 
to emerge from such conduct in other media outlets that favour the opposition. The event did 
not lower Ocariz’s standing in any way, nor did it receive any other penalisation; it did not even 
motivate an apology from his part. It speaks volumes of the lack of interest on the subject of 
race and racial discrimination (see Subbiah 2020, forthcoming).  
The case of Orlando Figuera 
This alleged hatred of the opposition towards the brown and black Chavistas was taken up by 
another young activist, Ignacio, twenty-one, from Spain, who was visiting Venezuela for the 
first time in September 2018. When Ignacio hears a “more moderate compatriot,” complaining 
of the one-sidedness of an event Ignacio had organised on Venezuela at his University (see 
Figure 11), he responds: 
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You can’t put people who build hospitals where there was no access to public health 
facilities, or give access to water and electricity, on the same level as people who burn 
others alive only because of the colour of their skin. 
Ignacio’s presents the conflict as lying between two moral opposites: those enacting social 
justice, and those capable of burning black or brown ‘others.’ Ignacio does not necessarily 
solely understand the conflict in these terms, as he demonstrates further on in the interview, 
but he is justifying why being partial to Chavismo, and being against the opposition, is the only 
possible ‘right’ position to have. For Ignacio, the sides are not morally equivalent, so the 
possibility of dialogue or any rapprochement should be closed. The ‘immoral’ effectively need 
to be silenced. Silencing them is justified or deserved: they do not stand on equal footing. Once 
the conflict is framed in these terms, there is no possibility of an ‘other,’ perhaps brown or black 
and against Chávez: if there were such black and brown Venezuelans, they are either ill-




Figure 11. Poster of the event organised by Ignacio, in conjunction with the Venezuelan embassy in the UK 
(anonymity preserved). 
Background photo of Chávez and a 
very large group of followers 
removed for copyright reasons. 
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Ignacio references the burning and lynching of Orlando Figuera, a 21-year-old afro-
Venezuelan, one of the most atrocious examples of the height violence has reached in 
radicalised Venezuela. Figuera was stabbed several times, doused in gasoline and burned by a 
multitude when opposition protesters accused him of ‘looking like’ a ‘Chavista,’ or a ‘robber’—
a look tied to his dark-skin and his working-class appearance. Opposition accounts say Figuera 
was caught stealing in the Altamira Plaza—one of the epicentres of the (very violent) 
opposition protests, known as guarimbas, against the government’s dismantling of the National 
Assembly in 2017. The idea of an infiltrated robber infuriated the group of protestors, fed up 
with systemic criminality in Caracas, who then decided to take the proverbial ‘justice into their 
own hands’ (El Nuevo Herald June 7 2017). The Attorney General’s office stated Figuera met a 
man with whom he had been in a job-related fight at the protest: the man stabbed him and 
then accused him of stealing in front of the other protestors. Orlando worked as a parking 
assistant and died in the hospital from his severe wounds on the 4th of June 2017.  
The lynching of Figuera was emblematic in bringing the associated risk of being black in 
Venezuela to the fore of the political discourse—at least for those supporters of the 
government. For President Maduro, Figuera’s death was not simply the result of an altercation 
around work: he tied the crime to racial and political hatred. Figuera, he says, was lynched 
“because of his skin colour, because someone called him a thief, because someone said he was 
a Chavista infiltrator, under the effects of limitless hate” (El Nuevo Herald June 7 2017).  
More importantly, the mother of the victim, Inés Esparragosa, agreed with President Maduro’s 
grave assertions. According to her account in Correo del Orinoco (June 6 2017), the group of 
protestors were hitting and laughing at him, telling him he was a ‘maldito negro’ (a damned 
negro). At the hospital, her son told her he had been asked by someone whether he was a 
Chavista. He said to her, “whatever I answered they were going to kill me. I said yes. I am 
Chavista, what’s wrong?” She explains he had never been militant in a political party, but that 
she herself was grateful to Chavismo because she graduated from an educational mission, and 
lives in government housing. She poignantly adds: “my son for being black, was killed. I’m 
black. What do I do? Who do I blame? […] They treated my son like an animal […] because of 
the selfishness and racism they hold.”  
Social determinism, as developed by Durkheim and Mauss (2009 [1963]) or Bourdieu (1984)  can 
explain how ‘othering’ works on perceived differences of appearances that establish 
hierarchies: appearances that become shortcuts for locating an ‘other.’ The way race, and more 
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particularly skin-colour, has been associated to lower-income, is part of Venezuela’s colonial 
legacy, as discussed in the chapter 2. Amid a large, mobilised group, it is not hard to imagine 
how Figuera’s skin colour could have been a tragic liability that associated him with Chavismo. 
I note that Afro-Venezuelan scholar Esther Pineda (2018) also cites Figuera’s case as a prime 
example of the entrenched racist hatred of the “extremist sectors” of the opposition—she is 
careful not to equate these sectors to the whole of the opposition, as she understands how 
many Chavistas (some white) can be racist as well.  
The fact that Figuera’s lynching has been tied to hatred of his race and political identity, most 
especially by those close to him—his mother—is extremely telling of Venezuela’s underlying 
structural racism. For Figuera, for Figuera’s mother, for Chavista supporters, for the media 
that supports Chavismo (including outside of Venezuela) and for Ignacio, Figuera was killed 
because he was black (and poor) and therefore looked Chavista—he evoked Chavismo in the 
opposition’s imaginary. His mother’s pain stems from her belief that her son’s skin-colour, 
something he cannot change, should spur such violence on the count of alleged political 
differences.  
 
Figure 12. Tweet by a Chavista social-media activist with Figuera’s image. It reads: ‘Orlando Figuera was 21 
years old and worked as a parking assistant. Because of his colour of skin and because he looked Chavista, he 
came under attack at a violent opposition protest in Altamira during the guarimbas of 2017. His death represents 
one of the most atrocious hate crimes of our country.’ 
Image of Figuera on the ground, 
seriously burnt and injured 
removed for copyright reasons. 
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There were at least three afro-descendants lynched during these deadly protests, according to 
pro-government media (Koerner Venezuelanalysis, May 29 2017). Chavismo’s leaders have built 
a discourse that has tied these deaths to racial and class hatred. The discourse could only have 
permeated deeply if it resonates with part of Venezuelans’ experience of exclusion on the basis 
of skin-colour. 
Ignacio and White ‘Fetishisation’  
Barrio activists detested the interrelated ideals of beauty, wealth, and whiteness—
symbolized by the opposition and by the misses (contestants) of beauty pageants—that 
confer a certain unmerited status and legitimacy in Venezuelan society (Valencia 2015, 35). 
Ignacio, white and light-eyed, openly tells me about his experience with racial and skin-colour 
dynamics in Venezuela and how these framed his understanding of the conflict, as well as his 
understanding of Figuera’s death: 
You’re the whitey and such. I see this affective relationship through some sort of weird 
fetishisation. As I say, when we got off at the protest, we thought people were approaching 
us because we were from Podemos. But they were approaching us because we were white. 
And it’s true that if you’ve never experienced being racialised, living it for the first time 
feels like a caricature, from the movies, when the coloniser comes and the indigenous 
people come close and such. And you feel really weird because you say ‘shit, I feel like a 
coloniser.’ And you’d say, ‘well yeah, that’s exactly what it is.’ The logics of racialisation 
stem from that. 
Ignacio feels fetishised: he feels he is admired but not for who he understands himself to be 
and the values he holds, but what his appearance represents:   
It’s really strange to feel like—because you really feel like a circus animal (atracción de feria) 
—and you know that at that moment your being is disjointed from what you are, and you 
become a fetish. I become a symbol, that is often based on a privilege, although there is 
also resentment towards things like that.  
Ignacio goes on to explain that all his Chavista colleagues were racialised because none of 
them were ‘catire’ like he was—Venezuelan Spanish for blonde. He explains he does not feel 
like a foreigner in Venezuela, but Chavistas feel that he is. It is not “until he discloses the fact 
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that he is with ‘the process,’ and Chavista,” that “the tensions disappear,” very much despite 
his race and privilege. The tensions seem to disappear because Chavistas feel he is a 
‘compatriot,’ who is fighting for the Chavista cause, i.e., that he is on the ‘correct’ side. The 
underlying racialisation, however, is ever-present, as he himself admits: in his words, it is 
“obviously a dimension of the relationship that is always there.”  
In Spain, Ignacio felt he was part of the revolutionary struggle of Venezuela, he admits that he 
comes from a lower middle-class background, that his friends were immigrants from Latin 
America, that he enjoys reggaeton. He feels he is ‘of the people.’ In Venezuela, because he is 
white, and because he is from Western Europe, there is no understanding of him as even 
remotely part of ‘the people.’ It is only through his discourse and sympathy with, and 
knowledge of, Chavismo that he is accepted, despite being ‘envied’ or ‘resented’ (in Ignacio’s 
words), for the interest he seemed to spark in women, as he later describes.  
Ignacio rationalises all this, but is nonetheless quite surprised that racialisation plays out like 
this in Venezuela—a sign that race is not a debate that is openly had in Spain:  
More than skin tone, your [Venezuelans’] phenotypes are not in—I really don’t 
understand where this rivalry comes from, but you could definitely see it was there.  
Ignacio is comparing Venezuela to Bolivia, where indigenous populations are more numerous, 
a case where racialisation by phenotype makes more sense to him. He is unable to see how in 
Venezuela, more extensive admixture of black, indigenous and white populations has made 
skin-tone the principal marker of othering, as discussed previously. I also note that Ignacio 
does not feel racialised by the opposition, who he sees as white in its majority.  
Rejection of Venezuelan autochthonous culture and 
Euro-philia 
Solidarity activists also tie this alleged hatred against brown and black people to hatred of 
Venezuelan culture more broadly—a hate related to Ignacio’s concept of ‘white fetishization.’ 
For Tim, the south-African journalist:  
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All the white middle class and upper classes, they were all educated in International 
Schools or in Miami, and they've learned English and everything because they look to the 
United States for their economic opportunities. Socially and culturally, they reject 
indigenous Venezuelan culture and society […] So it’s a kind of [pause] it’s a sort of self-
hate of the ruling classes. A kind of mixture of, well they certainly hate the indigenous part 
of themselves, or the indigenous part of their society. As you can see at the current rallies 
where they put the stars and stripes up behind the stage and everything. They actually 
superimpose it. In screens. And the Israeli flag. So there's a kind of hatred of thinking of 
the white man as better. So much of this is subconscious. Buried under this concept of you 
know ‘The Venezuelan’ where we’re all one. Underneath it, there’s a hell of lot going on, 
but not too many people want to acknowledge it. 
For Tim, the Venezuelan white opposition are in fact burying the indigenous parts of 
themselves underneath their mestizaje “where we’re all one,” discussed in chapter 2, and it was 
impressive to hear him speak on this particularly Latin American racial project. He was 
correctly informed: pro-government media, such as TeleSur, showed photographs of the Israeli 
flag and the American flag on the background of Guaidó’s stage at the rally in February 2019—
surrounded by dummies of Trump. In some rallies in the city of Punto Fijo, in the west of the 
country, the Venezuelan flag was lowered to raise the US one, this at a time when many in the 
opposition were hoping for US intervention (see Figure 13). 
When Tim suggests the opposition “reject indigenous Venezuelan culture and society” he is, 
we assume, referring to what we could call ‘autochthonous’ Venezuelan culture. Venezuelan 
music is heavily influenced by afro-Caribbean rhythms, and food is influenced by indigenous 
produce, for example. Tim’s understanding of this as ‘indigenous’ culture is contentious. 
Centuries of admixture, in rather complex ways, involved an ‘amalgamation’ of rituals, 
gastronomy, religion, symbols, and of many different cultural practices—an ‘amalgamation’ 
that has indeed also become part of Venezuela’s nation-building.  
A central part of President Chávez’s agenda was to bring ‘popular’ Venezuelan culture, here 
understood as the symbols and practices of the popular classes, to the fore—those more often 
tied to their African and indigenous origins. For President Chávez, promoting the “re-
foundation of national cultural policy” was a top priority (Fontes and Lessa 2019, 557), more so 
than for any other government in Venezuela’s history. Chávez understood the importance of 
the “production, diffusion and consumption of symbolic objects created by a society” (Milza 
1980, 362), and the deep roots it would leave on his movement—as I have argued one of the 
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most important marks of the movement’s strength. By funding community television and radio 
stations, Chávez aimed to break the Venezuelan media’s dependence on international 
production capital, but also, to disseminate a popular cultural identity (traditional dances, 
traditional music, traditional festivities), an identity that gave renewed value to the symbolic 
objects of a brown and black majority (Block 2016). 
 
Figure 13. Screenshot @teleSUR (pro-government media) post showing Venezuelans raising the US flag, and 
lowering the Venezuelan one, posted February 2, 2019. 
Although many solidarity activists assume that all the opposition rejects the indigenous side 
of themselves, which is no doubt the case with many Venezuelans who oppose the 
government, it is possible that in the highly politicised and antagonised environment other 
Venezuelans reject, instead, the bond that Chávez built between Venezuelan popular culture 
(that belongs to all Venezuelans) and his politico-social revolution. The Venezuelans that 
began the task of documenting traditional dances and music in the 1960s, for example, were 
mostly white—most notably the tobacco company Bigott started a foundation that “has been 
active in almost every area of cultural production since 1981” (Guss 2000, 22).  
Photo of two Venezuelans 
lowering the Venezuelan flag and 




It is hard for solidarity activists to substantiate the claim that there is hatred of white 
Venezuelans towards Venezuelan popular culture. It is easier to claim that there is racial 
hatred, racial exclusion and through this hatred, a dislike and undermining for cultural 
practices (certain folk music, or certain festivities) that are traditionally associated with black 
and indigenous groups, but this is by no means generalisable. Venezuelan migrants in the 
interviews, as I discuss in the next chapter, reject certain personality traits that they associate 
with being part of ‘the people,’ (laziness, for instance) but I did not perceive a rejection towards 
Venezuelan popular culture. Most admitted they heartily miss their gastronomic culture, for 
instance. 
What solidarity activists feel is white Venezuelans’ rejection, or devaluation, of autochthonous 
Venezuelan culture, values, and symbols, is perhaps more specifically their allegiance, or love 
for US and Western culture. For James: 
There’s no question that the right-wing elite of Venezuela is involved in doing what so 
many Latin Americans have done throughout history, which is to call upon the United 
States to get involved with the coup when they don't like the government. So this internal 
domestic betrayal, of the values of Latin Americans, is one of the most painful 
characteristics of the right-wing in Latin America. And they do it time and time and time 
again. It's painful to watch. I don't know when it’s going to end. 
Only one solidarity activist, Ignacio, points out that ‘revolutionaries’ (Chavistas) also share in 
this endo-racism, or ‘euro-philia.’ He discusses what he finds strange about two Venezuelan 
Chavista friends that were trying to stay illegally in Spain:  
That the ideas that they like are from Netflix, that the music they play is English music, 
that when they pass by a supermarket—something I never understood until I went to 
Venezuela—they go nuts over all the things they can find in a supermarket […] That you 
can see they’ve really idealised capitalism. 
Ignacio is unable to understand, or empathise, with Venezuelans who are fervent supporters 
of the Chávez and Maduro governments, but idealise capitalism. Here of course he is on point 
regarding Venezuelans’ love for the West, which he finds self-deprecating of Venezuelan 
culture: importantly, that this is a phenomenon that extends transversally across the divide. 
This love for European and American culture can be understood as a product of white-
hegemonic discourses, the influence of the foreign owned oil sector, post-colonialism more 
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broadly and living in the periphery. It affects all Venezuelans, indifferent of their political 
position.  
Although the influence of the foreign-oil sector in the first half of the twentieth century on 
Venezuelans’ admiration for European and American culture cannot be underplayed, the love 
for Netflix and English music also reflects a modern global preoccupation with whiteness and 
capital as symbols of social status that can be traced to the hegemony of the US’ entertainment 
industry today, that exists regardless of admiration for dark-skinned Hugo Chávez. It is not a 
phenomenon necessarily endemic to Venezuelans. 
One of my Venezuelan migrant interviewees, Cintia (the concert pianist—one of the few who 
was favourable to Chávez’s movement initially but currently considers herself apolitical), 
partly agrees with Ignacio and James. When speaking of her rejection of military intervention 
she explains why she thinks other Venezuelans could be in favour: 
There’s a part [of the population] that does not want sovereignty. That I see as 
something—I’m surely mistaken—but I think its part of the colonialist [colonialista] 
mentality. Let someone else do it. And like that, with whiplashes, with bombs.  
Much like for James, for her, the idea that Venezuelans could support a violent removal of the 
government by foreign power, shows how Venezuelans denigrate their own sovereignty: what 
she calls their colonialist mentality, wanting to ‘be something else,’ to belong to the West. She 
also alludes to the idea of having others do the violent work. That certain Venezuelans are 
disloyal to their nation—and admiring of the West—is a discourse that circulates exclusively 
amongst Venezuelans who were at some point favourable to the government. 
For Ignacio, meeting these friends in Madrid was a moment of reflection: he had expected 
Venezuelan Chavistas to abhor capitalism and American hegemony much like he does and 
other solidarity activists I interviewed do. Instead, these Venezuelan Chavistas did not see a 
contradiction between holding a fascination for a supermarket full of groceries, and loving and 
identifying with Chávez—an aspect of the division that points to ways in which the external 
groups can be far more intransigent than the groups on-the-ground in Venezuela. In other 
words, it seems the identity of those interviewed here is far more attached to the political ideals 
of Chavismo, than that of Chavistas in Venezuela. 
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From Ignacio’s account, it would seem Chavistas in Venezuela have ideas about how power 
works in Venezuela; they do not extend that understanding to how power works in a global, 
post-colonial domain. One could also say that from their experience, these Chavistas simply 
do not see the relationship between the US, neoliberal hegemony, Netflix, English music, post-
colonialism, racism, and an inordinate variety of products to choose from at supermarkets. 
They might be unconcerned with cultural vis-a-vis political and economic hegemonies—in 
other words, they understand power only in its “political” ascription. It could be that what they 
have learned from Chávez’s discourse is limited to the context in Venezuela; or that they 
simply choose not to see the contradictions because they derive pleasure from capitalism’s 
material benefits, status, and US’ cultural output—in other words, that for historic reasons, 
they feel added self-value from consumption of American products or wearing branded 
clothes.  
This is not incidentally the principal reason members of criminal gangs in the poorest sectors 
say they become involved in delinquent activities in Venezuela: wanting to project a specific 
image of themselves by wearing and possessing certain expensive (usually American) artefacts 
(Moreno et al. 2009; Crespo 2016). Through the entertainment industry, American cultural 
hegemony has been pervasive to the extent that it has naturalised the way we attach our self-
worth to ‘things’, an opportunity that branding exploits. Neoliberalism’s strongest weapon has 
been to impinge our self-value on the things we own, making desire for new, better, more 
valuable things a perpetual self-debasing circle, almost impossible to break out of. The point 
here is that unbridled love for consumption is not inherently a Venezuelan problem: 
consumerism is an existential paradigm of ‘late modernity,’ even when the historic social 
hierarchies built by foreign oil companies have produced a uniquely Venezuelan variety of 
this problem. Ignacio sees an incongruence in Chavista Venezuelans because he expects them 
to have a similar moral system to his own, or at least, expects them to have immaterial things 
on which to impinge their self-worth—he also expects them to abhor the role the US has 
played in the continent as much as he does.  
Ignacio dismisses his Venezuelan Chavista friends as not true revolutionaries, but it is also 
possible Venezuelans are particularly fascinated with capitalism’s dazzling products because 
they are restricted and largely unavailable in Venezuela— making them even more desirable. 
This is perhaps one of the most striking contradictions of the Bolivarian Revolution itself. If 
Ignacio’s account of dazzled Venezuelans is generalisable, as he seems to think so, the 
Bolivarian Revolution might have inadvertently resulted in a reversal of what the project 
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intended to do in the first place: among other things diminish consumerism and foment 
Venezuelan ethnic and cultural values. Although they are aware of the detrimental effects to 
popularity that Venezuela’s dire economy has on public loyalty to the Chávez movement, 
these are not the thoughts that confront most solidarity activists. It is also still not sufficient for 
them to believe that supporters of Maduro could be in a minority. 
Racism on the other side of the fence 
Most Venezuelans do describe instances of xenophobia against them as minor, incidental 
events that cannot be generalised. Jeison, a brown Venezuelan currently in Mexico starting a 
pop-singing career, tells me: 
It’s really a minority that gets stupid regarding xenophobia. Yes, I have lived certain 
episodes, very short ones, but to the extent that, for example, I get to a McDonald’s, and I 
realise that there are like giggles, because of the way I speak. I just swallow it up, because 
remember the average employee that works at a fast food chain, or as they say here, ‘el fast 
food’, is not really someone who has studied a lot. So in the end, I have a kind of talent for 
humiliating people without insulting them or using bad words, when they do something 
like that. So I tell them, ‘what are you laughing about? My accent?’ And I take it from there. 
I tell them, ‘do you know that I know the Latin American manager of McDonalds? So, if I 
lift up my phone, and report this, you’re out of a job.’ But it’s a lie, I’m taking the piss (le 
estoy cayendo a cuento). They go pale. ‘But I’m not going to do that because, as a foreigner, 
and as a Venezuelan, I’m going to tell you something: I love your country. Your country 
opened its doors to me, so don’t misrepresent your country, because Mexicans are 
welcoming, and what you’re doing is bullying.’ 
For those living in Perú especially—the country that after Colombia has received most 
Venezuelan migrants—xenophobia felt more widespread. Adriana, a young chemist and a 
professional violinist in her late twenties, recalls the distress that meant not being able to afford 
anything in Venezuela. Her family was unable to cope with hyper-inflation, even though she 
was working two full time jobs as a violinist in an orchestra and as a chemistry teacher. After 
her violin was stolen, her main source of income, she chose to migrate to a country in South 
America because “it was closer and cheaper than any other country,” she explains. A week 
before she was leaving, she was robbed again on a bus in her hometown of Coro, a city in the 
west of the country. The robber hit her on the head once he suspected she had hidden her 
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phone—an experience most Venezuelan migrant interviewees were familiar with. She was 
nonetheless one of the luckier Venezuelan migrants I spoke with; Adriana managed to save 
enough to buy a plane ticket to Lima, Peru, where she has lived since November 2017 (other 
interviewees I spoke to travelled by bus across the continent).  
Adriana suggests xenophobia against Venezuelans is very common in Perú because 
Venezuelans are willing to work for less than minimum wage. She describes how she was 
belittled by Peruvians while living as a migrant, especially by her boss, who she says, “had 
money and believed he was some kind of a big shot.” She openly confronted her boss’ attitude, 
but she eventually had to quit. She now teaches chemistry at a school and plays for a smaller 
orchestra. For her, Peruvians are racists even amongst themselves—especially against those 
they see as ‘indigenous’: 
In Peru they’re a bit racist amongst themselves, amongst Peruvians themselves. Racist and 
classist. I mean, yeah, here people are very differentiated by zones, popular [working-class] 
zones, and expensive zones, for example. Certain municipalities are expensive, and that’s 
where people with more money live, and others are poorer, so those people with money 
denigrate a lot. In fact, they often use a term ‘choclo’. It’s a bit pejorative. And they say it 
to people that are from the sierra, because they are like—they come from, indigenous 
peoples. 
Her understanding is very telling of mestizaje, and especially the idea Venezuelans have of their 
own ‘Patria café con leche’ national narrative, previously discussed. In her interview, Adriana 
makes no mention of Venezuelans as potentially racist against indigenous and black 
populations, or the similar differentiation of poor and wealthy zones in Caracas. This might be 
because she feels she does not engage in this behaviour, or perhaps because she comes from a 
small-city, Coro, where class distinctions, at least in terms of housing, are not so stark as in 
Caracas where the city’s mountainous landscape is marked by the proximity of the barrios and 
the taller middle- and upper-class buildings.  
An Afro-Venezuelan against Chavismo 
To further nuance the complexities of Venezuela’s divide, I point at César’s understanding, a 
strongly anti-Chávez afro-Venezuelan in his late thirties:  
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And the truth is, if you seriously look at it, let’s say, those problems in Venezuela, like 
racism, like whatever—we had come a long way in overcoming them, to the point that they 
were not really a reason—I mean, in Venezuela they are much less, it was always less 
strong than in other countries in Latin America, for example. 
For César, a more pressing concern than the racism he ‘could’ feel as an afro-Venezuelan, is 
ridding Venezuela of “the criminal government,” as he calls Maduro’s government throughout 
the interview. César, like Adriana, points to the racism of ‘other countries in Latin America.’ 
César has only visited, and not lived in these other countries, so of course, he cannot know this 
from experience, but the idea that the issue would be worse in other countries is César’s way 
of minimising the gravity with which solidarity activists see the issue, comparatively. César 
openly resists the idea of framing the conflict as racial. Although he does not purport to speak 
on behalf of all Venezuelans, or all afro-Venezuelans, he feels that the framing of the divide as 
racial is an integral part of the government’s discourse, what the government wants people like 
solidarity activists (and ordinary Venezuelans) to believe, in order to garner support. This is 
not, he believes, because Chávez is improving anything for black and indigenous communities.  
César denies, to a certain extent, the importance of fighting a battle against racism in 
Venezuela because he ties the racial aspect of the conflict with part of the government’s 
discourse—and he refuses to accept it in these terms, or acknowledge even a fraction of the 
work the Bolivarian movement has done in this regard (by passing the Organic Law Against 
Racial Discrimination, for example, see Rivas Brito and Ruette-Orihuela 2019). This comes at 
the cost of admitting, and fighting very real racism in Venezuela. When asked about Figuera’s 
death, for instance, Cesar simply complies with the opposition’s account of the narrative, i.e. 
that Figuera was burned alive because he was robbing someone—not that they killed him 
because he was poor and afro-Venezuelan, and therefore in the eyes of the opposition crowd, 
both a thief and a Chavista. 
César also claimed that Barlovento and other majority afro-descendant coastal towns, 
historically tied to cocoa plantations, have been “handed over to narco-trafficking groups.” He 
tells me his father, who used to return to his hometown every fortnight “stopped going when 
he saw men with muskets on motorbikes” parading through the streets to instil fear. He then 
tells the story of his cousin who quit his cocoa business that produced small-scale artesian 




Venezuelan cocoa is renowned around the world and is sold at a high price abroad in dollars. 
Because hyperinflation has made Venezuelan currency practically worthless, selling 
Venezuelan cocoa has become extremely lucrative for these gangs—one of the few ways of 
getting foreign currency (which cannot be bought and sold legally). I add that cocoa is also not 
subject to US sanctions, at least as of 2019 (Mersie Reuters June 7 2019).  
According to an article published by BBC news, these gangs operate by trafficking drugs, 
extorting farmers, and kidnapping (Pardo BBC news July 28 2019). Pardo writes “here the logic 
of violence seems to have liaised itself with extreme poverty.” Although the government 
publicly reported it had agreed to a peace treaty with the armed gangs in 2015, the director of 
the state of Miranda Police, where most of these gangs are based, claims the negotiations 
essentially handed over control of the areas to the gangs. Luis Cedeño, the director of the 
Observatory of Organised Crime, confirms this, adding that gangs only agreed to put down 
their arms if the state guaranteed that the police and the armed guard would not interfere in 
those areas. “The state conceded its monopoly on violence to delinquency,” Cedeño concludes. 
According to official records 8 gangs were dismantled in Barlovento and 83 people were jailed, 
and yet homicide rates have only barely decreased.  
From these reports, it is clear the government’s gang policies have been wanting. Venezuela 
has the second highest rate of violent deaths in world, currently, 81.4 deaths for every 100,000 
citizens. Most of these figures overwhelmingly affect the lowest income areas. I note that this 
important fact about Venezuela was kept out of solidarity activists’ discourse, either because 
they feel Chávez’s government has no part in this increase, or because they are not informed 
about this aspect of the crisis. Given most Venezuelan migrant interviewees were victims of 
crime (including homicide), this was a major factor of opposition to the government: what they 
felt was its inability to rein in crime.  
Additionally, the UN Human Rights Commission report (UNHRC 2019, 14) notes how the 
government targets violence against indigenous leaders, specifically the Pemon community, 
opposed to the government and who have vowed to let humanitarian aid in through the 
border. Unfortunately, the report makes no mention of afro-descendant Venezuelan 
communities. The situation in many of the majority afro-descendant areas in Venezuela is 
unclear. The stories have left the media radar, so I rely on information that is about two to 
three years old. Nevertheless, the important question becomes: has Chavismo made a 
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difference for those who have been discriminated, oppressed, excluded? For the indigenous 
and afro-Venezuelan communities?  
US sanctions have no doubt profoundly harmed working-class, brown and poor Venezuelans. 
The benefit government policy is having on the most vulnerable sectors of the population, and 
specifically the black communities of the coast, is not a question that is being asked sufficiently 
by solidarity activists. Whether César wants to believe that racism is merely a governmental 
tactic and not a problem he experiences, is a speculative endeavour. Although this thesis 
cannot speak to the extent of this, it would seem the government benefits from transnational 
solidarity activists framing the conflict in racial terms because it forces the conflict to be seen 
on moral terms: it signals to those with progressive sensibilities globally, that Chavistas are 
morally superior, and (for some) justifies a populist stifling of the debate or exclusion of the 
opposition entirely.  
Solidarity activists’ more idealist (vis-a-vis pragmatist) moral system make them less interested 
in critically judging whether Chávez’s government has indeed helped the socio-economic 
outcomes of the non-white majority, in ways that supersede discourse. Solidarity activists, 
instead, distinguish between what I have just described, i.e. ‘doing something’ for the brown 
majority, and having a ‘brown majority’ hold power against US-led factions of the opposition.  
Conclusions 
Few (non-afro-descendant) Venezuelan scholars accept Venezuela’s racism, as discussed in 
chapter 2. Some do, however, suggest more specifically that racism was ubiquitous, not only 
from the rich towards the poor. In an interview with Cecily Hilleary (2014), for example, 
academic Carolina Acosta-Alzuru speaks of the latent racism Venezuelan soap-operas and 
beauty pageants embrace, and points to the existing skin-colour and class correlation. 
However, she adds emphatically that Chávez “didn’t put it [racism] on the table to raise 
consciousness. No, no. He wanted to use it to his own advantage.” 
The ill-intention this comment assumes about Chávez’s motives for supporting anti-racist 
measures—whether one supports his movement or not—is a conjecture meant to question 
Chávez’s moral standing. It is the same ‘moral logic’ some solidarity activists like Ignacio use 
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to derive moral superiority from supporting Chavismo because they, rather unquestioningly, 
suppose that all of those opposed to Chávez and Maduro are racist.  
As I have argued in a forthcoming paper (Subbiah 2020), the fact is that the government is able 
to frame the divide in racial terms, regardless of whether subjects feel racism is a ‘problem’ or 
not in Venezuela—and the data on the correlation of socio-economic groups and skin-colour, 
(among many other things) show that it is. Chávez’s discourse on race resonates with sectors 
of Venezuela’s population. It points to the latent racism that associates dark-skin and under-
privilege. Even if we were to assume, like César does, that Figuera’s death had nothing to do 
with his skin colour, the structural inequalities embedded in Venezuelan society, inherited 
from colonial times, hold that a majority of lower income groups are brown, indigenous and 
black. This meant Figuera was assumed to be a ‘Chavista’ or a ‘robber’; either way these are 
characteristics that relate to his skin. It becomes simplistic to say that the government 
discourse on race is fabricated because it stagnates a debate on race that desperately needs to 
be had.  
It is also dangerous, on the other hand, to associate the violent factions of the opposition with 
all opposition to the government because the idea that one faction is morally superior to the 
other, silences any criticism that can be made of that government. It assumes, rather than seeks 
to confirm, whether and if afro-Venezuelan communities and indigenous communities are 




Chapter 7. The discursive ‘pueblo’ 
 
[It was] rewarding just seeing how, you know, we're told that ordinary people, they're the 
reason why are things bad, you know, everyone's just lazy or reactionary or whatever. But 
Venezuela, to me, showed the complete opposite:  where the most politicised people were, 
in what you could deem ordinary, in inverted commas, people. I don't like the term 
‘ordinary people.’ I think for me they were the most extraordinary people in Venezuela 
[Fernando, personal interview March 2019]. 
Here I try to answer who ‘the people’ stands for in each group to point at the moral 
assumptions embedded in their respective imaginaries, what Laura Grattan (2016) has pithily 
called the act of ‘peopling’ that stands at the centre of populist logic. For solidarity activists, 
fighting—or speaking on the behalf of the disenfranchised in Venezuela—is inherently ‘good,’ 
or more fundamentally what it means to stand in solidarity. In broad terms, solidarity activists 
seek to show their love and admiration for a politically conscious, “extraordinary people” in 
Fernando’s words—in a bid to strengthen the validity of their opinions on the country. As I 
have noted in chapter 4, social justice demands not merely that ‘the people’ live better or are 
given maximal opportunities: for many solidarity activists, the only way to guarantee success 
on these fronts is by dispelling the elite.  
Venezuelan migrants, on the other hand, seek to distance themselves from ‘the people,’ a 
majority whom they see as ‘lazy’ or ‘cunning.’ They often use the notion of ‘viveza criolla’ to 
describe this cunning and to explain some of the reasons they plan on never returning. 
Simultaneously, though, their discourse takes that same ‘people’ as a majority of Venezuelans, 
to validate their claim against Maduro’s legitimacy. For them, ‘the people’ stand 
overwhelmingly against a government who has harmed them, and who they feel is responsible 
for the crisis. 
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The political consciousness of ‘the people’ 
Socialism would appear to be the motor guiding solidarity activism. But a closer look at the 
most ‘gratifying’ or ‘rewarding’ aspects of solidarity, according to the interviewees, reveals that 
underlying this commitment is the ultimate goal of putting the brown working class, ‘the 
people,’ rather than the white privileged, first. In other words, it is a moral retribution of 
initially misplaced power. 
For Ricardo, a Spanish activist in his early forties who travelled for six months around South 
America with his partner Victoria (whom I also interviewed), the strength of the Bolivarian 
revolution is itself the discursive pueblo:  
First [it] provides dignity, right? And then it provides organisational capacity, that I 
believed soared in the Chávez period, the organisational capacity of the people, not 
waiting for the state to give you everything, to do everything for you, but organise you in 
your own communities, the issue of the communal councils. […] I think [the project’s] 
strength is the people, who demonstrate it because they go out to support it, so we have to 
trust in that people […] for me, the strength of the process is not so much what comes from 
above, but what has been built from below.  
It comes as no surprise that solidarity activists who defend the Chávez and Maduro 
governments, are drawn to and admire the social movements, the trade unions, workers, the 
women’s groups, that formed the bases of Chávez’s popularity. For them, the ‘people’ are the 
strength of the movement, not “what comes from above,” i.e. the leaders of that movement 
(although these are no doubt important and legitimate as I discuss in a later section). Again, 
Ricardo underlines that ‘the people’ go out on the streets to support Maduro—suggesting 
President Maduro is popular—and hints that this is because the Bolivarian process empowers, 
gives dignity, and awakens self-organisation and mobilisation. Importantly, that ‘the people’ 
could be dependent on the state for food is seen, by both groups, as negative. Venezuelan 
migrant interviewees often suggested that ‘the people’ wanted the government to give them 
everything, that they are conformists, or passive receptors of aid, as I explore in the last section 
of this chapter. Interestingly, Ricardo suggests that the government has, on the contrary, 
helped ‘the people’ overcome this dependency—“que el estado te dé todo” [that the state gives 
you everything].  
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Mack, a young American in his late thirties who, for a time, worked for TeleSUR (the 
international media outlet, in English, financed by the Venezuelan government) conducted in-
depth interviews in the slums and working-class areas of Caracas for a month. From that 
experience, Mack describes his deep admiration for the consciousness he felt the poor of 
Venezuela had acquired with the Bolivarian Revolution: 
Even people that you meet that have an amount of discontent, were still supportive of the 
process, and were really conscious of the role of the US in all of this and the right-wing’s 
role in all of it […] everyone there has a feeling that they have been a part of the political 
process in the beginning and still are now. There’s the opposition that want a coup, that's 
one side, but then there's the people who are critical but they understand that they, for the 
first time, have an actual way to resolve things internally, and through different democratic 
processes. […]  there is just such a high level of participation, where people who had really 
hard working lives, and whatever, were taking time out of there day to like go and gather 
and like debate and discuss and really understand, all of these new things that were 
happening […] It really showed me that there is just a completely different level of political 
consciousness.  
If as Mack argues above, those inside Chavismo have internal mechanisms through which they 
channel demands, then democracy is alive and well in Venezuela. Although what those 
mechanisms of internal criticism are, is unclear from his statement, Mack implies that the 
government has put in place a grassroots machinery that channels popular and working class 
demands and concerns to community leaders—it is this consciousness and interest in politics 
that he contrasts with his own American ‘people,’ to highlight how special he feels it actually 
is. 
Abdo, the Sudanese-British journalist, makes a similar comparison, pointing to Venezuelans’ 
‘political knowledge’:  
I mean our cameraman today, who I was filming with, was more knowledgeable than most 
journalists back in the UK. Like when I go out with a cameraman in the UK, and I ask them 
what their thoughts are, they say they ‘I don't do politics,’ I get that a lot. But here, everyone 
is deeply, deeply embedded in the political knowledge of what's going on. 
Evidently many demands are not being channelled: among them those of the opposition. 
Solidarity activists dismiss the opposition as coup-mongering and therefore profoundly 
undemocratic. But this is because, for them, the truly democratic debate happens amongst ‘the 
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people’—as Mack adds, “who have really hard-working lives.” The argument seems to imply 
that the opposition do not want democracy, so why should they get to have a say in it? That the 
people’s debate should be prioritised over the debate of the country in its entirety—the Demos 
rather than just the Populus—sees in the empowerment of the Chavista governments (and the 
disempowerment of the elite) a way to enact ‘justice,’ i.e., a way to empower those who have 
not held power before.  
Chase, another white American activist, in his mid-sixties, who had been very involved in 
Nicaragua solidarity during the Iran-Contra scandal in the US (and flaunts a shirt that says 
“We will not be silent”) tells me about his favourite memory from his only trip to Venezuela in 
2010:17  
I remember one area we went to; we had a meeting with somebody in the schoolhouse. 
They had had their communal council meeting the night before. And so up on the board 
was their list of priorities—what they wanted to do with the money that they were going 
to get. And the number of votes for each thing. And their top priority was to put a fence 
around the school yard so the cows didn't get into the school yard, and you know, leave 
their business for these kids to step in [laughs]. You don't get any purer democracy than 
that.  
Again, it is the idea that ‘the people’—for him, members of the communal councils—are so 
highly invested in the political decisions of their communities, that fascinates Chase. A 
particularly colourful, even trivial example of what these democratic decisions can amount to, 
was profoundly moving to him. 
Perla, one of my few female solidarity activists, from Argentina, explains her admiration for 
the Bolivarian revolution as the first popular movement in Latin America that came to power 
through the existing mechanisms of “bourgeois democracy” (rather than through violence):  
The Bolivarian revolution takes place in the conditions of our time. Not in the ideal 
conditions of books, but the real conditions that we inherited. This is how history is built, 
 
17 Chase believes it could also have been in 2009, he is not entirely certain. 
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with the sacrifices of now, that demand change. In challenging the privilege of the 
powerful, there will always be trying and difficult conditions […] but these are being 
overcome. So we need to defend flesh and blood revolutions, balancing whether they are 
defending the people, or the powerful.  
Perla exposes a binary understanding of the political world, that both groups in fact share: ‘the 
people’ versus ‘the powerful,’ a reasoning that implies many things, among which, is a sense 
that the powerful could never, for example, work for ‘the people’—it suggests each group’s 
interests necessarily collide. For Urbinati (2019, 57) this discourse proposes a paradox where 
‘the people’ can never ultimately “directly rule.” Perla is assuming Chávez and Maduro are still 
part of the people, and not the powerful: for her, the traditional business elite allied with the 
US (although she does concede this should be checked). Perla’s conception of the politically 
powerful refers only to sectors that have been privileged historically and racially—that ‘the 
people’ have gained political power in the Bolivarian Revolution, in Perla’s view, does not 
mean they are now ‘powerful’; even if Chavistas have de facto become the political elite. 
(Belonging to the political elite is what Urbinati and the opposition would consider ‘powerful,’ 
this being evidently one of the major points of contention between the groups.)  
Solidarity activists’ admiration for the working class and their understanding that they should 
rule over their lives is entirely legitimate. Chavismo has made this possible in their eyes: it has 
given the marginalised an opportunity to do what is truly important to them. However, this 
understanding of democracy and of Chavismo’s legitimacy as representative of ‘the people’ 
presents two issues. First, it assumes that only the ruling classes oppose Maduro. It justifies 
contempt towards the opposition sector of the Venezuelan population, but it also disregards 
those who are not members of the ruling class, have also been disenfranchised, but are against 
the government for a number of reasons—including the fact that they depend on food baskets, 
but are many times forced to pledge political allegiance to receive them regularly. It also 
assumes that wealthy and business sectors of Venezuelan society always oppose Maduro. 
There are sectors within Chavismo that have amassed fortunes under the auspices of the 
government by various legal and illegal means; they are known ostensibly as the 
“boliburgueses”—a neologism that comes from the words Bolivarian and bourgeoisie. Many of 
these ‘boliburgueses’ are being investigated around the world, some were part of the Panamá 
Papers (Deutsche Welle September 17 2019). They have been criticised from within Chavismo as 
early as 2007, in the online pro-government forum Aporrea, as sectors inside the government 
that only pretend to be “rojo-rojito”, (‘really, really red,’ meaning very Chavista), and socialist 
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but have continued the highly corrupt and clientelistic practices of all the past governments 
(see Evans Aporrea October 25 2007; Duque Aporrea October 2 2014). 
Knowledge, identity and positionality 
 
Figure 14. The Hugo Chávez People's Defense Front (HCPDF) in Canada showcase this report entitled "30 
Facts." I note that all gains mentioned in the report have unfortunately been reversed, as discussed in chapter 2. 
Solidarity activists, that are mostly white and European,18 are not, by their own understanding 
of the Venezuelan people and their sovereignty, part of this ‘people.’ And yet, solidarity 
activists feel that their passionately strong opinions on Venezuela are not entirely justified if 
they are not somehow part of ‘the people’ they argue for. This was clearly a complex 
disjunctive all solidarity activists felt they needed to address: their racial understanding of ‘the 
people’ of Venezuela meant they—as white Europeans, Americans, Australians, Canadians, 
Spaniards, with few exceptions—have no place in that ‘people.’ There are several ways 
activists deal with this: they either 1) try to show that their knowledge is superior to that other 
 
18  As I have discussed in chapter 1, I had two young black activists participate, one female Latin American 
academic (Argentinean) and one male activist from Brazil.  
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Venezuelans; 2) imply that white upper- and middle-class opposition Venezuelans do not have 
their nation’s interest at heart—and they do; or 3) dispose of the notion of ethnic and racial 
belonging altogether, and underline a global class-socialist struggle that transcends national 
boundaries (which, some argued, was more worthy than ‘petty’ identity politics). In this sense, 
traditional national belonging is both affirmed in the support for sovereignty against US 
imperialism and afro-indigeneity as the principal character uniting a Venezuelan ‘people’; and 
questioned in the idea of a ‘global’ and ‘universal’ working class, to which they feel they do 
belong. 
Additionally, they feel the need to justify how and why their opinions are valid despite the fact 
some of them have never even visited Venezuela. Generally, activists older than fifty justified 
their opinions by demonstrating certain knowledge about Venezuela (see Figure 14). For 
example, by demonstrating knowledge of specific historic events like the riots of ‘El Caracazo,’ 
or knowledge of Venezuela’s geography, as well as by demonstrating specific knowledge of the 
social progress accrued in the Chávez era. Tim (the white South African-British journalist) goes 
so far as to suggest that he has a better understanding of the country than white middle- and 
upper-class Venezuelans:  
Yeah, they all live in a bubble. And they don't mix. The middle classes they don't go into 
barrios, they've never been into them. You have a ludicrous situation where somebody like 
me knows more about, with bad Spanish, knows more about their own country than quite 
large numbers of the people who live in it. I mean that's jaw dropping when you think 
about it. Have no idea. Absolutely no idea, this sort of faceless mob, as far as they're 
concerned out there who are going to.  
Tim here is justifying his ability to form an opinion about the country and the way it is 
governed—were it to be questioned by Venezuelans (which it very often is). Here he is 
implying he knows more about the country than middle (not even just upper) class 
Venezuelans because he has gone into the barrios—suggesting he is more aligned with the 
people’s interests than the white-settler class. This alignment to ‘the people’—the 
dispossessed—is key because it presumes that his interest in Venezuela is well-intentioned. 
Whereas for him, the middle- and upper- classes abide by the interests of whiteness, the US, 
capitalism, and the rich (again a moral argument).  
Moreover, Tim, James, and Ignacio argue that Venezuelans themselves reject their belonging 
to the nation when they reject the part of themselves that is black and indigenous, as described 
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in chapter 6. The opposition’s narrative, aligned with US interests, is treasonous (as Mack also 
suggested in the section above). Because alignment with the US goes against national 
sovereignty, the opposition deserves (in a populist understanding) to be excluded, or at least not 
considered. 
To form an opinion on Venezuela, knowledge of the country and allegiance to its ‘people,’ are 
more important requisites than national-belonging or having been born there or having lived 
there—an idea contrary to what Venezuelan migrants feel. I discuss how this ‘battle’ plays out 
in chapter 9; for now, I note that for some of the younger activists, a commitment to the ‘global 
working class’ fight and the socialist project (as well as the fact that some of their governments 
were involved in freezing Venezuela’s assets abroad), was enough to justify their support for 
Maduro’s presidency. To these activists, being invested in a global socialist project necessarily 
meant being invested in the narrative that surrounds Venezuela, given that for them 
Venezuela is fighting against capitalism, and any country attempting that fight needs to be 
supported. The global working-class struggle is irrespective of national, ethnic or racial 
identity and belonging. In the words of the black-British young solidarity activist, Jack: 
So that's sort of where the passion for Venezuela came from, because it corresponded with 
the history of our struggle. And to be a socialist is not just to care about what's happening 
in your own country, it's to care about the working class of every country and what they're 
struggling for.  
In a different part of the interview, stressing this idea of his allegiance to a global ‘people’, Jack 
adds:  
Obviously, our idea when it comes to socialism – it’s a mass movement, it’s a movement of 
the working class, it’s a movement which is rooted among the people, it’s a movement that 
should be organised among the people, work among the people. We have to be part of the 
people. And in practice I think Chávez realises that he makes it a reality because he is 
raised up from the people, he is speaking to them, he is not coming from the outside. He is 
speaking as one of them, as sort of them, while realising their own passions, their own 
visions for their country. And that love doesn't come from people who have said ‘oh you 
must love Chávez,’ ‘you must love this guy.’ It’s come because he's actually done what he's 
promised. His deeds, his words have been validated by deeds, so his practice has proven 
his theory and that is sort of where the affection and passion come from. 
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By sharing in their struggle, Jack makes himself a part of ‘the people’—the disenfranchised—
of Venezuela. In a sense, this is essentially what many scholars would say ‘populist’ politicians 
are able to manoeuvre effectively: they construct a discourse that empathises authentically 
with the struggles of a large majority, making themselves a ‘true’ representative of that 
majority (usually the working class or poor) even when they themselves were brought up in 
the upper- or middle-classes.19 
Here, young solidarity activists feel that they are part of the global working class, although most 
of them are educated middle-class. All solidarity activists managed to get into and complete 
university, for example. Their commitment and empathy towards the working-class in their 
own countries stems, in part, from having been part of a working-class family, or for some, 
from having been educated in a struggling state school. This is Liesel’s case, a top-tier 
university student, transgender activist, who feels that the argument that their support of 
Venezuela is ‘invalid because they are not Venezuelan,’ comes from ‘identity politics’:  
And Venezuela fits into that, because it’s not enough for Marxists just to parade around 
changing society, we have to have an understanding of politics. We have to participate in 
struggles, with other people, and working people. We have to be serious about politics and 
that involves our position on Venezuela and campaigning on Venezuela […] A lot of what 
I get is actually from the identity politics crowd. The opposition, the right-wing is never 
afraid to use identity politics. But because the British left is so weak on it, the right wing 
tends to think, if you say, ‘this offends me as a Venezuelan, stop doing it,’ everyone will 
stop doing it. And they get quite shocked and upset when it doesn't happen. 
Liesel’s point here, as explained further on in the interview, is that those that believe they 
shouldn’t be involved with defending Venezuela’s government, “equate identity with politics.” 
Without entering a theoretical discussion on identity politics, which is as convoluted as a 
discussion on populism, I note simply what this politics means for Liesel: a politics that 
constructs divisions based on gender, race, ethnicity, and national belonging, i.e., a politics that 
 
19 Some leftists would label the centrality of the working-class in Jack’s discourse as ‘workerist’— in other 




precludes discussion or debate. Affinity with Marxism is not seen as a part of these identity 
constructions in Liesel’s conception—a potential problem given they fail to see how an 
ideological identity can work in an equally emotionally powerful way.  
Because it’s not just about the fact that I'm doing it because I'm Marxist, I'm a socialist. It's 
also because all of the people who are expressing solidarity with Venezuela, none of them 
are doing it because of identity politics. Or maybe a few, but can you think of any? Because 
it represents an idea. 
Liesel’s solidarity with Venezuela is ‘noble’ or ‘moral’ in their eyes precisely because it 
represents an idea (what we might normally understand as an ideal) and not an identity. Liesel’s 
point, much like the solidarity Butler envisioned discussed in chapter 3, is that people can be 
united in solidarity for Venezuela despite their different identities: solidarity work de facto 
transcends these boundaries. 
Ignacio, on the other hand, who has spent considerable time thinking about the Bolivarian 
project and its ideals and possesses a deep knowledge of the country’s political culture—
unusual for being such a young activist—thinks of himself as a Chavista, and as a Venezuelan 
(although he is Spanish). He is no doubt one of the most committed solidarity activists I met. It 
is precisely this feeling of thinking of his identity as Chavista, and his deep knowledge of 
Chavismo, that he feels justifies his deep involvement with the country’s politics. For him the 
most rewarding aspect of his solidarity work is how he feels a part of the ‘people’ and the 
Revolution: 
Seventeen-year-old boys who knew perfectly well how to defend their city, their village, 
were there to be an imperialist invasion, because they had been given military training 
(entrenamiento militar). That's what's so rewarding. That's what you don't forget. Because 
then you connect it with—you walk past Chavez's grave and you see it. It's having felt 
Venezuela. That's why I always carry this [he shows me a medal with the sign 4F, signalling 
February 4th 1992, the day Chavez organised a coup against President Pérez]. And there’s 
not one day when you don’t reference Venezuela, or feel Chavista. There you will always 
be the little Spaniard. But that’s ok. You’re the little Spaniard who is a Chavista, but you 
are a Chavista, which is more important. That's the most gratifying thing. 
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Love for Chávez and Maduro 
Whatever happens they will never beat Chávez, because I am not Chávez, Chávez is an 
unbeaten people... You too are Chávez (2012 campaign slogan). 
Admiration for the leader at the head of it all, Hugo Chávez, was not the basis of solidarity 
activists’ support for his and Maduro’s government—in slight contrast to my initial 
expectation. Part of my statistical content analysis (see Appendix C) in fact, suggested that the 
phrase ‘trade union’ appeared more frequently than ‘Hugo Chávez,’ in pro-government 
solidarity English media. Admiration for Chávez comes from solidarity activists’ 
understanding of Chávez as a very charismatic president, but more importantly from what his 
relationship to ‘the people’ was. 
Mack explains this complex relationship between his feelings of admiration for Chávez, 
Chavismo as a political ideology, and ‘the people’:  
I think that what made me really passionate about the project and I think what made—
and for the people I met in Venezuela it was the same thing—it was, on the surface you 
know, Chávez he's so charismatic, he's lovable, he's just like as a figure you're drawn to 
him, which is why I was initially drawn to him, right? I was drawn to who he was, that he 
was brave and what he believed in, the philosophy of equality, and the poor being able to 
be the makers of history and all of those things. So it was the morality, the ideals, and the 
personality that drives you into it, but then the most amazing thing about it, is the 
movement.  
I note both the feeling that circulates around Mack’s admiration for the Venezuelan people 
who support Chávez, what he describes as ‘movement’; and his love for the idea of the poor as 
‘makers of history’—a moral feeling of supporting something inherently ‘good.’ Much in line 
with what Block (2016) argues, it seems that for Mack it is Chávez’s unique ‘mimetisation’— 
coming from and becoming— ‘the people’ that legitimises his leadership. This also applies to 
Maduro (originally a bus driver) even when some solidarity activists were critical of his 
administration.  
For Perla, the Argentinean activist and academic, Chávez’s humble origins are fundamental in 
making him who he is, this “fount of love” she describes: 
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Hugo Chávez was a man that enjoyed extraordinary capacities, with a sensibility—love. 
Genuine love for others, love that was evident in every one of the pats he gave each boy or 
girl that came near him, for the humblest of his pueblo. They carry their humble origin, like 
that of Evo Morales, in their heart. It’s burned on them (lo tienen marcado a fuego) and it 
leads them to love their people profoundly, because that is where they came from.  
Perla also reflects this understanding that Chávez’s legitimacy comes from his humble—afro-
indigenous—origins. These origins, in a sense, guarantee true sensibility and care for those 
that are most in need. Although this is no doubt a loose guarantee, Chávez’s discourse—his 
racial discourse in particular—speaks to the humblest segment of Venezuela’s population, 
which Perla admires deeply. 
Damien, the Australian-Russian journalist who has interviewed several very high-profile 
leaders, also underlines Chávez’s origins:  
There are two ways in which I saw President Chávez. One way, I saw him as a 
revolutionary anti-imperialist leader who actually cared for the ordinary and working-
class people of Venezuela. You could feel it. You could really feel it during those 13 years 
that he was in power, that direct connection which he felt with the ordinary people of 
Venezuela, and a lot of this was influenced by his own upbringing. His parents were 
teachers in a working-class family, not impoverished, but still. He learned from a very 
young age what the life was like for the ordinary people of Venezuela and of course his 
grandmother was a huge influence on him. So I believe because of that he developed this 
direct consciousness with the people of the barrios, and the workers, campesinos, 
everyone. And you could always see it, in his addresses, in the nature of his reforms, and 
in his vision, his political vision.  
Damien points to Chávez’s ‘authenticity’ when he describes the way Chávez cared. As Canovan 
(2005) asserts in The People, this push for transparency is also central to the populist message. I 
discuss the importance of care in justifying interviewees political positions in the last chapter, 
specifically how each side argues that the other side ‘does not care.’ Here I underline how both 
Damien and Perla feel that Chávez cares, and how this is a central aspect of their admiration 
for him. I note authenticity has been discussed extensively by journalists as the quality for the 
politician of the 21st century, in the era of social media (especially as it related to Hillary 
Clinton’s supposed deficiencies in the elections of 2016). As Julia Azari (2015) insightfully 
suggests in a short article for Vox magazine, “the implicit argument is that by virtue of the 
realness of their personalities and convictions, ‘authentic’ politicians like Donald Trump and 
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Bernie Sanders will change the political system.” For Damien, Chávez’s working-class origins 
gave him the ability to connect—and represent— ‘ordinary people’, a representation seen as 
the only way to be an ‘authentic’ (and legitimate) politician.  
Some of my solidarity activists also felt the need to defend Maduro against those who criticise 
him. When I asked Perla about Maduro more specifically, she again underlines where he 
comes from, and the importance of defending him because he is the ‘face’ of the ‘popular 
subject’: 
What’s at stake here is a people: a historic project, a popular subject that become a historic 
subject with Chavismo, and today Maduro is the face of that project. I think he’s a leader 
that, similarly to Chávez and Evo Morales, is tied at the core to his origins, to his popular 
origins. He always reclaims this, and he highlights that he is a workers’ president. He has 
experience in the student movement, in the labour movement, and he comes from there. 
Of the barrio assemblies, in the factories, the workshops, and he never forgets that, and 
that gives him enormous sensitivity.  
In another quote, Victoria one of the three female solidarity activists, explains why she feels 
Maduro deeply deserves her support, and explains how Chávez’s posthumous magnification 
has exempted him from the strong criticism that now befalls Maduro: 
Chávez has now been aggrandised—even the opposition has aggrandised him, because 
he’s not there anymore. If he were, they would surely treat him like they treat Maduro—
that’s a fact […] I give a major vote for Maduro, yes. Of course, seeing contradictions, and 
seeing very good things. But for me, for example—I think it’s very difficult to find a leader, 
at the world level, I’m not talking only about Latin America, but around the world, that 
can sit in front of any person that grants him an interview, or in front of his people, and 
that can talk as Maduro talks: looking in the eyes, feeling, thrilling. When he goes out and 
talks in front of the population, when he does it in front of a Spanish interviewer, and he’s 
going to be on television. That is, he is able to look in the eye, and feel. I don’t think that’s 
fake. It’s very hard to fake. Very hard. 
Jack, the young black-British activist, tells me he admires Maduro’s humble origins, again, 
seeing him as a true representative of the working-class of Venezuela:  
I'm very, very happy to stand in solidarity with Maduro, because firstly, I like to think, 
where has Maduro come from? He used to be a bus driver, or something like that. This is 
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someone who now is the president of this country, now has been raised by the party, by 
the working class, by the movement of socialism, to now be the person who is at the 
forefront of this fight. And I think it goes back again to the point, you can't support 
Venezuela without supporting who the Venezuelan people themselves have chosen to be 
the president. You can't just say I'm in solidarity with Venezuela and Chávez, without 
being in solidarity with the person that system has made president now. He was chosen by 
the party, and made up of people and this has been legitimised by election, there is no 
good reason not to support Maduro without relying on typically lazy tropes and liberal 
sentiments. 
Jack contrasts ‘liberal sentiments,’ with an understanding of true representation—again 
prioritising having what he considers to be ‘the people’ in charge, over any criticisms that can 
be made regarding individual, civil and political, rights. 
Critiquing the people’s government 
This is not to say Jack avoids criticising Maduro entirely. In explaining the importance of his 
support for the Maduro government, Jack explains: 
I'm not saying he's done everything perfect, maybe they have made mistakes, but we can't 
just write them off, and write off the entire system because we don't like one leader. We 
have to say, actually the system still works, the system is still there, he hasn't gone back on 
the fundamental promise of the system, he hasn't gone back on the fundamental basis of 
the system.  
I found it significant that Jack accepts that both the Chávez and Maduro governments have 
committed mistakes. Importantly this does not change the moral prerogative: it cannot deter 
support for the ‘system,’ because commitment towards ‘the people’ is still being ‘upheld.’ It is 
enough, in a sense, for these governments to try because they represent ‘the people.’ External 
circumstances are mostly responsible for the dire situation; mistakes are forgivable because 
they are seen as unintentional, following Cushman’s (2015) moral theory described in chapter 4.  
For Sahas, the British-Asian young activist, also a Corbynite, the mistakes involve not having 
gone far enough in the anti-revisionist path:  
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I think there's a couple of things that I think that he [Chávez] made a mistake on. One was 
not confronting private capital, which I think we're seeing the effects of today, really, 
because I think that the Venezuelan economy is still dominated by private enterprise, 
which is able to collude with the United States and participate in economic sabotage.  
Yet despite this strong ideological, if you will policy related disagreement—a disagreement 
shared by the Communist party in Venezuela (PCV), for instance—Sahas also avowedly 
continues to support Maduro’s presidency (unlike the PCV). Sahas adds he is ultimately 
“confronting his own government always pushing for war in the Middle East and Latin 
America and elsewhere.” 
A starker example comes from José, principal organiser of one of the large UK Venezuela 
solidarity organisations, and part of the Trotskyist IMT: 
There have been many cases in recent months of the national guard, local judges, local 
officials of Venezuela’s land institute that go and evict peasants from land that these 
peasants had property titles for, for at least 5 or 10 years. So that’s why I say, for example 
when the guarimbas last year, in 2014, we’re not in favour of the opposition, guided by those 
guys, taking power, because we think it would be a mess—as has happened in Argentina 
with Macri’s arrival. So we defend the government against that offensive. But that does not 
me that we agree with the government’s policies. For us, the economy policies that the 
government is applying right now are headed for disaster.  
José knows many of the new policies under President Maduro (towards whom he has 
reservations) have acted against landless peasants. But despite how disastrous José believes 
Maduro’s administration is, he feels the need to defend it against the opposition’s ‘offensive.’ 
José uses the word ‘disaster’ to describe them both, but the thought that the opposition will be 
friendly to US interests and neoliberalism, means he needs to defend Maduro—even if he felt 
Maduro was not really defending ‘the people.’ Liesel, and those who identify with the 
Trotskyist left, had similar complaints about Maduro: that he is a reformist and has not taken 
enough steps to confront capitalism and the bourgeoisie directly. Ultimately, they prefer him 
to US-backed Guaidó. 
Solidarity activists often made mention of co-gestión (co-ownership and workers’ control) as 
one of the policies they most admire from the Chávez era. These policies showed a 
commitment to the empowerment of the working-class—even if Chávez’s relationship to 
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organised labour was fraught (Venezuela’s main union federation was strongly tied to AD, one 
of the two parties of Venezuela’s Punto Fijo period, see Azzellini 2017). Although these 
initiatives have largely been dismantled, for José, co-gestión continues to be at the centre of 
what he finds most rewarding about his solidarity work, regardless:  
The possibility we’ve had to send a delegation from here to get to know Venezuela’s 
experience, particularly, I would say, of workers’ control, that was perhaps the most 
important experience […] Most of these experiences don’t exist anymore, have been 
crushed by bureaucracy in general, but the one in Gocha, for example, is still running. It’s 
a textile factory in Aragua that is taken by workers and is functioning under workers’ 
control, and I think it has been the campaign’s most gratifying experience. To be able to 
see that live. A revolution. Workers’ control. Something that only happens very few times 
in history, when workers’ take their destiny into their own hands […] There's a workers' 
assembly where all the important decisions are made and they are producing, despite all 
the legal, and bureaucratic problems. But what I saw there was a really strong feeling, that 
the company is now theirs, that they fought for it, that they have managed to bring it back, 
are producing, and that they don’t need patrons and they won’t let anyone take that away 
from them. 
The image of the worker ‘taking charge of his own destiny’ is obviously very powerful for José. 
José contends the failures of all attempts at workers’ control are a product of bureaucracy, and  
nothing to do with the policy itself. For Fernando, the Australian-Argentinean journalist who 
lived in Venezuela for three years, and also witnessed some of these policies in action, co-gestión 
is, instead, easy to romanticise: 
Researching things like co-gestión, work in co-management and things like that, seeing that 
in practice was to me really rewarding […] I helped to edit a newspaper for the Electrical 
Workers Union, which was one of the sectors where co-gestión was first introduced. It was 
also one where it was ultimately rolled back as well. So they obviously had a really 
important story to tell about both of their really positive experiences under co-gestión but 
also their strong criticisms about why that had been, you know, been rolled back internally 
within the company. Obviously, these things can be romanticised very, very easily and 
very quickly. And when you go there and see, first day, and you see the real big challenges 
that they are facing, you get to better understand the debates, the pros and cons of this 
process of workers’ control. And I say that as someone who comes from a position of 
supporting that push for workers’ control. I've also learned that it's not that simple to just 
say, you know, let's just hand over everything to workers and everything will be resolved. 
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For every positive example, like every 10 positive examples, I could talk about five negative 
examples as well.  
He continues to explain how what the workers really wanted was adequate pay and basic 
benefits for the work they were trained to do. According to Fernando, the load of having to run 
the company was not something they were keen to add to their duties, unless the consequence 
of them not taking over was that the factory halted production. Although Fernando is more 
critical of the experience, both him and José value the opportunity to experiment with workers’ 
control; they very much wish they could emulate some of these policies in their respective 
countries. Their admiration for co-gestión has not stopped these activists from questioning its 
efficiency, but the idea that it seems more inherently ‘just’ or ‘moral,’ does trump a more, say, 
‘utilitarian’ concern with its efficacy—as is the case with the government’s performance as a 
whole.  
Abdo’s criticism goes even further:  
If you want to empower the working class you've got to have a confrontation with the 
bourgeoisie class. And it feels like Chavez and Maduro never really wanted to do that. 
They use a lot of slogans about socialism, but they never really implemented a socialist 
system. So I think I read somewhere, there are more industries in France that are under 
state control, than there are in Venezuela. And no one would describe France as a socialist 
state, so yeah, that's probably my biggest criticism, is that they didn't go far enough. And 
they kind of, in some ways, they kind of let the working classes down by that. Because 
they've talked all the good stuff but haven't delivered and then now the working classes 
are suffering because of the high inflation, because of the water shortages because all of 
these various things, which obviously my opinion is exacerbated by external forces, but 
you allowed the state to be so vulnerable that these things could happen.  
Even James, who admired the voting system (discussed in chapter 5), admits:  
I did see people taking apart rubbish bins, and bags full of rubbish looking for something 
to eat or sell. And that is very distressing. It's very distressing. Including actually some 
people near the hotel, in Chacao, one of the most expensive areas. So I think there is a lot 
of denial by the Maduro government. And I think that's not helpful at all. You know to 
pretend they're all revolutionaries. It's not revolutionary to behave like this.  
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The idea that the Bolivarian governments contest capitalism, in other words, that they are a 
true alternative to neoliberal hegemony, can be and is questioned by many activists. They 
especially see President Maduro as a revisionist, in broad terms, willing to make concessions 
with the bourgeoisie, and pulling back on some of Chávez’s principles (for example, the 
aggressive use of special action forces FAES, originally created to combat crime and allegedly 
responsible for many extrajudicial executions, see UNCHR 2019, 7). As I have argued 
previously, this seems to respond to the idea that the government should be defended solely 
on the grounds that it purports to fight for ‘good’—for economic and social justice, as well as 
for its unwillingness to negotiate with the US—whether it is on track to achieving economic 
and social justice, is of less concern.  
Viveza criolla 
The tendency is to see middle-class participation to decentralize state structures as 
legitimate, and poor-class participation for inclusion in the state as nongenuine or 
unsophisticated. In these cases, the poor are not only defined by their class position but 
also through their lack of legitimate political participation and their dependent 
relationship to the state. They become the stigmatized popular masses (Valencia 2015, 43). 
Beliefs about Venezuelans that have remained in Venezuela, i.e. that have decided to stay or 
are unable to migrate, are tied to ideas about who ‘the people’ of Venezuela are, from the 
perspective of the Venezuelan migrants I interviewed. Here I discuss their belief in the 
inherent ‘corrupt’ and ‘lazy’ nature of their compatriots. This ‘peopling’ Venezuelans and 
other South Americans share of their fellow citizens, in fact colours their understanding of 
systemic issues in Latin America and their respective countries.  
Nelson’s reading of Chavismo, of Venezuela’s present crisis, and of Venezuela’s future, hinges 
on the idea that ‘the people’ in Venezuela are ‘cunning’—what Venezuelans term ‘viveza 
criolla’—a very negative form of self-interest. Nelson comes from a lower-middle class 
background, and calls himself ‘negro,’ because he is dark-skinned and has afro hair (although 
does not self-categorise as afro-descendent). He has never identified with Chavismo or its 
tenets as an adult, he explains, but admits having been amiable towards Chavez’s leftist bent 
when he was around 13 or 14 (right at the beginning of Chavez’s presidency). Despite holding 
a college degree as a physical education teacher—one that he earned at a public university in 
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Venezuela (public universities in Venezuela have been practically free, even before the Chávez 
era)—economic stagnation had him working at a supermarket in his hometown of Coro, a 
small city in the West of the country. Although supermarket management was less lucrative 
than teaching, it helped him find products largely unavailable due to the shortages—he insists 
there is nothing he hates more than having to stand in a long queue to buy food (which 
continues to be the norm in Venezuela). Nelson lost his job in mid-2017, when hyperinflation 
began, and he was left unemployed for six months—he lived off money a friend was sending 
from Spain. He left Venezuela at the end of 2017, by bus, across the continent to Chile. He was 
homeless for more than two months after his arrival and depended on the kindness of a group 
of priests in Santiago, until he found work as a security guard in the daytime and as bouncer 
at a club at night.  
Nelson’s ‘folk sociology’ describes how he explains the enduring popularity of Chavismo in 
Venezuela—even when he is not from a privileged background himself:  
When I was in the supermarket, I was forced to see the reality of the society that Hugo 
Rafael Chávez Frías created. I don’t even call it socialism, or the Left. No. Hugo Rafael 
Chávez Frías, the true culprit of all the situation Venezuela is living through. And 
Venezuelan society was degraded to such levels that an elderly person is not worth 
anything. Not respecting an elderly man for a pack of flour, not respecting a child for a 
pack of flour, insulting and hitting each other, just to be first in line. Cheating, the viveza 
criolla’ that seems to live in the genes of Venezuelans, to the point where I don’t have faith 
in the country today. Because Guaidó can come, Leopoldo López [another opposition 
leader] can come, but if this doesn’t change […] Venezuela is not going to come up [salir de 
abajo]. Trump himself can come govern, and that’s not going to change. How can that 
change? […] those who have remained are the conformists, the ones who like getting free 
stuff, the population Chávez wanted to stay.  
Nelson’s distinction between Chávez and socialism, or the left more broadly, shows he sees a 
difference between Chávez’s twenty-first century socialism and Chávez’s actual policies. More 
fundamentally, for Nelson, Hugo Chávez created a society that thrives on Venezuelans’ natural 
‘viveza criolla,’ a stereotypical understanding of Venezuelans as sly or cunning.  
Wikipedia translates viveza criolla as “creole’s cunning,” an expression that describes a “way of 
life in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela […] a philosophy of progress along 
the line of least resistance and ignoring rules, a lack of sense of responsibility and 
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considerations for others, and it extends to all social groups and throughout the whole 
country.” In his op-ed entitled Viveza Criolla, Reinaldo Rojas (El Universal May 27 2019) refers 
to it as “Venezuela’s recurrent problem wherein 100 years of unproductive oil riches, has 
generated a social conduct that conspires against long-term solutions.” The concept belongs 
to a narrative surrounding ‘the people’ of Venezuela of all standings. Among the first twenty 
entries of a simple Twitter search of ‘viveza criolla Venezuela,’ you find:  
Every time I hear that Venezuela is a rich country I think, rich in ‘viveza criolla’, rich in 
corruption and rich in robbery (malandre0) [February 20 2020].  
You can dolarise Venezuela, but how do you stop hyperinflation, delinquency, viveza 
criolla, speculation and everything else? [February 25 2020]. 
I am dark today. Wanting to have power so that I can return all those f***ers to Venezuela 
who think they can do what they did there, here: taking advantage, making fun, tricking, 
viveza criolla, bullying (he writes this word in English) and more. If I left, it was also so that 
I would stop having to deal with people like that [February 19 2020].  
What the third tweet is implying, much like Nelson, is that the author finds the need to take 
distance from Venezuela, but especially from ‘the people,’ whom they associate with this 
cunning attitude. As I have come to understand it, viveza criolla suggests that Venezuelans are 
easily willing to by-pass institutions and procedures for maximising and expediting personal, 
vis-a-vis collective, benefit. This can be via unconventional means (‘creatively’) but it can also 
be via illegal means (‘corruptly’); both make a generalisation of ‘the people’ as ‘wrong,’ or 
immoral. 
Nelson insists that it matters not who governs: things will not change unless this corrupted 
nature he describes is dealt with. His mention of Trump hints at the idea of foreign 
intervention—indeed later in the interview he explains that foreign military intervention is 
the only way forward. At this point of the conversation Nelson uses it as an exaggeration (‘hasta 
el mismo Trump,’ even Trump himself). It’s hard to say if this exaggeration implies foreign rule 
could be justified, were it somehow able to curb Venezuelans’ ‘cunning,’ or if he is simply 
questioning whether intervention will, in the long term, solve Venezuelans’ problems. I 
highlight Nelson’s feeling that change, and a bright future are impossible: an elimination of 
hope that justifies his migration and explains why he feels he cannot return. He then sincerely 
asks, quite helplessly in his tone of voice, “how does one change this?” For him, the generalised 
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immoral character of Venezuelans is deterministic of Venezuelan society, meaning it is an 
incredibly difficult trait to subvert—even ‘strongman’ Trump cannot help. 
Similarly, Marcos, a young brown Venezuelan in his late thirties, who now lives in Colombia,20 
describes those that have remained, and by extension, those who have left Venezuela:  
And the problem is that the people that remain in Venezuela—not to discredit or be 
prejudiced—are people with social and cultural levels that are, well, very low, because it 
is the lowest level of society, because those who more or less were able to leave given their 
intellect, or their work, their training, have left. The vast majority. So those who remain 
well, the ones Chávez called ‘the new citizen’ are people who never worked, never studied, 
never trained. People who have nothing else to think about except Chavismo, and sadly 
it’s not their fault, it is the fault of the system that shaped them that way. And so, they are 
people who get to other countries, and are a burden to other countries […] And I don’t 
blame them, because the system is designed for people to become cannibals, so people 
annihilate other human beings.  
Marcos mentions ‘those who stay,’ but he means to say ‘those who have stayed thus far, given 
he is trying to explain how these people have become a burden to other countries. Exactly what 
he means by the low ‘cultural’ level of ‘the people’ he refers to is unclear, but we can presume 
he is alluding to an alleged propensity for crime ‘the people’ share, linked again to the idea of 
‘viveza criolla.’ The Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, in April 2019, affirms that every 24 hours 
at least 13 Venezuelans are arrested for stealing in Bogotá, a fact that has evidently created a 
series of tensions with Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia. Marcos is trying to explain why 
Colombians might feel Venezuelans are a burden—simultaneously distancing himself from 
them. Although he insists he does not mean to be prejudiced, or to discredit other 
Venezuelans, his first characterisation of these people are those “who have never worked.” 
This assumes somehow that they did not even try—not that this was in many ways out of reach 
for them. Still, their low ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ level is not their fault: this is Chavismo’s fault, in 
his view. Chavismo has de-incentivised them from work. In another part of the interview, 
Marcos more explicitly suggests that the food boxes given by the government system have 
 
20 See chapter 8 for a more detailed description of Marcos’ story. 
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made the poor fight against each other for the little ‘cajita’ (box) on which they are entirely 
dependent.  
Similarly, Ibrahim, in his forties, who has been selling SIM cards in the streets of Perú (but 
worked in the oil refineries when he lived in Venezuela), tells me: 
It’s not that I want to humiliate, or speak ill of people, but the government started to 
accustom people, lazy people, people who idle, ‘I’ll give you a house, I’ll give you food, I’ll 
give you the opportunity of owning a car,’ you get me? In order to get people to support 
them. ‘I’ll feed you, I’ll give you money, I’ll give you a bonus.’ That is to support the 
unashamed façade of the government. It’s a narco government that can move so much 
money that it can afford to give scraps (una miseria) to the people. 
In a bid to counter the swiping generalisations that are been made about Venezuelans and 
their links to delinquency in other Venezuelan countries—which we can presume, men need 
to grapple with more than women—Nelson, Marcos and Ibrahim seek distance from the viveza 
criolla trait. They see their own hard work as enabling their migration. What Ibrahim implies 
is that the government gives ‘the people’ scraps to legitimise its “unashamed façade”—scraps 
compared to what it garners with oil—but scraps that, nonetheless, attract ‘lazy people’ 
(incidentally laziness is also a theme that crops up very often in the US right, as discussed by 
Hochschild 2016). 
For Pablo, a white middle-class Venezuelan who left for the Netherlands in the early 1990’s 
(and then decided to return to Venezuela in 2000 to help the well-known cost-free Venezuelan 
system for musical orchestras), Chávez, moreover, sowed resentment:  
[When I returned] I found the new government of Hugo Chávez, a socialist doctrine, an 
inflammatory discourse and a social emancipation charged with hatred and social rage 
towards the normal population. Sadly, I had—there was a terrible political environment, 
and my wife and I are artists. He starts to breed a social resentment against those who have, 
those who had, the business owner, against those who have something, who have earned 
something. And he starts to ignite and create a hatred and a rebelliousness, and incites 
hate to take from those who have. Because basically, to the poor, I remember him saying: 
“let’s take from he who has, take the shoes of those who have because you don’t have, and 
now it’s your time, of the poor, of us to take the reins of this country.”  
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I note how Pablo’s ideas reflect a certain fear of the middle-classes towards the ‘resentful’ 
people (even an ‘aporophobia,’ fear of the poor) that became engrained as criminal activity, 
and impunity, skyrocketed. In the year 2000, the year Pablo returned, there was a 31 percent 
increase in homicide violence. I do note, however, that as far as I have been able to gather, 
President Chávez never openly suggested people should steal if they were hungry, although 
many opposition politicians have declared he did.21 At an important discourse given in 1999 
(the year he was sworn in) Chávez explained how he met a young man, 25 years of age, whose 
children were dying of starvation. He told the audience that he knew his opponents would say 
that he was inciting delinquency, but he acknowledged that like that man, he would do 
anything to save his daughter from the grave; he felt anyone would be able to understand that 
prerogative. Did he say that stealing was pardonable under such circumstances? The question 
has led to two distinct narratives. 
It is interesting to see how the story of Chávez and the young man has lived in the imaginary 
of those who oppose the government. President Chávez indeed declared many times that being 
rich was wrong and inhumane—although his cabinet was criticised for hypocritically wearing 
ostentatiously expensive watches and amassing fortunes abroad (Lansberg-Rodriguez 2016). 
Pablo felt Chávez’s inflammatory discourse pitted the middle class (and not just the corrupt 
rich elite) against the impoverished majority.22 Venezuelans like Pablo felt this bred 
resentment against those ‘who have something’ or who ‘have earned something,’ and are easier 
prey than the rich, who have expensive guards and electrical fences. Pablo unconsciously calls 
them the ‘normal’ population, unaware of its privileges—at the same time suggesting he is not 
part of the elite either. Pablo is taking a moral stance against the kind of ‘justice’ he feels 
Chavismo was advancing: stealing from the middle, and not really upper, class.  
Viveza criolla is, in Venezuelan migrants’ minds, associated with Chavismo’s political strength 
in Venezuela. Migrants seem to have sought distance from this ‘laziness’ and Venezuela itself 
as its breeding-ground. For them, ‘the people’s lazy nature’ easily falls for Chavismo’s material 
clientelism—and not Chavismo’s ideological discourse of ‘brownness,’ nationalism, or 
 
21 This has been what many opposition politicians feel was the crux of ‘Venezuela’s moral crisis’.  
22 See Domínguez 2008 for a complete analysis of Chávez’s presidential discourse on poverty. 
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working-class morale. They suggest therefore, no doubt controversially, that the poor hold a 
certain moral vacuousness for utilitarian reasons. They extend this (mis)understanding to the 
solidarity activists that I interviewed who are not Venezuelans: they believe solidarity activists 
either receive some monetary benefit for their support, or are being deceived. By 
characterising those that are left in Venezuela this way, Venezuelan migrants more 
importantly explain what they feel is the underlying corruption that holds the system in place, 
despite Chavismo’s poor governmental performance over the years.  
The idea that Chavismo has made Venezuelans in Venezuela dependent of the government is 
pervasive among Venezuelan interviewees. Chavismo is ‘immoral’ in the way it bolsters 
Venezuelans’ laziness to garner electoral advantage; these are notions that colour the 
disillusion concerning Venezuela’s future and dignity as a country, and justifies migrants’ 
search abroad. This type of clientelistic policy has never been exclusively “Chavista,” as I 
discussed in chapter 2. Venezuela’s rentier state, or the ‘Magical State’ in the words of  
Fernando Coronil (1997), pushes governments to engage with short-term policy, and Chavez’s 
government was never the exception. Although food boxes are in some ways degrading, 
previous policies, such as the educational missions, show that other policies of the Chávez 
government have been dignifying, and therefore perhaps more central to Chávez’s long-
standing popularity. This aligns with studies on wellbeing in the Global South, that suggest 
work is an integral part of feelings of ontological security and self-fulfilment, i.e., that people 
do not want to be given things. Today most policies are indeed clientelistic as the UNHRC 
(2019) report confirms, and this does not help in challenging the problematic way in which 
some Venezuelan migrants understand true structural needs. 
Populo and Demos 
Both groups of interviewees—both Venezuelan migrants and solidarity activists—underline 
the centrality of ‘the people’ in their ideas of politics, but diverged greatly in terms of who they 
understood ‘the people’ to represent. Previously I have suggested that solidarity activists gain 
their understanding of democracy, and of Venezuela’s democracy in particular, from what 
they feel are the opportunities the Chavista government has awarded ‘the people’—those 
disenfranchised from structural racism, the political system, and global capitalism. For 
solidarity activists in particular, ideas of ‘the people’ stand for the ‘ordinary’ working-class 
brown as a majority represented in Chavismo—a constructed collective subject that is the 
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legitimate heir to power, given the unjust historical-racial disenfranchisement it has suffered. 
The sense solidarity activists have of pertaining to a global working class can be seen both as 
an intent to overcome national boundaries, and as a means to put ideological narratives above 
national ones.  
Venezuelan migrants, on the other hand, share a more ‘heterogenous,’ but also ambivalent, 
understanding of ‘the people.’ Their imagined community is an economically diverse, highly 
repressed majority, that stands against the Chavista government. Yet in their imaginary ‘the 
people’ are also a ‘lazy’ or ‘conformist,’ prone to viveza criolla. This is a widespread cultural 
notion that understands Venezuelans as innately ‘cunning,’ a cunning that the government 
has profited from. This understanding of Venezuelans as naturally inclined to their own self-
interest and opposed to their community, supports migrants’ belief that Venezuela is 








Chapter 8. Moral-emotional rationales 
The viscerality of ‘narrative appropriation’  
An online (English) newspaper for Venezuelans abroad, Caracas Chronicles, has a store where 
they sell Venezuelan related paraphernalia. In March 2019, the website boasted a section of 
their merchandise dedicated to the hashtag #AskAVenezuelan. Their blurb read: “Tired of 
people marxplaining Venezuela to you? Join us in this campaign to educate foreign folk about 
the situation in Venezuela” (see Figure 15). The verb ‘marxplaining’ obviously takes from 
‘mansplaining’: it characterises conversations between Venezuelans and non-Venezuelan 
leftists as condescending and patronising, and based on, they feel, a blind and narrow 
understanding of a particular ideology, Marxism. It describes the frustration—and 
contempt—Venezuelans feel towards those who speak to them in favour of the Chavista 
government from outside Venezuela.23 
The premise of the campaign is based on the idea that ‘foreign folk’ cannot know what is truly 
happening in Venezuela—they need to be ‘educated.’ Only those that have lived experience of 
Venezuela can ‘knowingly’ speak about it, hence why only Venezuelans should be asked about 
the situation there. The campaign reflects an underlying theme that appeared in the interviews 
with Venezuelan migrants: that non-Venezuelans should not speak about Venezuela because 
they have not experienced living under Chávez’s and Maduro’s governments. 
This is in fact, among other things, an epistemological conflict. From the perspective of 
Venezuelans, it is felt as an immoral appropriation of their ‘right’ to narrate Venezuela’s story 
by those that live in the ‘privilege’ of the Global North. It is deeply felt by Venezuelan migrants 
as a violation committed against them by those who do not know, really ‘know,’ about 
Venezuela. It is felt as a wrong ‘done’ to them: a denial of their lived experience—not a denial 
 
23 The hashtag has been removed, as of March 2020. The site now sells merchandise with the slogan “Keep 
Calm and ask a Venezuelan.” 
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of their understanding of the crisis—one that I term ‘narrative appropriation.’ Venezuelan 
migrants argue opinions on political systems can only come from experiencing the policies, 
and living under the authority of those political systems—i.e. by having lived through the crisis. 
Yet this appropriation seems to apply only to those non-Venezuelans that have contrary ideas 
to theirs: ‘foreign folk’ who do not disagree with their narrative (Marco Rubio, or Donald 
Trump for example) are not seen as appropriating; they are not felt as unjust or immoral, 
because they are not challenging Venezuelan migrants’ lived experience.  
 
Figure 15. #AskAVenezuelan Campaign promoted by online newspaper and blog CaracasChronicles. 
In the words of César, the afro-Venezuelan interviewee in his late thirties:  
And obviously it’s really enraging that from the comfort of tourists, that can enter and 
leave as they please, and live in the comfort of a modern society, where they have certain 
guarantees, certain freedoms—where they’re not afraid that a police, as we say here, ‘falls 
in love with you’ and sends you to jail, or disappears you, just because—that they come 
and tell us that what is happening here is good […] So I feel that they’re completely blinded 
by ideology—like they saw, you know, El Dorado. 
For Venezuelan migrants, solidarity activists’ approval of Maduro’s administration ensues a 
particularly visceral reaction that was replicated across the interviews. For César, what is 
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especially enraging is that those who support the government from abroad have freedom of 
movement—if what is happening in Venezuela fails to suit them, they need not bear it; they 
remain ‘untied’ to Chavismo’s authority. This is ultimately how César experiences a type of 
oppression: solidarity activists are free to leave and return to their privilege; Cesar, an afro-
Venezuelan, with no European ancestry or double citizenship like other Venezuelans, as he 
underlines, is forced to endure the systemic food and medicine shortages, hyper-inflation, 
incessant power cuts, and rampant criminality in Caracas that he attributes to the Chavista 
governments. César ends his remark by referencing ‘El Dorado’ to make a point on how the 
activists’ ideology is disengaged from reality. For him, activists are ‘blinded’ by their belief in 
the Venezuelan ‘socialist dream,’ a dream that prevents them from seeing how the ‘on-the-
ground’ project has failed.  
What makes the discourse of solidarity activists particularly abhorrent to César is the felt 
privilege from where it is uttered. Their discourse comes from what he calls ‘modern society’— 
a society with ‘certain freedoms and guarantees.’ There is a latent anger in that they cannot 
justifiably speak for him, in place of his experience of Venezuela’s crisis—specially not when 
their own states have in fact met their basic needs and ontological security. César is trying to 
describe what he as an afro-Venezuelan anti-Chavista (in the process of preparing his 
departure from the country) sees as renewed colonialism: an attempt to overthrow his right to 
narrate his own story. This point is particularly scathing because ‘colonialism’ is what 
solidarity activists intend to stand against—albeit US colonialism.24 
As Venezuelan migrants understand it, the ‘right’ to narrate Venezuela’s story, is not only 
about where they are born—their race, or nationality—but a claim to their personal 
experience: how they believe the government’s undue enactment of power has impacted their 
life. A ‘right’ that solidarity activists, by virtue of supporting President Maduro, deny. I note 
that the experiential knowledge acquired from travelling to Venezuelan territory is not lost to 
solidarity activists. It was an argument those who had been to Venezuela used to explain why 
they have a ‘deeper’ sense of what is going on than, say, the international media— experiential 
‘posteriori’ knowledge simply feels harder to contradict. The problem in the eyes of 
 
24 I address their anti-imperialist stance more explicitly in the last chapter. 
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Venezuelans, as César explains, is that visits, even long ones, are insufficient: they do not 
represent enough lived experience of a country to narrate its story. Their argument is not based 
on the experience of Venezuela’s space, but the experience of living under the—as he has it, 
illegitimate—authority of the state, its governmentality, as I have underlined. (Only one of my 
interviewees met this condition fully: a Basque solidarity activist who has been living in 
Venezuela since 2007, that I discuss in the last chapter.) 
Most Venezuelan migrants described a visceral feeling in the stomach when I mentioned I had 
spoken to non-Venezuelan admirers of Presidents Chávez and Maduro. It elicited a deep 
displeasure they were unable to hide. Many told stories of Chavista friends that they had 
stopped contacting. Some were genuinely in disbelief that anyone abroad could lend support 
to the government given what is shown in the international news on Venezuela—a disbelief 
that was soon turned to either anger or disgust (two strong moral emotions): 
That surprises me really. That there are people outside, observing Venezuela’s reality that 
continue to support this kind of process. Because of course, I repeat, watching the movie 
is very different: sitting there with your popcorn and drinks, and then to say ‘it’s 
marvellous’ is very different from being inside. 
Jaime, a young gay actor in his early thirties, was working three jobs and the weekends. He 
crossed the border to Colombia by foot in 2017: “you could not do anything,” he adds 
desperately, “it was impossible to aspire to a future there.” He admits he earned much more 
than many given he was working so much, and yet was not able to buy food. One day he told 
his partner, “Look, I’m leaving. With or without you, but I’m leaving. Because this is above and 
beyond me, I can’t cope.” They both managed to migrate to Colombia, where his partner was 
from and where they could get married. (In Venezuela same-sex marriage is still not legal, 
despite the government’s discourse alleges support for the LGBT+ community.)  
Again, Jaime takes this idea that solidarity activists are observing from ‘outside,’ even when he 
himself has left—because for him solidarity activism is disembodied, imagined. He is 
simultaneously describing the luxury of idleness and the safety of being in an audience; in the 
case of solidarity activists, the safety of the Global North. For Jaime, Venezuela’s movie—made 
a spectacle, imagined and admired by those who share socialist ideals—is completely detached 
from the reality ‘inside’ that can only be lived and embodied.  
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Solidarity activists coming from what César and Jaime feel are privileged backgrounds, impose 
a narrative about their experiences that tries to invalidate their decisions to leave Venezuela. 
If what the government is doing is not only legitimate but desirable, Venezuelan migrants have 
no reason to ask for asylum or even migrate. Their experience of suffering at the hands of the 
government, as they see it, is being denied.   
On another level, the feeling that these Venezuelans convey of ‘appropriation’ by those who 
live ‘in privilege,’ shows the extent to which both groups understand how power is being used 
to subvert them. Solidarity activists, middle-class and educated in the Global North, see power 
in terms of US’ neoliberal world hegemony and its arguably despicable behaviour in the 
region. Some of these Venezuelan migrants, also educated but in the Global South,25 
understand power in broader post-colonial terms: for them simply living in the Global North 
is a form of privilege, and so their story of Venezuela’s Bolivarian project as a wonderful idea 
is an appropriation of their experience of the crisis. 
Women and the need to respect 
Venezuelan migrant women were, in general, less willing to directly attack solidarity activists; 
they very rarely if at all used swear words, unlike the Venezuelan migrant men I interviewed. 
I do not necessarily see this as supporting the idea that women were somehow more polite,26 
rather that they more instinctively felt tolerance is a moral prerogative, which meant they the 
felt a stronger need to be pluralist, or tolerant of different viewpoints. This supports Carol 
Gilligan's (1982) famous study that showed women’s propensity to take the standpoint of an 
‘other’ and their ability to show empathy. Ultimately, these Venezuelan women justify how 
they are unable to be tolerant because they feel ‘the other’—solidarity activists—are defending 
what they feel is ‘unforgivable.’  
 
25  Not all the Venezuelan migrants I interviewed had a college education, although most had finished high 
school. 
26 See Mills (2003) for a discussion on how she views this as a simplistic conclusion more generally. 
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The viscerality of these moral feelings, in other words, the strong physical emotion that 
accompanies this denial of narrative, is felt as appropriating, moreover, defamatory. These 
feelings were particularly explicit in part of my interview with Camila, a young white 
Venezuelan in her late twenties, orphaned at 13 when her father, a taxi driver, was killed in an 
attempt to steal his car and his night’s earnings—an unfortunate yet common occurrence in 
crime-ridden Caracas. She is quick to tell me that she started to work very early on as a 
children’s clown (payasita) as she felt the need to help her mother and family: “From a young 
age, I have been very responsible,” she adds.  
Her trusting positivity faded when I asked her what she thought about non-Venezuelan 
supporters of the government. To counter them, she lists a series of commonplace hardships 
she has endured: having a family member shot at a protest, ensuing impunity, 12-hour queues 
for food, getting scratched fighting over chicken, lack of basic services and being permanently 
exposed to criminal activity—things that can only be experienced in situ. She continues: 
“When someone who has not lived in Venezuela tells me they love the idea, and Chávez, and 
this and that, I get a little something in [pause] my heart is going to sort of [pause].” She stops 
and she just exclaims in a high pitched shrill ‘ay Dios!’ (oh, God). Visibly fighting her rage and 
clenching her fists, she turns to me and says “I want to…” but hesitates to utter any violent verb. 
After a deep, long breath she says “I try to understand their point of view […] but I remain in 
disagreement. I disagree because I think that you have to live it to be able to then say whether 
you like it or not.” She uses a common Spanish expression ‘tienes que vivirlo en carne propia’—
which literally translates to ‘you need to live it in your own flesh.’ 
During the interview, Camila explains that her father, who was a working-class man, voted for 
Chávez because “he felt that what Chávez was saying made sense to him.”27 She tells me both 
her mother and her felt the need to respect her father’s opinion, despite garnering deep distrust 
for Chávez. With this, she discloses what she feels is a fundamental moral quality: the respect 
of another’s opinion. However, from the emotion that the support of Chavismo stirred in her, 
 
27 This is incidentally the same phrase one of the solidarity activists I interviewed, James, used to explain his 
affinity to Chávez. 
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it seems she sees Chavismo’s failure to deal with the exponential gun violence and judicial 
impunity already described, as somehow intrinsically responsible for her father’s death:28  
And he died because of delinquency which is so rampant there. And never, well, we never 
found out who the killers were, because there’s no impunity in Venezuela [she means to 
say that there is]. The number of families that have been left without a paternal or 
maternal figure, without brothers or sisters, because they have been murdered by the 
mobs (hampa). And the government has not taken charge.  
Camila’s position though, and that of other Venezuelan migrants, mistakenly assumes that if 
you live in Venezuela 1) you will experience the crisis and necessarily blame the government 
for it; and 2) that no Venezuelans in the country continue to support President Maduro. It is a 
position that reflects both an optimistic idea that people that undergo similar experiences 
necessarily share the same point of view—or at least rationalise them in the same way. Also, 
that no middle ground is possible, i.e., that people cannot like some aspects of the government 
and dislike its role in the crisis at the same time.  
Alicia also shares this understanding of the value of respecting other points of view. She is a 
Colombian-born Venezuelan in her forties, with some indigenous features, that came to the 
UK in 2005—several years before the crisis. Alicia modestly admits that in her Jehovah’s 
witness family only the bible was read; she had no furniture as her family could not afford it. 
She believes she has a limited understanding of politics because according to her family’s 
religious values voting was considered a sin. Now that she has abandoned her family’s beliefs, 
she raises money for charities that send medicines to Venezuela, and organises her city’s 
Venezuelan community.29 
 
28  As discussed in chapter 2, I note that the numbers show that during Chavismo crime homicides have gone 
up an astounding 484 percent. Additionally, when Chávez was elected in 1998, for every 100 deaths there were 
110 people arrested for suspicion. In 2018, there were only 9 people arrested for every 100 deaths. 
29 As part as may fieldwork, I attended the meetings organised by this community group, who were actively 
trying to raise consciousness on the issues facing Venezuela.  
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Alicia’s expression of anger is somewhat restrained to a deep frustration that she describes as 
‘loss of respect’ for those in the left who support the government, a feeling that stems from the 
belief that they are morally wrong. This is different from the full-on hate I saw in some 
Venezuelan migrant men (a hate I discuss in the next section): 
What upsets me is when people start defending something that in this case in particular, 
ignores the humanitarian aspect, the humanitarian problem in Venezuela. So in that sense 
they lose my respect, when they begin—when they don’t care about that. Because I can, I 
really can try to respect someone who feels leftist, but that admits that what is being done 
in Venezuela is wrong. That they would want to keep that government simply because of 
ideology, that’s not ok. From that point of view, I cannot accept that they would think that 
way. 
Alicia goes on to name one of the most important solidarity organisations in the UK, ‘Hands 
off Venezuela’ (HOV) telling me that if they protest in favour of the Maduro government it is 
even worse, given they have never even been to Venezuela. Because she can only respect 
someone feeling leftist, if they accept that ‘what is being done’ in Venezuela is wrong, she is 
implying there is essentially only one ‘right’ position that can be held. There is a sense of 
‘injury’ that calls on a set of specific actors who have ‘harmed’ the nation—Chavistas. In seeing 
that it is ‘wrong’ of solidarity activists to support the government simply because they share in 
its ideology, she is expressing her understanding that the government is unpopular and 
therefore illegitimate and undemocratic.30 
Similarly, Eva, a young, light-brown Venezuelan in her early thirties who moved to Madrid 
only ten months before I interviewed her, in mid 2019, starts by underlining how important it 
is for her to respect every person’s opinion: 
I think that I have always very much respected the opinion of every person. Everyone has 
their own way of looking at things. But now seeing what people are going through, what I 
feel like is ‘beeeep’ [she makes a long beeping noise, as if the television were censoring her 
words and then laughs]. I mean, I get angry (me molesta). I get angry because I cannot 
 
30 See chapter 5. 
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believe that there are people who think that everything is going well, and that the ways of 
the government, if you can call them that, work, I mean I don’t know […] You would have 
to be “wetting your hands” [getting money from it] or I don’t know. Because I’m not going 
to say they’re crazy, or not. But they have a different way of looking at things? To not call 
them crazy? [she laughs] They’re so closed-minded […] They think Chávez was from the 
left, but there’s nothing ‘left’ about our government. Very pretty and all, but it’s not 
socialist […] There’s no equality because the government is increasingly getting richer […] 
Very pretty on paper.  
Eva’s rhetorical questions and dialogue with herself were telling of how she struggles with 
feeling anger at support for the government—and how she tries to keep her wonderful sense 
of humour throughout. She concludes that those who continue to support the government are 
either crazy, or benefitting from it monetarily. She can think of no other possible reasons they 
might support the current government. When she suggests monetary benefit, she is 
extrapolating from what she knows about some Venezuelan Chavistas, who are not 
ideologically oriented but (much like the boliburgueses mentioned previously) have benefitted 
economically from Chavismo. She then suggests they might be deceived into thinking Chávez, 
or his policies, were socialist. What is interesting about her phrasing is that she understands, 
even supports, the moral argument behind socialism: that we should all be equal is a ‘good’ 
thing. She is not what solidarity activists would think of as a ‘right-wing fascist,’ and although 
she lives in Spain, is not white. For her it would be ‘nice’ to have actual socialism, but this is 
not what exists in Venezuela given the government’s corruption, a theme I discuss more 
broadly in the next chapter.  
What is unique about women’s responses to solidarity activists is that they admit to the 
importance (or ‘rightness’) of understanding another’s point of view. They feel obliged to justify 
why they are unable to give solidarity activists the respect they believe every person deserves. 
Venezuelan migrants’ argument about validity of knowledge wants to counter-deny solidarity 
activists’ narrative by emphasising the importance of lived experience versus imagined or 
disembodied experience (a kind of a priori knowledge). Venezuelan migrants assume that it is 
not possible to blame the government for some aspects of the crisis, and still support it more 
broadly, as I argue, because they have a totalising understanding of the government: the 
government has acted ‘wrongfully’ and therefore is wrong (evil) in a moral sense, an idea I 
return to in chapter 9.  
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Injury and the desire to annihilate 
A survey that looked at negative emotions, specifically anger, ‘rabia,’ or ire ‘ira,’ conducted by 
pollster Datanálisis in March 2019 showed that at the beginning of the crisis (in 2014) those that 
reflected these emotions (they use the phrase ‘negative but activating’ emotions) accounted for 
4 to 8 per cent of the population.31 At the time of the survey in 2019, these emotions were 
expressed by at least 25 percent of Venezuelans (Informe21 March 25 2019). 
Rage and ire, as I have been describing, are underlying and sustaining the ‘radicality’ of 
Venezuela’s divide. Francisco, a white businessman in his mid-fifties, initially optimistic about 
Chávez’s project, came to the UK in 2014 with his family through an entrepreneurial visa. He 
tells me of a ‘small something’ in his stomach—a gut wrench—when he speaks to friends of 
his that are still supportive of Chávez: 
F: Yeah, I have Chavista friends in the embassies, for example. They tell me: ‘That’s going 
forward, bro’ (va pa’lante ‘mano). It hasn’t materialised for exogenous reasons, but that’s the 
way.’ How much of that is personal and how much of it is pure ideology, I don’t know.  
P: Have you stopped speaking to them?  
F: Not me. I get a thing (una cosita) in my stomach. But then, I auto-examine myself. If my 
business went down, and I’m not in the country I want to be in, and my children won’t be 
speaking Spanish anymore, well, I get something (una cosita) in my stomach. But then I 
say, well, I’m actually just fighting against something that I can’t—that’s bigger than me, 
so I calm down, because what the hell. 
Most others spoke instead of the distance they had taken from friends that supported the 
government; others about the tensions that had arisen amongst family members, where 
conversations about politics were prohibited to avoid confrontation. Not Francisco. He even 
watches Chavista news “to get their version.” Speaking to his optimistic Chavista friends 
 
31 No specific date is given for the first time this question was asked, i.e, they simply mention at the beginning 
of the crisis, which we suppose is the 2014 oil crash. 
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(whom he compares to solidarity activists) prompts a realisation about what he has lost—what 
he believes he has lost because people like his friends continue to support Chavismo. In the 
end, Francisco dismisses his gut wrench and resigns: it is a system he feels he cannot actually 
fight. He goes on to say that these Chavista friends would not risk leaving their parents in 
Venezuela if they encountered health issues—such hypocrisy: “If they want, we can have a 
chat about ideology over coffee, ideology with whiskey. But that’s it,” he says. 
Marcos is a particularly striking example of how this visceral anger at Chavismo can be taken 
to its extreme. Marcos, a 27-year-old brown Venezuelan arts graduate from Caracas, worked 4 
jobs before he left to Colombia in January 2017. One of those jobs was outsourced from the US, 
so he managed to earn in coveted US dollars although he tells me: “it wasn’t the salary of a 
lifetime, not at all. But it was a salary that allowed me to cover my basic needs.” Given other 
interviewees had mentioned they had faced difficulties in terms of xenophobia, I asked how 
he felt there. He insists:  
You’ll always have one or two people that are very closed minded, that stain a general 
vision of society. One or two xenophobes, one or another person that tries to trip you over, 
but it’s really not generalised, and it’s not the majority […] There are people who will say 
negative things so that you don’t get a certain job […] but it’s not because I’m Venezuelan, 
but because those people are bad people.  
Marcos does differentiate between a few isolated episodes and Colombians’ broader treatment 
of Venezuelans. Yet he easily stereotypes when I ask him about solidarity activists:  
Well… they are, look, they are so amoral, better—no. Because an amoral person is 
someone who does not know morality. They are immoral, because they understand 
morality and deny it. They are so immoral that on the 4th of February, a coup, where tons 
of people died. Where a minuscule little group of the armed forces decided to break the 
constitutional order of a country, perfectly able to campaign politically and run for the 
presidency (as he did do later on) […] For less, look, the country was not even in the tenth 
of the situation it is in now, and Chávez organised a coup. Then it was justifiable? Because 
he was from the left? Because he was a communist? No, come on. Really, don’t f**k me 
communists. Really. That is when you truly understand why Pérez Jiménez went around 
killing communists. Then came Human Rights and ‘oh well, no.’ But really, I can be really 
drastic, but after what has happened to Venezuela, you say, I get it. I get why people used 
to kill communists […] Its a plague. A disease. They are garbage, I mean they really must 
be eradicated. Whatever they touch they destroy. Look at Mexico, it hasn’t been six 
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months since López Obrador, and the economic indicators are decreasing, investment is 
decreasing, they have an oil crisis, a border crisis. 
Here Marcos is essentially explaining why he feels killing communists is justifiable. He’s 
infuriated by the double standards that solidarity activists show by pardoning Chávez’s coup 
but condemning one from the opposition—an act Marcos understands to immoral, as he 
describes it. 
His anger at these double standards leads him to suggest that killing all communists would be 
permissible. By sympathising with others who enacted these actions in the past, in this case 
Marcos Pérez Jiménez (although the dictator was known for torturing and killing opposition 
in general, not only communists), he is deferring responsibility of his thoughts to the past and 
to others, but in the process condoning and justifying his own thinking.  
Marcos’ ‘oh well, no’ (ay, bueno, no) suggests that there is a genuine choice there, that is, that 
we (in the name of human rights) decide to spare people’s lives out of kindness—not because 
killing communists is not justified.32 His tone is condescending of this kindness, purposefully. It 
shows a hint of regret at the fact that wanting to kill communists is seen as morally 
condemnable today. By highlighting the anachronism, he questions the current moral and 
human rights standards that have he believes, implicitly, failed to stop Venezuela’s 
destruction. 
Because he knows his thoughts are considered inappropriate, he admits to knowing “he can be 
very drastic.” But communists who have violated Venezuela’s national body, of which Marcos 
is a part (and here he includes me) need to be destroyed. ‘We’ are in Ahmed's (2004, 2) words, 
“a group of subjects who can identify themselves with the injured nation in this performance 
of personal injury.” What has happened to Venezuela justifies the extirpation of what he 
considers to be the underlying disease: communists. It is, then, a ‘moral’ duty to get rid of them; 
in other words, it ‘ought’ to be done because the pain of Venezuela’s economic decay and 
humanitarian crisis should not be tolerated, and should not spread. The appeal to ‘eradication’ 
 
32 I will return to this idea of human rights as hierarchical, useful for justifying violations of some in 
prejudice of others, in the next chapter. 
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for ‘universal good’ is not incidentally a central theme for philosophers who see its potential 
for violence, from Nietzsche to Adorno to Schmitt and Butler.  
Moreover, Marcos wants to eradicate communists, not communism. Eliminating the 
circulation of communist ideas in the first place is not considered: Marcos’ ire is directed at 
bodies, not ideas. The thought that eradication, mass global genocide, is impossible 
logistically, even if justifiable in his mind, is not considered in practical terms: it is a reaction 
to the pain felt, not by what has happened in Venezuela, but what ‘has been done’ to 
Venezuela. 
What Marcos is proposing is essentialising or to use Gramsci’s nomenclature, ‘hegemonising’: 
for Marcos, those who subscribe to communism are instantly unworthy of life—a dangerous 
logic that (of all people) Carl Schmitt recognised. Marcos’ own analogy of the ‘disease’ of 
communism, how it infects bodies, points to this. To an extent, these feelings parallel the 
contempt and hatred present in Islamophobia, ideas seen as diseases—contained in bodies—
as responsible for the suffering of entire body politics and other ‘healthy’ bodies.  
The consequences of war against, if not all of communism, at least Chavismo in Venezuela, 
would be an armed conflict with foreign intervention, given the opposition is not armed and 
the military have stood by President Maduro. Even if the government were to be annihilated 
physically, it is impossible to eradicate the ideas that sustain those who support Chavismo. In 
the best-case scenario, Venezuela would still have a parallel militia that would feel they have 
been robbed of their government. A state of semi-permanent civil unrest would ensue, even 
outright civil war, if the military were to split (although some of the interviewees felt that the 
current levels of homicide violence due to criminal activity, made it seem like they were 
already in a war). Marcos’ proposed elimination of communist bodies, for him the ‘source’ of 
Venezuela’s pain, justifies violence and partially alleviates his pain, while avoiding the 
cognitive load of thinking through what this would cost and its plausibility.  
This desire for annihilation is evidently an important aspect of the escalation of social conflict, 
and was luckily rare amongst interviewees, although the contempt that stems from a sense of 
injury, was not. Despite hesitation and varying ideas about foreign intervention, most were 
convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict to solve the country’s problems. 
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In chapter 6, Figure 9 showed a Facebook post that one interviewee, Fernando (the Australian-
Argentinean journalist), published in early in 2019. The commentary scoffs at the idea that the 
entire Venezuelan diaspora in New York looks white and upper-class. The last comment reads: 
“I’ve lost faith in Putin during recent years, but I’ll start supporting him if those Russian troops 
will start executing these Euro-settler m***r f*****s.” The comment was not, I stress, written by 
Fernando, it was part of the commentary on his post. I make note of it to show that this extreme 
annihilation discourse is not unique to Venezuelans that oppose the government, it lives in 
other side as well. 
A discourse of normalcy  
Venezuelan migrants claim living ‘normally’ has been made impossible in Venezuela—the 
implied causality is important, as it references the damage Chavismo has enacted on the 
nation—it’s part of their claim to its illegitimacy.33 Migrants felt they are either trapped in the 
normalised ‘abnormal’ or forced to leave. A nostalgia for what seemed ‘normal’ before the 
crisis, prompted the phrase ‘not normal’ to describe the situation that they left behind, the 
evidence of their claim to migrate.  
Eva, the thirty-year old brown Venezuelan in Madrid, admits that she was not struggling “too 
hard” living alone in Maracaibo (Venezuela’s second largest city, famous for its oil fields), 
before coming to Spain. Eva’s parents were, however, worried that she would get assaulted. It 
eventually happened one night when she was driving back to her home at 1:30 in the morning: 
she was stopped at gunpoint by a man who wanted her phone. She explains the garage door 
took more time than usual to open. She guessed: “that’s ok. It happened to me. I need to be 
more careful. I shouldn’t come back home so late […] Maybe I didn’t pay enough attention to 
[the robbery] because I didn’t want to leave,” she tells me. For her, the progressive realisation 
that none of this was ‘normal’ changed her mind:  
 
33  See chapter 4 and Raz’s (1986) conception of legitimacy as service. 
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What’s normal, you go to the supermarket, its 7, you get soap and get back home. No. It 
was going to one, and another, and another, and another, and another until you found it. 
And it was like, is it worth it? […] Because I might have had the money to live ok, but it was 
also that my parents were always worried. I wasn’t super badly off. But there were things—
it was something more personal. I wanted to be able to have—a tranquil, normal life. 
Most interviewees had in fact been mugged at least once. Francisco, who I mentioned has 
important Chavista friends, was even kidnapped. In recounting his experience of traveling 
back to visit Venezuela in mid 2019, he tells me:  
It’s not normal. So if I’ve got the option of being, what I’m going to say sounds harsh, but 
if I can be away from all this, I choose to be away. Yes, I can be judged. Yes. Sure. But it’s 
my choice. I want to walk. I want to be peaceful […] ‘Look, go, there’s everything, go to the 
supermarket and you’ll find everything.’ You’re lying to me. I’m not an idiot. My brother 
lives there, and he calls me every day, says there’s no toner to send me a letter. No ink. It’s 
not normal […] And if you lose your card? You’re f****d because there’s no plastic. I went 
to get mine because it was expired. [imitating a lady] ‘Sorry sir, no! We haven’t had plastic 
since 2017!’ [laughs] So it’s not normal. Economic war or not, it’s not normal. It’s not 
normal. 
Francisco repeats the phrase ‘not normal’ thirty-five times throughout the interview. For him 
leaving Venezuela is not really a choice: if you have an option you take it.34  
Cintia, a well-known Venezuelan concert pianist, left Venezuela as a teenager, thirty years ago, 
to pursue her musical career. She uses ‘normal’ instead to describe what is not ‘normal’ but 
has become part of Venezuela’s day to day: “I’ve just seen a friend who lost 9 kilos in one year. 
That’s quite normal. Losing 9 kilos at that time, was normal.” Venezuelans were in fact losing 
weight considerably in 2017, as described in chapter 2.  
 
34  Unable to sustain his livelihood in the UK, Francisco was forced to return to Venezuela a couple of months 
after our interview. 
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Jeison, a brown Venezuelan in his late thirties, in Mexico, trying to make it as a pop singer, 
describes it succinctly:  
You can watch them on YouTube, guys that went there, calculated the minimum wage, ate 
under those circumstances. They were robbed, some got sick, and demonstrated that it is 
impossible, unless you rummage through like a thousand things, to have a normal life in 
Venezuela. 
Forced migration 
It’s a forced migration. It’s not that we emigrate because when I was a boy I wanted to live 
in England, or I wanted to live in Japan. No. You’re migrating because you’re country, 
sadly, threw you out [imitating others speaking] ‘As a professional, I tell you, what you can 
earn here is enough for buying a pack of peanuts, so you decide, if you stay or…’ [returning 
to his voice] And well, you had to leave because you have another kind of—you want to 
grow as a person. 
Hector, a gynaecologist in his mid-thirties, now living in Chile (and working as a nurse because 
he has been unable to validate his medical degree) explains what he feels is a ‘forceful’ 
dismemberment—a feeling he uses to explain and justify his exile, and a feeling that 
underlines his sense of disempowerment. The idea that his aspirations are to blame is related 
to other interviewees’ want for normalcy. While others underline the impossibility of living 
Venezuela, Hector underlines how he feels wanting to improve his life chances is being 
criminalised in Venezuela. It also reflects an idea of other Venezuelans that is not immediately 
apparent: that those who stay have no aspirations, or are conformists and happy “to earn more 
than a box of peanuts”—a theme I referenced in the last chapter. Hector understands 
aspirations as a ‘right’—part of his human dignity. The possibility that other Venezuelans 
cannot develop, is not readily admitted or problematised. Because Hector is a gynaecologist, a 
profession understood as sacrificing in many respects, there is a sense of guilt he conveys from 
having ‘wanted more’ from his life, having left behind many in need. In this sense the idea that 
he has been ‘forced’ is perhaps a device that helps him cope with this guilt.  
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Similarly, Pablo, a baroque violinist in his late fifties who has been living in Japan for the past 
20 years, explains why he feels he has not been able to return, and how he ‘has been made’ to 
stay in Japan (where his wife is from): 
So I’ve been in Japan now exactly 20 years […] I had to stay here in Japan given the level 
of genocide and death of a country. Annihilated, trampled on, sequestered by the malign 
forces of a government, an absurd, cynical and bad regime basically. 
Pablo would have wanted to return to Venezuela, had it not been for the damage carried out 
by the ‘cynical and bad regime’—something out of his control. In a literal sense, had he wanted 
to, he could have of coursed returned, but it is the belief that he would be significantly worse 
off in Venezuela that ‘forces’ him to stay in Japan. 
Wilson, instead, underlines how he did not want to leave Venezuela ‘to beg.’ A professor of 
music at one of Venezuela’s important universities in the state of Carabobo, William 
completed both his bachelor’s and master’s degree in the US and returned to Venezuela to 
sing opera and teach classical singing. He finished his master’s at the prestigious New England 
Conservatory and was an eminence in the operatic world of Venezuela. He felt forced to leave 
to Perú where he was offered a post as a vocal coach, a bare two months before our interview 
in March 2019. Yet as he himself explains, his studies did not ‘save’ him from the road many 
Venezuelans, educated or not, decide to take: migration to another country in Latin America. 
He tells me: 
The disillusion that comes from knowing you have completed a number of degrees, have 
many years of experience, and have to beg, is a very depressing thing. I told my wife in 
December, it’s the first time I have to leave the country, not to my liking. Not to my liking 
or fancy, I’m leaving obliged to do so. Not because I want to. Not because I have a plan, a 
beautiful life abroad, but because it’s what I have to do, I can’t continue being here. I can’t 
continue being here.  
For Wilson, his degrees and experience, make begging (pidiendo limosma) profoundly 
depressing—almost shameful in his tone. His feelings reveal the extent to which Venezuelans 
admire studies abroad (especially in the Global North), tied to Wilson’s own idea of success. 
Now they are part of his sense of an even deeper failure, a downfall from what was a ‘higher’ 
place, compared to many. There is deep sadness inherent in the way he understands ‘having 
to’ leave versus ‘wanting to’ leave.  
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We can relate Wilson’s and Héctor’s feelings as a loss of a second basic psychological need, 
what self-determination theorists understand as competence: “experiencing opportunities to 
exercise, expand and express one’s capacities” (Ryan and Sapp 2009: 76). Because President 
Maduro and Chavismo control the state machinery, and there is an excessive use of force 
against protestors in demonstrations (UNHRC 2019) those who are against the government 
become disenfranchised from political power to the extent that they see leaving as the only 
way out of the government’s authority. Those that do not see themselves as part of Chávez’s 
people, have no place in the nation. The idea of being forced out is complementary to the 
feeling of being forced to stay inside—for César in the first quote of this chapter, the metaphor 
is being trapped. These feelings reflect a sense of impotence, what can even be interpreted as 
perceived oppression, experienced as a lack of opportunities and channels through which to 
voice demands. Again, taking from Self-Determination Theory (Deci and Ryan 2000) we could 
also say Venezuelan migrants have lost a second of their fundamental psychological needs, 
autonomy, defined as self-endorsement of one’s actions.35  
Frustration with opposition leaders 
Tied to this sense of forced migration and lack of autonomy and competence, is the idea that 
there is no coherent—or politically successful—opposition to Chavismo, able to hold 
Maduro’s power to account. Save for the international media’s ferocious campaign the 
opposition have no ’real’ or ‘positive’ political power in Venezuela, or a place where their views 
are represented and acted on.  
Eva is tired of reading about Venezuela because it is “more of the same,” she says. She 
references the support Guaidó received from the international community in early 2019, but is 
nonetheless invaded by a sense of ‘terrible hopelessness’, a hopelessness most interviewees 
shared: 
 
35 For a further discussion on STD see Ryan and Sapp (2009). 
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I think the fact is I’m sick of reading. Because it’s always more of the same. So now we’re 
advancing. Call me whatever you want, but I get—I have a feeling of terrible hopelessness. 
Because it’s just always the same. Everyone says—well this girl that I mention who is 
deputy for VP, this guy’s [Guaidó’s] party, she’s always saying ‘don’t lose hope it’s proven 
that after I don’t know how much time—the third month of protests everything crumbles’ 
and blah blah blah. But after seeing this guy with all the other politicians that have done 
exactly the same, it’s like, am I going to follow him? I have lost, really—I don’t have a lot 
of confidence. I thought he had a good language or something. But after seeing 
everything—then I saw him in a picture with Manuel Rosales [ex-governor of her home 
state], please! Manuel Rosales. No! With all those old politicians. For me it was like, really. 
[…] Yeah, I don’t trust any of them. I think the opposition in Venezuela now is just marred 
(viciada) and in the end it’s going to be the same. Everyone pushes their own interests.  
For César, the afro-Venezuelan interviewee, exiled opposition leaders actually help corrupt 
sectors from within the government launder their money (sanctioned abroad): 
Chavistas [in Venezuela] make a mess, but how do they take that money out of the 
country? They need to go through—get it out taking advantage of frontmen. The old rich 
kids […] There are a lot of people benefitting from the government [enchufados] that are 
mantuano [white-colonialist]. The people that have always been rich. They are the ones 
that set up financial structures for Chavistas abroad, because they are the ones that know 
the bankers, they are the ones who know the financial engineers that know how to handle 
these things abroad.  
The idea that part of the opposition wants President Maduro to stay because it has been 
lucrative for them, was insinuated by former Chavista and retired General Clíver Alcalá a year 
after the interview with César, when he was indicted by the Department of Justice for his 
involvement with what the US government terms ‘narco-terrorism’ (Manetto El País Marzo 30 
2020). As a young lecturer at Venezuela’s most important business school, the IESA, César 
taught some of the leaders of the companies involved in those scandals. In October 2018, news 
outlets were already publishing information on family members of exiled opposition leaders 
laundering at least one billion euros harnessed by corrupt means from Chavistas in charge of 
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)—Venezuela’s State oil company (Placer Economía Digital 
October 22 2018). The news was confirmed on the BBC more than a year later and some months 
after the interview with César (BBC News, December 2 2019).  
In a serious tone, César confesses: 
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Look, I’ll tell you something. You put me in a room or a hall and you give me permission 
to kill. I’m the executioner, and you give me a gun with two bullets, and you place Nicolás 
Maduro and Henry Ramos Allup [an opposition leader, former president of the National 
Assembly] in front of me, and I would shoot Henry Ramos Allup twice. Just like that. The 
people who have allowed this government and oxygenated this government to get to 
where it has, are the opposition, ok? 
César’s repugnance for opposition actors was not surprising. But the notion that he would 
shoot the opposition leader twice, was extremely revealing of the extent of his anger. Similarly, 
for Alicia, being opposed to the government does not mean she is convinced by a leader of the 
opposition: 
I don’t feel identified with, in fact, the traditional political parties AD, COPEI, all that, died. 
We don’t even remember them. And this new wave of parties, say Voluntad Popular 
[Guaidó’s party], Avancemos. We don’t even remember them, we’re not conscious of them. 
I’m not aware of them. I only see faces, I see options. And of course, seeing they’re always 
suppressed by the government, the situation makes me become opposed. I do feel I’m of 
the opposition, but I’m not identified with anyone in particular. Not even when Capriles 
was really popular [opposition presidential candidate in 2013 against Maduro]. But no. I 
never felt like I was of Capriles or anything like that.  
Alicia’s sides with those opposed to the government in seeing how “they’re always suppressed 
by the government”—here we presume she’s referring to the banning of opposition leaders, 
and broader protest repression. In effect, nothing about the opposition excites her, or is 
meaningful to her, even when, as I’ve noted in chapter 2, a lot of their discourse is in fact shared. 
Wilson points instead at Guaidó’s lack of ‘real’ power, and the opposition’s inability to grasp 
the armed forces loyalty to Chavismo: 
Having about 50 odd countries recognise this man, Guaidó, is not that useful, right? 
Because yes, he is recognised, but what’s happening in the country? The armed forces—
that was the hope of the 23 of February [2019], that the armed forces would stand up 
because he proposed an amnesty for the military. I guess they thought that many would 
turn their back on the government, but it ended up being only a few and of lesser rank. 
Once opposition leaders are accused of corruption, but what is worse, of assisting Chavistas in 
their pilfering of the state’s coffers, they have lost all moral ground—perhaps why most 
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interviewees are entirely disenchanted with the opposition as a political faction. The ‘position’ 
that unites migrants is a stance against the undemocratic and authoritarian practices of the 
government, hence why I feel it is important to define their unity on their belief in Maduro’s 
illegitimacy, and not as a ‘political identity’ tied to a set of policies or politicians. Migrants were 
opposed to the government but have no one they felt represents them, or someone they 
admire—the way solidarity activists admire Chávez—although they did circulate ideas about 
intervention that are strongly tied to the discourse of opposition politicians (as discussed in 
chapter 2). 
It is difficult to gauge how migrants’ positions towards political actors relates to that of 
Venezuelans in Venezuela, but we know more polls conducted in 2021 have shown that 45 
percent would prefer a candidate that is neither Guaidó nor Maduro. The fact that street 
discontent, and protests have decreased since 2017, also hints at this widespread political 
apathy.   
Hope in the Alternative to Neoliberalism: Learning 
from Venezuela 
In writing about his reasons for joining the Abraham Lincoln Brigades to fight in 1930s Spain, 
as a young black communist, James Yates writes in 1989:  
There, the poor, the peasants, the workers and the unions, the socialists and the 
communists, together had won an election against the big landowners, the monarchy and 
the right wingers in the military. It was the kind of victory that would have brought Black 
people to the top levels of government if such an election had been won in the USA (Yates 
1989: 112). 
Solidarity activists’ discourse about how the world ‘ought to be’ shares a striking resemblance 
to the passion with which Yates, a young black man from Quitman, Mississippi, writes about 
the justice inherent in defeating those who are—he feels, wrongfully—powerful.  
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Solidarity activists see in the Chávez and Maduro governments an alternative to the global 
hegemony of neoliberal doctrine against which they themselves feel ‘powerless.’ Many 
activists spoke specifically of the hope the country elicited after the fall of the Soviet Union:  
For many of us who are militant in the political left, Chávez offered hope—more than 
anything because he was coming at a time when neoliberalism was absolutely hegemonic, 
it had no ideological contestation in the world, save for small societies, such as Zapatismo, 
for instance. So the Bolivarian Revolution was the tipping point, that came to tell us that 
there are alternatives, that you can take power, and use it in a different way, and resist 
neoliberalism and build another alternative coming from social movements, popular 
power, and helping the people. Above all, I was drawn to the idea of how the figure of 
Chávez brought into Venezuelan politics and society thousands of people who had been 
alienated throughout the twentieth century.  
Here Martín, a young Spanish activist in his mid-thirties, local leader in Podemos, describes a 
very powerful hope. Again, the idea that Chávez was constructing an alternative with ‘the 
people’ as its central political subject, an inclusive project formed of those marginalised by 
Venezuela’s ancien régime, resurfaces as his moral ideal.  
Similarly, Victoria, a Spanish activist in her late thirties (who travelled on foot through South 
America), explains her version of this new alternative: 
We were coming from a period, after the fall of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, where the 
dominant propaganda was, well, socialism already failed. Capitalism can be better or 
worse, but there’s no alternative. That the leader of the political movement in a country, 
that was also the president, and who had been re-elected god knows how many times, 
could say that we needed to head towards socialism, really caught our attention in Europe. 
Well, all these things established a really deep connection in our movement, activists and 
others, towards the figure of Chávez. Although we obviously always insisted that our 
solidarity was not with the government—in fact, even then we criticised some of the 
government’s decisions—our solidarity was with the Bolivarian movement, and Chávez 
was an important part of that but not the only one. 
The fact that Chávez emerges from this picture as an elected official—many times victorious 
elected official—calling for socialism (although I note this was much later in 2006), is 
something Victoria feels caught the eyes of Europe.  
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For José, more specifically, Venezuela stood in contrast to the austerity that was taking place 
in Europe: 
A country that invests a ton of money in health, education, extending university education, 
whilst what we had here was in fact the opposite: educational spending cuts, the 
introduction of university fees for the time, health spending cuts, all that. And then the 
workers’ control movement caught our attention. It was not a government that was simply 
applying a series of progressive politics, and that in Europe we were in fact applying the 
opposite ones, but also that this was a really large grassroots based social movement, of 
workers taking factories, farmers taking land, and taking the lead from below. 
I note that health spending in particular, was inexplicably low in Venezuela, almost 10 percent 
of GDP less than Cuba, as described in chapter 2—José seems to be moved by Chavismo’s will 
to act for an expansion of well-being, what Coronil (2011) feels is the defining feature of the 
‘Left,’ and by the broad bottom-up coalitions that sustain Chavismo.  
In passionate language, Perla—an Argentinean academic and activist in her mid-forties—
describes how she sees Chávez’s Bolivarian project inaugurating Latin America’s turn towards 
the left—what scholars have dubbed ‘the pink tide’: 
More than anything once the brutal offensive of the coup of 2002 and the bosses’ lockout 
of PDVSA is over, we could say that starting 2002, 2003, the revolutionary process deepens. 
It turns towards the post-capitalist horizon, with socialism at its horizon, and it opens a 
process of hope, a vocation of power for the political and social processes of resistance. It 
opens that road to say, well, we have to dispute, there are possibilities to dispute, even with 
elections, the power of government […] It open an impressive perspective in Latin 
America.  
Perla’s ‘process of hope’ sees Chavismo as an opportunity for resistance movements, those 
oppressed, to dispute, and take over, the power of government—this being a more just (and 
moral) way in which power should be enacted, that, as I described in the last chapter.  
Sahas underlines his admiration for the ‘semblance of equality’ he feels Venezuela has 
achieved: 
I often, get told about all the—‘where has socialism ever worked?’ And they point to 
Venezuela as a kind of failed project. But, you know, when you look at the things that it 
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has achieved, just in terms of bringing some semblance of equality to society, I think it's so 
important. And sometimes I give the example of the 1917 revolution in Russia and things 
they achieved immediately in the aftermath of the revolution. But, you know, we don't 
even need to look that far, we can look at Venezuela. And despite the criticisms I 
mentioned earlier, in terms of what Chávez could have done better, they did have a 
massive impact. And it tells you the kind of effects we can have in society, you know, with 
socialist ideas and with organising. 
Sahas’ ideas are in line with Bobbio (1994) (but also Lukes 2003) widespread understanding of 
the Left as defined by the importance it places on equality. As Lakoff (1996) notes, and as I hope 
to argue on the basis of this research, this understanding tends to overlook the fact that equality 
is a moral value. “Bringing some semblance of equality” is fundamental in Sahas’ 
understanding of politics, and it is why he values Chavismo. Sahas presents Chavismo’s push 
for equality—broadly understood as social and economic justice—as his ideal, or what many 
might see as a utopian vision of what ought to be.  
That Western countries could learn from Venezuela’s ‘experiments’ is a related idea that was 
also prevalent. As Fernando in Australia tells me: 
Venezuela as different as it is to Australia, always provided us when we were doing 
solidarity work here with some concrete examples of how things could be done 
differently[…] But there's no reason why some of their very simple policies like, you know,  
nationalising oil or redistributing oil wealth can’t be useful for other countries, or at the 
very minimum show that these are a possibility. Whereas in Australia the discourse is like, 
I think in most of the world, the discourse is that there is just no alternative to the free 
market. 
Similarly, Chase, a white American Sandinista in his late sixties:  
In the 1990s the Sandinistas lost the election in Nicaragua. And of course, a couple of years 
before that, the Soviet Union collapsed. So, the US was the only superpower, and 
everything seemed to be going its way. And then we had this really interesting guy coming 
to our consciousness and Venezuela starting these really interesting experiments in 
popular democracy and economic justice. So yeah, Venezuela took on an important—as 
an inspiration to those of us who were working on the movement, including me.  
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What Fernando and other solidarity activists seem to love about ‘Venezuela’ (although they 
really mean Chavismo, as I have explained) is its discursive, very open, contestation of 
neoliberalism against the presumed inescapability of free-market capitalism. As other activists 
have noted, Chavismo’s timing is important: it came at a moment when the world seemed 
determined to crush any ‘idealised’ aspirations towards what solidarity activists understand as 
a more just, and moral, political system.  
I note Nordic countries never surface in their imaginaries, the way Cuba does. The Guardian in 
2014, suggested a majority of us (rather naïvely) believe them to be ‘utopia’ in terms of their 
social indicators, and of how we know they rate their happiness levels (Booth The Guardian 
January 27 2014). Solidarity activists, it seems, simply dismiss these countries ideologically: 
although heavily regulated and very well unionised, Nordic countries are still controlled by 
private investment. I note this is a bit different for Norway and its oil industry (and the 
companies Equinor, its state oil firm, run), but most solidarity activists see these countries as 
‘reformist’ or social democratic, not truly socialist (or more explicitly Marxist). I have pointed 
previously that solidarity activists seem less interested in the pragmatisms that surround 
achieving equality. They are more concerned with the discursive elements of combatting 
imperialism and broader geopolitical inequality. Venezuela’s and Cuba’s anti-imperialist fight 
against the US, and Chávez’s policies confronting domestic elites, are at the centre of their 
proverbial ‘fight against injustice.’ Nordic countries perform very well by all accounts, yet they 
are not engaged in practices of radically overturning power (so central to populism) which 
makes them ‘uninteresting’ in solidarity activists’ eyes—although we could argue they are of 
course heavily invested in climate change. 
Fearing the downfall of Chavismo 
The hope for the survival of Venezuela’s socialist project, also shares a fear of its 
dismemberment. For Abdo (the British-Sudanese journalist whose father, an academic and 
opposition figure in Sudan, was once detained for his affiliation to communism) Venezuela’s 
success is pressing:  
I always felt that if they don't allow Venezuela to succeed, then they'll do the same to the 
socialist system in Sudan.  
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For solidarity activists, there is a sense that all peoples in the process of combatting privilege, 
will be attacked—if Venezuela loses that struggle, sustaining socialism will again be 
undermined historically. Jack sees his passion for ‘defending Venezuela’ as stemming from 
this:  
What I say to people is, if you want socialism, you have to fight for it. […] That's why I say 
we have to defend Venezuela, not because we've been to Venezuela, we think the people 
are very nice, but because have to defend it on the very same principals of what we're 
fighting for. Because how can we justify fighting for what we say is socialism, when we're 
not prepared to actually stand up when it gets tough […] And it is in that struggle in which 
I find my passion for defending Venezuela, because one day that could very well be us. 
That could be us, isolated, under threat, an economy under siege because we said we want 
to take it into our own hands.  […] One of us could be labelled as a Maduro if we get into 
power, when we actually start saying, ‘we're going to take back from the ruling class what 
they have taken from us.’ […] He is still upholding his end of the bargain. We have to 
uphold our end. Because if we don't, we leave him to be the victim of, he could be in many 
ways, another Salvador Allende, like in Chile, or you know, Granada, Nicaragua, if we 
don't actually stand in solidarity with these people. 
The ghost of the Chilean case looms large for solidarity activists around the world who 
underline the parallels of Chávez’s fate with the hatred the US felt towards Allende’s Chile 
(see Figure 16). As I have noted in chapter 3, many Venezuela solidarity activists were involved 
with Chile solidarity in the sixties or are Chilean exiles themselves. For Perla, as an 
Argentinean, there is a broader fear of a return of genocidal right-wing dictatorships: 
So here we are, defending her [Venezuela], and it is the strategic battle of our time. If 
Venezuela falls, the dark night will be upon us in Latin America, of the hand the 
Bolsonaros, the Macris, the Piñeras, I was going to say Uribe, because we all know that the 
person who governs Colombia is a puppet, all the heirs of the worst of our history, the 




Figure 16. Post by VSC on their Facebook profile, stressing their position against both US and Venezuelan 
military intervention. 
Living at the fringe of the international order 
Already at the turn of this century, sixteen years before Trumpism and Brexit, Chantal Mouffe 
(2000) was speaking of the disaffection towards democratic institutions, and the 
disenchantment with traditional political parties. This as she suggests, has seen the advance of 
many extreme right-wing parties, and “a marked cynicism about politics and politicians [that] 
has a very corrosive effect on popular adhesion to democratic values.” She begins her short 
book, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism with a phrase that would resonate with most 
solidarity activists in this research: “As this turbulent century draws to a close, liberal 
democracy seems to be recognised as the only legitimate form of government. But does that 
indicate its final victory over its adversaries, as some would have it?” (Mouffe 2000, 1). For 
Mouffe (2000), liberalism is wary of popular participation. She admits very few dare to openly 
challenge the ‘liberal’ democratic model, suggesting that part of the reason for this is the 
deeply seated idea that individuals are motivated by individual interests and not a moral belief 
that they should do ‘what is best for the community.’ 
As activists for the Venezuelan government, the stance solidarity activists take forces them to 
feel they live at the margins of the international order of this liberal democratic model, 
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standing for their own moral beliefs. There is a sense they are isolated and misunderstood—a 
feeling I argue is akin to Venezuelans’ forced migration, experienced as reduced political voice 
and autonomy. 
My purpose here is descriptive, in other words to show how interviewees view themselves as 
global outliers because of their rejection of the ‘liberal’—that for them has resulted in elite-
governed—democracy model. As I have discussed in chapter 4, Urbinati (2019) and Bobbio 
(1987) convincingly argue that such a distinction between ‘liberal’ democracy and democracy 
is false. I argue such distinction is indeed false, but only in a theoretical sense; it exists in the 
way interviewees dismiss violations of civil and political rights, and prioritise what they feel is 
a more legitimate manner of enacting policy: for them, through the empowerment of ‘the 
people’ more directly.  
Victoria, a Spanish documentarist and filmmaker in her late thirties, who spent six months 
with different indigenous communities in South America, backpacking all the way from Chile 
to Venezuela, describes a sense of under-appreciation of her work. Her support of the leftist 
governments of Latin America—and more specifically the Venezuelan government, 
internationally seen as a dictatorship—has meant her filmmaking, her experiences with 
indigenous communities, and her desire to document their struggles, are not taken seriously:  
People around us know what we do, and know that we are attached to certain voices, and 
that we have, well, direct information about the places. And when they ask us, specifically 
about Venezuela, they ask without an interest in learning. So, they maintain their position, 
regardless of what you say to them, or tell them. I feel that this is also somewhat of an 
aggression, because when human beings stop learning, or do not open themselves to what 
others can say, we stunt the opportunity for growth. In that sense, I find that we are 
sometimes—they don’t tell us directly, but people close to us, obviously we have a lot of 
family members that are not on our—on the shore that we have decided to be on, and from 
there, although they love us, there is a certain ‘you’re wasting your time’ […] To be frank, 
those of us who support and are in solidarity with other struggles, above all struggles that 
are stigmatised, in some way our work is belittled. It is true that there is an undermining 
of our ideas. 
For Victoria, her family and friends’ unwillingness to change their views (in light of her 
personal experience of the continent and Venezuela) is a form of aggression. Victoria then tells 
me she does not mind constructive criticism that opens debate, but what she receives online 
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(commentary on her blog, for example) is vitriol: insults that attack her and her partner 
personally.  
Solidarity activists have often been attacked for their views on Venezuela, either on social 
media, or when organising a protest in solidarity with President Maduro or Chávez—no doubt 
in response to how the Venezuelan government is presented in the international media. In one 
case, anti-Chavista Venezuelan migrants attended an event one of the interviewees had 
organised and started talking over his panel. And yet, most solidarity activists did not feel that 
these types of attacks were the main difficulty involved in organising campaigns or defending 
the revolution. For José at least, the principal difficulty was finding the funds necessary to 
support the work of the campaign:  
We organised an event around May, June perhaps […] [Venezuelans] came into the event 
and tried to stop it from happening. Some were seated in the first row, and I was there 
talking, and they were quite violent, filming, and well, it didn’t amount to more […] but I 
would not say that’s the principal difficulty we’ve faced. The principal difficulty has been 
precisely that of organising a movement that does not have financial means and stuff, only 
the support of a few activists.  
When I ask Fernando, our Australian-Argentinean journalist, if he has been a victim of 
aggression from Venezuelans more specifically, he tells me that for him it is harder to deal with 
those in his own continent: 
The hardest thing for us is most of the time explaining to people where Venezuela is, and 
then when, you know, it really erupts in Venezuela, having to, then all of a sudden, 
everyone who a week before didn't know where Venezuela was, is now an expert wanting 
to tell us ‘ah but how can you support what's going on in Venezuela?’ And it's like, well, 
because we've been following it for the last decade, you know, you didn't know where it 
was last week—you thought it was a piece of fruit. And now you're on my Facebook page 
telling me you know why I'm wrong on Venezuela. So that's, I think that's really been the 
hardest thing that we face. 
Fernando is again suggesting that he knows more about Venezuela than the others who 
criticise his views. In saying they thought it was a piece of fruit, he is questioning the validity 
of claims he feels are parroted from the international media’s narrative on Venezuela. 
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For Mack, the American TeleSUR journalist, anti-communist sentiment in the US has been 
particularly problematic for him and his work:  
Any identification with socialism in general, or any existing socialist project or movement 
somewhere, it’s definitely like a black mark on you. Within the movement and within just 
general work. But you know, that's really changed in the past—really the Bernie Sanders 
phenomenon, socialism can be talked about in an open way. It really is a dramatic shift 
from everything that I'm used to. So, I think there are different sides of it. Of course, there 
is the ‘within the movement’ type thing, but in general in the media, it definitely has, in 
terms of as a journalist, you're less likely to be touched or respected, supposedly, if you are 
supporting governments that the rest of the media is calling dictatorships. […] And then 
there's been, within a progressive media landscape and things like that, it’s like harder to 
get on the big platform, or have your work respected. It’s more like people are scared to 
touch the issue, right? There's a lot of self-censorship in the United States and so there's 
less people that are like, it's great to say, ‘yeah I support this revolution,’ ‘I support this 
government because people don't want to.’ You feel that there are things that are not going 
to come from that, so there's few of us that aren't scared to do that. So, it brings all these 
other—you get kind of cast-off certain things because of it. 
Mack portrays how supporting the revolution requires a certain courage. Others that are also 
a part of the progressive landscape in the US, are not willing to be cast-off from the main media 
outlets simply because they hold a particularly controversial political position on Venezuela.36 
Like Victoria, and Martín, Mack speaks of a resulting career-wise stigmatisation. He sees his 
support for the Chávez and Maduro governments as a ‘black mark’ that casts him off certain 
work, but more importantly, makes it hard to have his work respected.  
Another important film documentarist, which most solidarity activists admire, Pedro, 
describes how, in practice, this relegates him to the fringes of the media: 
I mean obviously I think there is a price you pay professionally for not holding the line on 
Venezuela, and I'll tell you there was sort of the possibility of making that first film in 2009 
 
36 I come back to this feeling of ‘doing good’ or fighting ‘for good’ in the next chapter. See also chapter 3 and 
the last section on the deontology of solidarity. 
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with a major broadcaster[…] to make a kind of, what I would consider a kind of really 
shoddy two dimensional piece, investigating Chavez's link to Hezbolla, and the kind of 
sensationalist kind of stuff that Venezuela has—the kind of stuff that's given regularly on 
Venezuela […] I think I've definitely given up financial rewards. I think if I had a much 
more hostile opinion on the government, I think I would be able to get commissions much 
more easily with a major broadcaster.  
Most of Pedro’s films are accessible to a wide audience online, at no charge. It is the sense his 
work is refuted by major broadcasters that makes him and these solidarity activists, journalists 
and filmmakers, harbour great distrust of the press. They see themselves as outliers fighting 
against the international narrative from a very fringe-corner of the world, which makes their 
work immensely more meaningful to them. 
By listing the ‘small groups’ present at Maduro’s inauguration, Andy in his early seventies, also 
spells out the fringe nature of his political position: 
And I was in Venezuela for the inauguration of Maduro. Sinn Féin was the only other 
major European Party which was present at the inauguration. There was no—there were 
some people from Mélenchon, France Insoumise. And there were some people from the 
Basque Country. But no other major party. Yeah, there was an Italian communist, I mean, 
there were small groups. 
For one young male activist, this had an impact on his political career—I refrain from 
providing his pseudonym to preserve his anonymity. He was made to step down from his 
placement on the party’s candidate list because, according to him, his Instagram was a liability: 
other party members were afraid the media would use the way he openly vouched for 
Maduro’s government to discourage votes for the party. 
Ignacio, the young Spanish activist who spoke of the way he was racialised in Venezuela, 
explains how this ideological isolation can be ‘attractive’ to some on the left: 
You realise that the revolution, as an organic system, is capable of transforming the 
concerns and curiosities that you have had to nurture isolating yourself from people, 
reading rambling (farragosos) PDFs written by Enver Hoxha at 4 in the morning, arguing 
with really marginal people, that in the end only adopt a leftist stance, to be different from 
other people, but not really by revolutionary virtue.  
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For Ignacio, Chávez’s revolution transformed what is generally seen as very niche leftist 
intellectual thought, into open popular debate. He mentions reading the little-known 
twentieth-century Albanian Marxist-Leninist head of state, Enver Hoxha, and uses the word 
farragoso to denote the thorny, controversial, but also stale nature of the texts he would be 
forced to read to quench his thirst for revolutionary literature. Turning to the left in order to 
seek distance from the ‘pack’ is inauthentic to him. What constitutes ‘revolutionary virtue’ is 
unclear, but we can presume it stands for the will to turn an underclass majority into 
protagonists of the political system.37 It is clear Ignacio feels (or wants to feel) even more 
isolated than he supposes he would be if he were simply from the extreme left.  
Even if Ignacio disregards those that want to differentiate themselves for the sake of it, their 
pull to the extremes is, in fact, fighting what we can understand as ‘sterile politics.’ It stems 
from a sense of dissatisfaction with the current Western political system, and counters a 
politics that lacks Schmitt’s impelling friend-enemy precept. It is in openly antagonising the 
‘norm’ that their position acquires meaning and significance—a point that highlights the 
appeal of moral populist politics (from both the extreme right and left) too often overlooked.  
Conclusions 
Venezuelan migrants feel that the opinions of solidarity activists directly negate their lived 
experiences of the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. They argue non-
Venezuelans cannot really ‘know’ what is happening because they have not lived through the 
crisis. But for Venezuelan migrants it is not simply national or ethnic belonging that grants the 
‘right’ to form an opinion on the country: it is being directly affected by the decision-making of 
the state, and living under its authority. Support for Maduro from non-Venezuelans is, for 
them, invalid, but what is more, it is ‘wrong’ because it is condescending, an international 
apologia of sorts, of the government’s crimes against humanity. 
 
37 See Brewer's (1999) “optimal distinctiveness model of social identity” discussed in chapter 4, that explains 
the allure of setting oneself, or the group we belong to, apart. 
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This ‘narrative appropriation’ is seen as immoral, in part, because it is uttered from the 
privilege of the Global North. However, those from the Global North that share Venezuelan 
migrants’ opinions (Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, among others), are praised, not questioned. 
This contradiction suggests that what Venezuelans find egregious is not the fact that solidarity 
activists hold an opinion without having experienced the crisis, as they want to argue; it is the 
fact that supporting Maduro’s government challenges and overtly denies their experience and 
understanding. It is only therefore ‘wrong.’ 
Denouncing solidarity activists and saying that they have no claim to an opinion, responds to 
a moral logic that serves to position their own group above Chavismo. This is parallel to how 
solidarity activists are not averse to the idea of Cuban, Russian or Chinese intervention, to help 
protect the government of Maduro, even though they are viscerally against American 
intervention. Or how they support Chávez’s coup in 1992, even though they vehemently 
condemn the opposition for being anti-democratic. These are parochial, not true moral claims 
as discussed in chapter 4. 
The chapter shows, moreover, that both groups display a loss of political voice, or what taking 
from Self-Determination Theory, psychologists understand as a loss of autonomy (Nietzsche’s 
‘powerlessness’). Solidarity activists feel that the media narrative (and the neoliberal order) is 
completely slighted against them, and that this has consequences for their careers; Venezuelan 
migrants feel they have been denied participation in their country’s political system, which 
leads to migration, or self-exile—feelings that again contribute to an understanding of undue 
power being exerted on them, and harbour Nietzsche’s ressentiment. The conception of ‘the 
powerful’ remains. For Venezuelan migrants, it is Chavismo as the political elite; for solidarity 








Chapter 9. Battling for ‘good’ 
The moral work of solidarity 
Solidarity activists support the government of Maduro when they stand to gain nothing 
political or monetary from their support, and even despite the fact they are ostracised online 
because of it. They feel it is their duty to defend or speak for those that seem especially 
vulnerable in Venezuelan society and for the government that seems to represent them. Most 
solidarity activists referred to this metaphoric battle—this fighting for Venezuela, although 
again I note, they mean Chavismo). The idea of fighting for “what is ‘right’” is a moral quest that 
grants meaning to their work.  
Damien, Russian-Australian journalist in his mid-thirties, is not deterred by the vitriol he 
receives online—on the contrary: 
I sometimes wish I did more, because you know, I kind of like that—how to say—how do 
I put this nicely? The more of my opponents I anger, the more I feel like I'm doing the right 
thing.  
Damien is encouraged by the anger of those he purports to be battling against. His words touch 
on the increased self-confidence (or ‘ego-boost’) that comes from feeling ‘morally superior’ to 
his ‘opponents,’ or put differently, from upholding his sense of dignity against the way his 
ideals are undermined by the mainstream.  
Andy, on the other hand, in his early seventies (who had done more than 15 interviews for 
Argentinean television after the media erroneously suggested he had predicted the 
devaluation of the peso in the early 2000s) seems far less attracted to the fight:  
Oh, I'm not driven by reward. No, no, no. I'm driven by guilt. I'm driven by guilt. I just feel 
something has to be done. It's moral. Yeah, I'd rather be on the beach. It's not rewarding at 
all. It’s [pause] it's scary. Because you feel individually responsible […] What is great, you 
know, the unexpected rewards, are the friendship and the friendships you form because 
you're fighting for a common cause.  
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Sahas also refers to meeting “people standing up for what’s right”—this common cause: 
First, is that it’s always great to see people standing up for what’s right, basically, and 
through—I mean, more recently, obviously—through participating in demonstrations 
around what's going on in Venezuela right now. And opposing our governments’ push 
forward, I’ve met some really inspiring activists. And yeah, I think generally, when people 
seeing people connecting the dots between what our government is doing abroad, what 
they’re doing domestically—you know, questions of imperialism—I think that’s very 
important.  
Again, the nature of this deontology is felt as actively supporting and speaking for the 
government of Maduro abroad, in other words, trying to counteract the prevailing media 
narrative regarding what is happening in Venezuela on social media, or as I suggested in 
chapter 3, granting that ‘external validation.’ Sahas conveys a naïveté about the power of 
networking Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest is characteristic of transnational activists. 
Embedded in this deontology of solidarity, is a converse idea of standing against what is 
‘wrong.’ Ignacio mentioned racism, as I discussed in chapter 6; Sahas mentions imperialism.  
For many solidarity activists this will to ‘fight for good’ is intricately sown to their lived 
experiences, i.e. the experiences that they feel have shaped their understanding and 
interpretation of politics—what Hochschild (2016) terms their ‘deep stories.’ Liesel, the young 
member of the transgender community, tells me:  
I got really stuck in because I wanted something to fight for, and I became convinced—I 
wasn't convinced of the ideas of Marxism at the beginning—because I don't think anyone 
is, you can only convince yourself through study. And then events will also educate you. 
You know, so I read the theory, I was convinced of it. 
Liesel then describes their former high-school’s situation, as part of the fundamental events of 
their life that educated them:  
We live in this era where it’s obvious that something is going really, really horribly wrong. 
Well, capitalism hasn't been progressive for 100 years now. […] There's this like a terminal 
crisis, and its being reflected in the way that capitalists don't let that crisis bite into their 
own profits—they sell it back to workers, they sell it back as a gig economy, they sell it back 
as precarious work. And austerity. I was also going to school when I was 17, that had a 60 
percent budget cut […] One of the teachers was sacked halfway through the year and we 
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didn't have a replacement teacher, so I finished my sociology A level through self-study. I 
think this is important because I want to outline why a young 17-year-old would choose to 
dedicate hours and hours of their life to socialism. On a very, very serious basis […] At my 
school we had, I think it was the highest suicide rate in the country. These are all 
reflections of the crisis. There was an awful lot of LGBT people in my school, including 
me, there were 5 homeless LGBT people in my year. […] And there was no money to do 
anything about it […]  They went into a student meeting with our head of student support, 
and our head of student support said, ‘What do you want me to do? Magic you a house? 
Because there's nothing that can be done’.  
Like other activists, Liesel references the very real impact austerity has had on their life—and 
their sense of its injustice. Liesel explicitly underlines this as the reason for why a 17-year-old 
in high school would commit so fervently to socialism. That capitalism was not working for 
everyone seems to follow from the severe lack of funding and the very inability to afford basic 
housing experienced by fellow LGBT classmates. These events shaped Liesel’s understanding 
of the political world—and of what ought to be, Liesel’s own moral systems and priorities, in 
very powerful ways.  
For Mack, a young white American journalist for TeleSUR (having just returned from fighting 
in the Iraq war) it was Chávez’s speech in the UN that deeply resonated with him. Chávez 
expressed something inside him that he was not able to articulate himself: 
So, I got out of the army 2005. I had been in the Iraq war, the invasion of Iraq—this had 
been under the Bush administration. So, I was someone who thought I was going to be in 
the military my whole life. And then the Iraq war and the Bush era sort of blew that all up 
in smoke. And so I got out of the army really angry at Bush, at the government, at the 
military, and all this stuff for, you know, starting that war, and having all these bad things 
happen to people I knew, and the Iraqi people. And I was young, like 22, so I had all this 
rage and anger particularly at George W. Bush because he was the idiot that sent us and 
all that stuff. And I just like see this speech, at the UN, of this guy Chávez calling Bush the 
devil, and I was like, who is this guy? This is awesome. And it just resonated with me so 
much and I was like so mad that no one was even confronting Bush and all that. So it really 
just began as that: it was like I saw Chávez standing up to Bush saying what I believed to 
be the truth, and he was expressing it in a way that I couldn't at the time. 
Mack’s experience gave him deep reason to question how US foreign policy is enacted: who 
he feels benefits from it, and who suffers at expense of its reach. The rage he felt at G. W. Bush 
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was expressed by Chávez’s bold speech—not incidentally, one of the most memorable (or 
crazy, depending on the source) United Nations speeches in history (Keating 2009; The 
Telegraph September 29 2015). This deep impression of Chávez coloured Mack’s understanding 
of the Venezuelan conflict. More broadly, Mack’s personal experience in Iraq, and his anger at 
Bush at being sent there, conditioned the way he understood politics and power (both domestic 
and foreign) and shaped the meaning he gives his current support for the Bolivarian 
government. It seems only natural that Chavismo’s political project would resonate with his 
ideals. To extricate himself from this position becomes increasingly difficult (as described by 
Bourdieu): it starts to determine the way he views the opposing sides—in terms of ‘bad’ (racist, 
undemocratic, allied with US interests) and ‘good’ (focused on ‘the people’, brave). 
In trying to explain one of the things that he admires most about the Bolivarian Revolution, 
Tim mentions the ‘Barrio Adentro’ missions: ambulatories, headed by Cuban doctors, installed 
in the hardest to reach areas of the Venezuelan barrios, discussed in chapter 2. He had come 
to Venezuela to investigate them when he visited for the first time in 2002 (Tim has been such 
a number of times, he cannot remember how many altogether):  
So we stopped off, we saw one of these Cuban clinics and it was part of the Barrio Adentro 
program […] And I stopped and I went in, and because my Spanish isn't very good, talked 
to the guy, he was called Dr. Brito, and he was a young guy, mid-twenties, very young. And 
I went in, and I said, I'd like to talk, I'm from Britain, I just wanted to know whether it was 
possible to have a chat with a doctor. ‘Oh, enfermo! setea setea’ [Tim means they told him to 
sit down, ‘siéntese’]. I said ‘ok’, and literally within—and you know how long it takes to wait 
in Britain. I phone up can't get a doctor’s appointment here for like three weeks. So like 
what's the point? I've either cured myself or I'm dead. Or I've gotta phone an ambulance. 
Walked in. Literally within seconds Dr. Brito appears, and says, ‘Hi! I'm Dr. Brito, what's 
wrong with you?’ So I said, ‘No, I want to talk to you and ask you a few questions’ […] So I 
said, ‘ok, my first question is I've just walked in off the streets. I'm a tourist, I'm just a visitor, 
yeah. I've got dollars, in my hand. How much would this cost, for a consultation if I did 
one?’ He said ‘no, it’s absolutely free.’ I said, ‘free for me as a tourist?’ He said, ‘here in 
Venezuela, the only qualification for treatment is that you're a human being.’ And I was so 
moved by that. Here was this guy who was going to give this western tourist a free 
consultation, without me having to produce any proof documentation, insurance, and the 
only qualification for this treatment was that I was a human being. 
Tim was deeply moved by the fact that he was going to receive, as a western tourist, a free 
medical consultation. He is painfully aware that in his own (much wealthier) nation, Britain, 
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he would not be granted such a consultation—a Venezuelan tourist in his country would not 
be able to access medical care without incurring in costs. In the case of Barrio Adentro, Tim 
points at a society should all aspire to, where everyone should be treated medically, regardless 
of who they are and where they are from. We should be seen given our shared humanity. Tim 
was not needing emergency medical treatment, this would be reason enough to receive 
medical attention in many places (depending on the country, this would be free of charge 
elsewhere too). But in the case of Barrio Adentro, medical assistance, of any nature, is given to 
all. Treatment will depend on the equipment and medicine available at the ambulatory, but 
you will be seen in a very short time frame, because the ambulatory serves a small locale.  
It is no doubt challenging to question the moral value of the Barrio Adentro programme. In 
principle, it aspires to place human wellbeing above any cost to the doctor, the state, or other 
Venezuelans. Although some might consider this to be idealistic to a fault, it is hard to argue 
against the idea that this is how the medical system ought to function, and this ideal constitutes 
the central tenet of Tim’s justification. Tim does not allude to the problems that Barrio Adentro 
has encountered more recently: for example, doctor and severe medicine shortages, even 
abandonment of thousands of facilities, according to the Venezuelan press, who quote the 
president of the Venezuelan Medical Federation (La Patilla December 8 2014). Critics of Barrio 
Adentro were concerned it reduced the spending available to the mainstream public health 
system in Venezuela (which is also free and available to all—something Tim might not be 
aware of), and responsible for fragmenting the system (R. Jones 2008). More striking is perhaps 
the fact that Cuban doctors themselves recently denounced the treatment they receive from 
their own, and other governments for whom they have worked for (including Venezuela), as 
“modern slavery” before the International Criminal Court in May 2019. The New York Times in 
fact published an interview with one of these Cuban doctors, Yansnier Arias, who left the 
programme at the end of 2018, and denounced that “his Cuban and Venezuelan supervisors 
told him that oxygen should be used as a political tool: not for everyday medical emergencies, 
but for when the elections were closer” (Casey The New York Times March 17 2019). 
Although I do not doubt the veracity of Tim’s account, it is possible that 15 years into the 
programme, the inclusiveness he heralds here, has steadily eroded—together with many of 
Venezuela’s institutions. Tim is not uncritical of the Maduro government, and neither are most 
solidarity activists. But the government’s failings are not, in their eyes, sufficient to deter from 
the predominance of who the government’s discourse, and these missions, uphold; nothing can 
justify any kind of intervention from the US or the West more broadly.  
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This is perhaps the central point of contention between solidarity activists and migrants that I 
hope to highlight. Many Venezuelans are convinced these activists are either misled by the 
Venezuelan government, or ill-informed, or simply ignorant or obtuse. What I have found 
instead, is that solidarity activists are willing to ‘forgive’ and ‘forgo’ the Chavez and Maduro 
governments’ mistakes, because they see those governments as fighting the US, and as 
governments committed to defending the poor and socialism. They understand the 
inadequacies as just that, ‘mistakes’—not incompetence—and easily find blame in the US 
sanctions. 
Criticising Imperialism 
As I explained in chapter 3, fighting imperialism (in its American, British and Spanish 
manifestations), was of primary concern for solidarity activists. Trying to defend Venezuela’s 
government from the ‘evils’ of US aggression and their economic mandates, largely constituted 
the ‘battle’ most activists affirmed they were trying to combat.  
Sahas, the young British-Asian in his early thirties, first engaged in politics when Gaza was 
bombed in 2009. For him, this was his first protest, and the first time he had heard of Palestine. 
He tells me it changed him: he got involved in anti-war organising, struck by what he 
understood as modern imperialism. He read up on Chávez, in his eyes, “a great friend of the 
Palestinians, a kind of anti-imperialist hero standing up to the US.” Sahas (like Jack, the black-
British young activist involved in Momentum), considers himself a socialist—Venezuela he 
says is “very inspiring […] an example of what can happen with collective solidarity and 
organising.” When I ask Sahas what he makes of critics who defy activists’ strong opinions on 
Venezuela, given many of them (including him) have never been to the country, he tells me: 
There is, you know, this kind of, ‘oh, you can only speak if you have some personal 
connection with it.’ But I think that's absolutely false. And I think, for one, generally, 
anyone can have the right to comment on something that's happening anywhere. As long 
as you're not kind of appropriating it as your experience, which, you know, no one is. But 
I think more importantly, obviously, I think it's important to point out that our government 
is playing a damaging role in what's happening. And so, we not only have a right, we have 
a duty to be talking about what our government is doing. And, you know, resisting the 
push for war. 
 
287 
Sahas points at the Bank of England who, in late January 2019, blocked an attempt by the 
Maduro government to withdraw 1.2 billion dollars’ worth of Venezuelan gold—an action of 
the British government that offended him deeply. According to CNN.com (January 26 2019) top 
US officials urged the British government to restrict Maduro’s access to these assets, steering 
them towards opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who had just declared himself president. For 
Sahas, his open opinion on Venezuela is justified (and is, moreover, a “duty”) because he is 
defying his own government—for him a “junior partner of American imperialism.” Ironically, 
he mentions that he does not feel he is appropriating Venezuelans’ experience—although this 
is exactly what Venezuelan migrants feel he is doing, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
Sahas’ feelings are, to a degree, different from those of solidarity activists in their fifties, sixties 
and seventies, who have a broader experience of Latin America, either from living there or 
from having travelled there extensively. James, for example, in his seventies, criticises the idea 
he feels many British people hold of Britain’s role in the world, using the example of London’s 
Canning House: 
They think they're the centre of Latin America here. You know Canning house? Victor 
Canning was the foreign minister in the 19th century when Latin American independence 
was achieved. That's why it’s called Canning. Because it's ‘I brought’ typical British 
arrogance. 
Tim, the white South African, criticised how certain British people aggrandise their knowledge 
of a place, in other words, how they hold an insidious imperialist mindset, despite being on the 
left (a view he shares, ironically, with other Venezuelans who resent this attitude profoundly): 
I'm not sure why British people think they’re authorities on other people’s revolutions. 
And the further left they go, the more they think they’re an authority. And the least 
knowledge of the countries they’re talking about the more certain they are that their 
templates and prescriptions are correct. So I’m very reluctant to do this. So I always ask. If 
they want, and that it’s an opinion, and it’s an opinion that’s based on far less knowledge 
of what's actually going on than they have. But sometimes you’re able to see the wood for 
the trees because you're not so caught up in the detail. 
Tim is discussing the extent to which he stands against appropriation: templates and 
prescriptions that are imposed on “other people’s revolutions” by those on the left—ironically 
as I have said, very much on a par with what Venezuelan migrants think about solidarity 
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activists themselves. He is surprisingly critical of the British left more specifically, perhaps as a 
white South African (although he has lived in the UK for most of his life—he grew up in 
working-class London, he mentioned). Tim admits to having limited knowledge of ‘what’s 
actually going on’ when compared to Venezuelans—a point I underline because it admits to 
the instinctive importance of lived experience that Venezuelan migrants also underline. Tim, 
though, is referring to the lived experience of the people in the barrios that he is visiting (not 
the experience of the middle- or upper-class Venezuelans). He ends by affirming his position: 
there is in fact something to gain from his perspective as an outsider.  
For Andy, the British-Canadian in his late sixties, British imperialism, more specifically against 
the Irish, was paramount: 
Above all anti-British imperialism. Because the Irish struggle was an extremely important 
part of British politics. And this is an armed struggle going on next door to you. This is—
basically Ireland was at that time, a third world country and has many aspects of being a 
third world country. It has one of the most advanced political movements in Europe. I 
mean, Sinn Féin […] So we were anti-imperialist against our own imperialism as much 
[pause] In fact, the USA was quite distant place. 
Andy underlines how imperialism was happening right ‘next door.’ It was not, in his view, 
solely a battle between the Global North and South, or against the US as ‘senior’ culprit, in 
Sahas’ terms.  
Many (white) solidarity activists sought distance from this imperial/racist part of themselves 
which they see as immoral—in a similar way Venezuelans want to distance themselves from 
viveza criolla. Victoria, from the centre of Spain, speaks of deconstructing her ‘arrogant’ 
Western mindset: 
I felt, for example when I got to Chile, that the European rationale, or Western rationale, 
weighed heavily. And I had to dismantle everything, a kind of educational arrogance, or 
colonial arrogance, let’s say. I had to decolonise the education I had received in order to 
open up to and listen to the ideas of native peoples, of another reality. And I think it is 




Victoria’s particular sensitivity to the injustices of her own colonial state and her privilege 
shapes her understanding of the Venezuelan conflict in a particular historical-moral way, that 
has allowed her to empathise, but more importantly, learn from the realities and experiences 
of native peoples.  
In speaking of his support of Chavismo, Alberto, underlines his Basque nationality instead, 
“that is important,” he tells me: 
I’m a Basque independentist. For generations we are Basque, and for generations we don’t 
feel Spanish, and that’s the issue. It has to do with the position that someone can have 
facing injustice. I am a person who does not like abuse, I don’t like—I say things that seem 
noble to me, regardless of whether that is shared by a majority. And regardless of whether 
there is someone very big, with a big stick, threatening you. And us Basques, well we can’t 
go back. And so it’s cost us a lot of disappointments. Like it’s costing Venezuela right now. 
If Venezuela would kneel before the Yankees, well it surely wouldn’t have any problem. 
No problems with the outside, it would have all its domestic problems.  
Alberto’s feeling of his subjection to Spanish imperialism, makes him especially sensitive to 
what he sees as an analogous anti-imperialist struggle in Venezuela—I note most other Basque 
independence political groups are equally, and very openly supportive of Chavismo (see 
Figures 17 and 18).  
As a non-Venezuelan supporter of the government, living in Venezuela since 2007, Alberto’s 
case is unique. Although he explains his as ‘any person’s position when faced with an injustice,’ 
it is easy to see how Venezuelan migrants would argue that they are suffering injustices at the 
hands of Chavismo. This is where blame attribution comes to hold an important key to the 
divide. Alberto prioritises imperialism in his moral system, given his experience of oppression, 
and his understanding of the conflict in a geopolitical versus domestic field. He does not claim 
that Venezuela does not have serious internal issues, but when choosing his overall position 





Figure 17. A poster in support of Chávez, written in Basque, produced by the organisation ERNAI. Reads: 
‘Because you have always been vigilant...Goodbye and honour comandante.’ 
Anti-imperialism was a particularly powerful sentiment central to the way these interviewees 
felt they could atone for what their countries had done in the past (and were doing at present). 
Tamara, one of the few female activists, leader of one of the largest US Venezuelan Solidarity 
organisations in Illinois tells me:  
I have been traveling Latin America since the mid 1980s when I graduated college. My 
interest and inspiration began when I was in the sixth grade. I was exposed to meso-
American anthropology and archaeology at that time. Also, at that time, I was exposed to 
US military incursions in Latin America via the evening news on television (something my 
generation watched before sitting down to dinner). I have been keenly aware, from a 
young age, as to the European and US role in the Americas for the past 500 years. Although 
I never met him, Chavez' vision for his country, his people and much of Latin America was 
a relief, in a way, to hear and follow. It was also inspiring to listen to him describe US 
foreign policy in a manner few US citizens understand and a policy others of us have 
protested […] Also, impressive to me, was Chavez’s creation of the Bolivarian constitution; 
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Venezuela's fifth I believe. The purpose, need and process for creating a modern 
democratic constitution spoke volumes as to the antiquity of the US constitution and how 
it was created. 
Chase, a white American activist in his late sixties, who started organising against the Vietnam 
war in high school, views solidarity with Latin America more broadly as “a way of life”: 
So you know, 1990s the Sandinistas lost the election in Nicaragua. And of course, a couple 
of years before that, the Soviet Union collapsed. So, the US was the only superpower, and 
everything seemed to be going its way. And then we had this really interesting guy coming 
to our consciousness and Venezuela starting these really interesting experiments in 
popular democracy and economic justice. So, Venezuela took on an important—as an 
inspiration to those of us who were working on the movement, including me […] And then 
the really inspiring thing about Venezuela was that they were doing things that we could 
actually benefit from here. The direct popular democracy, the communes, the 
cooperatives, those kinds of things provided a way forward, a different kind of social 
organisation, social, socio-political organisation, than the neoliberal capitalism. Whereas 
like in the Middle East, although we opposed US intervention, there weren't really models 
that we wanted to emulate.	 
Chase’s story is representative of other activists who became involved with solidarity through 
the Cuba and Nicaragua campaigns, as described in chapter 3. I note Chase’s emphasis on his 
admiration for the Venezuelan political model as something he was inspired by and how it 




Figure 18. Twitter post of the football match between Venezuela and the Basque country in October 2018. The 
banner, with Chávez's eyes, reads (in Basque): "Overcoming Imperalism, forward Venezuela!" The banner 
provoked such a virulent social media war, it was covered on national Spanish television. 
Care and justification 
Transnational solidarity work, by definition, involves sustained efforts that include protests, 
marches, even recollecting funds for another’s nation. In Victoria’s own words, who spent 
considerable time with indigenous peoples around South America: 
I think that the most rewarding—it’s a complicated question, but there isn’t what is more, 
there are things. And one of them is, well, looking, having the ability to gaze into someone’s 
eyes and empathise with the pains and the loves of others, which is something that, even 
now, is really hard, even when you are a journalist or reporter, right? The other is a story, 
there are always barriers and shields that are placed before you, and they don’t let you 
embrace the essence or the soul. 
Victoria’s deeply emotional language shows how fundamental empathy is as a moral value, at 
least for her. I have previously discussed how Lakoff (1996) sees ‘Morality as empathy’ as the 
principal tenet of US ‘liberal’ morality: here evinced in the words of Victoria. The centrality of 
Photograph of the match, banner and fans 
removed for copyright reasons. 
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‘care’ as a prime expression of empathy, and conversely ‘no care’ as a sign of an ‘evil-nature,’ 
was central to the arguments of both groups.  
A tweet by Jack, the twenty-two-year-old, highly optimistic black British activist involved in 
Momentum (the grass-roots organisation supportive of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK), summarises 
this accusation:  
This so-called ‘democratic’ opposition in Venezuela, with the US puppet Guaidó at the 
head, is a gang of snakes with no care for the Venezuelan people. They just want to steal 
all the wealth and natural resources of the country to sell to their US masters. 
Jack points to the vile and uncaring nature of the Venezuelan opposition towards ‘the people,’ 
as a way to evince their ill-intention. This moral manoeuvre was prevalent on both sides and is 
central to the radical nature of Venezuela’s populist divide, open to violent conflict. 
It is no different on the Venezuelan side. In describing the commentary he gets on his pro-
Maduro posts, Sahas, the young British-Asian, tells me: 
I got a few comments, ‘you're blind to what's happening in Venezuela.’ Or, even worse, 
‘you're complicit in the hardships being faced by Venezuelans.’ In much more colourful 
language.  
The accusation of ‘being blind’ is related to that of ‘not caring’ for the Venezuelan people, being 
negligent. Specifically, they are accusing Sahas of caring more for ideology, or wealth than for 
‘the people’—here referring to a majority who are struggling to feed themselves through the 
crisis. These are instinctual claims that Venezuelans make against him, and other solidarity 
activists, from their understanding that the government is responsible for the crisis. From 
Sahas’ quote, we can tell his detractors also feel he is ‘complicit’—in other words, also to blame, 
in his lack of condemnation of what is happening in the country. I would say there is evidence 
to suggest that Sahas and all solidarity activists indeed care for those with little resources in 
Venezuela; they simply care less, or not at all, for upper and middle-class Venezuelans who 
have (at least until very recently) had the financial means to leave the country.  
Marcos very explicitly denounces solidarity activists’ immorality given their support of 
Chávez’s coup in 1992: “They’re immoral because they know of morality and reject it,” he tells 
 
294 
me, as I mentioned in the previous chapter. He continues explaining how they only ‘care’ about 
being anti-US:  
The communist doesn’t reason. The communist is a dogma. Who cares, I mean who cares 
that people there are getting f***ed (jodiéndose), the important thing is to be anti-
imperialist, anti-US, because that is the only thing that will give you value as a human 
being.  
Carlos, a young Venezuelan surgeon now in Canada, tells me he never really understood he 
was from a privileged conservative background: “I used to say, yeah I grew up in a normal 
family,” then adds, “No. I grew up in a very privileged family.” It was not until he spent two 
years living in the poor barrios of a smaller city in the West of Venezuela, and another two 
years living in La Pastora (another poor barrio of Caracas), while studying to become a priest, 
that he came to experience poverty in Venezuela. Again, his complaint is ‘blindness’ and ‘not 
caring’: 
My strongest criticism against the non-Venezuelan left is the blindness towards anti-
Americanism. They don’t care what is happening with people there. 
Carlos’ story contests solidarity activists’ account of the opposition: Carlos is a white upper-
middle class Venezuelan that spent considerable time living in the shanty towns of Venezuela. 
He tells me of the mornings he spent sweeping bullets in the backyard of the church—a normal 
Tuesday morning—and how living amongst communities permanently under gang violence 
changed him. Incidentally, this feeling of the other side not caring for those struggling in 
Venezuela, i.e., blaming solidarity activists for a lack of empathy caused by ideological 
blindness (an accusation of psychopathy in its most elemental definition) is a remark that has 
been made in the context of other pervasive divides. It was, for instance, part of Jeremy 
Corbyn’s statement after the prorogation of parliament was deemed unlawful (in 2019).38  
 
38  “There we have it, Mr Speaker: a simple warning, a simple truth, that a Tory Government are continuing 
to follow a policy they know will hit the poorest people in our country the hardest. They simply do not care,” 
Jeremy Corbyn (House of Commons Hansard for 25th September 2019). 
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Particularly unnerving to Venezuelans is the fact that solidarity activists tout anti-imperialism 
but accept ‘meddling’ by other countries. Lorena, in her late sixties, asks: 
Why don’t they speak of the fact that Russians, Chinese and Cubans are involved? Why 
don’t they speak of them? How is that not imperialism also? 
Lorena, who works as a cleaner in Costa Rica, asked for asylum in 2017 after she was unable to 
find her hypertension medicine in Venezuela. Although Lorena is fair skinned, she comes from 
a humble background. Lorena mentions she resents the behaviour of Mexico and Uruguay 
towards Venezuela, whom she compares to solidarity activists’ because, she claims, they also 
admire Venezuela’s anti-American stance, the only thing they care about.  
Solidarity activists indeed feel hostility towards the US, seen as omnipotent (and therefore 
corrupt)—vis-a-vis China and Russia, seen as ‘new’ players fighting for a multipolar world. 
Again, this interpretation of the political world is different to that of Venezuelan migrants—
more domestically minded—who see power in Chavismo’s repression of the opposition, and 
Chávez’s own intents to construct a southern geopolitical block and ‘hegemony’ using 
Venezuela’s vast oil resources to stay at its head.  
César, also alludes to solidarity activists’ ‘blindness,’ but he invokes something slightly more 
sinister:  
They come here to the new world to experiment, and I tell you, they wouldn’t fuc— 
freaking dare try them in their own societies, and they are happy that we are the ones who 
suffer the consequences of those experiments. They hope, I presume, to see those 
experiments to the end, because they don’t suffer the consequences. They don’t care. They 
don’t care about us. They care more about their ideological triumph than the suffering of 
people. 
Interestingly, solidarity activists define Venezuelan sovereignty against American imperialism 
and the threat of military intervention; Cesar, afro-Venezuelan anti-Chavista, defines it against 
those citizens from western nations trying to promote specific ideological experiments in other 
poorer nations—an accusation that we can relate to the hashtag ‘Yankee go home’ 
(#YankeeGoHome) that Abdo received.  
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Because solidarity activists are not tied to the authority of the Venezuelan state, they avoid the 
negative consequences of these experiments’—they could ‘care less’ about the people affected 
by those policies. For César, their love for experiments with socialist policy, ‘without care for 
the experimented on,’ is colonial—also immoral. Later in the interview, César uses a 
particularly memorable, albeit vulgar phrase, citing the controversial Argentinian libertarian 
economist Jaime Milei, “Con el culo ajeno, todos somos putos” (with a foreign ass, we are all—
male—prostitutes), although the word choice in Spanish sounds considerably more explicit. 
Cesar takes the phrase out of its original context (Milei was commenting on the idea of 
redistributing other people’s wealth and not our own) and relates it to promiscuity with ideas. 
As I discussed in the last chapter, solidarity activists indeed see Venezuela as a place from 
which to learn from. But for César, this is not just about experimenting on someone else’s 
territory and learning from it, it is experimenting on the territory of Global South countries, 
those who are less powerful.  
Similarly, for Alicia:  
But if there are people that continue to support this, then I say, well I’m sorry, my respect 
is not for them. I mean, I cannot respect their ideology because you are by-passing what I 
imagine that same person expects of their own government. 
Venezuelans underline how they feel solidarity activists care more about their ideas than 
people’s suffering—something that is easily, or they expect, universally, understood as wrong. 
By believing that solidarity activists do not care about the Venezuelan people, but do about 
their ideology, Venezuelan migrants put solidarity activists on a lower moral plane: solidarity 
activists have no empathy towards the Venezuelan people, they are therefore misguided—
even psychopathic, and their views are irrelevant.  
Jeison, a young pop-singer and former Chavista, now in Mexico, felt slightly differently. Yet 
again, he emphasises the importance of care: 
Maybe there’s support for Maduro because they have a very broad sense of what no-
intervention means in a sovereign state—according to Chávez’s discourse on socialism. A 
real socialism where you care (te duela) about your community. But that’s not what 
Venezuela lives today. 
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Caring and more specifically not caring for ‘the people’ is made an integral part of assigning 
fault or blame on ‘the other.’ It is interesting that caring, generally associated with the family 
and subsequently with notions of the state, becomes a requisite for having political opinions 
that are ‘valid’ and ‘just’—an argument somewhat different from the argument of holding 
‘valid’ knowledge, explored in the last chapter. Care, affection, love for ‘a people,’ is presented 
as an important moral quality needed to justify an opinion about an other’s issue because at a 
more basic level, a positive intention towards a group of ‘others’ is felt as requisite for 
confidence in that opinion. By the same token, disregard, ill-will or apathy towards suffering 
is, for both groups, de-legitimising of that opinion. I note, taking from Tronto (1989), that the 
object of care is crucial for moral judgement. Solidarity activists accuse the middle- and upper-
classes of not caring of ‘the people’, or caring more for their wealth; Venezuelan migrants, that 
solidarity activists care more for ‘ideology’ than ‘the people.’ It is this lack of care that makes 
each of their opinions invalid. It also makes ‘the other’ immoral: by defending or arguing 
against Chavismo, ‘the other’ perpetuates an alleged damage.  
The Mafia State 
Wilson also admits he voted for Chávez the first time he ran for president, and then remarks:  
Power corrupts. No matter how good your intentions were in the first place. And well, then 
of course came the cannibalism of all his — of all his [Chávez’s] entourage. 
Wilson’s comment is in line with Machiavelli’s prime assumption: that exercising power is in 
tandem with developing negative moral qualities. Yet in the case of Chavismo, Venezuelan 
migrants more often sought to stress the criminal nature of the government, which for them 
went beyond mere susceptibility to corruption, or general ‘viveza criolla’: 
It’s no longer a political issue, it’s an issue about a group of organised crime that owns a 
country, that holds it hostage, and yes, it tries to find a series of excuses and lies to convince, 
to make you believe that the kidnapping is fair, but no kidnapping is fair. […] It’s not a 
coincidence that Russia is Venezuela’s principal ally—it’s practically the same thing as 
Venezuela. What do I mean by this? It’s not a country that has a mafia, it’s a mafia that has 
a country. It’s also a criminal organisation that controls a state. 
 
298 
Here César highlights how Venezuela’s issue is not a mere divergence of political ideas. Which 
is why a negotiated, political solution is unviable: how can you negotiate with organised crime? 
For him the answer is clearly you cannot, and you should not. 
Alicia actively organises events that raise funds for sending medicines over to Venezuela, 
through her community group. Similarly, her desire to ‘fight’ or ‘do something’—not 
dissimilar to solidarity activists’ ‘fight for good’—is framed by what she understands as a 
‘humanitarian’ and not ‘political’ concern: 
It will take many years for Venezuela to recover, but if you try to—the little things (granitos 
de arena) you do here, are only because you feel you can’t keep your arms crossed. Because 
that’s what I feel, that you have to try to do something, but not from a political point of 
view, it is more from the humanitarian point of view. 
The idea that Chavismo and Nicolás Maduro’s government are a criminal organisation—or at 
least, that they enact serious human rights violations—is not new, nor restricted to Maduro’s 
government vis-à-vis Chávez’s government, as discussed in chapter 2. For Venezuelan 
migrants, the indictments on Venezuelan officials and the repeated allegations of human 
rights violations in the context of the severe crisis are further evidence of an ‘immorality’ that, 
for Venezuelans has no remedy save the use of force. For them, understanding the issue as 
political does not sufficiently account for its metaphysical dimensions. 
For Carlos, the medical doctor who lived in the barrios, there is no alternative but intervention. 
Venezuelans are completely unable to solve the crisis on their own: 
I attended the screening of an Al Jazeera documentary the other day. [imitating others] ‘Let 
Venezuelans resolve their issues on their own’ [responding to them] How? Tell me how?  
Al Jazeera, in this case, represents the side of the international stance on Venezuela that believes 
that there should not be any foreign intervention. Interestingly what for Venezuelans feels like 
apathy from the international community, is the definition of national sovereignty for others, 
in this case, Al Jazeera.  
In a powerful way, the idea that Maduro’s government is criminal and morally corrupt, 
reinforces the divide, or the want for distance from those who support it. Here I refer to 
Ignacio’s argument as an example of this logic: “what ‘dialogue’ can be had with racists?” 
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Again, seeing the other as morally reprehensible—not merely in what Urbinati, Mudde and 
Kaltwasser claim is populism’s moral appraisal of power as corruptible—but as empirically 
evidenced in the media’s accusation of its criminal activity, means dialogue and consensus are 
not so much inviable as intolerable. They are also morally ‘wrong’: it is ‘wrong’ to negotiate 
with ‘evil’ or with criminals, as in so doing, you are helping ‘sustain’ or promote them.  
Encounters with the ‘corrupt’ 
For Nelson, the brown-black Venezuelan who travelled by bus to Chile, ‘viveza criolla,’ this 
‘creole cunning,’ is so ingrained it appears written in Venezuelans’ genetic make-up.  To stress 
this point this, he tells me of a recent experience with another Venezuelan in Chile:  
Two days ago, a guy came up to me and said, “where can I get a fake contract?” A 
Venezuelan. And I said to myself, what the f**k. Son of a b****h. Sorry for the expression. 
You just left Venezuela. Why the hell are you thinking about cheating? And I tell him, 
“Bro, the best thing you can do is get a proper contract.” No, but the problem is that if he 
gets a normal contract he will have to work. And I was like, this asshole came here to what? 
Sell drugs? Steal? The f**k you have to work. How can you get along in life if you don’t 
work? I don’t see any hope for Venezuela. This generation of evil and perverse and dirty 
(cochina) people would have to pass.  
At the mention of the word ‘fake contract’ Nelson proverbially ‘loses it.’ The dislike—or rather 
disgust given his use of the word dirty (cochina)—is evinced by an ensuing stream of insults, 
difficult to translate. Nelson apologises for the vulgar expressions he has used, but importantly 
not for his feelings.  
Nelson had been working thirteen hours a day, two jobs and no weekends, to afford living in 
Chile and sending money back to his family. It is easy to see how he could be deeply enraged 
by someone trying to escape work. Moreover, Nelson implies that other Venezuelans, those he 
feels are intent on cheating the system, tarnish Venezuelans’ reputation abroad. Many of the 
Venezuelan interviewees referenced the xenophobic effects of the stereotypes and 
generalisation made of them in their host countries, principally in Perú and Colombia, as I 
briefly mentioned in chapter 6. That another Venezuelan would want to cheat the system—
stealing and selling drugs are some of the most common criminal activities that Venezuelans 
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have been charged with—has real consequences for brown-black Nelson, and for other 
Venezuelan migrants across Latin America.  
Nelson almost naïvely wants to hope that the privilege of leaving Venezuela should push this 
man towards becoming less ‘cunning.’ Nelson wishes he show more respect for the country 
that has taken them in. As I mention, the use of the word ‘cochina,’ suggests that there is not 
only something ‘dirty’ but ‘vile’ about this ‘cunning.’ This is in line with social psychological 
accounts that see disgust, more than any other moral emotion, as having very concrete mental 
representations (Panksepp 2007).  
Eva, who as I explained before has moved to Spain recently after experiencing a gun-point 
assault in her car, shares Nelson’s moral disappointment with the Venezuelan ‘people’:  
Now it’s not so political, I mean, it is, it was at some point, it was influential, but now people 
have crap (porquería) in their heads […] Venezuelans, not all, because there are some that 
are still there that are good, in my view. But the majority has got crap in their head, as if 
they’re always looking to harm someone, to advance themselves […] And I tell you, I don’t 
think it’s a political problem, it’s sowed in the minds of some, not to say all Venezuelans, 
to harm another.  
The implication is that this behaviour, one of constantly seeking to harm an ‘other’ so as to 
advance self-interest, is an unresolvable problem; her use of the word ‘sowed’ underlines how 
ingrained, intrinsic she feels the attitude is. Here, I note, Eva does not directly blame Chavismo, 
or the ‘mafia/criminal’ state,39 rather, her disillusionment extends to all Venezuelans. This idea 
of a cochinera (dirty) mentality, is related to Venezuelans’ ‘viveza criolla,’ but is no doubt 
believed to be considerably worse. It very explicitly expresses Eva’s and Nelson’s disgust—a 
prime moral emotion, the object of which they seek distance from. It was prevalent throughout 
the interviews and is related to the idea that those who remain in Venezuela are not only 
conformists but corrupt.  
 
39 I discuss this idea of the ‘mafia state’ in the next section.  
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There is a sense, however, that the government is a particular exponent of this ‘corrupt’ trait of 
Venezuelans, and some of the interviewees who had worked for the government, were open 
about stories that they felt confirmed this for them.  
Ibrahim, in his mid-forties, moved to Perú and has been working on the streets selling SIM 
cards since. He worked in the oil refineries in his hometown of Punto Fijo before migrating, 
and recounted a particularly harrowing account of his experience of voting in 2012: 
The same general managers that knew me […] tells me, look you have to vote for—this was 
Chávez’s last election—‘Look you have to vote for Chávez, because that’s known.’ And I’m 
like ‘it’s known?’ ‘Yeah.’ And true thing. I remember, Chávez being there, I go to the 
elections thinking, well, I work for the government, because Chávez—the country hadn’t 
fallen so badly as it has now or when I left. And you won’t believe it. I go out on a Sunday, 
and Chavistas are out saying, report yourself, report yourself, location, this and that. I 
voted and I didn’t report that I voted. But because it was a Sunday, I had to work support, 
so I went to the refinery. I’m inside with the manager of human resources, and he tells me 
to come to his office and closes the door. S**t, I got scared […] he says, ‘thanks for 
supporting the government. For supporting the revolution.’ And I was like, ‘what? How do 
you know I voted?’ ‘The general manager sent me a message.’ That general manager wrote 
to him directly […] And he showed me his phone and it showed where I voted and who I 
voted for […] When Maduro’s election came, I didn’t vote. Because I already knew. 
Although I cannot confirm the veracity of Ibrahim’s story, the detail with which he recounts 
this episode seems to show it is carved in his memory: the realisation instilled by his managers 
that he ‘must’ show support for the Revolution that was employing him—fear—was not used 
lightly. And yet he had already felt that he needed to vote for the government because he 
worked in the oil industry. The story shapes Ibrahim’s own understanding of the Revolution, 
and the subsequent—although unnecessary—guilt he felt in having to tell me that he voted 
for the Chávez government.  
Thirty-year-old Gisela, breast cancer survivor now in Panamá, after pleadingly telling me she 
needed tranquillity, tells me of the many times she had been mugged travelling on the bus 
from La Guaira, her hometown in the coast, to Caracas where she taught. She then shared a 
similar corruption scandal from when she worked for the Ministry of Sport in her state: 
 
302 
Look, the governor, when the state of Vargas athletes would go to national games, the 
director of the sports institute, was who gave the figures to say how many medals, how 
much money had been invested, how much hadn’t, all that. And I remember how all that 
information was fake. Because the sports institute was forced to tell him, for example, look 
we spent 1000 dollars. And me, I as planner, knew that we had spent 100. But he had to tell 
him 1000 because he was stealing the other 900. But the governor didn’t know. 
Support for interventionism 
Most Venezuelan migrants—although hesitantly—felt that intervention was the only way 
forward for Venezuela, given what they felt was the intransigence of the government.  
Rosario, white, in her late forties—who lives in Houston with her staunchly Chavista mother 
and works independently selling baked goods—flaunted a Facebook profile image at the time 
of our interview in March 2019 that read: “I support humanitarian and military intervention 
now!” (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19. Facebook profile picture of one Venezuelan migrant interviewee, Rosario, in 2019. 
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Only one other interviewee, a single mother in her early thirties, Margarita, held deep faith in 
intervention. She emigrated by bus to Perú after having been unemployed in Venezuela for 2 
years. She tells me that what she earned managing a supermarket was only enough to pay for 
the public transport it cost her to go to work in the first place: it was just not worth it. She asked 
her brother, who was already abroad, and supporting her, to help her migrate instead. 
Venezuela, with the help of “her president Trump” as she referred to him—who she felt only 
needed a small push to intervene—would recover in little time: 
I’m not like other Venezuelans who say that it will take 10 years. I don’t think so. I think 
we’re going to show the world that it will be very little time, because we have the economic 
support of the international community. So for example, my president Trump said that 
we have more than 500 million dollars for the transition. Germany and other countries 
also bet on that. So the transition will be to support Venezuelans who are in an emergency 
situation. And then when we have financial security, multinationals will come to provide 
jobs. So I think in 3 years Venezuela will be different. 
Margarita’s hope in Venezuela’s future was rare. A study conducted in Caracas in late 2018 
showed that, in Venezuela, the majority was against intervention, 54 percent. When asked 
about renewed dialogue with Maduro, only 37 percent felt it would be useful; 63 percent would 
prefer a negotiated settlement to remove him, as mentioned previously (Smilde 2019). 
Venezuelan interviewees reflected these same tensions. In the words of Adriana, the chemist 
teacher and violinist in Perú:  
Yes, it’s a bit complicated. A military intervention can obviously negatively affect everyone. 
And anyone can fall. So you don’t know if it’s your family, so its delicate. But on the other 
hand, if the government is still there […] people are getting sick, dying, all of that. So at the 
end of the day we need a drastic solution, because it’s obvious, there’s no doubt that the 
government will not resign peacefully, like ‘please leave’ or with protests or none of that. 
So in this case, I would be inclined towards American intervention because it’s a solution 
now.  
The appeal of intervention seems to lie in its immediacy (ya, meaning now), even if as Adriana 
explains, it would affect everyone negatively. Similarly, Jeison, the Venezuelan pop singer living 
in Mexico, and former Chávez supporter, ultimately justifies intervention given a situation he 
sees as unsustainable: 
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Look, intervention is complicated, because there is an issue of oil interests, so eventually 
it’s going to be a mess to get the US out. I think that if you get to a point where it was 
almost—localised, as a Venezuelan, I think that as an alliance, Guaidó is able to 
intelligently utilise the forces on his side, plus the support of the great powers, I think there 
should be an intervention. Maybe not like the one in Iraq, or Afghanistan, but there has to 
be an intervention now, because this is unsustainable, a parallel world, some crazy s**t 
(una vaina loca). I mean, I have acquaintances who have died because they didn’t have 
medicines.  
The apparent immediacy of intervention as a solution is not readily questioned by most 
Venezuelan migrants. Only US-educated Wilson, the brown voice teacher in his mid-fifties 
from Valencia (in the centre north of the country) shared a more nuanced view—a position he 
says stems from “his leftist heart”:  
When we speak of military intervention—I would say yes, right? As long as it was, and this 
is the problem, as long as it was a military intervention for humanitarian reasons, seeking 
to lift a country out of the misery in which it finds itself […] I obviously want my country 
to come out of this torment. But I’m not 100 percent certain that their reasons are actually 
humanitarian. You go back and remember what happened in Vietnam, of course, it was 
another time in history you would say, what happened in Iraq, that they pretended was 
going to be super quick, and it was several years before they could more or less tame the 
beast. So, of course, not wanting military intervention only leaves you with the other 
agenda, the diplomatic agenda, the talks, dialogue, hope that these people get the point, 
and will actually want to hold elections, which I doubt, because even if the top of the 
government is willing to, obviously all its surrounding criminal groups will not agree so 
much. So, it’s very complex, really. 
Wilson understands how Venezuela’s oil and mineral wealth makes intervention a thorny 
business. Interventions have historically been complicated, so for him, intervention in 
Venezuela cannot be ‘surgical’: fast and precise. I note how Wilson insists that he “obviously 
wants his country to come out of this torment,” as if trying to assure me that he does indeed 
want this, were I to doubt it by his cautiousness. Not wanting military intervention only leaves 
diplomacy and dialogue as options, which Wilson has no faith in. For him, it is delinquent 
groups that are actually in charge: specifically, he mentions the Colombian guerrilla and 
Hezbollah. This deep pessimism was pervasive and underlines the extent to which 
Venezuelans feel their life choices are being heavily constrained.  
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Contesting Human Rights 
Amnesty International entitled its 2019 report on Venezuela: Hunger for Justice: Crimes against 
Humanity in Venezuela. Their methodology is described in detail and consisted of interviews 
with more than 70 people and 15 representative case-studies involving those who had either 
died, were seriously injured, detained or subjected to torture. The report suggests, among 
many other crimes, that the authorities carried out “targeted extrajudicial executions as a 
means of punishment and social control through the PNB (National Bolivarian Police), and 
above all the FAES (Special Action Forces) units”: 
[E]xtrajudicial executions documented in different parts of the country illustrate a 
recurring pattern. In all cases, the victims were young men who were critical of the 
government, or perceived as such by the authorities, from low-income areas and whose 
participation in the protests had been visible or whose criticisms had gone viral on social 
media. That is, they were targeted executions based on the profile of the victims. All died 
as a result of gunshot wounds to the chest and were executed while in the custody of the 
authorities (Amnesty International 2019, 17). 
According to Human Rights Watch (2020), since 2016, nearly 18,000 Venezuelans have been 
killed at the hands of police and security forces, for alleged “resistance to authority.” Human 
Rights Watch has been denouncing Hugo Chávez’s presidency since 2008 when they reported 
on the state of Venezuela’s democratic institutions. They claimed, at the time, that 
“discrimination on political grounds” and an “open disregard for the principle of separation of 
powers” had been defining features of the Chávez presidency (Carroll The Guardian September 
18 2008). The Human Rights Watch delegation was expelled by President Chávez that same 
year, accused of anti-state activities.  
As mentioned, transnational solidarity work has been historically invested in the protection of 
human rights, against dictatorship and the dominance of military regimes and political torture, 
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most especially in Chile (Kelly 2013). Yet, solidarity activists disregard reports on the state of 
human rights today because they feel these are part of the US’ agenda. 40 
Aaron, who is an academic, wrote his doctoral dissertation on the role the media plays in 
presenting Venezuela as a ‘nightmare dictatorship’—that he contrasts to data presented by the 
World Bank and the United Nations: 
So, I did a bit more research, and started reading the media. And they were presenting it 
as this like abominable nightmare dictatorship. And I thought, ‘what the hell's going on 
here?’ […] What I do usually is look at United Nations documents or things like that, to 
look at the statistics. And clearly there was something really weird going on, where there's 
either this almost like a conspiracy among the media to try and present the country as 
badly as possible. Well, there was an even bigger conspiracy that involves like the World 
Bank, the United Nations and stuff to make a dictatorship look really good.  
Aaron is referring to the sharp decrease in poverty headcount that Venezuela experienced 
from 2004 to 2009; in reality, social and economic indicators on Venezuela have not been 
provided by the Venezuelan government to the World Bank since 2015, as mentioned in 
chapter 2. Furthermore, the UNCHR (2019, 14) report on Venezuela, confirmed that “there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that grave violations of economic and social rights, including 
rights to food and health, have been committed in Venezuela” given that, among other things, 
government social programmes are used “in a discriminatory manner, based on political 
grounds.”  
Although some solidarity activists insist that these reversals are the effects of sanctions and 
what they feel is an economic war waged against Venezuela— and although this is true to the 
extent that they have exacerbated the crisis—it seems unrealistic to believe the government’s 
actions and mistakes have had minimal weight. These human rights are in fact understood as 
negative obligations, i.e. duties not to act, and are not affected by economic scarcity. For solidarity 
activists, non-governmental human rights organisations are pushing a political (and fake 
moral) agenda that seeks to justify ousting governments that—at least in discourse—call for 
 
40 See T. Evans (1996), for a full account on US hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights. 
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the widening of social and economic human rights, and are not ‘US puppets.’ Although the 
fairness of the 2018 elections that President Maduro won are highly contested, their argument 
stands that if the US and the West were concerned about human rights, they would call for 
regime change in countries like Saudi Arabia or China41—an important rebuttal famously 
advanced by Aryeh Neier (1996, 91) who called this problem the “New Double Standard”: when 
governments and intergovernmental bodies that can have influence, “pay lip service at best” 
to “the human rights abuses [that] occur in countries of first-rank importance.” 
 
Figure 20. VSC’s Facebook post quoting Pablo Iglesias’ critique of human rights as an excuse for US intervention 
For José, the principal organiser of one of the largest Venezuelan solidarity organisations in 
the world, preoccupation with human rights is simply an excuse to force regime change:  
That there’s a migratory crisis in Venezuela? Well, obviously. Tons of people are leaving 
the country. But to use that as justification to have the EU intervene, and to have that mean 
that we must remove this government and put a new one? That’s a different thing. It’s one 
of the strongest narratives that they are promoting. Human Rights all that. Well, it so 
happens that they care about Human Rights in Venezuela but they don’t care about 
Human Rights in Colombia. It’s been one month since the elections, and they’ve killed 119 
social activists, most of them identified with Petro.  
 
41 Both are considered ‘not free’, but Saudi Arabia scores slightly worse on the Freedom House measure. 
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In what is commonly referred to as ‘deflection arguing,’ José simply points at other human 
rights violations in the continent—he does not address or deny the allegations, given his 
purpose is to underline their use as an excuse for regime change (see Figure 20 for a similar 
argument by Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias). This accusation could definitely be made of 
governments wanting to remove Maduro from the presidency, but not of non-governmental 
organisations who document these violations in all countries. Bílková (2018) suggests it is hard 
to imagine how diverse domestic and international NGOs could ‘plot’ against one state and 
contravene their own values. 
Andy, the British Canadian activist (as I mentioned, originally driven by anti-British 
imperialism in Ireland) had a similar claim regarding hypocrisy:  
So, we twinned London with Venezuela. And brought Chavez over to speak in London. 
They provided cheap or free oil to allow them to give seniors free passes on London 
Transport. It was fantastic. Of course, as soon as the right-wing mayor Boris Johnson got 
in, he immediately tore it up. He said: we don't deal with dictators, and immediately started 
talking to Saudi Arabia... Right? I mean, the hypocrisy.  
Tony, the Australian ex-lecturer, stressed his distrust of Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch more specifically, given their alleged links to Washington: 
I’m an internationalist who's been very influenced by Cuba. And also, Venezuela. I've seen 
the dirty wars in Latin America […] But in 2003, when Bush invaded Iraq, he was talking 
about 60 other countries that they might carry out a pre-emptive war against. And the 
Cubans thought ‘we're on the list, surely we’re next.’ And they arrested about 70, what they 
call ‘dissidents’, but they were just people being paid by US basically there. And there was 
a huge human rights outcry: ‘ah the terrible, repressive regime in Cuba,’ blah, blah […] 
then Human Rights Watch, and those other organisations linked to Washington— 
including Amnesty International, by the way—went for Cuba and they went for Chavez.  
[…] I’d spent years investigating, you know, the fakery of Amnesty international and 
Human Rights Watch against Venezuela and Cuba. And there were issues against Chavez 
for a number of years, and they just called him everything that’s just invented stuff, they 
started to do the same thing about Gaddafi in Libya. And the same thing about Assad in 
Syria, the same stuff. 
Tony describes these human rights organisations as ‘going for’ Cuba and ‘going for’ Chávez: 
as organisations placed to discredit—injure—with no moral base, rightfully elected 
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governments. In his eyes, what he understands as their ‘agenda,’ and their ‘links to 
Washington’ completely discredits them. Allegations related to drug trafficking were similarly 
not countered or even discussed—presumably because they are felt as irrelevant or tangential 
to the ‘Hybrid War’ being waged.42  
This distrust of Human Rights organisations, shared by most activists, is expounded in the pro-
government English online newspaper, venezuelanalysis.com: Tamara Pearson writes, “Latest 
Human Watch Report: 30 Lies about Venezuela” (January 23 2014); Nino Pagliccia, more 
recently writes, “UN Report on Human Rights in Venezuela Faulty by Design” 
(venezuelanalysis.com July 8 2019). The second article criticising the UN report alludes to the 
view of a former lawyer for the UN High Commission, Alfred de Zayas, who argued that it is 
methodologically flawed (although he does not explain in which ways) and more significantly 
that the report indeed ignores mentioning the severity of US sanctions (Wilpert 2019).43 
The role the US has historically played in the region, particularly in Chile but also Nicaragua, 
has tied the defence of human rights (at least what regards civil liberties) to what Dan Kovalik 
called the ‘imperial hubris’ of the United States.44 The accusation is not new, and without 
fundament. Several scholars argue “human rights” have been the “chosen battlefield of US 
worldwide propaganda”(Heuer and Schirmer 1998, 5). For Rieff, human rights in the 1990s have 
indeed been “an organising principle for action,” similar to how anticommunism propelled the 
Cold War (Rieff 1999, 1). Rieff (1999, 2) notes how the interventions in Somalia meant to protect 
 
42 In April 2020, in one of VSC’s online events, and after Maduro was indicted by the US government for 
narco-trafficking, the speaker who was briefing on the situation, Francisco Domínguez, explained to the 
audience how he felt that the drug allegations were false, because Venezuela does not produce cocaine—
Colombia does. The allegations are about transport and involvement in sales, not production, but it seemed 
Domínguez was not aware of this.  
43 The allusion to sanctions could explain the violation of food rights—yet it does not counter, as I 
mentioned, negative obligations, understood as the state’s role in guaranteeing and protecting civil and 
political rights. 
44 This was at a talk Kovalik gave for the Venezuelan Solidarity Campaign (VSC) in London (March 2020) 
promoting his book The Plot to overthrow Venezuela (2019). 
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civilians in a failed state, and the alleged prevention of genocide in Kosovo, were “a realist’s 
hypermoralization [sic] of international political action”—illegal under the UN charter and 
invoking an “ad hoc assemblage of moral-humanitarian claims” that set the course for 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Branch 2005, 103; De Sousa Santos 2008; Nardin 2005; Moyn 2010). 
Douzinas (2007, 7) argues instead that human rights—legal remedies protecting the 
individual—reinforce oppression by serving to criticise ideologies that challenge geopolitical 
power structures, whilst acting as “bargaining chips” for aid. From fieldwork in slums of the 
global south, Davis argues more broadly that all NGOs are top-down, unelected, answer only 
to their donors, and come at the expense of the true needs of local communities (Davis 2004).  
The arguments made by these scholars, no doubt difficult to ignore, demand deep 
consideration. But, in the case of solidarity activists, given movements around human rights 
arguably flourished from the International Left’s campaigns against Pinochet’s brutal 
repression of political and civil rights in the 70s alongside Amnesty International (see Kelly 
2013), it seems contradictory that many of these same activists are willing to justify their 
dismissal of major claims of political and civil rights violations in Venezuela today simply 
because Venezuela has a socialist government. Can the inherent issues with American moral 
discourse automatically mean we can dismiss the claims of political torture and repression 
made by the UNCHR, the OAS, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, in 
Venezuela or elsewhere? 
We can argue that the expertise of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and their 
formal knowledge correspond to a more valid interpretation of the situation of human rights 
in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, among many other countries, but for solidarity activists, 
defending the Chavista governments against US interests and defending what they believe are 
the economic and social rights ‘the people’ have gained with Chávez, seems to trump whatever 
can be claimed of the government’s repressive persecution of detractors and crimes against 
humanity. Their point is that it is those against President Maduro—both within Venezuela’s 
confines and beyond—that have historically committed human rights violations against 
populations in Venezuela and around the world.  
Kelly (2013, 168) suggests that, for those involved in Chile solidarity, the idea of human rights 
was “primarily a means to talk about the suffering and victimisation of families and 
compatriots” —it was never truly about human rights. This is convincing to a degree. It can 
easily be concluded that the fact political torture and repression in Pinochet’s government 
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stood initially as central to solidarity activism, and now lays dismissed, these activists are more 
concerned with promoting their political agenda than a human rights agenda. However, I do 
believe this argument assumes a simplistic allegiance to ideology, and ignores the complexity 
involved in justifying political choices to oneself and others—even if the choice is itself largely 
pre-determined, or instinctual. Assuming solidarity activists share a blind allegiance to 
ideology misses what is genuinely meaningful about taking a stance in a political divide, or 
what could account for the motivation to take it in the first place—what I argue is behind the 
idea of ‘doing what is right’ or ‘solidarity,’ in Žižek’s (1989) terms, the real power of ‘ideology.’  
Many solidarity activists sacrifice aspects of their professional careers for maintaining this 
political position (as discussed earlier). Dismissing this behaviour as adherence to political 
dogma, is a way to rob solidarity activists’ decision of meaning. That is not to say that they are 
not blindly adhering to their political beliefs in praxis—their ‘solidarity’ could be, in fact, the 
product of an irrational binding to their political identity, or social beliefs, or indeed a number 
of different unconscious processes hard to isolate or determine. What I mean to say here is 
that, regardless of what spikes their behaviour, solidarity activists’ justification for it, before 
themselves and others, is entirely deontological, i.e. a moral (and therefore meaningful) 
mandate. As is the justification for intervention that Venezuelan migrants defend, from the 
other side of the divide.  
Activists give priority to the belief that fighting imperialism is more important than fighting 
political repression, in other words, they have a hierarchical or prioritised ‘folk theory’ of 
human rights, where ‘some rights are more equal than others.’ Venezuelan migrants, similarly, 
felt the government’s behaviour towards those that criticise it, its extrajudicial executions, its 
war against the press, and its banning of leaders of the opposition, the way it has dealt with the 
crisis, merit either foreign or domestic military intervention—intervention that would no 
doubt lead to further violation of human rights. For Marcos, as discussed in the last chapter, it 
even justified the mass killing of those he sees as ‘communists.’  
Venezuelans’ contradiction of wanting military intervention to stop President Maduro’s 
crimes against humanity (declared as such by the UN in September 2020), not incidentally, 
speaks to the paradox of human rights intervention more broadly (including controversies 
around the International Criminal Court in Africa) that Branch (2011) references in his work 
on Uganda and the Acholi people. Branch (2011, 181-182) highlights the “inherent dilemmas” in 
trying to realise universal moral imperatives under political contexts—justice seeking that 
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builds as it were (and as mentioned in the context of Adorno, Butler and Schmitt) “enemies of 
humanity.” Using the case of Uganda, Branch argues convincingly that intervention generally 
fails to prevent the violations of human rights it purports to, and indeed many times 
exacerbates civilian suffering (Branch 2011, 182). 
It is easy to understand the need to fight for individual freedoms, in the case of Venezuelan 
migrants, and the need to fight for social justice and equality, in the case of solidarity activists: 
these fights are not mutually exclusive in theory but appear so as political systems become 
increasingly polarised through a moral and demonising logic. It seems that in the Venezuelan 
case the human rights paradox lies on both sides of the divide: either violent intervention or a 
totalitarian state are, depending on the side, seen as evils acceptable in the name of the 
purported ‘greater good’ of dismantling or maintaining Chavismo in power and, therefore, 
expanding certain preferred rights.  
This, I believe, actually raises an important question about how social concepts live in the 
public sphere, i.e. as ‘folk theories’—detached from our legal and academic conceptual 
debates. The more robust definition of human rights as universal and indivisible—a definition 
that withstands arduous theoretical probing—does not live so plainly in the political sphere 
where groups see some rights as ‘more equal than others’ in an Orwellian sense. There is wide 
acceptance for human rights and democracy. Both are seen as inherently ‘desirable,’ and 
‘good,’ but the broad reach of their definitions means exactly what is good about them is 
contested. The Venezuelan divide is thus not a question of divergence of values, but rather a 
divergence of value priorities and age-old parochialisms. In other words, it is eristic: a conflict 
for the sake of conflict, not a dialectical project for arriving at the ‘truth,’ or at least something 






What do you think of Hugo Chávez? Are you for or against him? Venezuelans inevitably 
confront these questions when we travel or meet people unfamiliar with our ideas. Unless 
one stands at one of the two opposite poles dominating political life in Venezuela during 
this last decade, it is hard to answer them. A generalized [sic] Manichean mind-set tends 
to push and flatten every position towards the extreme ends and nuanced views are often 
dismissed or cast aside as camouflaged versions of either pole (Coronil 2008, 3). 
Summary 
I was deeply interested in understanding what justifications felt more valid or appealing to each 
of the two sides of Venezuela’s divide, taking a ‘social subjective’ Weberian understanding of 
legitimacy. Specifically, I hoped to look at how sides made sense of Venezuela’s crisis and what 
emotions underlay their political ‘positions,’ seeing them as central to their rationale and 
rejection of the other. These are, as Coronil (2008) writes, so entrenched—and Manichean, in 
other words, moralised—that any attempt at a nuanced view is derided. Consequently, so is 
rapprochement or the idea of negotiation. In some extreme cases, the morality of the issue 
justified violence, even extermination. 
Interestingly, the conceptual debates exposed by participants, more specifically on democracy, 
race, ‘the people,’ and human rights, are in many ways similar to the theoretical debates that 
plague the literature. Part of what the analysis shows is that concepts—regardless of the ways 
theorists purport to argue for them—‘exist’ discursively in shared political positions; that is, as 
‘lay political philosophy’—many times highly contradictory in its parochial nature. In 
refraining from arguing for one particular understanding of a concept over another, I sought 
to show how ideas about the political world in the public sphere, co-opted by populist logic, 
make them seem opposed to one another, and how they come to have profound effects over the 
lives of those I spoke to.  
Political power felt legitimate to my interviewees when it was enacted, in their judgement 
‘morally’; conversely it was illegitimate when it was enacted ‘immorally.’ In this sense, 
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legitimacy for these groups is not simply the extent to which a government abides to the law—
in a Rawlsian understanding—but rather the extent to which they believe it engages in what 
they each consider proper moral conduct, i.e., in the interest of the collective (for solidarity 
activists); by respecting political, civil rights and human rights more broadly (for Venezuelan 
migrants). Both groups remain ‘in solidarity’ with Venezuela to the extent that they appear 
concerned with the suffering and hardships Venezuelans face: one group blames the 
government for it; the other the US.  
Interviewees did not speak of policy in terms of its efficacy: groups were invested in a 
discussion relating to the immoral qualities (and failures) of their opponents and defending 
the position that felt ‘right’ to them, based on the knowledge they thought valid. For the two 
groups, the legitimacy of Maduro’s governance—their position—was not ‘political’ but more 
meaningfully, a deontological issue related to the concept of ‘solidarity,’ i.e. a sense of duty to 
‘engage with what is right,’ using the idea of ‘the people’ as the victim of wrongs. This I contend 
is where populism theory becomes relevant. Populism is not committed to an ideology, it is 
committed to a moral political project, as many authors have noted. 
I argued that for solidarity activists, legitimate power is that which stands in the name of (or 
directly represents) ‘a people’—in this case a previously excluded racialised dark-skinned and 
poor majority. There are two related elements to this conception: a ‘democratic’ understanding 
that sees ‘majority’ rule as legitimate, but also a ‘moral’ understanding, that see ‘rightness’ and 
therefore legitimacy, in the discursive empowerment of those living under unjust racial and 
class disadvantage—i.e. in a purported correction of injustice through dispossession of power 
from a corrupt elite, what I term ‘historical-racial’ moral logic. This is not legitimacy seen in 
terms of how lower income groups are de facto ‘served,’ but rather whether they are perceived 
to be ‘in power.’ Solidarity activists’ support is bolstered by the US’ immediate endorsement 
of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s self-proclaimed president, the harsh (and for 
Idriss Jazairy, the UN Special Rapporteur, illegal) sanctions it has imposed on the country, its 
past interventionist behaviour in the region, and President Trump’s disclosure that he would 
consider military action in Venezuela. In this regard, the group’s ‘solidarity’—their 
engagement in political activity relating to Venezuela—is antagonistic, inasmuch as it is 




Conversely, for Venezuelan migrants Maduro’s government felt illegitimate because it was 
seen as criminal, repressive, authoritarian, intimately tied to narco-trafficking, and deeply 
corrupt. Again, this conception implies two understandings of legitimacy: one that sees 
Maduro as both unpopular, and intolerant of dissent, and therefore ‘undemocratic’ and 
‘imposed’; and one that sees Maduro as ‘morally’ corrupt, and therefore unfit to govern, 
represent, or decide on their behalf. ‘Solidarity’ for Venezuelan migrants is reflected in the way 
they raise funds to send medicines, or organise events to raise awareness—again 
antagonistically, seeing its purpose is to foment outrage against the government. I note 
Venezuelan migrants ‘distance’ themselves in several facets of their lives: they seek 
geographical distance from their country by leaving, in physical terms; they seek political 
distance by escaping Maduro’s governmentality; and finally, more radically, they seek ‘moral 
distance’ from those they have left behind—‘the people’ more broadly (not only Chavistas). 
Importantly, both groups ‘feel’ Nietzsche’s ressentiment. For Venezuelan migrants, it is the 
Chávez and Maduro governments that ‘force’ them to leave Venezuela, as I discuss in chapter 
8. In practice, the opposition does not have a voice in policy matters, nor can it effectively 
protest. For solidarity activists, it is the hegemony of neoliberalism, embodied by the US and 
its foreign policy, that they feel belittles their ideals and curtails their career opportunities. 
Both groups feel slighted in relation to their autonomy: using the terms of Self-Determination 
Theory discussed in chapter 4, that is, the degree to which they feel they can endorse their own 
behaviour. This, it seems, makes them feel especially ‘powerless,’ and if we take Spruyt, 
Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck's (2016) finding seriously, vulnerable to populist logics and 
attitudes. 
Theoretical contributions 
I resist concluding that what I witness in these groups is merely a clash of value priorities as a 
result of geography. The analysis does indeed suggest that such a clash exists, but it exists in 
Venezuela, too.  
I find that the underlying similarities in both groups’ broader rationale make a more 
compelling argument for the appeal of populism. The groups’ exaltation of democracy as the 
most legitimate form of government, the privileging of certain facts over others, the 
significance of ‘the people’ in their political discourse, and each group’s feeling of ‘loss of 
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political voice’ or autonomy in their respective settings, are all significant to the extent that 
they are reproduced in both facets of the divide. The most salient of these logics seems to be, of 
course, the framing of the conflict in meaningful moral, rather than, political terms—
specifically in a bid to demonise ‘the other,’ many times as ‘uncaring.’  
I note how some solidarity activists were sacrificing career opportunities for holding a political 
position on Venezuela. To understand their support as the result of ‘brainwashing,’ (as many 
Venezuelan migrants seem to suggest) or, as Kelly (2013) argues, a will to promote ideology, 
neglects what is highly compelling about sustaining political (qua moral) positions in the face 
of significant opposition. Hence why I argue morality seems to matter a great deal. The 
‘transcendence’ of what is ‘good’ above the (material) advancement of careers, for instance, 
solidifies a specific enhanced sense of group and self (as Foucault might suggest) that is 
rewarding and also contravenes mainstream ideas of success (see Lamont 2000).  
I also argued ‘immorality,’ in the Venezuelan case, was not simply embodied by those who 
directly exercise political power, as Urbinati (2019) and C. W. Mills (2000 [1956]) claim when 
looking at populism and elites respectively. Even if we always instinctively distrust those in 
power, as Machiavelli argues, in justifying the immorality of others (including those in power) 
there are specific ‘wrongs’ that we seek to highlight. For solidarity activists, the legitimacy of 
Chávez’s and Maduro’s governance is rationalised not merely from the belief in its numbers—
its democratic pedigree—but also from its (purported) reversal of a historical-racial and class 
injustice (that bears evidence). The resulting expulsion of the opposing faction is understood 
as ‘moral’ given those opposed to the progress of ‘the people’ are seen as immoral, undeserving, 
even treasonous. Conversely the illegitimacy of Maduro for Venezuelan migrants, stems from 
his government’s immorality: its continuous violation of human rights, its ties to narco-
trafficking, its electoral tampering, and its exorbitant corruption (claims that also bear 
evidence). Their forced removal is also justified, in their eyes. 
Second, the two groups also present each other— not only those that ‘hold power’— as immoral 
and ‘uncaring.’ This suggests populism does not only make moral judgements about those in 
power, as these authors want to argue, it makes a moral judgement about ‘the other,’ point blank. 
Populists, lest we forget, are many times in power themselves.  
In the empirical chapters, I tried to deconstruct these prevailing stereotypes by showing how 
they respond to an essentialised idea of the other that locates political positions on a moral 
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plane. For solidarity activists the opposition is mantuano (white-settler class), it is anti-
democratic/violent/racist, also right-wing. For Venezuelan migrants, solidarity activists are 
ignorant, they are paid by the government, and they are blinded by their ideology. For both 
groups, the other is fundamentally ‘uncaring,’ ‘negligent,’ which as I discuss in chapter 4, is a 
negative moral judgement that signals the other as inherently unempathetic—a trait that, 
when taking an evolutionary view is the most prejudicial to the group. If there is something 
that these interviewees show, on the contrary, is that both activists and migrants, appear to care 
immensely about Venezuela. 
It is in this moralising respect centred on a battle to represent the ‘legitimate’ people that I 
characterise Venezuela’s divide as ‘populist.’ By engaging in a discussion on legitimacy, 
morality, and populism, I tried to explain in chapter 4, how this research contributes to 
understanding the particular appeal of moral logic in populist politics—an aspect of populism 
widely accepted as one of its principal tenets—but either assumed to be appealing per se or 
hardly scrutinised. I also argued for an abstract understanding of populism as a logic or 
rationale, taking from Laclau (2007) that polarises the political sphere both domestic and 
transnational. 
In understanding the relationship between morality and political power, Sayer (2005) suggests 
that “without morality, any politics is directionless—as capable of increasing oppression as 
reducing it.” But I would argue, on the contrary, that even with “morality,” politics is as capable 
of increasing oppression as reducing it—the moral indignation, against the treatment of 
Germans by Poles before WW2, sustaining Nazi propaganda, is a case in point.  
To avoid this pitfall, I highlight specific aspects of moral logic (or in Giner-Sorolla’s 2012 term 
‘moralisation’) vis-a-vis morality that helps explain how it ‘sticks’ using Ahmed’s (2004) 
phrasing. Moral logic: 
1. is parochial, or “defensive” and highly emotional (Giner-Sorolla 2012, 18), as is of 
course, populism; 
2. it serves to strengthen divides by drawing moral boundaries, seen as absolute; 
3. it enforces the idea of the moral superiority of the in-group, enhancing the 
concept of group and self, thus providing emotional certainty;  
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4. it claims morality’s universality as transcendent, and therefore ‘true,’ which 
makes it particularly meaningful;  
5. it helps to reinforce values that are seen as constituent of the self, and therefore 
provides certainty; 
6. it is conditional, i.e., it calls out for indignation and exclusion based on lack of 
reciprocity (what Elster calls quasi-moral values, not incidentally, aspects of 
morality we share with primates);  
7. it is essentialising, meaning that it characterises subjects, rather than actions, in 
moral terms. 
Morality, if we take a moral philosophical quasi-Kantian understanding, is on the other hand 
almost impossibly exacting. It applies to everyone universally, in other words, without specific 
regards to whatever it is ‘they’ have ‘done’—a prime example being the universal declaration 
of human rights.  
This moral logic is evinced in the contradictions that result from participants’ judgements of 
others. Solidarity activists for instance blame opposition for being coup-mongers; yet defend 
and admire Chávez’s coup in 1992. They also worked to defend political rights in Pinochet’s 
Chile, together with Amnesty international; but today find that Amnesty’s allegations against 
Maduro’s government are excuses aimed at dismantling the government. They stand for anti-
imperialism and sovereignty, but are willing to accept the intervention of Russia and China, 
given they fight for multi-polarity. Venezuelan migrants, similarly, feel offended that solidarity 
activists have opinions on Venezuela without having lived there, but can praise, or at least 
accept the opinions of others who have not lived there, provided they agree with them on 
Venezuela’s crisis. Some Venezuelan migrants make claims against repression, but are willing 
to accept intervention—some even desire the extermination of the other allegedly to spare 
‘more suffering.’ I note these contradictions—some which caused deep moral indignation to 
participants—were mentioned by interviewees when speaking of ‘the other’; not surprisingly 
contradictions within their own position were rarely if ever acknowledged.  
I have noted above that, under this antagonistic pull, acts are seen as embodying immorality. 
In other words, for both groups, actors do not commit immoral acts, rather acts are committed 
by immoral actors. Actions are seen as determinate of an immovable moral character. This 
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reasoning works, and is particularly meaningful, given it is drawn on what are understood as 
universal principles. Essentialising, or determining the ‘nature’ of another, is a type of ‘folk 
sociology’: ‘nature’ is seen as predictive of the future behaviour of the other. Once this 
essentialising takes place, actors stop questioning the assumptions implicit in their positions, 
and assume moral ‘rightness,’ understood as absolute, and reaffirming of the in-group, and 
therefore self. Despite any criticisms they might share of a leader, no participant questioned 
or doubted their own political qua moral position. We might ‘use’ moral logic as a tool to 
reason about our political position initially, but not on a recurring evaluative basis, were it to 
need re-adjusting. (Which is why, I note, some scholars argue reasoning does not come prior 
to emotion). Once those positions reaffirm what we believe about our group and ourselves, 
they become entrenched. This entrenchment is consonant with neuroscientific accounts that 
highlight the role of emotion in resisting change to one’s beliefs, as doing so incurs in 
significant cognitive load (Kaplan et al. 2016), and psychological uncertainty (Giner-Sorella 
2012).  
Emotional certainty of the group and self, is instead gained by holding a superior moral 
position—understood as transcendent and ‘true.’ This appears to be at least one of the most 
appealing aspects of populist politics, particularly for those feeling most vulnerable in society. 
It makes rapprochement intolerable, insofar as opponents are seen as enemies, and not 
legitimate political adversaries, with a right to hold a contrary opinion. I note that these 
dynamics become especially tricky in the populist sphere, an environment when everyone 
assumes they are abiding the ‘truth’; not holding opinions. 
Taking from several sociologists, I have also noted how integrating reflexivity and highlighting 
the role of experience helps broaden the explanatory power of Bourdieu’s habitus in 
addressing the moral dimensions of sociality—despite the fact Bourdieu himself famously 
overlooked it. I lastly also suggested an interdisciplinary approach in tackling issues of 
morality.  
Epistemology, divides and democracy 
I contend here that both groups make moral judgements of the other based on specific (and 
contested) knowledges and epistemologies—notions of what counts as valid knowledge to 
justify their beliefs of the other’s immorality—not simply because they sense that elites are ‘by 
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nature’ corrupt, or because they fear what power ‘can’ do. Participants refer to specific news, 
highlight certain events, and point at data they have come across. Although we could be 
inclined to believe that they are simply justifying something that they already feel more 
instinctively, this was not the way the groups’ political positions were ultimately ‘reasoned’ or 
understood, and therefore, justified.  
Specifically in the empirical chapters 5-7, on democracy, race, and the people, I described how 
divides seem strengthened or structured by epistemological ideas: our understanding of what 
we feel counts as sufficient or ‘valid’ evidence to agree or disagree with a position— 0ur belief 
in certain media outlets, or the credibility and methodology of certain institutions. Venezuelan 
migrants were sceptical of news outlets in Venezuela given how they feel auto-censorship has 
played out. They also ignore the role the sanctions have played in the crisis because they 
believe these are excuses made by a government unwilling to accept responsibility. César, an 
afro-Venezuelan, dismissed racism as a discursive device of the government. Solidarity 
activists were, similarly, highly sceptical of any information being presented by the 
international media, international NGOs, even the United Nations, given that, in their 
understanding, these institutions are under the aegis of the US.  
I note an inverse, albeit imperfect, analogy that helps explain the significance of this 
epistemology in divides—our social understanding of which knowledges are valid—the 
scientific method. Scientists aim to arrive at the only plausible interpretation of an observed 
event, and to understand a specific phenomenon to such a degree they are able to manipulate, 
or even predict an outcome to a statistically significant degree. In order to achieve this, and 
replicate the results, an epistemological culture surrounds science’s practice, a method, 
whereby others—at least for the moment—can arrive at the same interpretation. Put very 
bluntly, the smaller the range of plausible interpretations, the higher their explicative value. 
Scientists know exactly how to achieve the “state of no dissent until proven differently” 
amongst their peers by following the scientific method that underpins their epistemological 
culture. Their peers may come with completely different life-stories, an entirely different 
‘positionalities’, and yet the method is such that few prejudices can restrict arriving at a 
consensus in the interpretation of what has been observed.  
The epistemological consensus of science adverts to the fundamental importance, conversely, 
of pluralism in democracy—as no such epistemology could ever be imposed upon people’s 
lived experience. This would undermine every understanding we conceivably hold of human 
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dignity. Lack of consensus in what stands as ‘truth’—regarding power and the political—
emanates from each person’s unique constitution as ‘political subject,’ in other words their 
unique manner of meaning-making in politics, as I discuss in chapter 1, both social and 
idiosyncratic. As such, theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe (and Schmitt before them) 
understand antagonism as that which inescapably constitutes the political.  
In looking at their contested epistemologies, the only conclusion that can be made is that no 
group has the ultimate claim to ‘truth’ on Venezuela, despite what they each hope to argue. 
We understand and frame issues from within our own position and are therefore limited in 
the ways we can understand, even view, such complex issues—myself included. Yet, we are all 
entitled to a position—it is hard to argue against this. This is in fact the principal reason we see 
democracy as both legitimate and moral—above any other reason. We only feel an ‘other’ 
“loses” entitlement to an opinion when moral logic builds an essentialising, immovable enmity 
on the basis of immorality. Competing political interests—agonism—is not only desirable, it 
is the pillar on which democracy is built, as Laclau (2007) and Mouffe (2000) argue: each side 
has to want to prevail. This does not mean that tolerance cannot exist (see Jeison’s comment 
below); taking from Wittgenstein (1953, 88), “agreements in forms of life” necessarily precede 
any agreement of opinion. We must see opponents as legitimate adversaries, i.e., worthy of our 
respect, if we mean to avoid the radical and visceral aspects of Venezuela’s divide.  
Future research  
One of the questions this research is not able to address, is what solidarity means to the actual 
recipients of solidarity—the unions, the communal councils in Venezuela. To better 
understand the phenomenon of North-South solidarity, we would need more insight into how 
the ties with those on the ground are built and sustained. Not all activists had ties on the 
ground, but they had attended or hosted events where they met Venezuelan labour union 
leaders that were visiting—whom they referred to as their comrades.  
Similarly, how the positions and divisions in the country relate to the transnational ones 
explored in this thesis require further investigation, given the information gathered here relies 
very bluntly on polls, and not in-depth interviews.  
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In terms of the analysis, the idea of positionality itself—to describe a relation to a particular 
movement, leader or party (rather than ideology)—needs to be examined in other contexts. Is 
it possible to argue that as divides and populisms take hold, we come to see politics as positions 
against or for specific groups, rather than as support for ideas or ideologies, or our placement 
on the left-right spectrum? Work in other contemporary contexts would be needed. 
The research also points at a hierarchical understanding of human rights that needs further 
probing. The historical tension between economic, social and cultural rights on the one hand, 
and political and civil rights on the other, is fascinating to the extent that it is replicated in 
everyday discourse. Specifically, it is unclear if certain human rights are always prioritised or 
if they are prioritised under certain constraints or under the pull of populism or ideology. 
There is a clear need for more sociological research on morality as a directing element in social 
life. As I noted in chapter 1, what I can conclude about gender in this investigation is limited. It 
would, no doubt, be interesting to understand gendered aspects of morality as studied in moral 
psychology. For example, as I mentioned in chapter 8, Gillian’s (1982) study showed that 
women find it easier to take the perspective of another, and this finding is partly reflected here. 
It would also be interesting to see if there are indeed gendered aspects to supporting the 
revolutionary international left, related more specifically to masculinity. 
To further develop the idea of historical-racial morality here proposed, further examination is 
required in other contexts where it might be at play: for instance, in the solidarity work with 
apartheid in South Africa, or in the solidarity work with the North, in the US civil war—even 
in the arguments proposed by the Nazis prior to the war. There is a latent ethnicisation in all 
populisms, pointed at by Urbinati (2019) also see Subbiah forthcoming (2020), relating to moral 
ideas, that warrants deeper reflection. 
Concluding remarks 
The contradiction-laden moral arguments, the sense that both sides are ‘apologetic’ towards 
those who share their stance, and the internal criticism of leadership, suggests that the main 
ontological concern of Venezuela’s divide is not the legitimacy of the government—although 
my initial question is framed this way. Each group seems to be insistent on sustaining a moral 
version of themselves, as framed by the populist sphere in which they operate.  
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This I note, is incredibly hard to contravene. Divides are in fact “empathy walls,” obstacles to 
a “deep understanding of another person, one that can make us feel indifferent or even hostile 
to those who hold different beliefs or whose childhood is rooted in different circumstances,” 
writes Arlie Hochschild (2016, 9) in looking at embedded anger in the American Right. Coronil 
(2008, 3) calls it “the rule of the stereotype”: an inescapable mutual demonisation, that as he 
notes, and I have confirmed in this research, has broken friendships and divided families. 
I argue here that any divide’s strength lies, in part, in its ability to convince us that we already 
‘know’ the other—in an essential moral way. Such is the distance that groups were seeking 
from each other that only one interviewee advocated for tolerance: Jeison, a 37-year-old brown 
pop-singer now living in Mexico. Jeison supported Chávez initially, his father still lives in 
Venezuela and strongly supports Maduro. Perhaps from this more intimate understanding of 
the support for a project he has now abandoned, Jeison tells me: 
I still defend that tolerance must exist, because Chávez became president for a reason: the 
conduct of thinking that the poor are garbage and must be trampled. That is why s**t like 
what happened in Venezuela, happens. That people revolt, and a crazy person like that 
becomes president. Because they’re sick of being marginalised, of not having the same 
opportunities that we had, of having a really high level of education. But that does not 
mean that we cannot not say that ‘what is happening now is s**t.’  
I found it interesting that others, with Chavista family members (parents, grandparents or 
siblings) did not come to the same conclusion. These interviewees do not see their family 
members as enemies (they see them as either ‘stupid’ or ‘intransigent’). As a result, they 
inaugurate a reign of “no politics at home” (see Coronil 2008, 3). To the extent that these 
political divides cut across close family groups, it seems that specific life experiences or 
idiosyncrasies (rather than broader moral systems inculcated in the family as Lakoff 1996 
argues) make certain positions feel more valid than others. 
From my side, understanding the crisis as a ‘spectrum’ of blame, between the Venezuelan 
Chavista government, and US economic warfare, has been useful in allowing me to converse 
and engage with both groups, and more importantly empathise, as I have noted, with their 
sense of injury—a Rorty (1996) inspired form of solidarity. I understand both the devastating 
effects of the government’s highly inadequate policies, the degree of its unpopularity, and at 
the same time the, albeit new, but no doubt grave effects of the US sanctions.  
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A final question I pose is, can we say ‘solidarity’ with Venezuela is unproblematic? In other 
words, are there ethical implications to sustaining Venezuela solidarity, as Venezuelan 
migrants want to argue, given the government has committed fragrant violations of universal 
human rights and crimes against humanity? Are they fighting or helping to perpetuate 
structural inequalities with their support? Answering these questions would be the equivalent 
of falling into the value-laden trap Max Weber adverts sociology should stay clear from. Yet 
not answering it, risks being labelled as apologetic. 
Changing the political system from the outside is looking increasingly insurmountable for the 
Venezuelan opposition— especially if, as some scholars argue, the Maduro government veers 
towards what Linz and Stepan (1996, 44) call ‘sultanism’: a regime where “all individuals, 
groups, and institutions are permanently subject to the unpredictable and despotic 
intervention” of those in charge, and “all pluralism is precarious.” Under the Linz and Stepan 
paradigm, Venezuela is still in many ways somewhere between totalitarianism and post-
totalitarianism (one or two steps away from sultanism). Whether Venezuelan migrants agree 
to it or not, Chavismo is likely to stay (and should stay) as a force in Venezuelan politics—in 
what form, and with what strength, is yet to be seen. It is important that any solutions to the 
Venezuelan conflict are accountable to its institutions and independent from foreign interests 
(as Branch 2011, 243 notes for the Ugandan case). These must be ‘self-determining,’ not only to 
protect sovereignty for the sake of it, but to protect their integrity, were these to be questioned 
in future, by externals or by Venezuelans themselves. Branch (2011) again refers to the 
importance of popular sovereignty, that principal component of democracy, as key in resolving 
these conflicts. An election, deemed fair by all parties, seems to be the best way to proceed. 
Whether it will actually take place, is a different matter entirely, sadly.  
I do feel that Chavismo has been a positive motivational force for community activism and 
organisation in the poorer sectors. The way it has opened a discussion on racism will be 
positive in the long run. The situation now seems too antagonised to allow for proper reflection 
beyond political bickering. Unfortunately, Chavismo’s articulation of the wrongs of Punto Fijo 
has lost moral force after 20 years in power, even when US sanctions are profoundly harmful. 
For scholars interested in measuring impact, there are strong reasons to believe —importantly, 
the rise in delinquency—that many structural aspects of poverty were never properly 
countered (Smilde 2017). If we are to take what the UNHRC (2019; 2020) reports suggest at face 
value, I find it necessary to remain highly doubtful of Maduro’s political performance—
especially towards the most vulnerable communities. I also feel sceptical of his claim to 
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legitimacy based on how contested the last elections have been, how the special forces (FAES) 
have acted, and how opponents have been incarcerated. I still find no reason to believe military 
intervention can be justified. Which leaves us in a dire position, at least in the foreseeable 
future. 
With regards to the question I have just proposed, I note that if solidarity activists are raising 
funds to help those in communal councils, it is unfair to say they are not playing a positive role 
for Venezuelans. If Venezuelan migrants are involved in raising funds to provide medicines to 
the hardest hit communities, they are also, clearly, playing a positive role. The issue of 
legitimacy, of course, remains. But it need not, necessarily, distract from the greater ideal of 
solidarity which is to work to help Venezuelans tackle the problems they face today. Part of 
the answer to Venezuela’s conflict then, as López Maya (in an interview with Prieto 2020) 
suggests, involves working to countermine the difficulties that Venezuelans face today, and, in 
my view, help build and sustain the ‘on the ground’ networks and grass-roots efforts required 
to strengthen Venezuelans’ democratic values. This in the hope that when elections do come, 




















         
 
 




This PhD research is looking at transnational Solidarity Movements with the Bolivarian Revolu-
tion. I am interviewing political activists here in the UK, some in Spain, some in the U.S. and am 
especially interested in the difficult opposition they have had to face in their home countries 
(and in Venezuela, when they've been), and also the inspiration behind their love for Venezuela 






1. I was wondering what inspired you, or motivated you to be involved 
with Venezuela? 
 
2. What have been the most rewarding aspects of your work with 
supporting and researching Venezuela and Venezuela’s revolution? 
 
3. Have you encountered any difficulties because of this support? Or 
extreme dissidence? 
 
4. How would you describe President Chávez’s leadership, or your 
relationship with him, if you had the chance to speak with him? 
 
5. Do you have any interesting stories to tell about times that you 
have seen him/ met him/spoke to him? Or about times that you have been 
in Venezuela, and how those times have inspired you? 
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PhD Candidate, Gates Cambridge Scholar 
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Senior Lecturer in Sociology  
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Fellow in Social Sciences, Downing College 
 


















This PhD research is looking at transnational Solidarity Movements with the Bolivarian 
Revolution. I am interested in looking at how Venezuelans living abroad perceive, feel 
and think about these activist groups internationally, as well as trace the reasons for 





1. How long ago did you leave Venezuela?  
 
2. How has this change affected you personally?  
 
3. Are you happy/dissatisfied with your move?  
 
4. Do you feel you have migrated for political reasons? Or mostly economic reasons?  
 
5. Are you still a supporter of the Bolivarian Revolution? If not, were you at some point? If 
yes, has this changed because of Maduro?  
 
6. I will read out several quotes, by activists of the Bolivarian revolution, that are not Vene-
zuelans, tell me what you feel and think about them.  
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Study: Narratives of Solidarity from Abroad 
 
Researcher: Parvathi Subbiah (pas89@cam.ac.uk) 
PhD Candidate, Gates Cambridge Scholar Department of Politics and International Studies Cen-
tre for Latin American Studies 
 
Supervised by: Monica Moreno-Figueroa (mm2051@cam.ac.uk) 
Senior Lecturer in Sociology 
University of Cambridge 
Fellow in Social Sciences, Downing College 
 
Funded by: Gates Cambridge Trust 
______ 
 
I confirm that I understand the purposes of the study and have had the opportunity to ask the 
researcher (Parvathi Subbiah) any questions that I might have. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, with-
out giving reason. 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
I agree to the interview / focus group being audio recorded. Y / N  
 
I agree to the use of quotes in publications. Y / N 
 
 














Appendix B.  
1. Table of non-Venezuelan solidarity activists cited in the text, with their pseudonyms: 
Pseudonym Age bracket Nationality Perceived Race 
Jose Mid 60s Spanish White 
Ignacio Early 20s Spanish White 
Ricardo Late 30s Spanish White 
Martín Mid 30s Spanish White 
Victoria Mid 30s Spanish White 
Juan Late 60s Spanish White 
Alberto Late 50s Spanish White 
Cameron Late 60s British White 
Sahas Early 30s British British-Asian 
Abdo Mid 30s British/Sudanese Black 
Chris Late 40s British /Spanish Mixed (British-
Asian/White) 
Tim Mid 50s British/South-African White 
Liesel Early 20s British White 
Aaron Early 30s British White 
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Pedro Late 40s British/Chilean White 
James Early 70s British/Canadian White 
Jack Early 20s British Black (Mixed Black-
British/White) 
Andy Late 60s British/Canadian White 
Mack Mid 30s American White 
Chase Late 60s American White 
Tamara Mid 50s American White 
Tony Late 50s Australian White 
Fernando Early 40s Australian/Argentinean White 
Damien Early 30s Australian/Russian White 
Mauro Early 50s Brazilian Moreno (light 
brown) 




2. Table of Venezuelans migrants cited in the text, with their pseudonyms: 
 
Pseudonym Age bracket Country of Residence Perceived Race 
Camila Late 20s England White 
Alicia Early 40s England Morena clara (with 
indigenous 
features) 
Cintia Late 50s England White 
Francisco Mid 50s England White 
Ibrahim Early 40s Perú Moreno claro 
Wilson Early 60s Perú Moreno claro 
Margarita Mid 30s Perú Morena oscura 
Adriana Early 30s Perú Morena clara 
Nelson Early 30s Chile Moreno oscuro 
Hector Late 30s Chile Moreno claro 
Gisela Early 30s Panamá Morena clara 
César Late 30s Moving to Chile Afro-descendent 
Jeison Late 30s Mexico Moreno oscuro 
Eva Early 30s Spain Morena oscura 
Jairo Mid 30s Spain Moreno oscuro 
Pablo Late 50s Japan White 
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Marcos Late 30s Colombia Moreno oscuro 
Jaime Early 40s Colombia Moreno oscuro 
Rosario Early 50s USA White 





Appendix C.  
Computational methods  
The graphs below represent computational textual analysis, done in the R programming language, 
using several different packages.  
Procedure 
I extracted (‘scraped’) all the blog posts published on the website of Hands off Venezuela (HOV) using a 
Python ‘spider,’ built for that specific purpose.  
After collating all the text, I first looked for the most prominent words (Figure 21), and for the most 
prominent phrases (of 2 or 3 words) using the R package ‘udpipe’ (Figure 22).  
Figure 21. Most frequent nouns identified. 
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As the Figure 21. shows, the most prominent words are, unsurprisingly, ‘people,’ ‘revolution’ and 
‘workers.’ Figure 22. Shows how the phrase ‘trade union’ actually appears more frequently than ‘Hugo 
Chávez’ (as discussed in chapter 7). It is also interesting that the ‘United States’ appears in this list, as a 
prominent element against which the discourse is built.  
I ran a sentiment analysis algorithm (in the ‘tidytext’ R package), that uses a Lexicon (specifically the 
NRC lexicon) that associates specific words with 8 specific emotions. Figure 23 shows the most important 
words associated with each of the eight emotions it targets (anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, 
sadness, surprise, trust).  
The algorithm, I found, suggests that ‘revolution’ and ‘socialism/socialist’ are words associated with 
anger, disgust, fear, and sadness—which was completely inaccurate for the group being studied—HOV 
Figure 22. Most frequently used pairs of words or phrases. 
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and anyone from the further left more broadly. ‘Poverty’ is associated with ‘disgust,’ (also definitely not 
true for those involved with HOV) but also with ‘sadness,’ which makes more sense. The only other 
words that appear to be consistent with the interviews, and an interesting find, are ‘delegate’ and ‘united’ 
with trust, and ‘majority’ with joy—a theme described in chapter 5 on democracy.  
The last graph shows the results of applying a machine learning algorithm (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) 
to the group of texts. LDA is useful for summarising large volumes of texts into ‘topics.’ The LDA 
algorithm makes two important assumptions: that every document is a combination of one or more 
topics; and that every topic is a mixture of words (Liske 2018). The concept behind the algorithm is that 
words belonging to a topic appear together in documents. Here I chose 4 topics (after trials with 10, and 
6 topics) and found it was the one that was easiest to interpret. The first topic that the model has 
identified (Topic 1) are words around the Bolivarian revolution itself (process, way, people, workers, 
socialism). Topic 2 is less clear, but we can interpret it as having to do with all forces against ‘the people’: 
Figure 23. NRC Sentiment Analysis showing the 8 most prominent words for each emotion. 
 
342 
opposition, coup, world, media, countries. Topic 3, is webpage jargon, and Topic 4, identifies words that 
have to do with Hands off Venezuela as an organisation.  
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